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WAR, FOOD, *and* POLITICS *in* EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS

G. J. OLIVER

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To
Christel

Preface

The Mouseion fortress was built on the slopes of the peaceful Philopappos Hill from which tourists now take pictures of the iconic Athenian Acropolis. But back in 288/7 BC an aged Athenian politician and general, Olympiodoros, led the youngest and oldest citizens left in the city up those slopes to recapture the fortress that was under Macedonian control. Not a lot of students of ancient history will know this. But this victory was one of the great successes of Athenian history. But why the idiosyncratic assault force? Where was everyone else? The main body of the Athenian army was out in the countryside protecting the harvest. They were led by the principal Athenian general of the time, Phaidros of Sphettos. His brother Kallias had left Athens a long time before and now operated in the entourage of a Hellenistic king, Ptolemy II. At the time Olympiodorus led his Dad's Army up the Mouseion, and Phaidros the main army in Attica, Kallias had come with soldiers to support the Athenians. Grain came from abroad to help sustain the city. This book is about an Athenian history that today most people looking across to the Acropolis from Philopappos will not imagine. But this was not always the case.

War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens deals with a difficult period of history, the late fourth and third century. Much of the third century does not benefit from an ancient source that offers a detailed narrative account. The study of the chronology of the third century is unsettled: the precise year in which some archons served is liable to change as new reconstructions are proposed. The publication of the epigraphical material was, and is, complex and there is great deal to absorb. A series of problems presented themselves when I undertook the programme of doctoral research on which this book is based, but I was fortunate to have the advice of a supervisor (David Lewis) and adviser (Robin Osborne) who were equally comfortable with the evidence and the scope of the project.

The book has taken on the problems of the ancient economy. It deals with familiar themes but tries to put them together in an interesting way. It does not offer a full analysis of any one of these themes—politics, war, the economy, and the grain supply—but tries to look at their interaction. Epigraphy lies at the heart of the book but it does not pretend to be an epigraphical publication. The audience of the book will of course be specialists of Greek and especially Hellenistic history but also, I hope, it will be accessible to non-specialists

who want both to get a feel for the socio-economic history of Athens at this time and to move beyond the narrative.

The book is divided into three parts which consider in turn the economic vulnerabilities of the Athenian polis (Part 1: Chs. 1–3), the impact and responses to warfare in Attica (Part 2: Chs. 4–7), and the institutional and economic modalities which depended on individuals—citizens, non-citizens, and benefactors—to secure the food supply of the polis (Part 3: Chs. 8–9). As far as possible, technical material has been placed in the Appendices, and Indices will allow readers to trace the themes, people, and especially the evidence on which the book is based. A series of maps and plans illustrate the space with which the book deals. I am grateful to Lorraine McEwan of Glasgow University for producing these illustrations.

This book has grown out of doctoral research but its origins lie deeper. As an undergraduate I undertook a study of the archaeology of the Athenian economy in the Classical period. With the support of my undergraduate tutor Simon Price, the advice of Robin Osborne, and the financial support of the 'New initiative in Archaeology' at the University of Oxford, I was able to spend an extended period in Athens where I confronted epigraphy, topography and the rural territory of ancient and modern Attica. A doctoral study and the project itself seemed a natural step. The British Academy funded my doctoral studies and I received financial support from Lady Margaret Hall. A Craven Fellowship allowed me to spend a year in Athens in 1992/3.

The production of the book has benefited from the advice and support of numerous people. The examiners of the doctoral dissertation, Michel Austin and Simon Hornblower, offered a critical readership and in several areas we found agreement in our disagreement. In my subsequent academic career I have enjoyed considerable stability at the University of Liverpool. There I was fortunate enough to have two colleagues, John Davies and Zosia Archibald, who shared similar interests in the economies of the ancient world and Hellenistic history. Liverpool provided an ideal centre that has allowed me the space and stimulation to nurture some of the ideas behind the doctoral project. The School of Archaeology, Classics, and Egyptology and the University of Liverpool have provided financial support for the production of the book. The publication contains some of the doctoral material but has been written and often rewritten over the last three years. During extended research leave funded by the then Arts and Humanities Research Board for the preparation of a new edition of the state decrees of Athens (321–301 BC) for *Inscriptiones Graecae*, I spent some of the final year of that quinquennium (1994–2004) working on this manuscript. More recently, a month in Spring 2006 as Professeur Invité at the École Normale Superieure in Paris gave me the time and library facilities to complete the manuscript. Inevitably a long

list of thanks appears at this moment. My teachers know who they were (F.N.C., J.P.E., A.S.C., I.J.W.) but without them I would never have considered studying in an environment where research in ancient history happened. My undergraduate college tutor and college adviser as a doctoral student, Simon Price, has been a source of great care and encouragement. Tutors at Oxford have taught me a great deal about the ancient world and how to study (the late Peter Derow, Richard Jenkyns, Chris Pelling, and Nicholas Purcell). Robin Osborne was my doctoral adviser and finally acted as supervisor when the dissertation was submitted. This was necessary because of the death of my original supervisor. The late David Lewis never saw the final product of the doctoral research but his influence over three years as supervisor will be felt everywhere. His gentle encouragement, kindness, incredible control of detail, and interest in the wider themes and horizons of ancient history breathed, and still breathes, life into my work.

Oxford brought me friendships and always discussion. Michael Clark was an important figure of encouragement and knowledge. I enjoyed the help of the few doctoral students in Greek history, especially Henri de Marcellus, Tom Harrison, and Niki Makres, in Oxford.

In Athens the British School of Athens, its Directors and Librarian (Penny Wilson) have provided an important and productive environment for research. It was in Athens that I first became familiar with and had the help of a wider international community of academics: I learnt much about Athens and Attica from the Vanderpool gang of John Camp, Merle Langdon, Greg Stanton, John Traill. Directors and staff of the Epigraphical Museum gave me access to material. I have been able to enjoy and benefit from discussion with many people including Ilias Arnaotoglou, Andrew Bayliss, Judith Binder, Glen Bugh, Sean Byrne, Charles Crowther, Jean-Christophe Couvenhes, Pete Fraser, the late Virginia Grace, Christian Habicht, Mogens Hansen, Ioanna Kralli, Stephen Lambert, Peter Liddel, Polly Low, Angelos Matthaiou, Michael Metcalfe, Alfonso Moreno, Josh Ober, Michael Osborne, Katerina Panagopoulou, Nikolaos Papazarkadas, Molly Richardson, P. J. Rhodes, Ron Stroud, Steve Tracy, Larry Tritle.

I have gained enormous support from friends and colleagues. Alan Bowman, Tom Harrison, Simon Hornblower, Chris Mee, Michael Osborne, Robin Osborne, and Simon Price have given me real encouragement to complete the book. Ralph Highnam in Oxford and Phil Freeman in Liverpool have been great friends. My parents have allowed me the space in which to study and my father has in all ways quietly supported my education. My children, Sophia and Misha, have had to tolerate, for a long time now, their father's work; little Arthur arrived to see the book's completion. Christel has made possible the

book's odyssey from thesis to publication via Moscow, Oxford, Athens, Paris, and Liverpool.

Material for this book has been read at different stages. Michael Crawford and Simon Price commented on doctoral material; Chris Howgego gave much advice on coinage. Peter Garnsey and Walter Scheidel provided important feedback on the dissertation. Sean Byrne and Christian Habicht read a draft of the manuscript and pointed out many errors. Two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press made suggestions and improved the book in many ways. The staff at Oxford University Press, Hilary O'Shea, Kathleen McLaughlin, and Jenny Wagstaffe, and the patient copy editor Sylvie Jaffrey, have helped the book through production.

Errors will remain and for these I apologize. The opinions in the book do not necessarily represent those of the people who read and commented on its earlier stages. I will have missed bibliographical items and tried to incorporate material published before May 2006 when I completed the manuscript.

G.J.O.

Liverpool
January 2007

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Abbreviations

AAA	*Athens Annals of Archaeology*
AD	*Archaiologikon Deltion*
AE	*Archaiologiki Ephemeris* [*Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς*]
Ag. I	Agora inscription, Inventory number
Agora iii.	R. E. Wycherley, *The Athenian Agora*, iii. *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1957
Agora xv.	B. D. Meritt and J. S. Traill, *The Athenian Agora*, xv. *Inscriptions: the Athenian Councillors*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1974
Agora xvi.	A. G. Woodhead, *The Athenian Agora*, xvi. *Inscriptions: The Decrees*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1997
Agora xix.	G. V. Lalonde, M. K. Langdon, and M. B. Walbank, *The Athenian Agora*, xix. *Inscriptions: Horoi, Poletai Records, Leases of Public Lands*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1991
Agora xxii.	S. I. Rotroff, *The Athenian Agora*, xxii. *Hellenistic Pottery: Athenian and Imported Mouldmade Bowls*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982
Agora xxvi.	J. H. Kroll, *The Athenian Agora*, xxvi. *The Greek Coins*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1993
Agora xxix.	S. I. Rotroff, *The Athenian Agora*, xxix. *Athenian and Imported Wheelmade Tableware*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1997
AHB	*Ancient History Bulletin*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
Anz. Wien.	*Anzeiger Österreichische Akademic der Wissenschaften, Wien, Phil-Hist. Klasse*
APF	J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971
AR.	*Archaeological Reports*
Ath. Mitt.	*Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung). Athens, 1876*

BCH	*Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*
BE	*Bulletin Épigraphique*
BSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History.* 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961
CID	*Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes.* Paris: École française d'Athènes, 1977
CIRB	*Corpus inscriptionum reginarum Bosporani.* Moscow-Leningrad, 1965
CISA	*Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia antica dell'Università del Sacro Cuore.* Milan: Vita e Pensiero
CJ	*Classical Journal*
ClAnt	*Classical Antiquity*
Class. et Med.	*Classica et Mediaevalia*
ClPh	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CSCA	*University of California Studies in Classical Antiquity*
de Sanctis, *Scritti*	G. de Sanctis, *Scritti Minori*, i, ed. S. Accame. Rome, 1966
EM	Epigraphical Museum, Athens
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.* Berlin, 1923–
FRA	M. J. Osborne & S. G. Byrne, *The Foreign Residents of Athens. An Annex to the* Lexicon of Greek Personal Names: Attica (Studia Hellenistica 33). Louvain: Peeters, 1996.
G&R	*Greece & Rome*
GGA	*Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
Hesp.	*Hesperia*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
HThR	*Harvard Theological Review*
I. Eleusis	K. Clinton, *Eleusis. The Inscriptions on Stone*, i (The Archaeological Society at Athens Library No. 236). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 2005.
I. Ephesos	H. Wankel, *Die Inschriften von Ephesos*, 1a. Bonn: Habelt, 1979 (*IK* xi. 1)

I. Erythrae	H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach, *Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai*, i–ii. Bonn: Habelt, 1972 (*IK* ii. 1–2)
I. Iasos	W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Iasos* i–ii. Bonn: Habelt, 1985 (*IK* xxviii. 1–2)
I. Ilion	P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Ilion*. Bonn: Habelt, 1975 (*IK* iii)
I. Kyme	H. Engelmann, *Die Inschriften von Kyme*. Bonn: Habelt, 1976 (*IK* v)
I. Kyzikos	E. Schwertheim, *Die Inschriften von Kyzikos*, i. Bonn: Habelt, 1980 (*IK* xviii)
I. Magnesia	O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900
I. Oropos	B. Ch. Petrakos, *Οι επιγραφές του Ωρωπού*, ii. (*Βιβ. της εν Αθ. Αρχ. Ετ.* 170). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1997.
I. Rhamnous	B. Ch. Petrakos, *Ο Δήμος του Ραμνοῦντος*, vol. ii (*Βιβ. της εν Αθ. Αρχ. Ετ.* 182). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1999
I. Teos	D. F. McCabe and M. A. Plunkett, *Teos Inscriptions. Texts and Lists*. Princeton: Institute for Advanced Study, 198.
ID	*Inscriptions de Délos*. 7 vols. Paris: École française d'Athènes, 1926–72
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin: de Gruyter
IK	*Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*. Bonn. 1972–
IOSPE	*Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latini*, vols. i, ii, iv. St. Petersburg, 1885–1901
ISE	L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni Storiche ellenistiche*, i. Florence: 1967
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
LCM	*Liverpool Classical Monthly*
LGPN ii	M. J. Osborne and S. G. Byrne (eds.), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, ii. *Attica*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994
LSJ	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, rev. and augmented by H. S. Jones, *A Greek–English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1940
Maier, *Mauerbau*.	F. G. Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften*. 2 vols. Heidelberg, 1959, 1961
Mem. Acc. Naz. Linc	*Memorie Atti della Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*
ML	R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1958, rev. 1988

Osborne, *Nat.*	M. J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens.* 4 vols. Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1981–3
P. Oxy.	*The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Oxford Classical Dictionary.* 3rd edn.1898–
PA	J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica.* 2 vols. Berlin, 1901–3
PAE	*Praktika tes en Athenais Archaiologikes Hetaireais*
PCG	*Poetti Comici Graecii*
RA	*Revue archéologique*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
RFIC	*Rivista Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica.*
RHDFE	*Revue historique de droit français et étranger*
Rhodes, *Comm.*	P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian* Athenaion Politeia. Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, with selected addenda 1993
RO	P. J. Rhodes and R. G. Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003
Schwenk	C. J. Schwenk, *Athens in the Age of Alexander: The Dated Laws and Decrees of the 'Lycourgan Era' 338–322 B.C.* Chicago: Ares, 1985
SCI	*Scripta classica israelica*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.* Gieben, 1923–
SEHHW	M. I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World,* 2nd impression, rev. P. M. Fraser. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1953
SO	*Symbolae osloenses*
Suidas	A. Adler (ed.), *Suidae Lexicon.* 4 vols. Lexicographi graeci, 1. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–38
Sv.	I. N. Svoronos, *Les Monnaies d'Athènes,* Munich, 1923–6 republished as *Corpus of the Ancient Coins of Athens.* Chicago: Ares, 1975
SVA	H. H. Schmitt (ed.), *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, iii. *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.* Munich, 1969
Syll.[3]	*Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum,* 3rd edn. Leipzig, 1915–24
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
Teles, *Peri Phyges*	O. Hense (ed.), *Teletis reliquiae.* 2nd edn. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1909

Tod, *GHI*	M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, ii. *From 403 to 323 B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon, 1948
Tracy, *A&M*	S. V. Tracy, *Athens and Macedon. Attic Letter Cutters of 290 to 230 B.C.* Hellenistic Culture and Society 38. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003
Tracy, *ADT*	S. V. Tracy, *Athenian Democracy in Transition. Attic Letter-Cutters of 340 to 290 B.C.* Hellenistic Culture and Society 20. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995
Tracy, *ALC*	S. V. Tracy, *Attic Letter-Cutters of 229 to 86 B.C.* Hellenistic Culture and Society 6. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990
Walbank, *Comm*	F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1970–9

All ancient dates, unless noted otherwise, are BC
Abbreviations of ancient authors are those used in *LSJ*.



Map 1. The Mediterranean

Map 2. Greece and Asia Minor

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Introduction

THE ATHENIAN POLIS AND HELLENISTIC HISTORY

Alexander's campaigns in Asia Minor in the 330s finally tore down the thin silk curtain that had 'separated' the Persian Empire from the Greek world. His destruction of Darius III's kingdom and the construction of a new Macedonian Empire had an epoch-making impact on Mediterranean history.[1] The collapse of Persia released a wave of change that swept through the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Epigraphy is one symptom of that change. In the subsequent Hellenistic period, cities small and large set up many inscriptions and compensated for their relative epigraphical silence that had marked much of the fifth and fourth centuries.[2] And so the epicentre of Hellenistic history has become the study of Asia Minor after Alexander the Great where the vast amount of material that had been the domain of Louis Robert is being represented in new and exciting historical studies.[3]

However, we must wrench our gaze away from Asia Minor to what was the periphery of Alexander's empire.[4] For in a small corner of 'old Greece' the new epoch was, momentarily, delayed.[5] The Lamian war saw the Athenians, Aitolians, and several other Greek polities fight to overthrow the Macedonian power that had been dominant since the battle of Chaeronea in 338. However there was no magic potion in this story. The only draught was the fatal one

[1] Will 1979 remains the essential narrative for the political history; still useful are the chapters in *CAH*^{2} vii.1. Shipley 2000 offers orientation. Brief accounts by Braund and Ager can be found in Erskine 2003: 19–50.

[2] For a recent survey of the epigraphy in Hellenistic Asia Minor, see Ma 2000*a*.

[3] Notable among many recent publications, are Dignas 2003; Ma 1999; Schuler 1998. One can consult the useful bibliography compiled by Couvenhes, Fröhlich, and Le Gras (in *Historiens & Géographes* 383 (2003) 81–136) for the Agrégation competition in France for 2003/4–2004/5. One of the principal regions in this programme of study was Hellenistic Anatolia (with coastal Syria and Egypt); see my review of Prost 2003 in *Topoi* 12–13 (2005) 647–59.

[4] Numerous recent epigraphical studies treat themes and institutions on the supra-regional level during the Hellenistic era, e.g. Ager 1996; Bringmann and von Steuben 1995; G. M. Cohen 1995; Rigsby 1996. This is a selection.

[5] In Central Greece, considerable progress is also a feature especially for the Hellenistic period, e.g. Eretria (Knoepfler 2001); Delphi and the Amphictyonic League (Lefèvre 1998*a* and his *CID* iv); Delphi and its territory (Rousset 2002); Thessaly (Decourt 1995).

taken by Demosthenes on the small island of Poros at the sanctuary of Poseidon in Calauria.[6] The death in 322 of the orator who had so vehemently opposed the rise of Macedon is symbolic of the change that was sweeping through Athens even as he swallowed the deadly draught.[7] The Athenians were crushed on land and also at sea, losing much of their fleet.[8] The Lamian war (323–322) was won by Antipater who had been responsible for managing Macedon and mainland Greece in the absence of Alexander.[9] As a result of the war, a new political regime that was overtly oligarchic in its constitution took over in Athens.[10] The Athenian democracy had not been defeated by Alexander; that final victory was secured by one of his many potential but ultimately unsuccessful successors.[11]

By the end of the fourth century, Alexander's most powerful successors had taken on the title of king; some controlled extensive territories. Success in battle, 'diplomacy', and often marriage in the first thirty years of the third century caused the crystallization of what had once been Alexander's kingdom into various components ruled by dynastic kings. By *c.*270 Antigonos Gonatas, son of Demetrios Poliorketes, grandson of Antigonos Monophthalmos, was king of the Macedonians and had territory in northern and central Greece. Antiochos I, son of Seleukos (I Nikator), ruled the Seleukid Kingdom (parts of Asia Minor, Syria, and east into central Asia). Ptolemy II, son of Ptolemy (I Soter), ruled Egypt and Cyrene, parts of Arabia, Phoenicia, south-west Syria, Cyprus, parts of coastal south-west Asia Minor, and much of the Aegean. These Macedonian, Seleukid, and Ptolemaic Kingdoms dominate Hellenistic history. But from the late third century onwards, Rome exerted increasing power while other forces came and went, notably the Kingdom of Pergamum in north-west Asia Minor. The death of Kleopatra VII, the last Ptolemaic ruler, can be seen therefore as the end of the Hellenistic period in 30.

This book concentrates on just under one hundred years that saw the Athenians dominated by the Macedonians. This period was characterized by the loss of Athenian control over the Piraeus for much, if not all, of the time from 295 to 230/29.[12] Athens, like all the other polities, was not a passive onlooker in this contest between the Hellenistic powers but often an active participant and sometimes a pawn in a much wider struggle that the

[6] Plut. *Demosthenes* 29. [7] Carlier 1990: 274–5.
[8] On why the Athenians lost the war, Bosworth 2003.
[9] Antipater: Baynham 1994; 2003.
[10] J. M. Williams 1982: 97–150 and Oliver 2003*a* on the nature of the oligarchy.
[11] On the first two decades of Macedonian domination, Green 2003.
[12] See Ch. 2.

enormously wealthy kings pursued with their large armies. The city was an important strategic point and also found itself for much of the third century at the interface between the Ptolemaic and Macedonian zones of control. The tenacity of the Macedonian hold over Athens in this period rested in the Piraeus. Control over Athens in the third century was almost always focused solely on that fact that a Macedonian garrison occupied Mounychia hill which overlooked and controlled the Piraeus. While the Macedonians held this position, Athens was never really able to establish that it was completely independent of Macedonian power: Athens did not integrate the Piraeus into the civic institutions of the polis until the garrison was removed in 230/29. Athenian history in the third century sometimes revolved around this issue. The Piraeus became the focus for what the polis saw as the symbol of its liberty and the Athenians celebrated their recovery of the harbour and the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison with considerable zeal in 229. The central figure of Diogenes, the last commander of the garrison, became part of the memory of this operation.

Athens was therefore part of the broader movements of Hellenistic history. Like many polities it was not only drawn into the struggle but sometimes launched itself onto various participants in search of support. Nor was it the case that all the Athenians agreed all the time with the way the polis fitted into these wider struggles. While some Athenians saw opportunities to gain power in the polis, others felt a threat to their own position. The internal dynamics of polis politics that are so familiar from the sources for the earlier fourth and even fifth centuries are played out in a changed environment in the Hellenistic period dominated by a different kind of power, the Hellenistic king.

This book deals with a polis that should be as much at the heart of Hellenistic history as other regions. Its focus is limited to the late fourth and third centuries, the early Hellenistic period, but the chronological horizons extend beyond looking both backwards and forwards. Three themes dominate this study—war, institutions, and economies—and are reflected in the title. The book is not a straightforward narrative history of the city; others have already achieved that. Nor is it a political history.[13] Instead the book offers a thematic analysis of a polis that is relatively rich in evidence compared to other polities in this period. For one problem that marks the study of Hellenistic history is the nature of the evidence. Much of the third century is characterized by the absence of any major literary source—Diodorus Siculus has dried up by the start of the third century and Polybius does not really start until the last quarter of the third century, which falls largely outside the scope of this book. We are left therefore with some literary sources (principally

[13] Habicht 1997.

Plutarch and Pausanias, as well as Diodorus for the late fourth and early third centuries) and epigraphical and archaeological evidence.[14] This book has, of course, exploited all three forms of evidence. It has tried to do justice to the archaeology, although both ceramic and numismatic evidence should perhaps have played more of a role than they have been given here.[15] One of the reasons for their relative absence is the domination of the inscriptions. However, here too there are problems, although of a different nature. For in the third century at Athens a chronology of events hinges on the list of eponymous civic archons.[16] This book is built around a reconstruction of events that could and probably will change (in the light of what has happened in the last hundred years of scholarship). However, enough of the main elements are in place to allow us to move away from the chronology, the narrative history, and the prosopography that have dominated studies of Athens in this period. These concerns offer important insights and are fundamental to this book, which attempts to build on important contributions that others have made in these areas.

In fact the basic question that lies at the heart of this study is both very simple and wholly transferable. How did people manage to feed themselves in times of difficulty? Any answer to this question for the period under investigation here will consider the particular contexts of the economies of ancient Greece, the political environment of the Athenian polis and its democracy, and the wider framework of the rapidly changing Hellenistic world. It is an ambitious question to ask because it forces one 'to grasp and describe essential elements in the life of a people'.[17] To form a coherent answer to the question within the context of the Athenian polis in the early Hellenistic period demands the treatment of the three themes that make up the title of this book. This is therefore not a straightforward political history; nor is it a book that focuses only on the operation of institutions; nor does it offer a comprehensive study of the economy of Hellenistic Athens. It aims, however,

[14] Diodorus (Books 18–20, 323 to 302) draws on Hieronymus of Cardia (Hornblower 1987). Polybius begins in 220 (1. 3) where he starts his account of how Rome came to dominate in the fifty-three years 220–167 (1. 5. 3). Plutarch's *Lives* of Phocion, Demetrius, Pyrrhus, and Aratos are the most relevant. Pausanias, *Description of Greece* Book 1, offers a fascinating construction of memory of Athenian history.

[15] Coins: *Agora* xxvi; Kroll 2003; Lönnqvist 1997; Oliver 2001*a*. Ceramics: *Agora* xxii; xxix; Rotroff 1988; 1990.

[16] A long and complex history of publication include Dinsmoor 1931; Pritchett and Meritt 1940; Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947; Meritt 1961; 1977; 1981; M. J. Osborne 1989; 2000; 2003. Pritchett 1963 is still essential to the principles of calendrical studies.

[17] Lewis 1997: 1. I feel that this is the essence of what D. M. Lewis thought was important about ancient history. It never seemed to be something we needed to discuss. For an account of the man and his work, see S. Hornblower, 'David Malcolm Lewis 1928–1994', *PBA* 94 (1996) 557–96.

to combine elements of all these things. In a sense this is a contribution to the history of food but not in terms of 'cultural studies'. The attempt here is to pursue history from a perspective that starts with the relatively unknown people who worked the land. If they were not able to perform their agricultural tasks then the rest of society would go hungry unless it devised other ways of finding food. Bottom-up history of this kind is particularly difficult in a society where the elite dominate the evidence, but at least the book starts off in the right direction.

HELLENISTIC ECONOMIES

> Athens lost much of its commerce and trade during the third century—the loss . . . being caused in part by the unwillingness of the Athenians and resident foreigners to venture upon substantial business risks in the face of the political uncertainty and disorganization which existed in Attica during the period of Macedonian domination.[18]

The twenty-eight pages of John Day's chapter on the third century, 'Athens before the Romans', remains the only treatment of the economies of Hellenistic Athens. Two aspects are striking. First Day recognizes the economies of the Hellenistic period despite the disruption that plagued the history of the polis. Second, Day considers all kinds of evidence including archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics, the sort of evidence that this book has tried to take some account of. Day's book is typical of its time. It was published a year after M. I. Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* which made extensive use of a broad range of evidence and has left an even more important legacy.[19]

However Day falls into the trap that had for so long dogged the Hellenistic period in that it perceives an almost inevitable decline after the heights of the classical period. Such negative effects of periodization in Greek history still reverberate. Ancient historians know what they mean when discussing things Hellenistic: it is no longer a 'history' that begins simply with the death of Alexander in 323. Hellenistic studies now look backwards and forwards in time and compare and contrast. 'Hellenistic' demands the historian to think of the continuities and changes over time, to establish whether there are phenomena that are peculiar to the sense of 'Hellenistic'. Not all regions or polities can be described as 'entering' the Hellenistic period at necessarily the same time.

[18] Day 1942: 26. [19] *SEHHW.*

ECONOMIES AND THE GREEK POLIS

No synthesis of the Hellenistic economy of Athens has been offered since Day's chapter. There are many reasons for this but not least is the difficult and changing nature of the evidence. There is no continuous textual narrative source for this period. Indeed the epigraphical evidence has become increasingly difficult to handle given the numerous and diverse range of publications that the historian must handle to 'see' the evidence. The publication of Kirchner's second edition of Athenian decrees, the last collection of such material, dates to 1913.[20] However, the reason for this neglect of the Hellenistic economies of Athens can also be found in the historiography of the economy. Finley's *The Ancient Economy* used archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics in a limited way and almost completely overlooked the Hellenistic era.[21] However as a result of Finley's work, historians have given the agrarian economy much more attention.[22] That Finleyan approach has, however, tended to displace what might be described (but somewhat misleadingly) as a modernist approach. Rostovtzeff (and Day) had adopted that approach.[23] Although it is not always productive to use the language of business as Day did in 1942, it is nevertheless useful and appropriate to consider the financial risks and profits that operated in the Greek economies.[24] This book has grown out of (and possibly away from) two very different traditions, Finleyan and Rostovtzeffian, and yet attempts to recover some of the realities of the economies of early Hellenistic Athens.[25]

THE HELLENISTIC POLIS—ATHENS

The study of Hellenistic Athens has been pioneered by two major figures—W. S. Ferguson and Christian Habicht.[26] The importance of their contributions

[20] *IG* ii^2. [21] Finley 1999; Davies 2001: 11–13.

[22] Garnsey 1988 comes out of this tradition. [23] Morris in Finley 1999: pp. ix–xxiii.

[24] E. E. Cohen 1992 is the most active proponent of this approach; contrast Millett 1990; 1991; on these approaches, von Reden 2002. See Ch. 1.

[25] Davies 1998. For more on this approach to Hellenistic economies, see Davies 2001. This book therefore fits into this 'Liverpool school' (Archibald in Archibald *et al.* 2001: 2; for the term 'English school' in this context, see Couvenhes, Fröhlich, and Le Gras, *Historiens & Géographes* 383 (2003) 113; these approaches have much in common with the integrated approaches to the economies in the 'French school', best represented by the St Bertrand series of colloquia (see e.g. Andreau, Briant, and Descat 1997; 2000; Bresson 2000; Descat 1989; 1995). See Oliver 2006*b*.

[26] Ferguson 1911; Habicht 1979; 1982; 1997.

cannot be overestimated. Nevertheless considerably less attention has been given to thematic studies of Hellenistic Athens.[27] This book attempts to offer some new insights into Athens by considering the interaction of its three themes, all of which are bound up into an approach to ancient Greece that considers the complex and integrated nature of the economies. These are addressed typically now as a plurality and one of the aims of this book is to illustrate how polis economies function in the Hellenistic period.[28] In some sense it is a case study of the economies of a Hellenistic polis. There have been surprisingly few attempts to produce a close study of the integration of politics and economies at Hellenistic Athens. This book is therefore an offering to the study of Hellenistic economies. It also serves as an investigation of the polis, an entity that thrived after the death of Alexander.[29] The food supply, war, institutions, and ancient economy are all subjects that have received a great deal of attention.[30] On several occasions the interaction of these themes has produced important new insights, such as Hanson's study of war and agriculture and Garnsey's contextualized approach to food crises.[31] Such integrated approaches have provided important models for *War, Food and Politics.*

RECENT WORK ON HELLENISTIC ATHENS

One crucial area that this book has avoided is a detailed survey and analysis of the political status of Athens. Considerable attention has been given to the democratic and oligarchic nature of Athenian politics in the early Hellenistic period.[32] Other major works have made the writing of this book an easier task.[33] Athenian religion has benefited from the studies of Parker and Mikalson.[34] Dreyer has brought a critical eye to current discussions of Athenian politics and the history of the late fourth and first half of the third centuries.[35]

[27] An important exception, the essays in Frösén 1997 and some of those in Palagia and Tracy 2003.

[28] Economies: Cartledge 1998. [29] Gauthier 1993 *contra* e.g. Runciman 1990.

[30] Recent examples on war and agriculture or territory include Garlan 1973; Hanson 1983; Andreau, Briant, and Descat 2000; Thorne 2001; Chandezon 1999; Pimouget 1995; war and the economy: Austin 1986; food supply and institutions: Couilloud-Le Dinahet 1988; Fantasia 1984; Migeotte 1991; 1998; Moretti 1977; insitutions and the economy: Migeotte 1983; 1984; 1992; 2000.

[31] Hanson 1983; Garnsey 1988. See also Hölkeskamp 1990 and Marasco 1984*b*; 1988.

[32] Rhodes with Lewis 1996: 35–61; Dreyer 2001.

[33] Frösén 1997; Palagia and Tracy 2003. [34] Parker 1996; Mikalson 1998.

[35] Dreyer 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; for his sharp review of the original German edition of Ch. Habicht's *Athen. Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit* (Munich, 1995; English edn., Habicht 1997), *GGA* 250 (1998) 207–50.

Historians must also thank M. J. Osborne and J. D. Morgan who have made significant progress in respectively publishing and divulging their restorations of the archon list.[36] Many thousands of Athenians are known from the literary, archaeological, and above all epigraphical sources. Osborne and Byrne's *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, ii*, has made an enormous difference not only to the study of Athenian history but also to the prosopography and of course onomastics in what is the most comprehensive directory of Athenians from *alpha* to *omega*.[37]

Most advances have originated in the treatment of epigraphical evidence. Tracy has published three volumes dedicated to the identification of the letter-cutters of Athenian inscriptions.[38] His work has produced many new important contributions to the dating of inscriptions and improvement of texts. New epigraphical discoveries continue to appear and in most cases they are published. Particular mention must be made of B. Petrakos's excavations for the Archaeological Society at Athens and the exemplary publication of the many inscriptions from the fortified deme.[39] The epigraphy from Rhamnous has revolutionized understanding of Hellenistic Athens and Attica and complements Petrakos's major publication of the inscriptions of Oropos.[40] Other inscriptions continue to appear in the excavations conducted by the Greek Archaeological service and the unflagging work of the Ephors and Athenian epigraphers (notably Angelos Matthaiou) has ensured that many of these discoveries reach the academic community.[41] At the heart of ancient Athens was of course the Agora and the excavations conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens continue to provide new material. Woodhead's *Agora* xvi. publishes the decrees found in the course of the American excavations and its appearance in 1997 has added to the rich epigraphical output from Athens that has marked the last decade of the twentieth century.

[36] J. D. Morgan has published a brief survey of time reckoning, see *ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΧΝΕΣ* 74 (2000) 17–31, and is writing a major study of all issues of Athenian chronology based on his rereading of the relevant sections of Athenian inscriptions. M. J. Osborne esp. 2000 and 2003.

[37] *LGPN* ii. See also J. S. Traill, *Athenians* (Toronto: Athenians, 1994–); Bayliss 2002 analyses Athenian politics but has also collected extensive prosopographical information on the politicians.

[38] Tracy, *ALC*, *ADT*, *A&M*.

[39] B. Ch. Petrakos, *Ο Δήμος του Ραμνουντος*, i–ii (*Βιβ. της εν Αθ. Αρχ. Ετ.* 182). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1999. Petrakos also publishes annual results in some detail in *PAE* and preliminary reports in *Ergon*.

[40] B. Ch. Petrakos, *Οι επιγραφές του Ωρωπού* (*Βιβ. της εν Αθ. Αρχ. Ετ.* 170). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1997.

[41] The Ephoreia: see e.g. Steinhauer 1993. A. P. Matthaiou co-edits the important journal *Horos*; Matthaiou and Malouchou 2004 contains several important new inscriptions and fragments.

THE ATHENIAN POLIS UNDER THREAT

Reports of the fall of the Athenian polis have been exaggerated.[42] The death of Athens or at least its decline can now be dismissed as a misguided approach to history as linear evolution or a story of decline and fall. But the threats to the Athenian polis in the Hellenistic era are more historical than historiographical. For the early Hellenistic period saw the Athenians living the life of their polis under the sort of threat from enemy forces that had last been felt in the golden age of Athens during the Peloponnesian war. In fact the citizens and residents of the Athenian polis in the last decades of the fifth and the end of the fourth centuries had much more in common than most textbooks would usually admit. However, unlike in the early fourth century, the Athenians were quite unable to recover their naval power in the early third century.

Responses to the threats to the polis came from the citizens and residents of Attica. Civic organization and contributions made by citizens and foreign residents to the protection of the Hellenistic polis were a fundamental feature. Institutions continued or were introduced that addressed the difficulties that were present in Attica. Individuals inside and outside the polis performed services for the community and their actions are often preserved because the individuals were regarded as benefactors and honoured by the community with inscribed decrees that were set up in the polis. Honorific inscriptions make up the largest proportion of evidence for the history of Hellenistic Athens. They are documents that must be read and viewed as texts and monuments in a physical context. Honorific decrees served a function in the polis. They were set up to be noticed and read by other people. More often than not, honorific decrees were designed to advertise to the viewer and reader that benefactors would be rewarded and that those who performed similar services would be treated in similar fashion. The epigraphical evidence therefore says much more than the information about the events provided in the body of the text on the stone. Epigraphical material cannot be understood fully when read as passages of text detached from its physical context.[43]

This book considers how threats to the polis affected the community in terms of war, its institutions, and two central aspects of its economy—its territory and the grain supply.[44] At the heart of this study, therefore, are the countryside of Attica and the agrarian economies of the polis. The important

[42] Mossé 1973. [43] Oliver 2000.

[44] In addition to Hanson 1983, Spence 1990; Ober 1985 have treated defence and territoriality in the classical period and Munn 1993 looks also at some of the early third-century evidence.

commodities produced in Attica, such as grain, provided food for the people. War could disrupt its production and collection. Athens imported a great deal of grain in the fourth century. How much stress should historians place, therefore, on the relationship between imported grain and the production of grain in the territory of the polis? What impact did war have on this relationship? What strategies did the polis develop or perpetuate in response to these pressures? What do these responses reveal about the nature of the polis and its institutions in the Hellenistic period? How do they compare with earlier practices? The questions that this book attempts to address apply to most Greek polities in most periods of Greek history. They are particularly interesting questions to ask of Athens in the late fourth and third centuries because of the relative quality and abundance of evidence compared to other polities in the same period in the rest of the Hellenistic world. It is hoped that Athens will provide a good example therefore of an integrated study of themes that have as much importance for other polities in different regions.

The book is divided into three parts.[45] The first deals with the major vulnerabilities that affected the economies of Athens. The question of Athenian dependency on grain imports in the 'classical' fourth century is considered first (Ch. 1). The chapter establishes the complexities, finances, and different interests that characterized commerce. Athenian economies in the fourth century were vulnerable largely because of the fragility of the relationship between the population, domestic food production, and overseas imports. Disruption in either of the two sources of grain—Attica or overseas commerce—rendered the polis sensitive to political threats far from Athens as well as closer to home. This chapter therefore sets up the study of three major weaknesses in the early Hellenistic period: the Piraeus—at the heart of Athenian commerce—and the overseas territory of the polis (Ch. 2), population (Ch. 3), and warfare in Attica (Ch. 4). Each of these chapters identifies changes in the historical conditions that characterize the difficulties that the Athenians confronted in the late fourth and third centuries.

The subsequent two parts effectively consider responses to these problems. Part II focuses on the military institutions of the polis and Part III the civic institutions that directly affected the domestic production of grain on the one hand and the importation of grain on the other. Part II is divided into three chapters. In turn they look at the infrastructure of defence in Attica (Ch. 5), the organization of military command (Ch. 6), and the use of military manpower (Ch. 7). This part establishes the high level of organization that existed even—one might say especially—during a period that continues to be

[45] This book has grown out of Oliver 1995.

characterized by many historians as one overshadowed by the presence of Macedonian power.

In the final part the focus falls on the institutional strategies that the polis adopted to finance its protection and in particular the harvest of Attica (Ch. 8). The role of citizens and residents of Attica lies at the heart of this study. The famous *epidosis* (subscription) of the archonship of Diomedon is analysed to illustrate the measured respect and dependence that existed between the community of Athenians and its benefactors among the citizen body and resident foreigners. The subsequent chapter (Ch. 9) looks out beyond the polis to foreign sources of grain and considers the economies of the grain trade. The resources of the Hellenistic powers were enormous. Individual kings were able to perform significant services and Athens, like many Greek polities, benefited from their gifts. How did these relations work? To what extent did the Greek polis depend on benefactors? This chapter focuses on the role foreigners played in supplying grain to Athens and suggests that times of difficulty in Attica correspond to those periods when the city was more likely to acknowledge, and perhaps look to, benefactors for the supply of grain from beyond the polis. Polis economies adapt in different historical circumstances and the context of early Hellenistic Athens offers a useful case study that illustrates the different strategies that a polis developed and what impact the loss of assets such as the commercial harbours or territory had. The evidence for the institutional organization and contribution of citizens and resident foreigners to the defence of the polis within this framework says a great deal about how the people of Athens responded to the threats of the early Hellenistic period.

This book therefore offers a study of the interaction of aspects of the polis that can sometimes be considered apart: institutions, economies, political and military history. The approach adopted here privileges the idea of the Greek polis as a spatial entity, a unity that was essentially and definitively a region with a political and administrative identity. The success and longevity of the polis owed a great deal to this harmony between space and politics. The interaction between the urban and rural space in Attica during the late fourth and third centuries is particularly significant. This period offers an opportunity to see how the Athenian polis sustained ruptures both within the urban space and between urban and rural space. Shifts in different forms of political structure disrupted the polis and invasions dislocated rural and urban life. These ruptures also affected the harbour of the city, the Piraeus, which had provided the polis with a launch pad for all kinds of networks based on its commercial and imperial power for much of the fifth and fourth centuries.[46]

[46] Garland 1987.

For most of the third century, the Athenian polis was no longer able to maintain its own control of the Piraeus because of the presence of foreign powers. The decision therefore to focus in this book on the late fourth and third centuries offers an important opportunity to consider the vital ways in which the Athenian polis sustained these various threats. An examination of a period in which the people of the polis succeeded in resisting such a variety of stresses may indeed tell more about the polis than we might have imagined. Those who read this book will be able to determine if it achieves any of these targets.

Part I

Economic Vulnerabilities

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1

Economic Fragilities in Fourth-Century Athens

1.1. DEPENDENCY CULTURES

The commodities which Attica did not produce within her own territory, were obtained by foreign commerce, and unless the importation was prevented by some extraordinary obstacle, such for example as war, there could be no danger of scarcity.[1]

If ever there was a better illustration that most good ideas have already been thought of, and often a long time ago, one need only to turn back to A. Boeckh, 'the first great example of "*Alterthumwissenschaft*"'.[2] Written over 170 years ago, Boeckh's words lie behind the subject matter dealt with here. For the interaction of three themes—war, commerce, and territory or countryside—is at the heart of this study of the Athenian polis in the late fourth and third centuries. However this book focuses on the impact of war on the grain production of the Athenian territory rather than only on the overseas movement of grain into Athens. It inverts the approach adopted by Boeckh and focuses on the centrality of the rural economies of the Athenian territory. For several reasons this seems a natural way to explore the early Hellenistic period and perhaps others too, both in Athens and many other Greek poleis.

August Boeckh was among the first to recognize the need to explore the level of dependency of the Athenian population on imported grain. In his seminal study of the Athenian economy, he estimated that a free population of 135,000 and 365,000 slaves required three million *medimnoi* per annum.[3]

[1] Boeckh 1828: 65. This chapter selects themes and topics. It lays the foundation for what follows. For a good overview of the fourth-century Athenian economy, see Descat 1989; Faraguna 1992 is a more detailed analysis with a narrower chronological focus. RO selects the most important inscriptions and provides important commentaries for both political and socio-economic history. Many of the references will lead to the lengthy list of articles and books that illuminate much of the history that lies beneath this account. *CAH*^{2} vi offers broader historical summaries.

[2] Lewis 1997: 1.

[3] A *medimnos* is equivalent to *c.*40 kg; it can be envisaged as equivalent to a large sack of grain.

Boeckh suggested that two-thirds of this demand was met by the Attic countryside and one-third by grain imports.[4] In his calculations there would have been an annual shortfall of one million *medimnoi* of grain every year.[5] Of course the agrarian economy of Attica had an in-built deficiency, the soil. As Boeckh reminded his readers in the nineteenth century, Plato says of the countryside of the Athenian polis that 'every sort of plant and animal thrived in spite of the poverty of the soil'.[6] The fragility of Athens' agrarian economies is a feature not only of Greece but of the Mediterranean as a whole.[7] The vulnerabilities of agriculture to the vagaries of climate and other ecological problems meant that even the most fertile regions of the Greek world were not immune to shortfalls in the harvest. Neighbouring Boeotia benefited from excellent soil but even it still suffered problems: Xenophon reports how food had to be imported there after two poor harvests in succession.[8] Productivity in the Athenian countryside was vulnerable to the same problems that affected other regions.

The impact of this fragility on the economies of the ancient Mediterranean was exacerbated, at Athens, by the size of the population. Any shortfall in local production, for whatever reasons, was going to render even more severe the already serious disparity between domestic grain production and the size of the population in the fifth and fourth centuries. The degree to which the Athenian economy depended on importing grain has dominated discussion of the 'grain supply'.[9] Garnsey's *Famine and Food Supply* has become the main point of reference (and disagreement) for the quantification of grain production in Attica, population size, and grain imports. This chapter does not offer a full assessment of the problems in this debate—a more complete and independent study is required to do justice to this important and vast topic. Instead it reframes the central issues by reconsidering some of the motivations and interests of those agencies involved in the movement of commodities such as grain. As such it emphasizes the commercial interests in grain movements. It argues that the evidence for the degree of dependency on imported grain to Attica in the fourth century has been distorted by overlooking the economic context in which the grain trade operated at Athens and in particular the function of taxation and re-exportation.

[4] Cf. As much as at least half the grain that was needed to feed Athens was imported (Bresson 2000: 277 and 299). Boeckh 1828: 65.

[5] Boeckh 1828: 105–10. [6] Boeckh 1828: 57; Plato, *Critias* 110e.

[7] Horden and Purcell 2000: 330–2. [8] Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 54.

[9] Garnsey 1985; 1988; Whitby 1998; Keen 2000; Bresson 2000: 183–210. Stroud 1998 has stimulated further developments, e.g. RO 26 (with references); Rosivach 2000. On the later fourth and early third centuries, Marasco 1984*b*.

1.2. MODELS OF DEPENDENCY

Garnsey reasserted the productive capacity of Attica. Grain harvested in Attica could have supported 120,000 to 150,000 people but the crops were vulnerable and in bad years, estimated at one in twenty, 'Athens' order for foreign grain must have been enormous'. According to Garnsey the population fluctuated in the fourth century from a high of around 200,000 to between 120,000 and 150,000 in 323/2. He concluded therefore that the degree of dependency on imported grain was relatively low, and significantly lower than Boeckh had envisaged.[10]

A reaction to his revisionist approach has now reasserted the long-standing dependency argument.[11] Essentially it suggests that the productive capacity of Attica was probably lower than Garnsey suggests and that the population may have been higher. Three critical issues are presented by Whitby. First, the amount of evidence for imported grain and the general theme found in the literary and epigraphical sources in the fourth century indicates that grain from outside Attica was much more important than Garnsey's overall model suggests. Second, the intrinsic productivity of Attica has been overestimated and that no more than half of the cultivable land was devoted to grain and that amounted to only 10–15 per cent of Attica.[12] Finally, Whitby suggests that the population was much larger than Garnsey has allowed and probably in the mid-fourth century numbered between 250,000 and 300,000 residents.[13] These three points lead Whitby to conclude that Athens in the fourth century was indeed dependent on imported grain.

The degree of dependency that Whitby determines is not given an absolute figure. Garnsey had offered a *range of possibilities* for the cereal harvest in Attica. Garnsey calculated that somewhere between 100,000 to 150,000 could have lived off the grain production of Attica.[14] Obviously a major difference in population size affects greatly the degree of dependency on imported grain. If the figures derived from the calculations proposed by Garnsey and Whitby are juxtaposed one can illustrate a more crude but working model for dependency assuming that between 100,000 to 150,000 people could have survived on Attic grain.

The very range of uncertainties surrounding population size, grain imports, and food production in Attica has led Scheidel to suggest that the

[10] Garnsey 1988: 104 and, quotation, 105. The number of bad years seems extremely optimistic, and Garnsey (1988: 146–7; [Dem.] 50. 4–6, 61) refers to the two poor years in succession suffered by Apollodoros in 362/1 and 361/0.

[11] Whitby 1998. [12] Ibid. 103–8. [13] Ibid. 109–14.

[14] Garnsey 1988: 107 table 2.

TABLE 1.1. *Models of dependency: Athenian population, domestic and imported grain*

Population of Attica	Residents supplied by Attic grain	Residents dependent on imported grain
120,000	100,000 to 150,000	−20,000 to 30,000
150,000	100,000 to 150,000	up to 50,000
200,000	100,000 to 150,000	50,000 to 100,000
250,000	100,000 to 150,000	100,000 to 150,000
300,000	100,000 to 150,000	150,000 to 200,000

plausibility of 'any model of the grain supply for Attica' has been severely undermined.[15] But it is still essential to consider the scale of dependency that has been so important for all assessments of the Athenian economy since Boeckh's original account. Whitby's criticism of Garnsey's optimistic model for Attic production and low population implies that the Athenian polis in the mid-fourth century needed imported grain to feed up to two-thirds of the population (200,000 people in the worst case scenario). One piece of evidence for the fourth century encapsulates many of the problems that the arguments developed by Garnsey and Whitby present. But it also requires greater consideration of the economic context. We turn therefore to the figures that Demosthenes described for the grain arriving at Athens from one region of the Black Sea.

1.3. QUANTIFYING DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED GRAIN

Demosthenes' speech *Against (the Law of) Leptines* offers the 'best' evidence for actual grain imports during the fourth century.[16] In this speech, the orator objects to the law tabled by Leptines that was intended to remove the privileges of tax exemptions not only from Athenian citizens but also foreigners and *isoteleis* (a special category of non-Athenians semi-integrated into the civic system of obligations). Demosthenes highlights one of the potential victims of such a law, the Bosporan king Leukon, who had been honoured by the Athenians. Leukon had been made an Athenian citizen and awarded other grants including *ateleia*, an exemption from taxation and civic obligations.

[15] Scheidel in Garnsey 1998: 200.
[16] Dem. 20, *Concerning* ateleia, *against the Law of Leptines* (355/54).

[30] For by birth Leukon is indeed a non-Athenian (*xenos*), but by your actions a citizen. In accordance with either of these two statuses, Leukon is not able to have *ateleia* as a result of this <Leptines'> law. But of all the other benefactors each has rendered himself useful to us for a certain time, but this man <Leukon>, if you reflect on it, is obviously performing continuous services for us, and those of which our city has a particular need. [31] For surely you know this, that we use imported grain very much more than all other peoples. The grain that is arriving by ship from the Pontos is equivalent to all that is now coming from other markets (*emporia*). For this is the product not only of this region having the most grain, but also because the ruler, Leukon, has given *ateleia* to those heading for Athens and declares that the first to be loaded with cargoes are those sailing to you. For although this man has *ateleia* both for himself and for his children, he has granted *ateleia* to all of you. [32] Consider now the extent of this. This man draws a 1/30th tax on those who export grain from his territory. There are around 400,000 <*medimnoi*> of grain now coming here from him; anyone could see this in the register kept by the *sitophylakes*. So from 300,000 *medimnoi* he is giving us 10,000 *medimnoi*, and from the remaining 100,000 *medimnoi* he is giving us in the region of 3,000 *medimnoi*.

Demosthenes claims that Athenians used the greatest quantity of imported grain of all people[17] and reveals that 400,000 *medimnoi* came to Athens from Leukon, the Bosporan king.[18] Apparently the grain from Pontos is equivalent to all the grain coming to Athens from other markets. If this suggests that 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain was imported, that quantity represents 32,000,000 kg (at 40 kg a *medimnos* of wheat) or the equivalent of cargo carried by just under 270 (assuming each ship has capacity to carry 3,000 *medimnoi* of grain).[19] Various projections could be based on such numbers. For example, 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain represents enough to feed about 140,000 people (consuming 230 kg per annum). If Attica was able to feed between 100,000 to 150,000 people and enjoyed a normal to good year in terms of productivity, these figures would suggest that a population of 240,000 to 290,000 people could have been fed in the year when 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain were imported.[20] The numbers fed would be higher still if the annual consumption of grain is lower. So if the amount of imported grain suggested by Demosthenes were taken at face value, these figures and one estimate of the carrying capacity of Attica indeed suggest that the population of Attica in the mid-fourth century is unlikely to have exceeded 300,000. The significance then of the 400,000 *medimnoi* cannot be overlooked.

But what is the value of calculating the possible levels of dependency? Not much if the figures given by Demosthenes are completely false. Nevertheless

[17] Dem. 20. 31. [18] Ibid. 32. [19] Bresson 2000: 278 n. 66.

[20] Garnsey 1988: 97: 400,000 *medimnoi* is 'enough to provide adequate sustenance for 80,000 people or to keep alive more than 100,000'.

the speech gives some idea of the mentalities of Demosthenes' audience. It gives an idea at least of the relative importance of Leukon's Bosporan Kingdom and some notions on the sort of quantities Demosthenes could claim as arriving from his territory. Demosthenes after all is citing 400,000 *medimnoi* as opposed to, for example 40,000 or 100,000 *medimnoi*. Clearly the higher the population, so the greater the degree of dependence. The smaller the productivity of Attica, the more intense the need to import food. For Garnsey dependency on imports was largely determined by problems in Athenian grain production while the evidence for the movements of grain from outside Attica can be seen largely as a response to specific difficulties, whether particular problems in the local harvests or disruptions in the supply of grain from outside. Whitby ultimately believes in a much larger population and assumes that the sources for the movements of grain into Attica reflect the huge *need* for the import of this basic commodity to feed the population: that need far outstripped the productivity of the countryside.[21]

Let us, however, pay more attention to Demosthenes' comments on Leukon's value to the supply of grain to Athens. For a significant difference between the approach adopted by Garnsey and that by those who wish to re-establish the more extreme dependency argument is the treatment of evidence. Garnsey deals much more explicitly with the evidence for grain imports to Athens in terms of historical context. He admits that 'the fourth-century sources . . . are full of explicit references to the importance of grain imports to Athens'.[22] But for Garnsey, the evidence for importing grain can be understood by considering particular cases and contextualizing the evidence against the wider political and economic conditions. The evidence for importing grain therefore becomes evidence for the solutions to problems that were induced by factors including poor harvests. But the grain from Leukon has dubious value. 'It would be unwise to take it literally,' says Garnsey, for the speech does not really allow true figures to be derived for the grain imported from sources outside the Black Sea.[23] Whitby pays less attention to the historicity of the references to imports of grain and reports of critical problems in supply, and instead prefers to see such evidence rather as indicating signs of a dependency on imported grain.[24]

There is however little ambiguity in Demosthenes' statement in the speech *Against Leptines*: 'For surely you know this, that we use imported grain very much more than all other peoples.'[25] Demosthenes emphasizes that as much grain was imported from the Pontos as from all other sources put together and that the records of the *sitophylakes* can confirm that 400,000 *medimnoi*

[21] Whitby has voiced an opinion that others favour, see also e.g. Rosivach 2000*a*: 38 n. 22.
[22] Garnsey 1988: 135. [23] Ibid. 97.
[24] Contrast ibid. 144–9. [25] Dem. 20. 31.

came from Leukon.[26] Epigraphical sources and the *Athenaiōn Politeia* confirm the importance of the *sitophylakes*. They controlled the two main (wholesale) grain markets, the one in the Agora and the other in *emporion* in the Piraeus and therefore supervised the wholesale transactions concerning grain brought to the polis by the *emporoi*.[27] They could affect the purchases of grain by the grainbuyers.[28] The *sitophylakes* seem to have maintained the role of controlling the wholesale grain markets in the city of Athens and the harbour in the Piraeus throughout the fourth century.[29]

The figures for grain from Leukon might be assumed to be one-year figures but there is no suggestion that they offer either an *annual production* for the harvest of the Bosporan kingdom or an *annual* importation from Leukon (Demosthenes would surely have made such claims). It is assumed that the figures represent the current year (355/4), which in many ways could have been exceptional. The figures might suggest a recent glut of grain or a concentration of grain exports from the Bosporan Kingdom to Athens. Leukon had evidently supplied a large amount two years earlier.[30] It cannot be assumed, then, that of the 400,000 *medimnoi* from Leukon's territory either all was destined to be consumed in totality by the residents of Athens or that all was *needed* to feed Athens in that year. Grain that came to the city need not have remained in Athens.

It is of course crucial to Demosthenes' speech that he persuades his audience of the importance of such individuals as Leukon, the Bosporan king. Leptines' proposal is that 'no one should be immune from taxation duties (*atelēs*)', 'that no citizen, no *isotelēs*, no foreigner be immune from taxation (*atelēs*)' and that the only exception should be the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton.[31] Such a proposal would deprive many

[26] Ibid. 31–2.

[27] Bresson 2000: 133–4. So in the Agora and in the *emporion* in the Piraeus, the *sitophylakes* were responsible for monitoring abuse in monetary transactions involving silver coins. Otherwise the *syllogeis* of the people (in the Agora in Athens in the *asty*) and the *epimeletai* of the *emporion* (in the *emporion* in the Piraeus) exercised authority for the other markets, RO 25 ll. 18–23.

[28] The *sitophylakes* were responsible in 386 for limiting the purchases by the *sitopōlai* of wholesale grain (restricted to 50 *phormoi*, Lysias 22. 5, 22. 16, Rosivach 2000*a*: 46 n. 48). The *sitophylakes* are no longer responsible for wholesale grain, as this seems now to belong to the superintendents of the *emporion* [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3 (see Rhodes, *Comm.*: 589–9, 788). On the register of the *sitophylakes*, Migeotte 1998: 235–6 n. 20.

[29] Stroud (1974: 180–1) had suggested that the functions of the *sitophylakes* changed later in the century, but Gauthier (1981: 22–3) has shown that the institution maintained a consistent set of responsibilities.

[30] Dem. 20. 33: 'But two years ago [357/6], when a grain shortage was affecting all peoples, not only did he send out enough grain for you, but so much that 15 talents of silver were made in addition, which Kallisthenes administered.' The date: Garnsey 1988: 147.

[31] Dem. 20. 1 (*μηδέν' εἶναι ἀτελῆ*) and 29 (*μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι ἀτελῆ*).

benefactors of their privileges of immunity from taxation, privileges that were frequently given to those who had performed exceptional services for the Athenians.[32] Demosthenes' speech warns the Athenians against adopting this proposal. Its adoption would endanger the benefits that the people received from such benefactors who would, he argues, be less likely to perform services for the Athenians if such immunities were removed. Leukon is one of the prime examples considered by Demosthenes as a potential victim of Leptines' law.[33] It is in Demosthenes' interests in terms of his argument to emphasize therefore the benefits the Athenians have received from Leukon and also to reduce any hint that Leukon's relationship with the Athenians is anything other than beneficial to the Athenians. Central to such considerations is of course exemption from taxation (*ateleia*). It will be argued here that the *ateleia* enjoyed by Leukon was also fundamental to the particular relationship that the Athenians and the Bosporan kings enjoyed in the fourth century. It is *ateleia* that will help explain the context in which we must view the 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain. A reassessment of the general background to the commercial interests involved in moving grain and the honours that the Athenians had granted Leukon and his sons provides a useful way of re-examining the 400,000 *medimnoi*.

1.4. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF MOVING GRAIN

Leptines' proposal was going to deprive Leukon of *ateleia* because as a citizen of Athens, albeit a foreigner awarded citizenship, he would not be allowed to have such a privilege.[34] *Ateleia* was, however, much more than an honour and clearly fulfilled an important role in the economics of commerce. It is notable that Leukon had waived the one-thirtieth taxation charge on exportation from the Bosporos and given priority to those filling their cargoes and destined for Athens.[35] In addition he had granted *ateleia* to the Athenians at the *emporion* of Theodosia.[36] Demosthenes' argument focuses on the advantages that the *Athenians* have gained from Leukon's grant of *ateleia* and other commercial advantages. He does not talk explicitly about any benefits that Leukon himself receives from the honours given by the Athenians and indeed

[32] On *ateleia*, see e.g. Henry 1983: 241–61; Vélissaropoulos 1980: 218–22. See Stroud (1998: 27) on the need for more work on taxation. On the privileges given to the Bosporan kings, see Osborne, *Nat.* T21.

[33] Dem. 20. 34–40. [34] Ibid. 30. [35] Ibid. 31–2. [36] Ibid. 33.

emphasizes that Leukon's interests in the awards were driven by his *philotimia* and not by any need.[37] In what follows, it will be suggested that Demosthenes is being economical with the truth in terms of the benefits Leukon enjoys from the honours, and in particular the *ateleia*, that the Athenians have granted.[38]

Indeed it is not unreasonable to ask what were the financial benefits for the parties in Leukon's relationship with Athenians and the supply of grain. Rosivach has pointed out that the relationship between Athens and the Bosporan kings does not make sense 'in strictly economic terms' for the latter. Indeed if we read Demosthenes' account of the grain trade between the Bosporan Kingdom and Athens, it is difficult to see that Leukon had any economic interest in giving priority in loading, *ateleia* at Theodosia, and exemption from the one-thirtieth tax in the Bosporan Kingdom to those sailing to Athens. It is therefore worth reconsidering what we might call the 'realities' of the grain trade and also the financial benefits of *ateleia* in order to realize the nature of the bilateral relations that both the Athenians *and* the Bosporan king(s) enjoyed in the middle of the fourth century.

The *realities* of the grain trade are of course very difficult to establish, but one way of approaching the dependency issue is to reassess the nature of the grain imports themselves. This point is recognized by Whitby whose pessimistic prognosis for Athenian dependency on imported grain is mollified by the fact that, like Garnsey, he allows some room for the re-exportation of grain.[39] Another aspect of the movement of grain, particularly in terms of the grain from the Bosporan Kingdom to Athens, is economic benefit. Who gains from such movement? Until now, it has generally been considered that only the Athenians did and the Bosporan kings were happy with their statues and honours (citizenship and *ateleia*).[40]

It is conceivable that grain arrived at Athens via two sets of agents. One group consists of Athenians or other residents of Attica involved in the grain trade (*emporoi*). They almost certainly borrowed money for moving grain (and other commodities) to arrive in the Piraeus. This group was required to make sure that (e.g.) grain came to Athens rather than directly going to other markets: 'the laws have laid down the most extreme penalties, if anyone living in Athens should take grain to any destination other than to the Attic *emporion*'.[41] It is clear that the lending of money to finance maritime

[37] Ibid. 41.

[38] An interpretation of the practical importance of *ateleia* is now offered also by MacDowell 2004: 129: 'unqualified *ateleia* did include exemption from Athenian import and export duties, and that this was what made it a practical advantage for foreigners, especially for foreign merchants trading into and out of Peiraieus'.

[39] Whitby 1998. [40] Gauthier 1985: 156–7. [41] Dem. 34. 37.

operations provided an important backbone for such trade. As Demosthenes says, 'For the resources required by those who engage in trade come not from those who borrow but from those who lend: and neither ship, nor ship owner nor passenger can put to sea if you take away the part contributed by those who lend.'[42]

Considering that such loans were the financial backbone for maritime trade, Demosthenes' report of the restriction on borrowing in Athens that required imports to come directly to Athens rather than going elsewhere was one of several major interventions made by the polis in trade. The restrictions on residents of Attica on taking grain anywhere but Athens are well established by the sources. The speech *Against Phormion* concerns events which took place between 335 and 327 and was probably delivered in *c.*327/6.[43] In Lycurgus' speech *Against Leokrates*, the prosecutor attacks Leokrates for having abandoned Athens and fled to Megara. There, Lycurgus says, Leokrates brought grain from Kleopatra in Epiros (daughter of Philip II and wife of Alexander of Epiros) to Leukas, and from there to Corinth.[44] Lycurgus reminds the audience that Leokrates' participation in this movement of grain contradicts the Athenian law that forbids Athenians from bringing grain to anywhere other than Athens.[45] Leokrates' action dates to his absence from Athens (338–332) and the speech itself to 331/0. A third source is almost certainly earlier still. In the Demosthenic speech (a *dikē emporikē*) *Against Lakritos*, a charge is brought by Androkles of Sphettos (an *emporos*) in an attempt to recover a maritime loan made originally to Lakritos' brother, Artemon of Phaselis, another *emporos*.[46] The latter has subsequently died and the speaker prosecutes the surviving Lakritos who is held responsible for his dead brother's misuse of the loan.[47] In the course of the speech, the prosecutor reveals that he had lent a sum of money to finance a trip from Athens to the Pontos and back to Athens.[48] However Artemon had failed to return from Pontos with a cargo and therefore the creditors could not recover

[42] Dem. 51 with Harrison 1971: 27; Cohen 1992: 140–1.

[43] Cf. Cohen 1992: 178 'about 330' (at n. 275 between 334/3 and 327/6); on the legal procedure in Dem. 34, the *paragraphē*, see Harrison 1971: 109–11.

[44] Epiros is exporting grain in the 330s but shortly afterwards (*c.*330–326) is among those who receive grain from Cyrene, see RO 96 l. 10 (Kleopatra receives 50,000 *medimnoi*). Leukas received 15,000 *medimnoi* (ibid. l. 20).

[45] Lycurgus, *In Leokr.* 27.

[46] Dem. 35. 1–2, 10. The loan of 3,000 drachmai was made by Androkles (*emporos*, ibid. 49) and a Nausikrates of Karystos to Artemon and Apollodoros of Phaselis; nature of charge, ibid. 32.

[47] The brothers are presumably metics at Athens.

[48] Dem. 35. 3, 10–13, the only surviving text of an Athenian maritime loan, Cohen 1992: 42 n. 4, 163.

their money by seizing Artemon's merchandise.[49] The complainant has therefore lost his money. Androkles also claims to have been endangered by the action of the Phaselite *emporoi* because the law is very tough 'if an Athenian takes grain to any destination other than Athens or lends money for any *emporion* other than an Athenian one'.[50] The Phaselite *emporoi* had reached the Piraeus with no cargo. The references to Isokrates, the teacher of Lakritos, suggest that the speech was written before the rhetorician's death in 338 but more precision is difficult.[51] The fact that the original ship was to go to Mende or Skione has been used to date the speech but provides little certainty. It seems more likely that 340 is the best *terminus ante quem*, for Philip II made maritime commerce in the Black Sea particularly difficult from that moment.[52] The speech probably dates from the 340s; Gernet's early date of 351 relies too much on the coincidence of Athenian relations with Chalkidike.[53] What is not clear, however, is when the restrictions on moving grain to destinations other than Athens were introduced. It is widely assumed that this was a long-standing law, but this is by no means certain.

Another restriction concerns the movement of grain when it arrived in Athens, or more precisely in the *emporion* in the Piraeus. A regulation mentioned in the *Athenaion Poltieia* required that the *epimelētai tou emporiou* (the superintendents of the *emporion*) compelled traders to take two-thirds of the grain that came to the polis by sea up to the city of Athens (the *asty*).[54] It is understood that the *epimelētai* directed *emporoi* to take the majority of their grain to the Athenian marketplace in the Agora and the remaining third stayed in the *emporion* in the Piraeus. In both marketplaces (one in the city of Athens in the Agora and the other in the Piraeus) the sale of the grain brought in by the *emporoi* was supervised by the *sitophylakes*. This explains why Demosthenes refers to their records (the *apographē*) as a place where one can confirm both the amounts of grain and its origin.[55] The grain market was clearly a discrete area in terms of administrative responsibility. There was one in both the Agora and in the Piraeus: five *sitophylakes* were assigned

[49] Dem. 35. 24–5. The cargo was allegedly lost when the ship was wrecked on the leg of the trip from Pantikapaion to Theodosia, according to Lakritos who claimed that it consisted of salted fish, Koan wine (80 amphoras), and other goods (apparently one or two bales of wool, eleven or twelve containers of salt-fish, two or three bundles of goatskins and nothing else, ibid. 34). In fact the cargo was destined for a landholder who had bought the items to feed those who worked his land and was therefore not able to be sold by Artemon (ibid. 31–4).

[50] Ibid. 50; the law itself, 51.

[51] Ibid. 15, 40.

[52] Cohen 1992: 176 with n. 267. For *c.*341/0, see e.g. Hind in *CAH*^{2} vi: 501.

[53] E. E. Cohen, 1992: 176 with n. 267. His identification of the witness, Phormion of Piraeus (Dem. 35. 13) as the banker Phormion seems sound; the banker is an Athenian who was trierarch in 325/4 and certainly active throughout the 340s and beyond (Cohen 1992: 176–9).

[54] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3. [55] Dem. 20. 32.

to the *asty* and five to the Piraeus, numbers which had increased to twenty and fifteen respectively when the *Athenaiōn Politeia* was compiled.[56] The silver coinage decree specifies that the *sitophylakes* exercised their own responsibilities concerning coinage in both localities where grain was sold while elsewhere such concerns fell in the domain of the *syllogeis* (in the Agora) and the *epimelētai* of the *emporion* (in the Piraeus).

A question that has vexed scholars for some time is what happened to the other third of grain imported by sea if the *emporoi* were forced by the *epimelētai* of the *emporion* to take two-thirds to Agora in the *asty*? It was long understood that the other third was exported.[57] This view shifted when Gauthier argued that the remaining third was sold in the Piraeus.[58] However, that such grain was sold in the Piraeus does not remove the possibility that such grain could be purchased for re-exportation. Garnsey offered a pragmatic interpretation of the realities of the wholesale grain market implied by the two-third/one-third ruling. There was little, in Garnsey's opinion, to prevent the grain that stayed for sale in the Piraeus from being bought up for re-exportation.[59] Gauthier himself had dismissed the re-exportation argument that had been originally put by Boeckh because in part such a reconstruction introduced 'une conception anachronique du "libéralisme économique" des cités grecques' and a misconception about Greek institutions.[60] Garnsey's more pragmatic view is likely to be more realistic and tempers somewhat Gauthier's too extreme an enforcement of what might be classified as a neo-primitivist approach to the economy. It is not certain, but the 15 talents raised by the sale of grain from Leukon in the year before Demosthenes' *Leptines* speech and subsequently administered by Kallisthenes may well have included revenues from grain sold for re-exportation.[61]

Taxation provided revenue for the polis. Revenue from taxation reinforced the importance the Athenians attached to having *emporoi* move grain to the *asty*. The comparison with the law of 374/3 on the grain tax from the islands (Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros) is instructive. It insists that the purchasers of the grain tax are to take their grain to the Agora in Athens at their own expense where it can be stored by the polis (without charge).[62] These interventions by the polis in the 'grain trade' and indeed the grain tax law have been interpreted as indications that the 'dependence on overseas grain is the reason behind much of Athens' regulation of the grain trade'.[63] However it is much more likely that such interventions do not simply explain an economy

[56] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3
[57] Boeckh 1851: 116 with Gauthier 1981: 8 nn. 9–10.
[58] Gauthier 1981, followed by e.g. Bresson 2000: 189–90; Rosivach 2000*a*: 45.
[59] Garnsey 1988: 140. [60] Gauthier 1981: 9. [61] Dem. 20. 33.
[62] RO 26 ll. 10–15. [63] Rosivach 2000*a*: 38.

of dependence but illustrate the complex economies of producing, moving, and selling commodities in the eastern Mediterranean. Grain that stayed in the *emporion* of the Piraeus was much more likely to be sold on and thus bought up for sale in other markets. The grain tax law of 374/3 no doubt deterred *emporoi* from buying up grain from the Agora of the *asty* and reshipping it out of Attica via the Piraeus because of the additional cost of moving the grain from the Agora back to the Piraeus.

Grain merchants were indeed as likely to find an alternative market *other than* Athens if restrictions were not imposed and enforced. If all things were equal and prices for grain at Athens were low, then a merchant with a shipload of cereal crops might well go elsewhere in search of a better price. This indeed is what happened to a cargo of Egyptian wheat heading for Athens when it was redirected to Rhodes as reported in a Demosthenic speech concerning the shadowy financial manoeuvres of Kleomenes when he held sway over Egypt.[64] In this context, the restriction of one-third of imported grain staying in the grain market in the Piraeus may well have facilitated and kept alive the re-export trade in grain as opposed to killing it altogether if the polis had required that *all* grain be sold wholesale in the Agora of Athens. Another important reason for making sure that grain was brought up to the Agora of the *asty* was no doubt to help subvert attempts at stockpiling grain and thereby preventing price rises.[65]

Commercial realities may then have some impact on the abundance of evidence for the importing of grain in the fourth century. Complaints about sharp practices by those merchants fond of profit certainly suggest that one of the more significant problems at Athens was not so much lack of grain per se but grain being sold at high prices. Of course one of the problems that raised grain prices on the Athenian market was the stockpiling of grain. This is identified in Lysias' *On the Grainsellers*: holding back grain rather than selling it on the retail market allowed the grain retailers to sell at a higher price.[66] The grain tax law of 374/3 was intended to puncture this potential price inflation that affected the retail market. The sale of the island grain could not be put to the vote until deep into the year in the month of Anthesterion (February/March) and even then the People decided the price at which the elected men were to sell the wheat and barley.[67]

When Demosthenes says, then, that the Athenians use more imported grain than anyone else what does this mean in terms of dependency? What does it

[64] Dem. 56. 8–10. So too Xen. *Oik.* 20. 27–8.

[65] Rosivach 2000*a* makes this the essence of such interventions.

[66] Lysias 22. 15 (386/5). See Seager 1966; Stanton 1985; Figueira 1986.

[67] Stroud 1998: 73 and 5 (Ag. I 7557) ll. 42–6. Rosivach 2000*a*: 55 n. 74 denies that the law was designed to buy the grain at a good (i.e. low) price, cf. RO 26: 127.

mean in terms of commerce? It is a mistake to turn to the 400,000 *medimnoi* from Leukon and assume that *all* this grain was coming to Athens and being sold (at retail price) in the market for immediate consumption by the (hungry) residents of Attica. As Whitby says of the imported grain coming to Athens: 'in most years it was probably the case that not all of this grain was needed for internal consumption, since it will have been in Athenian interests to encourage a certain amount of oversupply'.[68] A good example of how difficult it is to interpret imported grain is indeed Demosthenes' own record of the grain that had come from Leukon 'two years ago'. There was then a grain shortage that affected everyone and Leukon conveyed grain that was not only sufficient for the Athenians but was enough to raise 15 talents which Kallisthenes administered.[69] The benefits of the Athenian grain trade were twofold, as Whitby says. On the one hand oversupply could keep down prices, and on the other, a surplus meant grain for re-export. The question remains therefore how much of the imported grain was really needed on a regular basis? The answer to that question depended inevitably on the productivity of the grain harvest in Athens but also on why grain came to Athens.

The high price of grain and the annoyance felt among the Athenians addressed by orators such as Demosthenes at those making profits is all too evident in some speeches. While the Athenians were either paying through the nose or having to eat barley, others may have been making profits—this is a familiar theme of the law court speeches of the fourth century and of course was always designed to produce a gut reaction in the orator's audience.[70] The price-rise phenomenon is surely one of the reasons why some individuals are praised in honorific decrees for having sold grain at what must have been a price below the going rate. Those who sold at the *kathestekuia timē* were selling below the market price, below the prevailing price, and if we follow Bresson at 'the recommended price' (the 'prix officiel').[71] Bresson suggests

[68] Whitby 1998: 125 (citing Dem. 20. 33).

[69] Dem. 20. 33: *ἀλλὰ πρωπέρυσιν σιτοδείας παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γενομένης οὐ μόνον ὑμῖν ἱκανὸν σῖτον ἀπέστειλεν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον ὥστε πεντεκαίδεκ' ἀργυρίου τάλαντα, ἃ Καλλισθένης διῴκησε, προσπεριγενέσθαι.* Kallisthenes (*PA* 8090) is presumably the author of the alliance with Thrace, Paeonia, and Illyria that was passed at the start of 356/5. The grain from Leukon was not necessarily a gift: Demosthenes is unlikely to have ignored the free donation of a large supply of grain from the Bosporan king. The verb corresponds with actions by benefactors described in inscribed decrees: sending Athenians (*IG* ii^2 398a l. 9; 493, ll. 22–3), ambassadors (*IG* ii^2 448 l. 79) or grain (*IG* ii^2 398a ll. 12–14).

[70] [Dem.] 42. 20; 34. 37.

[71] Bresson 2000: 182–206. Bresson argues that this was a price set by official mechanisms but not necessarily a price that could be enforced. Rosivach's 'prevailing price' does not work if a prevailing price was 11 drachmai higher than the price at which a merchant sold the grain, as Dem. 34. 39. The point of such references is that individuals are praised for selling at a price that was below the prevailing price. The corollary seems to be the case when prices are 'fixed' (in the negative sense) the verb is *συνίστημι* (Dem. 56. 7).

that a price-setting authority lies behind the term (*kathestēkuia timē*). Indeed among the mechanisms of the first-fruits at Eleusis was the facility for the barley and wheat, along with other commodities, to be sold at a price decided by the assembly. The price fixing for the grain that came from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros has already been mentioned.[72] All the evidence points to the presence of market forces that pushed up prices and various mechanisms whereby the polis tried to make sure that grain came to Athens to mollify such upward price pressures.

It was of course the role of the several institutions in the Athenian polis to oversee the correct and just sale of various commodities. These are grouped together in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*. The *agoranomoi*, five in the city itself and five in the Piraeus, made sure all sales were good and true. The *metronomoi*, five in the city and five in the Piraeus, inspected weights and measures to make sure that those used by the seller were good. The thirty-five *sitophylakes* by the time of the *Athenaion Politeia* made sure that the grain in the marketplace was sold justly, that the millers sold barley flour and the bakers sold wheat products at a price in proportion to barley and wheat costs and at the measures that they set because the law requires them to fix the weight. All three sets of these officials are selected by lot. At most levels, commodity sales were supervised by Athenian officials.[73]

A re-examination of the grain exported from the Bosporos suggests that the terms arranged by the Spartokid kings and the Athenians in fact served the interests of two parties, the kings and the Athenians. Those sailing to Athens were given special priority in loading their ships and an exemption from the one-thirtieth tax.[74] The various grants awarded by the Bosporan kings almost certainly brought considerable movement of traders and commerce to their territory and, crucially, their *emporia* where revenues could be exacted. At Athens the Bosporan kings also enjoyed *ateleia*. A surviving copy of the decree, passed in 347/6, awarding honours to the Spartokid king and his sons who had succeeded Leukon, emphasizes reciprocity when the Athenians extended the privileges previously given to Satyros and Leukon to their sons Spartokos and Pairisades (and Apollonios).[75] 'Since they <Spartokos and Pairisades> give those grants to the Athenians which Satyros and Leukon

[72] *IG* ii^2 1672 ll. 283, 287, 289.

[73] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51.

[74] Dem. 20. 30–2; 34. 36. How exclusive was the grant? *IG* xii. 2 1223 records taxation privileges that were granted by Leukon (the Bosporan king) and his sons to the people of Mytilene around the same time, in the 350s.

[75] RO 64 ll. 1–2 (the three sons), 20–4 (Spartokos and Pairisades), 65–8 (addition of Apollonios). In terms of the exchange/sale of commodities between the two regions, Bresson 2000: 125 n. 66: 'La notion d'échange reciproque . . . est capitale pour analyser les échanges d'Athènes avec le Bosphore.'

gave, Spartokos and Pairisades are to have the grants that the People gave to Satyros and Leukon.'[76] Demosthenes singled out the *ateleia* awarded to the Bosporan kings as a critical element of their honours.[77]

1.5. *ATELEIA*—THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF HONOURS[78]

Ateleia was an honour given by the Athenians only to significant benefactors.[79] In several cases such awards referred to specific taxes. For example, *ateleia* for a metic gave exemption from the metic tax.[80] On one occasion an honorand was specifically given, in an inscription, *ateleia* from everything.[81] In *c.*307/6 at Athens a limited form of *ateleia* granted exemption from military service to those who contracted to repair the walls of the city for the four-year term of the contract.[82] So what did *ateleia* at Athens actually mean for the Bosporan kings? If *ateleia* really meant freedom from all tax obligations then we should assume that this would have included freedom from paying various duties such as the one-fiftieth tax, or other taxes on commercial operations.[83] The Scholiast on the speech *Against Leptines* makes it clear that *ateleia* has a double benefit: '*Ateleia* is twofold; for it relates either to commerce or to liturgies.'[84] The Scholiast believes that Leukon is understood to benefit in both of these terms, in other words he has *ateleia* in terms of commerce and

[76] RO 64 (= *IG* ii^2 212) ll. 20–4: [ἐπ]ε[ι]δὴ δὲ [τὰ]ς δω[ρει]ὰς διδόασιν Ἀθηναίοι[ς ἅσ]περ Σ[άτ]υρος καὶ Λεύκων ἔδοσαν, εἶναι [Σπαρτ]ό[κ]ωι [κ]αὶ Παιρισάδει τὰς δωρειάς, ἃς [ὁ δῆμ]ος ἔδωκε Σατύρωι καὶ Λεύκωνι; Satyros I (433/2–389/8); Leukon (389/8–349/8); Spartokos II (349/8–344/3) with Pairisades I (349/8–311/10).

[77] Dem. 20. 29–40.

[78] Knoepfler 2001: 55–60 provides a useful survey of *ateleia* in central Greece.

[79] Dem. 20. 132 suggests that *ateleia* was a more exclusive privilege than *proxenia* (with Knoepfler 2001: 57 n. 189): ἀλλ' ἕτερον πρόξενόν ἐστ' εἶναι καὶ ἀτέλειαν εὑρῆσθαι. Knoepfler 2001: 60 shows that it was a rare privilege when it was first granted also in Boeotia and at Eretria.

[80] For examples see Henry 1983: 241–6; exemption from metic tax: 244–5, from *eisphora*, 245. The corollary is some indication for *isoteleia* implies not only paying *eisphora* and military service but also 'paying *teleia* just as Athenians' (Henry 1983: 249, *IG* ii^2 287 ll. 2–7).

[81] Ibid. 245–6, *IG* ii^2 286 ll. 4–5; Knoepfler 2001: 58 n. 193. On general *ateleia*, ibid. 56 n. 179. At Oropos *ateleia* from all duties is granted to Macedonian honorands *c.*310 (*I. Oropos* 4–6 = *IG* vii 4256–7 and *SEG* xv. 264).

[82] *IG* ii^2 463 ll. 116–17. This is the clearest example of the specific privilege of exemption from military service (overlooked at Henry 1983: 245). For a similarly limited period of *ateleia*, compare the grant in 181 (Walbank, *Comm.* iii. 255) of *ateleia* for three years given by the Achaean League to the Messenians in order that the latter can restore the prosperity of their territory, almost certainly their agricultural economy; note this privilege too was to be inscribed on a *stēlē* (Polyb. 24. 2. 3).

[83] This is not an unreasonable assumption, cf. Marasco 1988: 162–3 on *ateleia* on Delos.

[84] Schol. ad Dem. 20. 113: ἡ ἀτέλεια διττή· ἢ γὰρ κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ λειτουργίαν.

liturgies: 'Since therefore Leukon happened to be exempt from duties (*atelēs*), on the one hand in terms of him setting down for himself wheat in the Piraeus, and on the other hand in terms of not performing *chorēgia* as he is a foreigner, Leptines brings a charge that the law, on account of this obscurity (*asapheia*), gives the opportunity to someone who wishes to, to invite Leukon to perform a *chorēgia* and what is more to threaten him with taxation charges (*telōnai*).'[85] The Scholiast suggests therefore that Leukon's benefits from *ateleia* included exemption not only from liturgies but also exemption from taxes including customs duties, exemptions therefore that he would lose if Leptines' law were adopted.[86]

There is nothing controversial in underlining the commercial benefits of *ateleia* although it has not been a prominent theme in the recent treatments of honours, benefaction, and institutions at Athens and elsewhere in the Greek world. *Ateleia* performed a practical benefit in terms of avoidance of tax payment, especially commercial duties. For example, in the Hellenistic era the artists (*technitai*) of Dionysos, the association that was so important for performances at religious festivals, enjoyed various immunities such as *asylia* and *ateleia*.[87] In moving from one Greek city to another they were not required to perform civic obligations and *ateleia* amounted to the non-payment of *all* taxes. Their privileges of *ateleia* seem to have been sufficiently well established that at Kos, Sulla (in 84 to 81) extended their *ateleia* to include exemption from the taxation payments demanded by Rome.[88] In other examples, selective privileges of *ateleia* often focused on an exemption from import and export taxes. The Athenians in the middle of the second century awarded one of their own leading citizens, Miltiades son of Zoilos of Marathon, with the unusual privilege of exemption from import taxes.[89]

[85] Ibid. 74: *ἐπεὶ οὖν συνέβαινε τὸν Λεύκωνα εἶναι ἀτελῆ, πῇ μὲν διὰ τὸν τιθέμενον πυρὸν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ, πῇ δὲ τὸ μὴ χορηγεῖν ξένον ὄντα, αἰτιᾶται ὡς διδόντος τοῦ νόμου κατὰ τὴν ἀσάφειαν ταύτην καιρὸν τῷ βουλομένῳ καλεῖν εἰς χορηγίαν τὸν Λεύκωνα καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐπηρεάζειν εἰς τελωνείαν.*

[86] The joint grant of citizenship and *ateleia* that have been awarded to Leukon and his successors are paralleled at Eretria by a comparable grant (*c.*318, Knoepfler 2001: 183–4) of the highest honours and complete *ateleia*, *IG* xii 9 196, with Knoepfler 2001: 179–80.

[87] Le Guen 2001; 2003. *Ateleia* was offered to the artists of the guild of Dionysos at Athens in the early 270s (*IG* ii^2 1128 ll. 9, 12; Le Guen 2001: i nos. 2, 56; ii. 69–71).

[88] Le Guen 2001: i no. 56 face B ll. 1–14 = R. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East. Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1969) no. 49.

[89] *IG* ii^2 968 l. 15 with Henry 1983: 251 n. 1. These civic honours (*IG* ii^2 968 ll. 2–18) predate the award (of 141/0 archonship of [Dionysios], Meritt 1977: 180; *IG* ii^2 968 ll. 19–71) of further honours, which almost certainly included the award of a bronze statue whose base survives (*IG* ii^2 3867). The *stēlē* recording this and earlier honorific decrees stood beside the statue (*IG* ii^2 968 ll. 65–6) in the Agora (where both the decree and the statue base were found). Miltiades was a member of the wealthy Athenian elite who served as *agōnothetēs* for the Theseia in 153/2 (honoured for his term in office, *IG* ii^2 958) and archon *basileus* (T. L. Shear, *Hesp.* 40 (1971) 257–8 = Ag. I 7186, with Tracy *ADT* 139).

Ateleia was therefore not only an honorific privilege but was of real value and could bring the honorand financial benefits.[90] In the aftermath of the earthquake suffered by Rhodes in 227/6, several foreign kings granted aid. Among these benefactions, Hiero and Gelo of Syracuse, Ptolemy III, and Seleukos II all granted *ateleia* to Rhodians sailing to their respective territories.[91] Several examples of the specific *ateleia* privilege on taxes for imports and exports are known from places in the Greek world. Such grants are relatively common in the Hellenistic period at Delphi and Delos where they are more often associated with grants of *proxenia* which has led subsequently to the belief that *ateleia* in some contexts was in fact the equivalent of *isoteleia*.[92] However the specific privilege of *ateleia* on imports and exports was granted in several locations. It is significant that this privilege was granted in the regions around the Black Sea. In Olbia *ateleia* was awarded on all things that the honorand and his descendants *and slaves* imported or exported. Even Athenians numbered among the recipients of such privileges.[93] More striking still is the grant of *proxenia* and *ateleia* in the Bosporan Kingdom. A resident of Amisos on the southern coast of the Black Sea, for example, received *ateleia* on all goods for both the inward-bound and outward-bound sailing trips.[94] Around the same time as Leukon exercised his *ateleia* at Athens, the people of Arkesine on Amorgos granted the Athenian governor and historian Androtion (the Atthidographer) a gold crown, *proxeneia*, and *ateleia* from everything.[95]

[90] *Ateleia* was not, at Athens, an automatic privilege granted alongside *proxenia*, see Rhodes, *Comm.* 653; Knoepfler 2001: 57 n. 189.

[91] Polyb. 5. 88–89.8 (see Austin 1981 no. 93); Syracuse: Diod. Sic. 26. 8. 1.

[92] Knoepfler 2001: 59.

[93] *IOSPE* 5 = Dubois 1996 no. 21 (*c.*340–30) for a pair of Athenians from the elite of society. Xanthippos son of Aristophon of Erchia is surely the father of Chrysogone who married the son of Polyeuktos of Bate (*IG* ii^2 5867), probably related to one or both of the contributors to the *epidosis* to defend the harvest in Attica in 248/7 (*LGPN* ii s.v. Xanthippos 1, Xanthippos 3, and Aristophon 23; *IOSPE* 5 was not considered at *APF* pp. 467–8 and probably assists the reconstruction of the Erchia branch of the family from Bate). Philopolis son of Philopolis of Deiradiotai (*LGPN* ii s.v. Philopolis 2) belongs to rich family known from their tombstones (*APF* 12076: *IG* ii^2 12499, 12658, and 12967) and [Lysias] 20 (which reveals they owned property in the deme ([Lysias] 20. 23 and 33). These Athenians are clearly energetic *emporoi* investing and presumably profiting from commerce, perhaps even the grain trade between Athens and the Black Sea.

[94] These honours were awarded to the son of Dionysios of Peiraieus and preserved on a decree from Pantikapaion (*CIRB* 1 = *Syll.*^{3} 217). The honorand, it is worth noting, came from Amisos which had been *renamed* Peiraieus (he was not an Athenian), see Knoepfler 2001: 201 with n. 625; Byrne in the online version of *LGPN* has corrected the entry preserved in *LGPN* ii s.v. Dionysios 622.

[95] RO 51 ll. 16–34 (= *IG* xii 7 5). One can only speculate as to what led Androtion to waive interest on a loan worth around a talent (RO p. 253). Arkesine was not without its valuable commodities and it is possible that Androtion somehow fleeced the island and benefited from

The issue of honours allowed communities to reward those individuals with whom they not only wished to be associated but also to reinforce associations. Did not the award by a community of *proxenia* and *ateleia* on import and export duties make honorands more likely to establish, continue and cultivate their commercial transactions with the polity that gave such honours? Perhaps not in all cases. But *ateleia* was certainly another mechanism that a community could use to intervene in the economics of commerce. It is quite clear that not only Athens but many other polities—including the Bosporan kings themselves—exploited honours for the commercial significance that they had for those who could enjoy them.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that the *ateleia* at Athens enjoyed by the Spartokid king meant that he did not pay taxes there. If one searches therefore for an economic explanation for grants made by the Bosporan kings to those sailing to Athens with grain, then the indirect commercial benefits and the direct profits from *ateleia* at Athens go some way to offering a solution. The reciprocity in the relationship involving Athens and the Bosporan king that is underlined in the language of the decree of 347/6 touches on the mutual commercial benefits in Athenian–Bosporan Kingdom trading relations.[96] The suggestion here is that the grants renewed by the Athenians in 347/6, which Leukon had been enjoying at the time of Demosthenes' speech against Leptines' law on *ateleia*, were much more than merely honorific grants and of *real financial* value to the Bosporan kings.[97]

How might this benefit have worked? The high level of trade in the Bosporan Kingdom that would have been produced by the arrival of ships conveying grain to Attica obviously creates a good economic and productive commercial environment in terms of incoming cargoes. The Bosporan kings have granted immunity from the one-thirtieth tax on grain leaving their territory. Ships arriving would still pay taxes, although at Theodosia the Athenians seem to have *ateleia*.

It is more difficult to unravel how the *ateleia* enjoyed by the Bosporan kings would have worked in the Athenian trading centres. The awards the Bosporan royal family enjoyed existed in their name but it was almost certainly not expected that they themselves needed to be present to benefit from the

ateleia in the process (on Arkesine's valuable exclusive clothing, see e.g *IG* ii^2 1514 ll. 2, 10, 22, 51, 63, 65).

[96] RO 64 ll. 20–4.

[97] This argument suggests that the interpretation offered by Gauthier (1985: 156, following quotation) who believes in the Finleyan model of the Greek economy (Gauthier 1981: 28) is wrong: 'Mais la priorité et l'exemption accordées par les Spartokides étaient des privilèges matériels ou tangibles, alors que le droit de cité et l'*atéleia* décidés par les Athéniens étaient *honorifiques* [my emphasis].'

privileges of *ateleia*. Bresson has explored the mechanisms of the tax exemption enjoyed by those exporting grain from the Bosporos and has shown convincingly that merchants carried documents that could identify the cargo, its origins, and destinations.[98] In addition to the registers kept by the *sitophylakes* there were records, for example, of the collectors of the 2 per cent tax.[99] Tax collectors exacted a typical 2 per cent tax on cargoes in the polities of the Mediterranean and compiled some sort of register in which it was possible to check whether someone had recently paid this tax. In the Demosthenic speech *Against Lakritos*, we hear how Androkles, who was waiting in the Piraeus to see if his debtors (Artemon and Apollodoros of Phaselis) had returned with a cargo, went to see if the 2 per cent tax had been registered in their names.[100] The debtors were *emporoi* travelling with their boat and were liable to pay the 2 per cent tax on arrival at the Piraeus. Presumably, records of officials elsewhere would have provided similar information. The *ellimēnistai* in the Bosporos had such a register and perhaps too the *pentēkostologoi* at Kyparissia.[101] However it was clear that individuals who had *ateleia* did not necessarily pay taxes such as the 2 per cent or, indeed, other customs duties.[102] In the speech *Against Phormion*, the slave and *nauklēros* Lampis abuse such privileges. King Pairisades, continuing the Spartokid kings' policy of offering favourable exemptions from taxes to those sailing to Athens, had declared *ateleia* to anyone who wanted to go to Athens to take grain to an Athenian *emporion*, i.e. the right to export grain to an Athenian-controlled *emporion* without paying taxes to the Bosporan king.[103] Lampis took up *ateleia* granted for the Athens market 'in the name of the polis' but instead took his cargo to Akanthos (on the east coast of the Chalkidike peninsula) and sold it there.

Commodities could arrive at a destination and not be registered for taxes such as the 2 per cent if the cargo travelled in the name of one who enjoyed

[98] Bresson 2000: 148.

[99] *Pentēkostologoi*; see Glotz 1926: 299.

[100] Dem. 35. 29–30 (with Harpocration s.v. πεντηκοστή); see Harrison 1971: 111–12. Cf. Dem. 34. 7.

[101] Dem. 34. 34; Kyparissia, see *IG* v 1 1421.

[102] The customs' law (*dēmosionikos nomos*) from Caunos (Caria) in the first century AD refers to foreign traders having *ateleia* on commodities they import, see G. E. Bean, *JHS* 74 (1958) 97–105 no. 38 C8–11: 'the foreigners who sail in and sell anything, themselves also having remission by *ateleia* on the commodities they import, are to put back again on their boats and take away within twenty days all the commodities that had been imported by them and, left on the ground, had remained unsold'. On Caunos in this period, Bresson 2002: 156–62; on the inscription, Purcell 2005: esp. 209–10 with n. 26 for refs.

[103] Dem. 34. 36–7 (*Against Phormion*). Lampis is a *nauklēros* and slave of Dion (34. 5–6 and 10) who resides temporarily in the Bosporan Kingdom but eventually makes it back to Athens (34. 11–15; Bresson 2000: 147).

ateleia. Lampis enjoyed those privileges as he was supposedly taking a cargo to Athens. It follows that commodities, such as grain, that arrived in the name of an *emporos* who was exempt from taxation would not be registered for the 2 per cent tax. However, the records at Athens that do seem to have recorded the source and amount of grain reaching the city was the register of grain sold on the wholesale market in both the Agora and in the Piraeus under the supervision of the respective boards of the *sitophylakes*. That register, indeed, is the one that Demosthenes suggests one can consult to confirm 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain has arrived from the Bosporan Kingdom.[104] That register, and not the records of the collectors of the 2 per cent taxes, is likely to have been the most reliable source of information. For it is possible that some cargoes from the Bosporan kings were transported in their name and were therefore not liable to taxation.

If commodities, including grain, could reach Athens in the name of the Bosporan kings, were they still exempt from import duties at the *emporia* of the Athenians? All seems to hang on being able to move commodities 'in the name of' someone.[105] The evidence suggests that the rights of the Bosporan kings to *ateleia* were published widely in Athenian *emporia*. The Bosporan kings enjoyed the highest privileges at Athens including statues and *stēlai* defining their honours. Statues were located in both the Agora and the *emporion* in the Piraeus.[106] We learn from Demosthenes that the Athenians and Leukon had *stēlai* set up at the Bosporos, the Piraeus and at Hieron (on the Asiatic side of the Thracian Bosporos).[107] It is likely that the *stēlai* for Leukon were set up in these locations not only to publicize the honours but for the practical dissemination and reinforcement of rights such as *ateleia*. Inscriptions (and statues) were often set up in a context that was most relevant to the subject matter.[108] Major Athenian honorific inscriptions and statues were seldom set up in the middle of the fourth century outside the *centre* of the polis, namely the Acropolis or Agora. This adds to the significance that *stēlai* for Leukon were set up at the Bosporos (possibly

[104] Dem. 20. 32.

[105] Dem. 34. 36: *κήρυγμα γὰρ ποιησαμένου Παιρισάδου ἐν Βοσπόρῳ, ἐάν τις βούληται Ἀθήναζε εἰς τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἐμπόριον σιτηγεῖν, ἀτελῆ τὸν σῖτον ἐξάγειν, ἐπιδημῶν ἐν τῷ Βοσπόρῳ ὁ Λάμπις ἔλαβε τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τοῦ σίτου καὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ὀνόματι.*

[106] *IG* ii^2 653 ll. 13–17 (286/5): the ancestors of Spartokos III (304/3–284/3) had been honoured with statues in the Agora and *emporion* and other privileges; Spartokos III received a statue in Agora alongside those of his ancestors and another on the Acropolis, ll. 40–2. The *stele* for Spartokos III in 286/5 is set up on the Acropolis; at this time the Piraeus is dominated by a Macedonian garrison installed on Mounychia.

[107] Dem. 20. 36 (with RO 64 p. 304): *τούτων δ ἁπάντων στήλας ἀντιγράφους ἐστήσαθ' ὑμεῖς τε κἀκεῖνος, τὴν μὲν ἐν Βοσπόρωι, τὴν δὲ ἐν Πειραιεῖ, τὴν δ' ἐφ' Ἱερῷ.*

[108] *Stēlai*: Oliver 2003*b*; statues at Athens: Oliver (2007).

Pantikapaion)[109] and certainly in Athens and Hieron.[110] Moreover the inscription passed in 347/6 honouring the sons of Leukon was almost certainly set up in the Piraeus (where it was found) and almost certainly beside the *stēlē* for Satyros and Leukon there.[111]

Ateleia is a privilege with spatial connotations. The operation of *ateleia* could well have affected the choice of location for the *stēlai* (and perhaps statues) for the Bosporan kings. Leukon enjoyed privileges of *ateleia* and the *stēlai* recording the honours were set up in Athenian territory in the Piraeus and at Hieron. Why? The reason should be clear if we consider that the most relevant context for Leukon's honours (notably *ateleia*) were the Athenian *emporia*. Here commodities liable to customs' taxes could arrive in the name of the Bosporan king. The record of Leukon's *ateleia* had most relevance in such locations where commodities arriving in Athenian commercial space were exempt from Athenian taxes.[112]

The suggestion is then that *ateleia* for Leukon, indeed for the Bosporan kings in the middle of the fourth century, was a real financial privilege, not a symbolic honour. The grant of *ateleia* awarded to Leukon was extended to his sucessors. In short, *ateleia* was a valuable privilege for the Bosporan kings and allowed them to avoid paying taxes in Athenian *emporia*. They too had waived similar taxes for those exporting grain from their kingdom to Athens. Here then is the reciprocal nature of the honours at the heart of the decree in 347/6. The context in which so much grain was coming from Leukon's Bosporan Kingdom to Athens is complex and cannot be separated from the structures of commerce and the economic history of the institutions of Greek polities.

Imported grain from the Bosporan Kingdom was not simply destined for consumption in a polis that depended on such imports. The grain imports from Leukon in the middle of the fourth century raise more complex problems. The movement of grain to Athenian *emporia* encouraged the movement of commodities back towards the Bosporan Kingdom. One of the problems for the Bosporan kings was clearly their limited ability to intervene personally in commercial movements. Indeed, it is possible that their request for ships' crews in 347/6 may reflect in some way how limited the Bosporan kings were in terms of managing their own maritime operations.[113] The grain from Leukon and the 400,000 *medimnoi* cannot therefore be trusted to represent needs in Attica. Nor can it be certain that all this grain would have

[109] This can refer to the whole of Bosporan territory or specifically to Pantikapaion.

[110] Liddel 2003.

[111] RO 64 was found in the Piraeus, and the *stēlē* honouring Spartokos and his brothers was to stand beside the *stēlē* for Satyros and Leukon (RO 64 ll. 46–7).

[112] Compare the provisions for those with *ateleia* at Delos, Bresson 2000: 145 n. 76.

[113] RO 64 ll. 59–63. It is not clear whether these operations were military or commercial.

stayed within the Athenian market. In short, any quantification of the size of imported grain consumption at Athens that is directly built on the figures for the grain from Leukon does not offer a realistic indication of the *scale* of the Athenian dependency on imported grain nor on their dependency on the Black Sea. It is clear that in the 350s the Athenians enjoyed a period of large-scale movements of grain from Leukon and that *might* have continued under his successors, but such movements were vulnerable not only to problems in and around the producing territory but also at strategic points along the routes used by the cargo-carrying ships. In the second half of the fourth century both these vulnerabilities became realities and affected and no doubt extensively disrupted such movements.[114]

1.6. BREAD BASKETS: OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

Various sources of grain imports were exploited by Athens in both the Classical and Hellenistic periods but consistent value was attached to the overseas territories of the polis, the cleruchies.[115] Their importance is reflected in the inscribed accounts of the *epistatai* from Eleusis in 329/8 recording the first-fruits given to the cult, 1/600th of barley and 1/1200th of wheat. The inscription offers data for establishing the cereal harvest for Attica and the islands of Skyros, Imbros, and Lemnos.[116] The latter are 'the islands' at the heart of tax law proposed by Agyrrhius in 374/3.[117] The data from the Eleusis accounts was analysed by Garnsey whose figures are used here. The production of Lemnos can be calculated only if one assumes that the dedications made by the cities of Myrina and Hephaistia represent the island's cereal production.[118] The inscription produces the results shown in Table 1.2.

If the cereal production of the three islands of Skyros, Imbros, and Lemnos are taken at face value, they offer some idea of the relative scale of the productivity and value of the imported grain from Leukon. Demosthenes' suggestion of 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain coming to Athens from the Bosporan king is roughly equivalent to the *total harvest* of the three islands of Skyros, Imbros, and Lemnos. This is an impressive total for the Bosporos Kingdom but also for the islands and should put into perspective the relative productivity of the islands and the Bosporos.

[114] Garnsey 1998: 150–1. [115] Salomon 1997: 175–84. [116] Ibid. 179–81.
[117] Stroud 1998 = RO 26; Salomon 1997: 183–4.
[118] A reasonable assumption, see Phylarchos *FGrH* 81 fr. 29 (Heinen 1972: 43).

TABLE 1.2. *Grain production on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in 329/8*

Island	Harvest in 329/8 (*medimnoi*)	Total weight (kg)	
Skyros	barley 28,800	(at 33.4 kg/*med.*)	961,920
	wheat 9,600	(at 40 kg/*med.*)	384,000
TOTAL	38,400		1,345,920
Imbros	barley 26,000	(at 33.4 kg/*med.*)	868,380
	wheat 44,200	(at 40 kg/*med.*)	1,768,000
TOTAL	70,200		2,636,380
Lemnos	barley 248,525	(at 33.4 kg/*med.*)	8,300,760
	wheat 56,750	(at 40 kg/*med.*)	2,270,000
TOTAL	305,275		10,570760

Source: P. Garnsey 1988: 98, Table 5: *IG* ii^2 1672.

Another major source of overseas grain for Athens was Euboea, a potential producer of surplus commodities and also an important location in terms of the movement of commodities. A great deal of attention is given to the strategic importance of Euboea in the fifth century because of Thucydides' discussion of its role when the Spartans took over Dekeleia.[119] But the history of Euboea is also central to the fourth century not only for its own potential production of commodities but also because it continued to be a strategic point in trading routes particularly from Skyros.[120] This helps explain why Demosthenes could complain that Philip II had become master of the wheat trade when he had control of Thebes, Euboea, and Byzantium.[121]

The production from the Aegean islands was of considerable value to the Athenians. They were vital to Athenian strategy and continued to be of great value in the Hellenistic period. It is true that their potential productivity was inferior to the capacity that the Bosporos Kingdom enjoyed but the relationship between Athens and the cleruchies made the islands a vital element in the economies of the polis. For as the 374/3 grain tax law shows, control of these islands enabled the Athenians to manipulate this grain source for the convenience not only of the Athenian market but ultimately for the revenues of the polis. In addition to all these aspects, the islands also served as useful locations for the maritime routes of the Aegean, including the sailing routes in the north-east Aegean to and from the Black Sea.

[119] Thuc. 7. 28. and 8. 4; Westlake 1948; Knoepfler 2001: 314–16.
[120] Knoepfler 2001: 315 n. 304. [121] Dem. 18. 241.

1.7. THE TASTE FOR GAIN: FINANCING COMMERCE

Other factors could well figure in the economies of importing grain. For instance, Bosporan wheat was highly desirable at Athens. While the Attic countryside was much more suited to barley production, the best bread wheat came from the Black Sea.[122] By the fourth century BC the Mediterranean economies had evolved considerably.[123] It is possible that the commercial availability of good wheat from outside Attica affected cultivation strategies of farms in Attica. But however much taste for good bread wheat determined demand, the real secret of moving the grain was in a successful *emporion*. The Piraeus was a typical *emporion* enjoying a good coastal location with secure harbours.[124] It was a centre for commercial activities and provided a wealth of individuals able to finance maritime operations. Money was required to fund the fourth-century maritime operations that moved commodities from producers to consumers, from source to market. The need for maritime commercial voyages attracted financing operations by individuals who were able to operate in the sort of ways that have been compared to proto-banks. The debate on the nature of credit and 'banking' in fourth-century Athens has polarized between two approaches that have offered alternative ways of thinking about the Greek economies.[125] The proponents of the debate, Millett and Cohen, rely on the same evidence but reach different conclusions about the importance of financing commercial activities. Millett emphasizes the social context in which money was lent and echoes the discredit that he observes in the literary sources for the charging of interest on such loans among friends.[126] Millett stresses the vast differences between modern banking practices and lending in fourth-century Athens. Cohen draws much closer parallels between the principles of modern banking and what he identifies as banking practices in fourth-century Athens. The stress, as Von Reden says, is on the significance that each author attaches to such lending practices. 'In Millett's account Cohen's examples are exceptions which are not sufficient in number and impact to make a difference to the economic process, while the ideological background considered by Millett is for Cohen no more than public rhetoric.'[127]

[122] Sallares 1991: 323–32. The value of the Black Sea in this respect is well known, see Michell (1957: 265) citing Arist. *Probl.* 909a: 'wheat from that region was highly esteemed; it was harder than other varieties, made good bread and would last longer'.

[123] 'Les temps étaient changés: au moins dans les grandes cités, on était dans un autre monde, aux structures juridiques et politiques plus évoluées, qui conaissait déjà une grande spécialisation des tâches et était exigeant en capital' (Bresson 2000: 295).

[124] Casevitz 1993: 20. For an inland *emporion* see now Pistiros (Velkov and Domaradzka 1994).

[125] Von Reden 2002: 143–5. [126] Millett 1983; 1990. [127] Von Reden 2002: 145.

How can the relative importance of lending be calibrated? Consider one of the specific functions of lending: the financing of maritime expeditions. As Cohen points out: 'Virtually all these cargoes were dependent on loans. These financings, together with the additional loans generated by the Piraeus' dominant position as an entrepôt for the eastern Mediterranean, provided creditors with an opportunity to absorb over many transactions the risk of a total loss from the sinking of a single ship.'[128] The measure of the importance of lending (and banking) at Athens is the function of such credit operations. If, as seems very likely, maritime commerce was funded and underwritten by credit transactions it is not difficult to realize just how important credit was to commerce and therefore to the economies of polis in general. Indeed, the degree of importance one attaches to the Athenian dependence on grain is in direct proportion to the importance of credit operations to finance maritime commerce. How can one quantify in absolute terms the importance of financial operations that provided credit and underwrote maritime commerce? One method is the quantification of the ship movements suggested by the hypothetical fleet of 270 ships required to carry the projected 800,000 *medimnoi* brought into Athens in one year in the 350s.[129] If the minimal number of ship voyages in a year was in the region of 300 then it is not difficult to realize the importance that must be attached to the financial support to sustain such ship voyages. Moreover if, as Millett wishes to stress, the numbers of those acting as creditors and financiers were small, then we should attach all the more importance to those individuals even if such lenders made up only a small percentage of the population. For in their hands lay an important part of the financial structure of maritime commerce that was expected to supply grain to the polis from overseas. The fact that such creditors were able to support and underwrite maritime commerce was of enormous importance to the polis and therefore to Athenian economies.

The Athenian polis provided neither the cargo ships nor the money to finance such operations, but it did provide an infrastructure and space within which commerce took place. The polis extracted revenues at various key points, and annually appointed officials to oversee, control, and secure such operations. It also offered the advantages of a strong coinage of value throughout the Mediterraean. And crucially, the successful commercial polis offered an environment in which those involved in commerce at all levels could be offered legal protection or resource to the courts.[130] In this fertile

[128] Cohen 1992: 140–1. [129] Bresson 2000: 278 n. 66.

[130] The Demosthenic *corpus* is evidence for the importance of recourse to such legal processes.

environment provided by the Athenian polis the grain trade had taken root and flourished in the Piraeus.

The Athenians harvested the benefits. Some Athenians and metics were able to take the richest pickings because they took the greatest risks.[131] Xanthippos son of Aristophon of Erchia and Philopolis son of Philopolis of Deiradiotai, the wealthy pair of Athenians honoured by the people of Olbia, were no doubt not alone. Honoured as *proxenoi* and given *ateleia* by Olbia, they surely number among the Athenian *emporoi* involved in commercial maritime expeditions in the fourth century. Nevertheless the investment in maritime operations was always one that entailed risk.[132] Athens and the Piraeus for much of the fourth century were not immune to political and military risks, many of which have been traced by Garnsey. Those dangers continued and the environment that the Athenian state could provide was not always to be as secure as that enjoyed in the first seventy-five years of the fourth century.

1.8. THE THREAT OF MACEDON: ATHENIAN ECONOMIES BEFORE 322

In the fourth century up to the death of Alexander the Great most of the direct threats to the rural economies of the polis that the Athenians confronted were almost exclusively natural (climate and other constant dangers). The external threats to the economies of the polis outside the territory were, however, severe and were related to the huge movements in the eastern Mediterranean that were the results of the expansion of Macedonian power. The political reverberations of Philip II and Alexander's imperialism weakened the position of Athens in the Aegean and affected the economies of the polis.[133]

The Athenian polis, as has been seen already, intervened in several ways in the grain trade. Some interventions were more directive than others: the legal requirements limiting the movement of grain to market in the Piraeus (the two-thirds rule) are of a different nature from the creation of a special fund for purchasing grain. In the fourth century there are numerous references to shortages of grain.[134] Clearly not all the crises were the product of human behaviour. Attica suffered from shortfalls in the harvest that were probably associated with climatic extremes that affected other areas of the Greek

[131] Montgomery 1986. [132] Cohen 1992: 53–7.

[133] On 340 and Philip II at Hieron and Byzantium, see Bresson 2000: 131–49.

[134] Garnsey 1988: 134–64 on the fourth century. All that follows owes much to this study which for the time being is the essential survey of the grain trade in the fifth and fourth centuries.

world.[135] The vast amounts of grain that were brought to Greece and the Aegean from Cyrene suggest how widespread these difficulties were at one particular moment perhaps in the 320s.[136] Athens was therefore not alone in having to devise solutions to problems in food supply that were exacerbated by shortfalls in local production. But its large population made it all the more imperative that the grain supply could compensate for such shortcomings, a factor that had been ever present in the Classical period.

Garnsey has considered in some detail the grain crises of the 330s and 320s and the responses that the polis devised.[137] The introduction of grain purchasing schemes by the polis (*sitōnia*) by the middle third of the fourth century was one of these.[138] Also in this period the epigraphical record sees a flurry of honorific decrees that award honours to various individuals for helping to supply grain to the polis.[139] Not all these inscriptions can be dated precisely but several clearly concern the same grain shortages. In this context it is probably worth stating the obvious. The honorific inscriptions respond to problems in the grain supply. The award and inscribing of civic honours was another strategy that enabled the polis to intervene in commerce. The award of honours and their erection on *stēlai* in a public place was an advertisement to others to imitate such actions inspired by *philotimia*. While honours (such as *ateleia*) were of considerable direct benefit, they were awarded with a great deal of discretion, as Demosthenes suggests.[140] But in the 330s and 320s the Athenians awarded individuals explicitly for their actions *and* wrote them up on *stēlai*.[141] This change in epigraphical culture is significant. Many of these

[135] Camp 1982 argued that the increase in the presence of wells/cisterns in the second half of the fourth century suggested that drought was indeed a major problem at this time. Such construction could also reflect a change in the population and not only absence of water.

[136] RO 96 = *SEG* ix. 2. An inscription from Cyrene listing the amount and recipients of grain that went from Cyrene to Greece.

[137] Garnsey 1988: 150–64. See esp. Montgomery 1986.

[138] On *sitōnia* see Fantasia 1984; Couilloud-Le Dinahet 1988; Migeotte 1991; 1998. Cf. Strubbe 1987 and 1989 for this institution in the Roman period. Demosthenes himself was a grain commissioner (*sitōnēs*) exploiting his personal contacts that are suggested by his concern for Leukon and his family connections with the region (*APF* 3597).

[139] Tracy *ADT* 30–5 summarizes the material. The epigraphical evidence of the decrees is being re-examined by S. D. Lambert who has clarified considerably some of these inscriptions. *IG* ii^2 283 (Garnsey 1988: 151 with n. 6) the honorand from Salamis (Cyprus) had performed some favourable action regarding freight charges, dated to *c.*337 (Lambert 2002). Lambert makes a good case for this being an award of *proxenia* and makes an important observation that this is one of the earliest epigraphical recognitions of contributions to an *epidosis* at Athens (Lambert 2002: 78–9).

[140] Dem. 20. 131–3, contrasting the award of *proxeneia* and *ateleia*; at Athens, proxeny status does not necessarily entail privileges of *ateleia*. Dem. 20. 133: 'for neither this man (Lykidas, slave of Chabrias) nor anyone else being a *proxenos* enjoys *ateleia* unless the People has clearly granted that person *ateleia*'.

[141] Enough epigraphical material survives from Athens in the fourth century to allow the evidence that we have to be considered as representative of the sort of concerns

honorands are almost certainly *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* otherwise unattached to the Athenian polis who in other circumstances were as likely to pursue whatever commercial opportunities they wished. Earlier in the fourth century facilitating movements of commodities does not rank high among the actions for which many individuals were awarded with *proxenia*.[142] Indeed before the 330s such honorific decrees are usually reticent about any specific actions or services that such individuals had performed and perhaps the emphasis of the discourse of such decrees is less concerned about what the newly created *proxenos* had done to receive this status.[143] The decrees of the 330s and 320s that honour those involved in supplying grain offer a new, more explicit discourse. Here are references to precise problems and records of particular actions. Grain was in short supply. An honorand brought wheat and/or barley in his ship (often the origin is stated). Sometimes the amount of grain is recorded. He sold it a good price—sometimes the price is recorded. He gave money to a fund for purchasing grain—the amount given is often recorded. When the honours for such benefactors are preserved it is worth noting who receives what: Herakleides of Salamis, honoured on several occasions and finally having the decrees inscribed in 325/4 is awarded *proxenia*, gold crowns, and the right to campaign and pay *eisphora*, but does not receive privileges of *ateleia*.[144] The absence of *ateleia* from the range of inscribed honours given to the benefactors who have assisted the grain supply reflects the more widespread discretion with which this privilege was granted.[145]

Garnsey suggests that the battle of Chaeronea acted as a turning point in these processes and Lambert's study of honours in the second half of the fourth century confirms this observation.[146] The years *c*.340–331 proved an unsettled period for maritime activity. Disruption of shipping from the Black Sea and elsewhere in the Aegean probably accelerated changes in the practices observed in the inscribed honorific decrees at Athens. Philip II's seizure of a fleet of 230 (or 180) merchant ships in 340 included a majority heading for

that the Athenians felt were important to be inscribed on stone and set up for public consumption.

[142] Mitchell 1997: 28–37.

[143] Ibid. 34–5. In the absence of a major work on the fourth-century proxeny decrees, Culasso Gastaldi 2004 offers a study of the Athenian proxeny decrees concerning Asia Minor in this period. On *ateleia* and *proxeneia*, ibid. 45–6 with n. 28.

[144] RO 95 records five decrees, the last in 325/4 finally merits an inscription and sees the writing up of the earlier decisions.

[145] See Appendix 7 for a summary of the epigraphical evidence for inscribed honours relating to the grain supply. Henry 1983: 241.

[146] Garnsey 1988: 150; Lambert in his *prolegomena* article on Athenian honours for foreigners (forthcoming).

Athens was a key factor in ending the peace of Philokrates of 346.[147] After Chaeronea and the later creation of the League of Greek States under Macedonian hegemony, maritime movements from the Black Sea remained vulnerable. The Macedonians operated an international fleet to patrol the key strategic points but the Persian-led naval threat was present until the summer of 331.[148] Problems existed elsewhere: the Rhodians intercepted ships heading for Athens in 338.[149] It seems that Athens no longer had control of key strategic locations or its presence was less decisive than before. It is not clear whether Athens lost their cleruchies in the Thracian Chersonese.[150] Philip seized Hieron in 340. It is unlikely that this key location continued to serve Athenian strategic and fiscal interests in the 330s or beyond as it had earlier in the fourth century.

The function of the Athenian fleet as a power to enforce maritime movements had been restricted effectively by Macedonian power.[151] Athenian military activity in the light of Chaeronea and the destruction of Thebes in 335 was no longer envisaged in the later 330s.[152] Although the Athenian fleet is maintained, its role was more limited. New vigour was injected into developing other sources although the Black Sea certainly continued to supply grain.[153] The western Mediterranean is one region that the Athenians wished to develop and it had the advantage of being more detached from the principal spheres of the Macedonian Empire.[154] The change in emphasis in the award *and inscribing* of honours for explicit aid in the movement of grain fits into this context of developing the diverse sources of grain.

Nevertheless the Athenians had more options now than for much of the late fourth and third centuries. They continued to possess not only a potentially powerful fleet but also their harbour installations at the Piraeus that permitted them to launch ambitious ventures such as the expedition of

[147] Bresson 2000: 131–3 and 132 (with refs. n. 4) for the text of the scholiast on Demosthenes.

[148] Garnsey 1988: 143–4, 150, and [Dem.] 17. 19; Dionysius tyrant at Herakleia Pontika (south coast of the Black Sea) is held responsible for the Herakleots interfering with shipping going to Athens (RO 95 ll. 36–41). Macedonian fleet and Persian naval threat: Hammond and Walbank 1981: 70–2.

[149] Lycurgus (*Against Leocrates*) 18; Bresson 2000: 138.

[150] Cargill 1995: 30.

[151] Hammond and Walbank 1981: 72 and n. 2.

[152] At this time, concerns were far closer to home. The Athenians wished to recover their former territory Oropos (Philip II had promised their liberty in 338). Demades achieved this in 335 and it seems to have been the victory that inspired the Athenians to award the politician the highest honours that the polis could give, as Knoepfler 2001: 380–7 has shown. The award was exceptional, see Gauthier 1985: 109–10; Kralli 1999–2000.

[153] Black Sea in the 330s and 320s, Garnsey 1988: 151.

[154] Garnsey 1988: 150: 'imports from the west and south-east only come into prominence in the sources after Chaeronea'.

Miltiades in the Adriatic.[155] In 325/4 the Athenians dispatched a fleet of triremes to support the establishment of a colony on the northern coast of the Adriatic.[156] This outpost was to provide a means of stopping piracy, facilitate the movement of grain (and other commodities) from the Adriatic, and exploit contacts with these regions that had existed for some time.[157] In the third century, such a strategy was not to be possible because Athenian naval power had all but disappeared and for much of the period from the 290s to 229 the Piraeus was no longer under Athenian control. In the 320s the Athenians still had a powerful fleet and enjoyed the facilities of the extraordinarily important harbours and docks of the Piraeus. The Adriatic was well beyond the reach of Alexander the Great and perhaps Antipater who governed from Macedon in Alexander's absence from spring 334.[158] Miltiades' operation in the 320s therefore takes on considerable symbolic importance. The importance of the west is confirmed by the large, intense, and ultimately costly naval battle that the Athenians fought and lost off the Akarnanian coast in the Lamian war after the death of Alexander the Great.[159]

In the 330s and 320s the Athenians did not face the difficulties and obstacles within the territory of the polis that were to affect Attica in the late fourth and third centuries. However, immediately after Chaeronea, the threat to Attica had been very real, caused considerable turmoil in Athens, and brought about a flurry of intense defensive measures.[160] Although no Macedonian invasion followed Chaeronea, the defence of the countryside continued to be a priority as it had been for most of the fourth century.[161] So the threats to the Athenian polis were all too evident in the 330s and 320s. The Lamian war fought by Athens and Greek allies saw another defeat by the Macedonian power with greater consequences internally at Athens than followed Chaeronea.

Change was particularly rapid in the years after the death of Alexander the Great. The 'Age of the Successors' that followed 323 was an insecure one in terms of the rapid transformations of political powers in the eastern Mediterranean and this had a knock-on effect for smaller polities such as Athens.[162]

[155] The details of the decree concerning this expedition (RO 100) appear in the inscribed naval lists; this underlines the importance of the Piraeus, its infrastructure and buildings. The Piraeus allowed the Athenians to maintain the fleet and the complex array of *matériel* that the warships required. Publication of Clark 1993 would make more widely available a masterful study of all these issues based on a thorough re-examination of the epigraphical evidence. Cf. Gabrielsen 1994.

[156] RO 100; Cargill 1995: 31–4. [157] RO 100 p. 525. [158] Arrian *Anab.* 1. 11. 3.

[159] Bosworth 2003: 16–19 with his important reading of Diod. Sic. 18. 15. 9 as referring to the Echinades islands off the west coast of Akarnania.

[160] See Ch. 4. [161] Ober 1985; Munn 1993.

[162] On the numerous perspectives required to untangle the interactions between polities and Successors, see e.g. Davies 2002.

But these changes also affected polis economies. There are significant movements of population into and out of Attica in the late fourth century. The polis was not able to maintain constant possession of all its overseas territories after 322.[163] Invasions and war mark the Attic countryside where there had been relative peace through much of the preceding seventy years.[164] Political change within the polis saw reforms of the civic body. Political differences produced internal civic strife (*stasis*). Major figures left the polis. Many never returned. Some established or developed friendships in the Hellenistic courts of the Successors of Alexander the Great.[165] But in addition to these major disruptions, the third century also saw long periods when foreign powers occupied key strategic points in Attica, Athens, and the Piraeus. This book is a study of the many changes that mark the history of early Hellenistic Athens and the impact they had on the polis economies, and offers an analysis that focuses on the interaction between three key themes—war, commerce, and grain production—and how they affected the polis.

The presence of a foreign power holding the Piraeus is one of the principal reasons why this book focuses on the early Hellenistic period. From 295 to 229 a Macedonian garrison occupied the Mounychia hill overlooking the harbours of Piraeus. One of the aims of this extended survey of the importation of grain to Athens has been to establish three points. First, that Athenian economies were built around the expectation that grain was produced by the territory of the polis and was of fundamental importance for the food supply. That territory was primarily Attica but also included the overseas territories, particularly the cleruchies.[166] Second, that the polis drew grain from grain producers that did not belong to this Athenian 'commonwealth'. The polis relied on individuals to move such commodities. Some of these agencies were Athenian residents (citizens, non-citizens, and slaves) but some were also the diverse *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* who operated in the Mediterranean. These individuals were the movers of commodities, both agricultural and material, and of products produced by craftsmen and labourers. In this respect, the movement of grain falls into the economic networks of trade and commerce. Such networks themselves were integrated within polities in terms of the institutions of the polis. Revenues (*prosodoi*) were derived from such movements in and out of the space over which the polis exerted its authority. Poleis could also exert influence over how their members and their residents exercised their involvement in such activities. Third, that the Piraeus as a massive naval base operated as the main hub that allowed the Athenians to exercise its

[163] See Ch. 2. [164] See Ch. 4. [165] See Ch. 3.

[166] Note e.g. that Samos was taken from the Persians and became an Athenian territory again from 365 (a *cleruchy*, Diod. Sic. 18. 28. 9).

interests overseas. Moreover, the Piraeus was also the primary interface between the space controlled by the polis and the rest of the economic environment beyond Athenian territory. As such the Piraeus offered a regulated and built environment in which the infrastructure, both human and physical, could support and accommodate the movement and arrival of both commodities and products. It is surely no surprise that the study of the early Hellenistic polis should begin with a consideration of the status of the Piraeus and Athenian overseas territories.

2

Piraeus and 'Peraea'

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The history of early Hellenistic Athens can be read on several levels but two storylines are considered in this chapter: the Piraeus and the island cleruchies of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. Athens' harbour-city and these islands raise fundamental issues. The Piraeus provided the facilities to receive grain and other commodities brought by ship from abroad. The islands were not only potential sources of overseas grain but could facilitate the movement of commodities in and around the Aegean.

The history of the Athenian polis in the third century can be read as a struggle to recover control of the Piraeus (2.2). As the previous chapter has suggested, the many different kinds of financial operation and people that were involved in commercial activities such as the importing of grain depended enormously on the *emporion* that was the Piraeus. However, Athenian history after the Lamian war presents intermittent disturbances in the Piraeus as it became an important strategic target in the wider politics of the Successors. It is therefore important to establish early on the degree to which Athens was able to operate 'normally' with free access to the Piraeus.

Another approach to this same period is to look outwards from the Piraeus and to consider the relationship between Athens and the overseas territories, not so much the neighbouring island of Salamis but the three islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros (2.3). These communities, occupied by Athenian settlers (cleruchs) in the fifth and fourth centuries, were acknowledged in the fourth century as territory that Athens controlled.[1]

Several island communities in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean had territorial concerns on the adjacent mainland. Such possessions are referred to as the *peraea* of such island communities. Notable examples include Samos, Rhodes, and Thasos. The underlying attachment between the Aegean islands (Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, not to say Salamis, and in the fourth century

[1] See RO 26 (374/3); the islands had *not* been subject to the terms of the treaty drawn up by Athens earlier in 378, RO 22, with comm. p. 102; on the link between the islands and Athens after the Peloponnesian war, see Cargill 1995: 12–14.

Samos) and the Athenian polis is conjured up by comparison with the island/*peraea* relationship seen elsewhere in the Aegean. Of course where Samos, Rhodes, and Thasos were islands that had territorial possessions on the opposite mainland (thus *peraea*), Athens was a mainland polity which enjoyed territorial possessions consisting of islands not only adjacent to it (Salamis) but also at a distance (Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros). This inversion, and the spatial separation, explains the use of the quotation marks that surround the term 'peraea' in the chapter title. Nevertheless, the word might be applied to Athens to underline the attachment of the polis to these island territories. That relationship is explored in the second half of this chapter.

2.2. POLIS AND PIRAEUS

One of the main issues that has concerned historians of early Hellenistic Athens has been whether the Athenians controlled the fortified hill of Mounychia which overlooked the Piraeus. The Mounychia fortress gave its occupant de facto control over the naval harbours that lay at the foot of the hill and therefore strategic control of the Piraeus (see Map 3). Historians have focused their attention on whether Athens had recovered control of the Piraeus in the years from the 280s to the 260s. This is a key issue, but important here is the degree to which the Piraeus and its core economic functions were disrupted by the political changes and military actions in the late fourth and third centuries.

In August 322 the Athenians were defeated at sea in the battle of Amorgos.[2] The following month they agreed to terms with Antipater, the Macedonian leader who had served as Alexander's commander responsible for Macedonia and Greece.[3] A Macedonian garrison took control of Mounychia. The course of the Lamian war was determined by the defeat of the Athenian navy and culminated on the battlefield at Crannon even if the losses suffered on it by both the Macedonian and the Greek forces were not heavy:[4] 'The war at sea had been crucial.'[5] A series of naval engagements mark out the Lamian war as

[2] Metageitnion 7, 322/1 (Diod. Sic. 18. 17. 5; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3; *pace* the Parian marble which placed the battle in the previous archon year, 323/22, *FGrH* 239 B9, with Bosworth 2003: 20 n. 49).

[3] Green 2003; Boedromion 20, Plut. *Cam.* 19. 8.

[4] Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 2; Habicht 1997: 39–40; Ferguson 1911: 28: 'The losses on either side . . . were trivial, but the battle was none the less decisive.'

[5] Bosworth 2003: 22.



Map 2.1. Plan of the Piraeus

one of the greatest naval campaigns in Greek history.[6] Diodorus highlights those at the Echinades islands where control of Oiniadai was at stake.[7] Oiniadai was important for maintaining the security of Aitolia, the other major opponent of Antipater in the Lamian war.[8] Naval conflict extended further east through the Aegean where the arrival from the Levant of Alexander the Great's admiral, Kleitos, gave Antipater decisive superiority.[9] In late summer 322, perhaps as little as two days after the defeat at Amorgos, the wrecks of the defeated Athenian navy began to arrive back in the Piraeus.[10] Six weeks later Macedonian forces occupied the Piraeus. The speed with which the final defeat at Amorgos and the relatively bloodless battle at Crannon were followed by the occupation of the Piraeus illustrates the central role that naval power played at Athens.

The democracy that had promoted this anti-Macedonian war in Athens was replaced by an oligarchic government based on a minimum property ownership of 2,000 drachmai that became a new qualification for citizenship status.[11] The proponents of the anti-Macedonian policies were hunted down ruthlessly to their death: Hyperides was killed and Demosthenes took refuge at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Kalauria on Poros where he ended his life.[12] The Macedonian Antipater helped to install oligarchy at Athens and neutralized any future Athenian naval threat by breaking the important relationship between naval power and democracy.[13] Baynham emphasizes this aspect of Antipater's policy. The invitation of (disenfranchised) Athenians to leave for a new foundation in Thrace was designed to remove these less desirable elements of the Athenian population, and from Antipater's point of view succeeded in doing so.[14]

The rule of the oligarchy at Athens (322/1 to 319/18) may have been marked by tension between the governing politicians and the Athenians, including many former citizens who now found themselves disfranchised. There was an increasing pressure within the polis to re-establish 'freedom' from the Macedonian garrison on Mounychia and several embassies were sent to Antipater to

[6] On the importance of the final naval battle at Amorgos, see Beloch (1912–27) iv. 1 p. 73 (quoted by Ferguson 1911: 17–18). Bosworth 2003 explains the naval battles; the abundant bibliography can be pursued here.

[7] Diod. Sic. 18. 15. 9. Bosworth retains the reading Echinades. Previously others have assumed the text should be read Lichades, islands off the north-west end of Euboea, or that Echinades in fact refers to a location in this region of east central Greece, see Bosworth 2003: 17 n. 27.

[8] Bosworth 2003: 17–19.

[9] Ibid. 21.

[10] Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3.

[11] Baynham 2003; Oliver 2003*a*: 45–6 argues that Antipater was not able to remove some democratic elements.

[12] Pyanopsion 9 and 16, one month after the loss of Mounychia (October 322; Habicht 1997: 40–1).

[13] Roy 1998 on Piraeus, naval power, and democracy.

[14] Baynham 2003: 25–7.

restore Athenian power in the Piraeus.[15] These efforts failed. Antipater's death in the winter of 319/18 saw several changes including the brief return of democracy to Athens in spring 318.[16] Polyperchon, handed the Kingdom of Macedonia, not only reversed Antipater's policy but also championed 'the freedom of the Greeks' which encouraged the removal of garrisons such as the one controlling the Piraeus.[17] This shift increased expectation that Mounychia would become Athenian again. The negotiations for the return of the Piraeus to Athens were led by Phocion but collapsed amid scandal concerning Phocion's double-dealing and betrayal of Athenian interests. Polyperchon's son Alexander had been in Attica trying to force the Macedonian garrison out of Mounychia, but to no avail. Phocion, the leading Athenian involved, was accused of neglecting Athenian interests and was sentenced to death and executed. His death (May 318) became one of the early 'victories' of the democracy that had taken over control of Athens in spring 318 but de facto was probably already in power in the closing months of 319/18.[18]

Despite the political change, the Athenians still did not control the Piraeus and that situation persisted until, in mid-317 (late in the civic year 318/17), the democracy fell. Throughout this period the Macedonian garrison on Mounychia had remained under the control of the garrison commander Nicanor. Polyperchon was no match for Kassander, the son of Antipater. Supported by Antigonos Monophthalmos and Ptolemy, Kassander returned to Greece with a fleet and occupied the Piraeus where he installed Menyllos as garrison commander. Kassander now worked in partnership with the Athenian Demetrios of Phaleron. Political reforms were introduced. This time a new qualification of 1,000 drachmai was imposed for those who wanted to remain Athenian citizens. However between 318/17 and 307 these changes did little to damage some of the political and economic realities of the Athenian state. The Athenian fleet continued to operate, although it failed to recover Lemnos. The sources suggest that the Athenians enjoyed a period of stability.[19] Despite the problems in the years between 322 and 307 it is highly unlikely that any serious long-term damage to the operation of the Piraeus as a commercial centre took place.[20]

At the end of 308/7 Demetrios Poliorketes landed in the Piraeus and forced the collapse of the regime under Demetrios of Phaleron.[21] The foreign garrison on Mounychia now under the command of Dionysius had little time left. After encircling Mounychia hill, Demetrios Poliorketes left to capture

[15] Plut. *Phoc.* 30. 4–5 with Oliver 2003*a*: 51 n. 43. [16] Habicht 1997: 47–53.
[17] Diod. Sic. 18. 56. 1–8. [18] Habicht 1997: 48–9. [19] Ibid. 53–65.
[20] Ibid. 65–8. [21] Diod. Sic. 20. 45. 1–5; Plut. *Demetr.* 8. 3–9. 1.

Megara,[22] then returned to the Piraeus where he assaulted and captured Mounychia in an intense attack over two days.[23] The fortress fell and the hill overlooking the Piraeus was again under Athenian control. Demetrios Poliorketes took the symbolic step of destroying the Mounychia fortress.[24]

In the late summer of 307, by the start of the new civic year (307/6), the Piraeus and Athens were one again. The gift of grain, the promise of timber for one hundred ships, and the return of Imbros (and probably Lemnos) by Demetrios Poliorketes suggested that at the end of the fourth century Athenian aspirations could be built on the same level of resources and infrastructure as the polis enjoyed earlier in the fourth century. The Piraeus remained a major commercial centre. Plans existed to rebuild the fleet. Overseas territories were once again under Athenian control.[25] It was not until the early 290s that the Piraeus saw considerable upheaval again.

If economic conditions in Athens were extremely fragile by the start of the third century, this was not because of events in the Piraeus. Civil strife (*stasis*) disrupted life in Athens between 301/0 and 295. Not only was the port affected but at some point it became identified with resistance against one group or other. Lachares, an Athenian general whom literary sources have described as a tyrant, probably enjoyed supremacy in the polis from around 298 or 297 until the collapse of the city after siege in 295. The *stasis* erupted in the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos and saw in its early stages a conflict between the Athenian generals Lachares and Charias. The latter installed himself and his men on the Acropolis where the Athenians were required to supply food.[26] Charias and his men eventually gave up their positions, to be sentenced to death. Soldiers occupying the Piraeus were involved in some sort of conflict but the details of events remain elusive.[27] The real damage to the Piraeus' feasibility took place in 295 when Lachares' regime fell.[28] Demetrios Poliorketes invaded Attica and laid siege to the city and Piraeus. During this campaign the supply of grain and other commodities to Athens through the Piraeus was strangled. Demetrios Poliorketes made an example of one ship carrying grain to the city by hanging its helmsman and merchant.[29] Only at this stage did other merchants take fright and find alternative destinations.

This campaign offers the clearest evidence of disruption to the economies of the grain supply to Athens. The inability of the Athenians to harvest Attica was exacerbated by Demetrios Poliorketes' ability to blockade the harbour.

[22] Plut. *Demetr.* 9. 2–6. [23] Ibid. 10. 1; Diod. Sic. 20. 45. 5–7.

[24] Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 1; Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1.

[25] Diod. Sic. 20. 45. 4; Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1.

[26] P. Oxy. 17. 2082 = *FGrH* 257a; for fr. 1 see now the reading of Thonemann 2003. Otherwise chronology and other details are in Dreyer 1999: 54–76.

[27] Bayliss 2003 is a recent attempt to unpick the early 290s, see also Dreyer 2000.

[28] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 1. [29] Ibid. 3.

Plutarch's source reveals that prices of commodities rose in Athens to extraordinarily high levels.[30] During the siege of 295, wheat prices were astronomical: Plutarch does not even bother to record the price by *medimnos* but cites the cost of a *modius*, roughly equivalent to one-sixth of a *medimnos*. Cut off from supplies arriving in the Piraeus, wheat was sold at the equivalent of 1,800 drachmai per *medimnos*. Prices in the third quarter of the fourth century at Athens ranged between 5 and 16 drachmai a *medimnos* of wheat.[31]

The pattern of the history of Athens for most of the third century was established when Demetrios Poliorketes took control of Athens in 295. He fortified two locations: the urban site on the Mouseion hill, overlooking the heart of the city, and Mounychia in the Piraeus. In the fortresses at these strategic points he installed his own soldiers. There is no reason why these garrisons should have prevented the movement of commodities into the harbour. In the years that followed activity in the Piraeus certainly resumed. Demetrios himself initiated shipbuilding activity as he had done in the period after 307. We are told by Plutarch that Poliorketes planned to build a navy of 500 ships: having set down keels for the ships in the dockyards of the Piraeus, Corinth, Chalcis, and Pella, he made personal visits to inspect the progress of the work.[32] The date is not certain but probably fell sometime between 290 and 288.[33] It is less clear who would have been responsible for (and benefited from) the collection of taxes in the Piraeus. But when the Athenians revolted against Demetrios in 288/7 the political climate changed and the conditions for economic activity in the Piraeus were dramatically disrupted.

The revolt of 288/7 succeeded in removing the Macedonian garrison from Mouseion hill but failed to secure Athenian control of Mounychia. And it seems as though in the remaining years of the 280s a state of war existed between the Athenians and those occupying Mounychia. The Athenians attempted to drive the Macedonian garrison from the Mounychia fortress but with no success. How many attempts were made is uncertain. One night assault involving 420 Athenians and eight generals failed disastrously.[34]

[30] Ibid.; a *medimnos* of salt cost 40 drachmai.

[31] Garnsey 1988: 154.

[32] Plut. *Demetr.* 43. 3.

[33] Cf. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 225–7. Demetrios' naval programme followed his treaty with Pyrrhus (Plut. *Demetr.* 43. 2; *Pyrrh.* 10. 1–4) that allowed to focus on recovering the territory that his father had controlled in the east. This programme made Athens central to the attempts of his opponents to cut short Demetrios' ambitions. At the same time, it made Piraeus critical to his own plans. In 288/7, encouraged by the success of campaigns in Greece against Demetrios, Athens also revolted (Shear 1978: 61–2 with n. 176 for the sources, Plut. *Demetr.* 46. 1).

[34] Polyainos *Strat.* 5. 17. 1.

Thereafter the Macedonian presence in the fortress lasted through the 280s, the Chremonidean war (*c.*268–262/1), and down to 229 when finally, and with much subsequent celebration, the Athenians removed the Macedonian garrison.

There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the years from the 280s to the end of the 260s. The Chremonidean war fought by the Athenians and allies against Antigonos Gonatas is recognized as a campaign to secure Athenian independence from Gonatas. For the Athenians one of its main objectives is thought to have been the removal of the Macedonian garrison from the Piraeus. However, had the Athenians managed to occupy the fortress in the late 280s only to lose it again to Gonatas at some subsequent moment, perhaps immediately before the outbreak of the Chremonidean war?[35]

Arguments about the recovery of the Piraeus have concentrated attention on the archonship of Nikias (II) in 282/1. After this date references to the recovery of the Piraeus disappear from Athenian inscriptions.[36] In January/February 281 (Gamelion 9, day 23 of prytany 7) Euthios, the eponymous archon of the previous year (283/2), was honoured and further awards were to be made to him 'whenever the Piraeus and the *asty* (i.e. Athens itself) are united'.[37] Of the three Athenian decrees mentioning the desired recovery of the Piraeus, the other two both refer to earlier occasions. A decree honouring Audoleon King of the Paionians looked to the continuing task of the recovery of the Piraeus: 'he (Audoleon) announces that for the remaining time he will provide what is needed joining in operation for the recovery of the Piraeus and the freedom of the polis'.[38] This decree was passed at the end of the civic year in July 285 (Skirophorion 25, prytany 12, day 25). An honorary decree for Philippides of Paiania looked forward to the future recovery of the garrisons *and* the Piraeus. Philippides was in the court of Lysimachos and asked the King 'to help both with money and grain so that the People may be free and recover the Piraeus and the garrisons as quickly as possible'.[39] This decree was passed in October 283 towards the beginning of the archonship of Euthios (Boedromion 18, day 19 prytany 3).[40]

After the honours are awarded to Euthios at the start of 281 the Piraeus disappears from the epigraphical record, a phenomenon that also requires some explanation. Those who advocate a recovery at the end of the 280s argue that this interruption occurs because the Athenians had succeeded in recovering

[35] Reger 1992; Dreyer 1999.

[36] See e.g. Shear 1978; Gauthier 1979; M. J. Osborne 1985; Lanciers 1987; Habicht 1997: 130–1; Dreyer 1999: 257–78.

[37] *Agora* xvi. 181 ll. 28–31 (= *Hesp* 7 (1938) 100–9 no. 18; *SEG* xxv. 89).

[38] *IG* ii^2 654 ll. 30–5. [39] Ibid. 657 ll. 33–6.

[40] Arighetti fo. 112 = Usener fo. 101, p. 133.

the Piraeus. They credit Olympiodoros with the success (Paus. 1. 26. 3). Pausanias summarizes the Athenian general's career and mentions that Olympiodoros had recovered at one stage the Piraeus and Mounychia:

(1. 26. 1) Later... they chose Olympiodoros as general. He led them, both old men and young men alike, against the Macedonians. He did so in the hope that they would succeed in the war more because of their enthusiasm than their strength. He defeated the Macedonians who came out to meet them in battle and from those who took refuge in the Mouseion he took control of the Mouseion. (2) In this way Athens was freed from the Macedonians. All the Athenians fought in a manner that was worthy of record, but it is said that Leokritos the son of Protarchos in particular showed boldness in this achievement. For he was the first to surmount the wall and he was the first to jump into the Mouseion. And because he died in the battle, honours were awarded from the Athenians and in particular they dedicated his shield to Zeus Eleutherios [of Freedom] having written on the name of Leokritos and his distinction. (3) This is the greatest achievement for Olympiodoros apart from those feats he achieved in recovering the Piraeus and Mounychia. And when the Macedonians made an attack on Eleusis, he drew up the Eleusinians and defeated the Macedonians. Before these achievements, when Kassander was invading Attica, Olympiodoros sailed to the Aitolia and persuaded the Aitolians to help, and when this alliance was formed it was the reason that they survived the war against Kassander.[41]

Pausanias identifies the greatest successes of Olympiodoros. These were recovery of the Mouseion when Olympiodoros was general and on another occasion the capture of the Piraeus and Mounychia. But de facto the Mouseion might have been the most notable. While the Mouseion success is easy to identify, the date of the recovery of the Piraeus and Mounychia is uncertain.

Habicht suggested very plausibly that Pausanias had taken the details of Olympiodoros' career from an honorific decree on the Acropolis, one of several occasions when inscriptions were used in the *Description*.[42] The outline of Olympiodoros' achievements and Pausanias' inclusion of information on Leokritos who died in the assault on Mouseion, suggest indeed that this event had more resounding fame than anything else. A recovery of the Piraeus by Olympiodoros was an important moment in his career but does

[41] Bultrighini's (1984: 57) analysis of the forty-five uses of the crucial verb 'to recover' (ἀνασῴζω; Paus 1. 26. 3: ἀνασωσάμενος) in Pausanias' writings found that this 'recover' is indeed the correct translation. Dreyer (1999: 259–63) compares the use of the word in third-century Athenian decrees. Bultrighini (1984: 58) thought (incorrectly) that τόνδε at the start of 1. 29. 3 referred forwards rather than backwards as seems more natural; cf. Lanciers 1987 *et al.* De Sanctis (*Scritti*, i. 497; after G. Unger, 'Attische Archonten', *Philologus Supplement* 5 (1889): 690) adjusted the verb to the present participle, giving the sense 'trying to recover' (rejected by e.g. Ferguson (1911): 152 n. 4).

[42] Habicht 1985: 90–2, 101.

not seem to have had the reverberations of his other most meritorious success. No other source associates Olympiodoros with the Piraeus.

If we look forward briefly to when the Piraeus is finally recovered in 229, the reaction of the Athenians then has all the hallmarks of a major moment in history. Among the many markers of that success is the symbolic creation of a new list of archons including the eponymous archon, king archon, polemarch, and six thesmothetai.[43] The Athenians mention the assistance that individuals gave to the polis in recovering the Piraeus by way of the *epidosis* in honorific decrees set up after 229.[44] The literary tradition exploiting the memoirs of Aratos' career records the contribution made by the Achaean leader who had given 20 talents to the fund that was raised to pay off the royal general Diogenes who was in command of the Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus at the time.[45] To celebrate the success the Athenian leader Eurykleides introduced a new festival.[46] Diogenes himself was elevated to a position of singular reverence. The Athenians honoured Diogenes for his services to the city in handing over the garrison for 150 talents and he became a benefactor of the Athenians and possibly on this occasion was indeed awarded Athenian citizenship.[47] He achieved fame for his part in giving freedom to Athens as his descendants were happy to remember.[48] It is likely that the Diogeneia, a festival named after him, was instigated soon after the recovery of the Piraeus.[49] The Piraeus' ultimate recovery was given considerable recognition. The cult of Demos and the Charites located on the north-west corner of the Agora was probably a creation associated with the recovery of the Piraeus in the early 220s.[50] It typified the renewed vigour that is so characteristic of the years following 229 now that the polis was unified in a way that was never possible while Mounychia was occupied. Eurykleides after all had held significant authority in the polis in the 240s as Treasurer of the Stratiotic fund but conditions were obviously different from 229 onwards. It was in the Piraeus that the Athenians set up a decree in honour of Eurykleides where he had made a contribution to the recovery of the Piraeus worthy of record and fortified not only the city but also the harbours and Piraeus.[51]

In Pausanias' account it is surely not unreasonable to have expected a stronger connection between the recovery of the Piraeus, the successful assault on the Mouseion, and the removal of the Macedonians, if indeed these events

[43] *IG* ii^2 1706 with S. Dow, *Hesp.* 2 (1933) 430–4.
[44] Ibid. 835 (Migeotte 1992 no. 18).
[45] Plut. *Arat.* 34. 5–6; Paus. 2. 8. 6.
[46] *IG* ii^2 834 ll. 33–4.
[47] Osborne, *Nat.* T100 (= *Nat.* iii/iv. 91–3).
[48] *IG* ii^2 3474; Mikalson 1998: 170–2.
[49] Parker 1996: 274 and nn. 79–80.
[50] Monaco 2001, esp. 114–16 for the date; Mikalson 1998: 172–8; Parker 1996: 272 'shortly after . . . 229'.
[51] *IG* ii^2 834 ll. 10–14 and 14–16.

had taken place in close proximity. However the connection between Olympiodoros' recovery of the Mouseion and that of the Piraeus and Mounychia is not clear and suggests that the events were not closely associated in Pausanias' source, presumably the decree for Olympiodoros. It is likely then that the Piraeus and Mounychia recovery that Pausanias refers to was *not* an event in the late 280s nor was it connected to the earlier recovery of the Mouseion hill.

If there was no successful recovery of the Piraeus in the 280s, then most historians have agreed that there was in fact an attempt that failed. Polyainos provides the evidence.[52] Demetrios Poliorketes was in Lydia and had left Herakleides as garrison commander in the Piraeus. A ploy by the Athenian generals was contrived in negotiation with the mercenary commander of the enemy garrison, Hierokles of Karia.[53] Oaths were sworn between the Athenian generals, Hipparchos and Mnesidemos, and the enemy mercenary leader. The Athenian generals Mnesidemos, Polykles, Kallisthenes, Theopompos, Satyros, Onetorides, Sthenokrates, and Pythion leading 420 soldiers were admitted to the fortress but were betrayed. Herakleides, the commander of the garrison, led 2,000 men against the Athenians and slaughtered all those who entered the garrison.

The date of the assault on Mounychia must follow not long after the recovery of the Mouseion hill and Demetrios' departure from Athens for Asia Minor. Osborne's association of the attack with events of 281 cannot be sustained because Polyainos' account places the attack *during* the lifetime of Demetrius Poliorketes who was in Lydia.[54] Plutarch tells us how Demetrios had left Athens for western Asia Minor with his cavalry and 11,000 men to recover Karia and Lydia from Lysimachos.[55] The assault is more than likely to belong to the time when Demetrios had captured Sardis and presumably before his march into Phrygia.[56] Even after Demetrios had been captured and set under royal guard by Seleukos I, he still had commanders installed at Athens and Corinth to whom he could write to preserve his cities for his son Antigonos.[57] The failed attempt on the Piraeus predates Demetrios' capture

[52] Polyainos *Strat.* 5. 17. 1.

[53] Hierokles is described later as commander of the Piraeus, in conversation with the Eretrian philosopher Menedemos (Diog. Laert. 2. 127). The episode belongs some time during the exile of Menedemos from his home city, after 268, and before the philosopher's death, *c.*260: Habicht 1997: 124 n. 1, following Reger (1992: 373–7); and Knoepfler 2001: 286; 295 and n. 173; cf. Dreyer 1999: 274.

[54] M. J. Osborne identifies the unsuccessful attempt with 281 (1979: 193–4) or at least 'late in the 280s' (*Nat.* ii. 161). Demetrios Poliorketes died in his 55th year (Plut. *Demetr.* 52. 3), 283. I thank Ch. Habicht for pointing this out.

[55] Plut. *Demetr.* 46. 2.

[56] Ibid. 46. 3–4.

[57] Ibid. 51. 1. His captivity dates 285–283, ibid. 52. 3.

Figure 2.1. The state monument for Chairippos (*IG* ii^2 5227a + *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45; EM 12748; copyright Epigraphical Museum, Athens)

and presumably falls around the time of his capture of Sardis. The most likely moment is in 286; Gauthier and Shear have placed it in 286/5.[58]

An Athenian tombstone inscribed with an epigram commemorates Chairippos of the deme Aphidna who died in an assault on Mounychia.[59] The epigram suggests that this was a state monument:

> Courage young men, setting foot before the enemy to die, with respect for your fatherland and parents. Because also for you, Chairippos, having perished there is great fame as the *polis* set up an image [or statue, *eikōn*] and at public expense a memorial (*sēma*), since at the walls of Mounychia warding off that day of slavery on behalf of your beloved fatherland you left your life.[60]

It is another piece of evidence commemorating an attack on Mounychia, an attack usually identified with the failed assault described by Polyainos. There is no certainty in that identification: other attacks on Mounychia are known, and Olympiodoros' earlier success may be one of them.

For if Olympiodoros' successful attack on the Piraeus and Mounychia was neither an assault in the late 280s nor that of 286, then when was it? In 307—Demetrios Poliorketes' removal of Kassander? Or in the early 290s during the *stasis* and occupation of the Piraeus following the execution of Charias? Or even in the mid-290s and the arrival of Demetrios and his recovery of the Piraeus?[61] There is no evidence to support Olympiodoros' involvement in the recovery of 307 but it is a suitable occasion. If Olympiodoros was associated with the recovery of the Piraeus and Mounychia in 307 then one might have expected Pausanias' description of the career of the general to have reflected this. At 1. 26. 3, Olympiodoros' embassy to the Aitolians is described as 'before these achievements'. An earlier recovery of the Piraeus in 307 does not fit the narrative that can be reconstructed from Pausanias' account.

A case might be made for Olympiodoros' recovery of the Piraeus and Mounychia during the troubles at Athens under the tyranny of Lachares. One of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus fragments describing the tyranny of Lachares refers to a group that occupied the Piraeus and opposed the tyrant, and was then besieged by the tyrant.[62] There is no indication of who

[58] Year 286/5: Shear 1978; 82–3; Gauthier 1979: 356; cf. Dreyer 1999: 238.

[59] *IG* ii^2 5227a + *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45 (EM 12748; ed. pr. Kyparisses and Peek, *Ath. Mitt.* 57 (1932) 146 no. 2; Moretti, *ISE* i. 13).

[60] *IG* ii^2 5227a + *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45 ll. 2–7.

[61] Ferguson (1911): 152 n. 4.

[62] Some care is required in labelling the personalities as 'democrats' or 'tyrants'; Lachares' tyranny had gained considerable notoriety, and his leadership was the product of some sort of struggle among the generals, principally Charias, probably the hoplite general, and Lachares, the general of the mercenaries. The removal of precious metal from the statue of Athena came later in Lachares' rule, after the death of Kassander and around the time of the 121st Olympiad, 296, which immediately follows the description of the stripping of the metal, P. Oxy. 17. 2082 fr. 4 ll.

led this group, but it is quite clear that the Athenians who had fought and died in the struggle *against* Lachares were held in high esteem in Athens. Elsewhere Pausanias notes a memorial of those who had died in the struggle against the tyrant.[63] It is possible that Olympiodoros was a prominent opponent of Lachares' 'tyranny'. Lachares had gained considerable notoriety by the time both Plutarch and Pausanias described some of his outrages, notably the removal of precious metal from the statue of Athena on the Acropolis. It would not be surprising if Olympiodoros was remembered for his actions against Lachares, particularly if the latter's prominence was part of a subversive scheme initiated by Kassander. Such a feat would suit the obvious rhetoric of the sources.[64] Olympiodoros was also a prominent figure in the 290s and served as eponymous archon exceptionally in successive years (294/3 and 293/2). An Olympiodoros described by Diogenes Laertius as the foremost of Athenians is probably the same man, operating in the 290s.[65]

Exactly how and when Olympiodoros could be said to have saved the Piraeus is not clear, but it seems to me that this achievement, mentioned by Pausanias, suits the events surrounding Lachares' tyranny. A group of Athenians in the Piraeus responded to Demetrios Poliorketes' appeal for aid when Demetrios was preparing his attack.[66] A passage in Polyainos described Demetrios contacting those living in Piraeus and seeking help. A favourable response saw them sending arms for 1,000 soldiers but Demetrios proceeded to lay siege to those who had sent the arms.[67]

13–15; fr. 2 ll. 15–17 describes the opposition to Lachares from the Piraeus; fr. 3 ll. 13–14 seem to refer to the siege of the Piraeus by Lachares.

[63] Paus. 1. 29. 7.

[64] Paus. 1. 25. 5 on the tyranny and Kassander's involvement; see also Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 1. Kassander's role in Lachares' rise to power is not clear, nor can it have been lengthy. The papyrus fragments describing these years reveal that Kassander died at Pellene in 297, probably during Lachares' siege of those Athenians in the Piraeus, P. Oxy . 17. 2082 fr. 3 l. 17; Lachares' tyranny must therefore coincide with the end of the year 298/7 or the start of 297/6 or earlier. Osborne notes the absence of any inscribed Athenian decrees in 298/7, 297/6, and the first nine months of 296/5 (Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 148 n. 641). Ferguson 1929: 4 suggested that Olympiodoros led the anti-Lachares faction in Piraeus.

[65] Olympiodoros, the general (*PA* 11388) and the archon (*PA* 11387); Davies *APF* pp. 164–5 for his identity. Diog. Laert. 6. 23 assesses Olympiodoros.

[66] Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 7. 5.

[67] The precise identity of those in the Piraeus who gave the equipment is unclear. If it was the anti-Lachares' faction in Piraeus, it does not make sense for Demetrios to have attacked them. The passage is very concise and may be confused. The situation is complex, as usual, with different groups within Athens vying for power and the most rational (but not necessarily the right) reconstruction of events would surely have seen those in Piraeus admitting Demetrios so that he could assist in the removal of Lachares from the city.

This passage does not make sense if Olympiodoros had been in the Piraeus when Demetrios made the assault. However it would make sense if Olympiodoros had been among those who had brought arms (and perhaps men) to Demetrios and joined in the assault on Athens to remove Lachares. It is possible that there is a mistake in the sources and that those in the Piraeus had admitted Demetrios and Polyainos has confused the narrative.[68] However, Olympiodoros is identified as the archon of 294/3 and 293/2. A central role in Demetrios' capture of Athens may have seen Olympiodoros given or appointed as archon in the aftermath. Pausanias' record of the career of Olympiodoros is likely to have been extracted from an honorific inscription. If honours had been given to Olympiodoros the most likely date is in the 280s, perhaps shortly after the revolt against Poliorketes.[69] An honorific inscription for Olympiodoros is likely to have recalled the many achievements in a long career in the manner typical of those (few) decrees in which Athenians awarded the highest honours (*megistai timai*) to their own citizens in the third century.[70] If so, then it is possible that the memorable role he played in recovering the Piraeus and Mounychia may well have been given in the context of recovering freedom for the Athenians. But Olympiodoros' involvement with Demetrios Poliorketes would no doubt have been problematic for anyone drafting the account of the career at a time when Athens was openly fighting against Demetrios. Demetrios Poliorketes' capture of Athens, or at least Olympiodoros' (hypothetical) involvement, might have been presented as relieving Athens from Lachares' tyranny.[71] When Demetrios Poliorketes declared to Athens the settlement following his entry to the city there was widespread relief among the population.[72] Lachares, one-time Athenian general, had been involved in *stasis* and melted down the precious metal belonging to the state of Athens to pay for his troops. Olympiodoros' role in removing Lachares and thereby freeing Mounychia and the Piraeus in 295 may be the context for one of his memorable feats recorded in Pausanias' summary. Olympiodoros was not the only Athenian to have supported Demetrios against Lachares.[73] If Olympiodoros' achievement belongs in

[68] Ferguson 1911: 134–5. [69] Habicht 1985: 91–2; 100.

[70] Gauthier 1985: 112 (on the rarity of such decrees); Kralli 1999–2000: 137–8; exceptional honours for Olympiodoros, Habicht 1985: 92.

[71] Paus. 1. 25. 6.

[72] Although a garrison was imposed on Mouseion and Piraeus and Mounychia were occupied, offices were introduced that were favourable to the people and 100,000 *medimnoi* of grain were given to the city, Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3.

[73] The overthrow of Lachares' tyranny belongs to the archonship of Nikias (296/5), the year when Phaidros is said to have been voted twice as general *epi tēn paraskeuēn* (*IG* ii^2 682 ll. 21–4 with Osborne *Nat.* ii 146 n. 630; 149–50). Osborne (*Nat.* ii. 150) argues that Phaidros had been

Figure 2.2. The hill of Mounychia (Piraeus)

295, then the memorial to the dead Chairippos could belong to any of the most significant assaults of 286, 295, or even earlier.[74]

The difficulties in the Piraeus not only in the middle years of the 290s but also in the 280s following the revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes will certainly have had an impact on the operation of the harbour as a commercial space. The inscription honouring Philippides in 283/2 that identified the hope that the Athenians recover the Piraeus and the garrisons implies that the polis could not use the Piraeus. Indeed in the mid-280s it is quite likely that the Athenians were unable to make any use at all of the Piraeus for the movement of commodities. An honorific decree passed in the final month of 286/5 (July 285) rewarded Audoleon, the ruler of the Paionians. The king had set down at his own expense 'in the harbours of the polis 7500 *medimnoi* of grain for the People'.[75] One would expect the Piraeus to have been the harbour where such grain could be shipped but the wording of the inscription might be taken to

elected general and, because he was opposed to Lachares, was reappointed general for the remainder of the year following Lachares' defeat in the course of the revolutionary year 296/5. The decree awarding the foreigner Herodoros the highest honours (including citizenship and a statue) was one of the first publications of the post-Lachares government passed towards the end of 295/4 (Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 144–53, D68 ll. 24–5, who has the government at Athens from the fall of Lachares in spring 295 through 295/4 as being democratic).

[74] *IG* ii^2 5227a + *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45 (Moretti, *ISE* i. 13).

[75] *IG* ii^2 654 ll. 25–30.

suggest that alternative harbours were used. The fact that the Athenians also honoured Timo[— —] for his role in moving this grain quickly confirms the logistical problems behind these two decrees.[76] Moving the grain to Athens was as much an achievement as the gift in itself.

Athens had not yet recovered the harbour after revolting from Demetrios Poliorketes and had still not done so by January 281.[77] If, as is argued here, Athens did not recover the Piraeus, less certainty can be attached to the subsequent years. No evidence for the status of Piraeus exists until towards the end of the 260s. Antigonos Gonatas was, from *c.*277 onwards, King of Macedonia and the precise nature of relations between Athens and Antigonos in the years after Demetrios Poliorketes' death and before the outbreak of the Chremonidean war are obscure. But as allies of Ptolemy II and Greek communities including Sparta, the Athenians fought an unsuccessful war against Antigonos (*c.*268–262). An inscription from Rhamnous hints at some connection between Piraeus and the north-east coast of Attica at the end of that conflict but the fragmentary nature of the text defies a full understanding.[78] Kleochares son of Kleodorides of Rhamnous was honoured by his fellow Rhamnousians for some sort of action that connected Rhamnousians with the Piraeus where Kineas had seized something.[79] The honorand has been appointed in the archonship of Antipatros (262/1), the year when the Athenian polis had fallen to Antigonos Gonatas.[80] He had completed sacrifices, a critical part of his achievements, and although the precise context cannot be retrieved it is likely that a religious context saw Kleochares performing useful services for his fellow demesmen.[81]

Despite the frustrating lack of evidence, the indications of the strategy in the Chremonidean war suggest that Athens remained without access to the harbours of Piraeus for the duration of the conflict. Nevertheless in the years after the Chremonidean war it can be expected that the Piraeus was able to operate in peace as a commercial harbour except for those periods when further warfare threatened movements in and out of the Piraeus. The real question remains: did the Athenians have any fiscal control over such operations in the ports? Or did the Macedonian-controlled garrison and commander subsume control of such commercial activities? It is likely that there

[76] *IG* ii^2 655 ll. 11–14. [77] *Agora* xvi. 181.

[78] *I. Rhamnous* 6 (an improved text with the addition of a fragment on the right side, *IG* ii^2 1217 (EM 422 + EM 13488)).

[79] *I. Rhamnous* 6 l. 7. The restoration '[the Rhamnousians stationed] in the Piraeus' is not certain. The reading of the critical participle is not certain and a dative singular might be preferred instead of a dative plural (thus Couvenhes in Couvenhes and Moretti 2004 follows Ph. Gauthier, *BE* 1997: 217). The fall of Athens 'in the year of [Antip]atros, the year before the archonship of Arrhenides' (Apollodoros *FGrH* 244 fr. 44; Habicht 1982: 15–16).

[80] *I. Rhamnous* 6 l. 2. [81] Ibid. ll. 8–11.

was sufficient co-operation between the Macedonian power and the Athenian institutions during this period to allow the polis to benefit from the arrival of commodities in the Piraeus. Whether the polis also enjoyed the fiscal benefits from such movements and sales is much less clear. Ultimately the presence of a garrison was enough of a problem for Athens that in 229 they sought to remove it.

Earlier in the fourth century the Piraeus was the main conduit for the movement of commodities into (and out of) Athens. It provided an environment for the agents involved in commercial activities and indeed space for the state to extract revenues from such operations. In the late fourth century there is little to suggest that sustained damage to that environment occurred. The function of the Piraeus was most clearly impaired during warfare. The best illustration is Demetrios Poliorketes' siege of Athens in 295. When he made an example to all other traders by hanging one ship's helmsman and merchant (*emporos*), 'all ships turned away in fear, food shortage in the city became acute and, in addition to the shortage of food, there was a lack of other things too'.[82]

What is less clear is how at the end of the fourth and early third centuries such circumstances affected the commercial investment in shipping and movement of commodities to Athens. Of course, what the siege of Athens and Piraeus in 295 demonstrated was the enormous profits that could be made from commercial ventures in such difficult times but the blockade of the Piraeus and treatment of those responsible for the cargo and the ship also displayed the danger of attempts to profit from such opportunities. In the medium term, is it possible to see a decline in Piraeus as an environment attractive to a particularly mobile element of the population, non-Athenians?

One index of activity in the Piraeus in the early Hellenistic period is the number of inscriptions that reflect cult activity, especially but not exclusively non-Athenian cults. The evidence is quite extensive and has been considered by several authors although in different contexts.[83] In the late fourth century foreign cults were clearly in no way impaired. For example, Kitians are honoured in 302/1;[84] a Cyprian proposes a decree for the cult he belonged to in 300/299;[85] Zeus Labraundos was being worshipped in 299/8.[86] Athenians too were active in cults located in the Piraeus. In the decade before the Chremonidean war, Zeuxion, priestess of the Mother of the Gods cult in the Piraeus, and her apparently Athenian husband were honoured in 272/1.[87] In

[82] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3.

[83] Garland 1987 in relation to the history of the Piraeus; Parker 1996 for Athenian religion; and more focused on the current themes, Mikalson 1998 on Hellenistic religion at Athens.

[84] *IG* ii^2 1262.

[85] Ibid. 1263.

[86] Ibid. 1271.

[87] Ibid. 1316 with Kirchner's restoration of the demotic (Phlya) at l. 14; see *LGPN* ii s.v. Agathon 44 and Mikalson 1998: 143 with n. 16. On the Mother of the Gods cult in

the summer of the Athenian year in which the Chremonidean war ended the members of the cult of Ammon built an annex to the sanctuary as recorded in an inscription.[88] After the Chremonidean war the inscriptions continue. Two decrees relating to the Bendis cult in Piraeus are particularly important.[89] Bendis, the focus of the oldest of the foreign cults at Athens, was worshipped on Athenian territory in three locations: in the Piraeus, in the *asty*, and on Salamis.[90] It has been suggested that the location of the temple of Bendis corresponds to the site of the prostyle temple found during excavations of the Piraeus.[91] In the archonship of Polystratos the Bendis cult in the Piraeus has to act 'so that they are evidently obeying the law of the city which orders the Thracians to send a procession to Piraeus and be well-disposed towards the orgeones in the *asty*'.[92] The decree reveals details about the preparations for the reception of the procession for the Bendis cult that will start in the prytaneion in Athens and end at the cult sanctuary in Piraeus. The Bendideion was located on the road from the Hippodamian Agora to the temple of Artemis Mounychia.[93] Although the decree suggests that there had been a breakdown between the city and Piraeus branches of the cult, there is no suggestion that the Piraeus group had ceased to operate. However the lack of rapport between the two groups seems to suggest that in fact although the Piraeus may have continued to be a good location for foreign cults, there were

Piraeus, see Mikalson 1998: 142–4 and Garland 1987: 129–31; in the Athenian polis, Parker 1988: 188–94.

[88] *IG* ii^2 1282, archonship of Antipatros (262/1). Another religious inscription possibly set up in the Chremonidean war is ibid. 1273 which refers to the archonship of Nikias (of which there are three—296/5, 282/1, and 266/5). The decree, probably set up in the year following Nikias, bears traces of the crucial archon on the moulding and there is space for an archon name of no more than nine letters if there is symmetry in the arrangement of letters: Euboulos seems the best choice. M. J. Osborne shows that this archon can be placed in 265/4 (M. J. Osborne 2003: 67 n. 3; 2004).

[89] *IG* ii^2 1283 (archonship of Polystratos, late 240s or 230s; cutter: Tracy, *A&M* 85, *c.*240) and 1284 (archonship of Lykeas, late 240s or 230s; cutter, Tracy, *A&M* 120).

[90] Mikalson 1998: 140–3; Parker 1996: 170–5. In addition to the Piraeus group in the early Hellenistic period: Salamis: *IG* ii^2 1317, 1317b, *SEG* ii. 10; Steinhauer 1993 (= *SEG* xl. 6, Piraeus museum no. 6657, Tracy *A&M* 121); Athenian Agora (?city branch): *Agora* xvi. 245 (= *SEG* xxi. 531, cutter not recognized by Tracy); cf. *Agora* xix. L16, late second or early first century, with Parker 1996: 171 n. 66; Laurion: *Horos* 7 (1989) 23–9 (= *SEG* xxxix. 210), dedication to Bendis, dated fourth/third century.

[91] *AD* 44 (1989 [1995]): 52–4: Bendis sanctuary site (?) at Odos Machaonos 8–10: a prostyle temple foundation, 7m long, bases of 3 columns (0.4m diameter), traces of animal bones, and two wells close to the entrance. Cf. von Eickstedt 1991: 176–7 for the Bendideion at the site of the Artemision.

[92] *IG* ii^2 1283 ll. 9–13.

[93] Mikalson 1998: 142; location in Piraeus: Xenophon *Hellenica* 2. 4. 11; Ferguson 1944: 103. Overlooking Tourkolimani (Mikrolimani) harbour, Garland 1987: 8 fig. 1 no. 20.

problems of communication between the *asty* and the Piraeus in this religious dimension. The particular reasons cannot be explained simply by the war. The archonship of Polystratos is (for the moment) dated quite late, at least in the late 240s. Another inscription from this year is the result of activity in the city for the Bendis cult where 'those now chosen in the city to build a sanctuary think that it is necessary to be well disposed to each other'.[94] The Chremonidean war had finished nearly two decades before. Recent hostilities in Attica in the first half of the 240s might have reintroduced reasons for a lack of communication between the Piraeus and Athenian cults, but the separation may be more deep-seated.[95]

If the Bendis cult is anything to go by, and the evidence for other non-Attic cults tend to reinforce this view, it is likely that the harbour retained a reasonably strong identity with non-Athenian ethnic groups throughout the third century. Warfare alone did not make cult activity impossible for either Athenian or non-Athenian cults. If there was any serious disruption for the Piraeus, its effect was probably felt in two significant ways. Serious military activity—sieges and assaults—almost certainly disturbed commercial activity. The most explicit example is 295. But more subtle adjustments probably occurred that affected specific kinds of activities that required regular movements between the *asty* and the Piraeus. And it is the communication or movement between the Piraeus and the upper city that is more difficult to determine. The movement of commodities into and out of the Piraeus could continue even when a foreign power held Mounychia. But on what fiscal conditions were the sales and movement of commodities based? A force in Piraeus at loggerheads with Athens could certainly prevent the fiscal benefits of movements into the Piraeus reaching the *asty*. A force in Piraeus whether at peace or war could also cut off any of the revenues normally extracted by the polis in the Piraeus.

The Piraeus remained the most important harbour for the Athenians. Their reaction to the permanent removal of the Macedonian garrison in 229 demonstrates that significance. The presence of a foreign garrison in the Piraeus was always a restriction on Athenian control of its territory. The Macedonian ruler installed a general in the Piraeus who responded to the king's instructions rather than those of the Athenian people.[96] Among the projects following their recovery of the Piraeus, the Athenians in 229 embarked on the construction of

[94] *IG* ii^2 1283 ll. 7–9.

[95] At *IG* ii^2 724 l. 3 Piraeus is mentioned in a religious context it would seem (date based on the cutter, *c.*286–239, Tracy, *A&M*: 83).

[96] *IG* ii^2 1225 ll. 15–16. What did Herakleitos' command amount to? He was general 'for the Piraeus and the rest of the duties (?*or* men) assigned (?*or* deployed) to the Piraeus' (*στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ Πε(ι)ραιέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν | ταττομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως*).

walls around the Piraeus and the harbours. This is precisely what had happened on recovering freedom in 307, and indeed had been a pressing issue earlier in the late 390s. It is quite possible that Athens had been deprived of some of the fiscal benefits of commerce in the Piraeus during the time when it has also been deprived of military control of the harbour, but there is insufficient evidence to draw a definite conclusion.

2.3. OUT OF ATTICA: THE ATHENIAN *PERAEA*

The focus now turns out of Attica. The territory of the Athenian polis had consisted of its cleruchies for so long by the late fourth century that it is necessary to remember that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were distinct from the main polis. This is particularly true of Salamis with its special cultic ties to the Athenian citizen body and physical proximity to the Attic mainland.[97] The major islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros have a different kind of relationship with Athens and these four islands make up Athens' quasi-*peraea*, as they are presented here.

Salamis remained important to the security of Attica in the early Hellenistic period.[98] But Habicht suggests that its capture by Demetrios Poliorketes in 295 initiated a long-term Macedonian control of the island.[99] It is possible that the island had been recovered by Athens in the late 280s and if lost again probably fell to Antigonos Gonatas during the Chremonidean war. The Athenian decree honouring Euthios, the archon of 283/2, famously expresses the prospect that the Piraeus and the *asty* (i.e. Athens) may be again united.[100] Among those who subscribe to this decree and award crowns are the tribesmen, the People and also the People of Salamis.[101] Under the circumstances it is difficult to believe that the People of Salamis were awarding a crown for Euthios when their island was under Macedonian control. By the end of the 280s it is likely that Athens had recovered Eleusis (and probably Rhamnous) and almost certainly Salamis.[102] A decree from Salamis passed

[97] Cultic ties: RO 37 for the Salaminioi decree of 363/2 and a complete bibliography. The third-century decree, passed in the archonship of Phanomachos (currently 263/2) makes this the longest surviving and best-preserved inscription in the whole of Attica from the period of the Chremonidean war, see S. D. Lambert, *ZPE* 119 (1997) 88–94 no. 2.

[98] Taylor 1997: 197–233 offers a very useful Salaminian perspective on this period. I follow much but not all aspects of her reconstruction, see below on 282–0.

[99] Habicht 1997: 130.

[100] *Agora* xvi. 181 ll. 30–1 (Moretti, *ISE* i. 14).

[101] *Agora* xvi. 181 ll. 44–5.

[102] Taylor (1997: 224–8, esp. 227) argues that the appearance of the People of the Salaminians in the decree for Euthios is not evidence of Athenian control of Salamis and concludes that the island was under a Macedonian garrison from 295 through to the Chremonidean war.

by the worshippers of Bendis dates the cult's presence on the island to 272/1 but does not prove that Macedonians controlled the island.[103] In the 250s, Herakleitos, the 'royal general', is honoured by the People of Salamis (the Athenian cleruchs) for among other things rebuilding the walls that had fallen down on the island.[104] The impression is that the island had not been in a good defensible condition, a further reflection either of the warfare in Athens and Attica in the 260s or of under-investment in the defences there by the polis or even Macedon in earlier years.

Samos must be considered briefly as its status was so controversial in the years immediately before the Athenians fell to Antipater in 322. The decree of Alexander the Great that declared in 324 that all exiles should be restored to their home cities presented major problems for some poleis including Athens. The Athenians considered that the cleruchy on Samos could be lost in the light of a specific request from Alexander to restore the island. This policy and the request to hand back Harpalos were two issues that were ultimately to lead to the Lamian war against Antipater. The realities of the decree on Samos saw the recovery of independence in *c.* 321.[105] The loss of territory on Samos had a major impact on the movement of people and the cities on the neighbouring mainland.[106]

The remaining three cleruchies of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, however, were still a major territorial concern of the polis not least for their potential importance as sources of grain, and continued in the late fourth and third centuries to require specific military administration.[107] The economic aspect has already been illustrated by the accounts from Eleusis of the first-fruits from the harvest in 329/8. Imbros and Lemnos provided Athens with the largest amount of wheat and were therefore important producers of high-quality grain.[108] The earlier grain tax law of 375/4 already signalled the central role that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros played as sources of grain.[109]

The Athenians lost their cleruchies at some point after the Lamian war. In 307, on the recovery of democracy, the Athenians were given back these

[103] *IG* ii^2 1317. [104] Ibid. 1225 ll. 11–12.

[105] Habicht 1997: 33–5, 41 with n. 14 and the Samian decrees *IG* xii. 6. 1, nos. 17–41.

[106] See below, Ch. 3.

[107] Tracy *A&M* 109–10 (see also Cargill 1995: 42–58) suggests that Lemnos was Athenian to 301, lost after Ipsos; Lysimachos took it in 288; Seleukos in 281 gave it back to Athens; Antigonos seized it at the end of the Chremonidean war. The islands are in Athenian control from *c.*255. Rhodes with Lewis (1996: 251) suggest Imbros is Athenian to 318; 307–301 (?); 281 to 202/1 and then 166 BC to the time of the Emperor Severus. Salomon 1997: 175–84 on the economic importance of these cleruchies in the classical period.

[108] See Garnsey 1988: 98, table 5; *IG* ii^2 1672 ll. 296 ff. (see Ch. 1 above, Table 1. 2).

[109] Stroud 1998.

territories.[110] A decree at the start of 305/4 records Athens' receipt of money from Lemnos and Imbros.[111] When had the Athenians lost control of the islands? It is most likely that Lemnos, followed by Delos, had revolted from Athens in 315 when Antigonos sent his admiral Dioskourides into the Aegean with the express purpose of securing an alliance with those islands that had not already joined him.[112] This campaign saw the creation of the League of Islanders. It has been suggested that because Antigonos gave back Lemnos (and Imbros) in 307 neither of these islands were members of this new federation.[113] On the news that the Lemnians were breaking away from Athens, a naval force was sent to recover the island. Several actions took place around this time. In 315/14, Thymochares (father of Phaidros and Kallias of Sphettos) captured Kythnos and made the seas safe because Glauketes had been using the island as a base from which to divert shipping.[114] In reaction to the problems on Lemnos, Kassander asked the Athenians to send a fleet of twenty ships. This small force was supported temporarily by a Ptolemaic contingent of ships commanded by Seleukos who moved on to Kos. Lemnos remained true to Antigonos whose commander Dioskourides captured the Athenian ships and expelled any remaining Athenians from the island.[115] The defence of Lemnos marks a phase of independence from Athens that lasted from *c.*315 to 307.

A second phase of independence preceded the recovery of the islands by Athens in the late 280s. The Athenians recovered Lemnos in 281, after the death of Lysimachos and before the assassination of Seleukos I (between January and February and summer 281).[116] It is clear that before 281 Lysimachos had been in control of the islands and it is possible that they had been under his command since he had gained power in the northern

[110] Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 4. Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1. On the retention of the ten tribes in 307 on Lemnos, and the decrees, Rhodes with Lewis 1996: 252–4 (250–1, Imbros; 288, Skyros, no early Hellenistic decrees).

[111] *IG* ii^2 1492 ll. 132–4. Different restorations have been offered, but it seems that Athens received from the islands either 29 talents 3051 drachmai 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ obols (A. M. Woodward) or 8 talents 3051 drachmai 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ obols (D. M. Lewis). I thank the late D. M. Lewis for these alternative restorations, both of which are unpublished.

[112] Date of 315: Diod. Sic. 19. 62. 9. I follow the higher chronology preferred by Bosworth 1992 for the middle years between 318 and 316, cf. Perlman 2000: 144–9. In Diodoros the dispatch of Dioskourides precedes Kassander's presidency of the Nemean games in the August–September of 315 (see Perlman 1989 on the timing of the festival in the Argive month Panamos, supported by S. D. Lambert, *ZPE* 139 (2002) 72–4, Metageitnion in the Athenian calendar). Date of 314/13: Billows 1990: 118, 222–3 (Habicht 1997: 62 dates Lemnos' capture by Antigonos to 318).

[113] Foundation: Billows 1990: 220–1 n. 89; Lemnos and Imbros not members: ibid. 223 n. 96.

[114] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 9–13 and Habicht 1997: 62 with n. 74.

[115] Diod. Sic. 19. 68. 3–4, 315/4.

[116] Habicht 1997: 130; Phylarchos *FGrH* 81 fr. 29. Heinen 1972: 20.

Mediterranean at the expense of Demetrios Poliorketes in 288. However, there is no clear evidence for a date.[117] Lysimachos' rule of Lemnos was evidently not popular.[118]

From 281 Lemnos was back under Athenian control and presumably remained so down to the Chremonidean war. At some point before that war broke out, the Athenians have cavalry under a hipparch operating on the island. A cavalry officer, Komeas, received honours from the cleruchs on the island towards the end of 279/8 or possibly 269/8.[119] He was clearly a major figure and had served as an ambassador, almost certainly voted by the people.[120]

The recovery of Lemnos coincided with a flurry of diplomatic activity with other Aegean polities in the 280s. At the end of 281/0 an ambassador from Tenos arrived in Athens and was awarded an olive crown and entertainment in the prytaneion by the Boule the following day.[121] The Tenians enjoyed an unusual status at Athens because their community was one of the few to have received a grant of privileges (*isoteleia*) that were renewed.[122] Reger linked the renewal of *isoteleia* with the recovery of the Piraeus, a link which is difficult to prove. However, the contact with Tenos certainly confirms Athens' growing activity in the Aegean and mainland Greece. It follows shortly after the recovery of Lemnos and Athenian participation in the festival of Zeus Basileus in Boeotia.[123] That diplomatic activity continued in the 270s.

The Athenians also praised ambassadors who had come from Tenedos in a decree of 276/5. The decree renewed Athenian interest in the island and recalled gifts previously given to the Tenedians.[124] The evidence suggests Athenian concerns in the north-east corner of the Aegean were well developed: Lemnos and probably Imbros were now in their control, and strong links were

[117] Habicht 1997: 130 on this suggestion; he thinks that Athens had lost the islands after Ipsos, the implication is that Demetrios Poliorketes had taken them.

[118] Heinen 1972: 34–6.

[119] *IG* ii^2 672 + Add. p. 663. Cf. *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 338–9. (Ch. Habicht, *Ath. Mitt.* 76 (1961): 135 and L. Robert, *REG* 77 (1964) no. 132). See Bugh 1988: 209–21 for Komeas' office of hipparch. For the cutter, Tracy *A&M* 83 with the report of new pieces (EM 12909 + 12925, as mentioned by Bugh 1988: 209). The earlier date (279/8) is the traditional one (thus Tracy *A&M* 83) but the space for the archon name may well be the archon who served in the otherwise unassigned year of 269/8 (Tracy *A&M* 169 n. 3).

[120] *IG* ii^2 672 l. 41. See Salomon 1997: 155–9 on the honorific decrees of the Lemnian cleruchy.

[121] *IG* ii^2 660b with Reger 1992. Another sign of Atheno-Tenian diplomacy is the survival of a decree honouring the Athenian, Charinos son of Aristodemos, *proxenos*, on Tenos, *IG* xii 5 800 (see Étienne 1990: 177).

[122] Reger 1992: 368–70. On the block grants of privileges, see Étienne 1990: 177.

[123] *Agora* xvi. 182.

[124] *SEG* iii. 94 = *IG* ii^2 684 + 752b; the decree is passed in 276/5, a date based on the few surviving letters of the secretary's name.

made with Tenedos in the mid-270s. It is possible that the Athenian attention focused not only on the islands as sources of grain but extended beyond in terms of their position on the routes used for maritime trade with the Black Sea.[125]

The subsequent history of the islands is far from clear. In the 250s Athens is still in control of Lemnos. New evidence from the island reveals that Athenians were using *horoi* to mark mortgaged property.[126] In addition Tracy has identified the letter-cutters of two decrees which can now be redated from the fourth to the third century. *IG* ii^2 550 is a decree concerning the island of Lemnos and the reporting of building walls possibly on the island. Some involvement with an individual who has been sent or come from Antigonos seems to date the inscription to the reign of Gonatas.[127] *IG* ii^2 1222 is cut by the same mason and may well refer to the same period, although this is not clear. The inscription seems to refer to the salvation of something, someone, or peoples.[128] A third inscription (*IG* ii^2 735) also refers to Hephaistia on Lemnos. The Athenian inscription was cut by a mason working in the 250s and 240s.[129] However a new fragment helps to identify more clearly the details and the inscription may date to *c.*250.

These recent advances in the epigraphy of Lemnos promise a better understanding about the nature of the contacts between Athens and the islands, particularly after the Chremonidean war. It is almost certain that Athens continued to value Lemnos and possibly Imbros and Skyros as sources of grain. But the military administration of the island remained prominent, which echoes the concerns for security that were seen in the fourth century.[130] The epigraphy shows a high level of interaction between Athens and Lemnos in the years after the Chremonidean war and confirms again the interest of the polis in its overseas contacts and in particular these territories.

These cleruchies were producers of grain and of potential importance in maritime commerce.[131] As the external territory of the polis, they seem always

[125] In the same period there is also evidence that *sitōnai* were appointed at Athens in 275/4 and 272/1 (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904, and *Agora* xvi. 188, see Chapter 8).

[126] L. Beschi, 'Nuove iscrizioni da Efestia', *ASAtene* 70–1 (1992–3) [1998] 262–7 (at Tracy *A&M* 109). Salomon (1997: 162–75) gathers the earlier *horoi* on Lemnos.

[127] *IG* ii^2 550 previously dated to 'post a. 314/3' (Kirchner). See for the cutter working *c.* 281/0 to 240, Tracy *A&M* 102, 109–10 (with further references, *SEG* xlii.92).

[128] *IG* ii^2 1222 + Add. p. 672 l. 1 (with some adjustments in Cargill 1995: 214–18, cut by the same mason who completed the previous inscription, Tracy *A&M* 102, 109–10). For the Philoneos Phil[— —] at l. 14 compare Philoneos son of Philoxenos son of Kephisia at *IG* ii^2 6444, Cargill 1995: 218.

[129] *IG* ii^2 735. The mason is the cutter of *IG* ii^2 776 who worked between *c.* 255 and *c.* 240 (Tracy *A&M* 114; previously associated in the style of a later cutter, *ALC* 43). An unpublished fragment joins the stone, Tracy *A&M* 115–16.

[130] Salomon 1997: 185–8; Cargill 1995: 143 n. 21.

[131] Salomon 1997: 188.

to be high on the agenda for Athens. Their loss repeatedly produced a considerable concern for their recovery. The distant territories (the Athenian 'peraea') were certainly but perhaps not exclusively of value for their contributions to the production and movement of grain.

2.4. ATHENIAN TERRITORY AND POLIS ECONOMIES

The return of the Piraeus and the recovery of the cleruchies were the two central concerns for Athenian connectivity with the worlds beyond Attica. Athenian history in the early Hellenistic period can be closely defined by the disruptions between the *asty* and the Piraeus that the foreign control of the garrison at times imposed. The harbour was the centre of Athenian commerce and a major locus of a large non-Athenian population. The Athenians in the fourth century relied enormously on the operation of Piraeus as a major *emporion* to which many commodities, including grain, arrived. All the varied activities vital to commerce were practised in the Piraeus. The grain tax from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros had been brought to the Piraeus before being transported to the Agora. These two elements—the Piraeus and the cleruchic islands—were critical features in the movement of commodities to Athens. The supply of grain to the city relied on the Piraeus. Imported grain from the islands could boost the imports of grain from external sources. Any change in the status of either the Piraeus or the islands was liable to have an impact on economic conditions.

The fragility of the Athenian economies was evident in its inability to protect the islands in the early Hellenistic period even when traces of its fleet still existed. Athens suffered many pressures that exposed these weaknesses in its economic structures in the early Hellenistic period. It is now necessary to turn to the people who were affected by these changes and ultimately were responsible for maintaining the complex and diverse economies of the polis.

3

People of Attica

> The question at any moment in Mediterranean history must be: where are the people? They can be very hard to see.
>
> (Horden and Purcell 2000: 378)

3.1. DEMOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

Without its most important resource, people, the future of any polis was bleak.[1] For Athens, the early Hellenistic period is seen to be one in which the falling levels of population accompanied economic decline.[2] A city that found difficulties in feeding its own population, with frequent cause to appeal to outside help to resolve grain crises, is regarded as a typical Hellenistic city.[3] Indeed, some have argued that food shortage stimulates emigration.[4] But the movement of the population of Attica is complex. The population consisted of people of different status: citizens, metics (and other non-permanent residents), and slaves. The composition of the population was never static and the ebb and flow of people into and out of Athens and Attica will have constantly affected not only demands on food supply but also the supply of manpower for the agricultural economies.

The labour required to maintain the agrarian economy of Attica was extensive and sensitive. Changes in population would have affected the many variables in the economies of the Athenian polis. Changes in the nature of the population, for instance the loss of slaves, will also have affected the type of labour force available. If the citizens themselves were providing the bulk of the labour force, then this would have affected the numbers of citizens available to serve in the army and protect the countryside.[5] Complex dynamics link the

[1] Purcell 1990: 44. Cf. Runciman 1990.

[2] Athens in decline, e.g. Mossé 1973; Tarn and Griffith 1952: 111.

[3] Garnsey 1988: 163, 'a chronic tendency to food crises'.

[4] Tarn and Griffith 1952: 100. Although they conclude that there was 'no actual depopulation in Greece till the Roman civil wars' (ibid. 102).

[5] That citizens did not supply the labour in the agricultural economy was in most poleis a philosophical fantasy, see Fouchard 1993.

agrarian economies, defence of the polis, and demographic factors. This chapter concentrates on how such demographic factors affected economic concerns in Attica in the early Hellenistic period.

3.2. LABOUR AND MANPOWER

It is possible to model the labour requirements for harvesting crops using comparative data although 'great caution should be exercised in extrapolating recent labour and production norms back into the distant past'.[6] Two important basic rates can be found in modern work which illuminate possible scenarios in Attica in the early Hellenistic period: labour requirements to produce grain and, more specifically, labour required to harvest grain.[7] First, Gallant assumes that to produce cereal crops required 48 man days per hectare per year, comparing figures from various Mediterranean locations. This figure, closest to the time spent producing wheat on Melos, sits at the upper end of the range of figures considered by Gallant.[8] Attica covers 2400 km^2 (240,000 hectares) making the territory of the Athenian polis (excluding the cleruchies) one of the largest known in the history of the polis.[9] Scholars have argued that between 20 and 50 per cent of the Attic countryside was cultivable.[10] The most important consideration here is the proportion of Attica devoted to grain, which Garnsey estimated at 17.5 per cent.[11] On the basis of these assumptions it is a simple operation to calculate the minimum number of workers required to harvest the cereal crops of Attica on the assumption that each worker worked for 175 or 200 days per year.[12] (See Table 3.1.)

[6] Halstead and Jones 1989: 53; Halstead 1987: esp. 78. Forbes (1992: 99) illustrates how 'the simple use of ethnographic data is no fool-proof route to an understanding of any aspect of ancient agriculture', since social, economic, and technological considerations are often ignored in the analysis of the ethnographic data.

[7] R. G. Osborne (1995: 33) has performed a similar calculation for the labour required to perform and bring in the harvest in Attica.

[8] Gallant 1991: 75. Throughout I have adopted the scale of one adult male to one man day, and do not present any additional calculations for the employment of adolescent males (0.9), adult and adolescent females (0.7), and elderly adults and children (0.5), see ibid. 76.

[9] Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 72, exceeded only by Pantikapaion, Sparta/Laconia (before 371), and Syracuse.

[10] See Garnsey 1988: 91 with n. 7. Sallares (1991: 310) suggests that 40 per cent of Attica was cultivable. Foxhall (1992: 156) argues that 'at least half, and probably more, of the area of Attika was usable for agricultural activities of some kind'. Whitby 1998: 118 n. 29: 10–15 per cent devoted to grain.

[11] Garnsey 1988: 102, table 2.

[12] In Table 3.1 I have offered calculations on the basis of Gallant's two rates for the number of days worked per year by an individual worker: of 200 and 175 man days worked per year.

Table 3.1. *Labour required to produce cereal crops in Attica*

Attica* Land under grain (%)	Hectares	Man days/year (1 hectare at 48 man days/year)	Minimum number of workers required (175 man days/year)	Minimum number of workers required (200 man days/year)
17.5	42,000	2,016,000	11,520	10,080
20	48,000	2,304,000	13,166	11,520

* 2,400 km^2 = 240,000 hectares

According to Halstead and Jones it is more difficult to assess how much time was devoted to processing the grain after harvesting, but their study underlined how in Arkesine, farmers worked under considerable pressure of time, particularly during the harvest period.[13] They concluded that 'the highly seasonal nature of agricultural activity and the uncertainty of the weather conditions required for some tasks conspire to place farmers under serious time stress at certain critical times. This is particularly true of the early summer period of harvesting and processing staple cereal and pulse crops and, perhaps to a lesser extent, of the winter ploughing season.'[14] Applying the rates of the harvest operation to Attica as a whole impresses the possible extent of the activity in the countryside during harvest time. The range of figures suggests that 15,000–20,000 workers could have been involved in the countryside at harvest time. Although different parts of Attica may have been harvested at different times, the general scale of the whole process of bringing in the grain harvest indicates the levels of manpower required to harvest the cereal crops. The manpower required to gather the local harvests of Attica presents a relatively constant problem in Athenian history. The question for this period is whether the population that depended on Attica changed and what impact, if any, such changes had.

3.3. THE POPULATION OF FOURTH-CENTURY ATTICA

The general view of the demographic history of Athens and Attica, and for that matter Greece as a whole, is that the size of population fell from the fifth century through to the third quarter of the fourth century.[15] Of that there is

[13] Halstead and Jones (1989: 47) note also that 7–10 donkey loads were required to carry away the harvest from one good field of one *stremma* (one-tenth of a hectare).

[14] Ibid. 53.

[15] For Greece as a whole, see e.g. Scheidel 2003: 120; for Athens and Attica: e.g. Ruschenbusch 1999: 92; Gallo 2002.

universal agreement. The degree of change is debated. One suggestion is that the population in the fourth century may have been a half of what it had been at its peak in the fifth century.[16] Any study of the demography of ancient Greece is fraught with problems. The penchant of historians to attempt to quantify numbers of slaves, foreigners, or citizens in Athens in particular, has a long history. Arguments have tended to rely on much of the same evidence that Boeckh had exploited in his *Die Staatshaushaltung* of 1828. The lack of evidence and margins of error may in fact make any quantification of population (and subsequent calculations of Athenian self-sufficiency in grain) particularly problematic or even futile.[17] The evidence for population in Athens and Attica is revisited here but the main interest is in trying to frame the size of the population and establish at least the scale of a theoretical population size. Can we establish a range of numbers? Are we thinking of 15,000 or 30,000 Athenians? Or 20,000 or 60,000 slaves? In some sense these can only ever be ball-park figures. But quantification is not the only focus. Where were the people? It has been widely assumed that people in Hellenistic Athens became more urbanized. Historians speak of a drift towards greater centralization: the population moved from the countryside to the urban centre. If one is to draw conclusions about population in Attica, they need to be contextualized in a wider framework of behaviour and the movements of people. After all, the fifth century, it can be argued, saw a considerably important period of urbanization when many rural Athenians found that they needed to move from the countryside to the city for reasons of safety, strategy, and policy.[18] The size and distribution of the population in early Hellenistic Attica may allow us to illustrate the scale of the economic problems and the political impact of the historical events that confronted the people who took decisions and directed the Athenian state.

A review of recent estimates of the population of Athens and its various components (3.3.1-4) anticipates a more qualitative methodology designed to trace the people of Attica in the early Hellenistic period (3.4). Good evidence for this operation is elusive. Any attempt to quantify, or even qualify, the numbers and movements of people in Attica in the Hellenistic period can only ever be scaled on the better but still poor evidence for numbers in the third quarter of the fourth century. But careful sifting of the evidence produces small gains and these can be used at least to sketch roughly the demography of Attica in the post-Classical period. Epigraphical evidence can, often indirectly, indicate movements of people or reflect pressures arising from such movements. The inscriptions and the relevant literary sources signal a background

[16] M. J. Osborne 2004: 164.
[17] Scheidel in Garnsey 1998: 198–200.
[18] Thuc. 2. 16–17.

against which decisions were being taken. It will be argued that the polis wanted both to remain attractive to movements of people from outside Athens and to retain those foreigners already resident in the city.

The fundamental purpose of the investigation is, of course, to establish the context in which political decisions were taken at Athens. The fluidity of human resources, especially when movements affected patterns of settlement, can affect the capacity to maximize agricultural productivity in the *chora*. The archaeological evidence, as far as it can be assessed in the early Hellenistic period, reflects changes in patterns of settlement in Attica but does not necessarily support a view that the countryside was abandoned. It will be argued that change in the representation of demes in the Council in the late fourth and third centuries indirectly reflects the relative prosperity and importance of individuals registered in some Attic demes.

Agriculture made huge demands on human resources, as it did in any Mediterranean community. It is one of the principal keys to our understanding ancient Greek economies.[19] Harvesting crops, for example, was one particular time-stress activity. The harvest made demands on human resources. The relationship between manpower requirements for harvesting and the size, make-up, and distribution of the population of the polis has wide repercussions for the running of the polis. In these respects, the movement of peoples and the presence of manpower in Attica were crucial to the Athenian economy. This chapter shows that movements of people in Athens during the early Hellenistic period were fluid. Such movements provided the context in which political decisions over military strategy and especially defence had to allow for the manpower requirements and settlement patterns that agriculture practice dictated and warfare affected.

Few have looked for the people of Athens and Attica in the Hellenistic period. One broad assessment of population in Hellenistic cities has suggested that overall numbers remained stable, which is possibly true in particular for the third century.[20] Evidence from ancient authors is rare and must be handled with caution. Polybius does not offer a view of Greece suffering simply from depopulation but weighs in with a moral tone addressed broadly at the social elite:[21]

In our time Greece was afflicted with a dearth of children and a general decline in population, which caused the cities to be deserted and the land to become unproductive, even though we were free from continuous wars and epidemics.[22]

[19] Descat 1989: 241, 'la clé de tout mécanisme économique'.

[20] Davies 1984: 291–2; on the third century, 267–8.

[21] Ibid. 268; Austin 1981: 149 n. 1.

[22] Polybius 36. 17. 5, trans. Austin 1981: 148, *ἐπέσχεν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἀπαιδία καὶ συλλήβδην ὀλιγανθρωπία, δι' ἣν αἵ τε πόλεις ἐξηρημώθησαν καὶ ἀφορίαν εἶναι συνέβαινε, καὶπερ οὔτε πολέμων συνεχῶν ἐσχηκότων ἡμᾶς οὔτε λοιμικῶν περιστάσεων.*

The majority of the evidence for the fourth-century population in Attica in fact belongs to the early Hellenistic period, the years after Chaeronea and before the return of democracy in 307/6. Despite the ongoing debate as to the size of citizen population of Athens, real progress is unlikely to be achieved without new significant evidence. However the benefits of the exercise here, at least, is to establish the problems involved in understanding the evidence for the third quarter of the fourth century.[23] The Athenian citizen body, foreigners and metics, and slaves are treated separately.

3.3.1. The Athenian Citizen Body

Calculations of the Athenian population have usually started with the adult male Athenians, from which the numbers of children and women are extrapolated. Four main types of evidence are used: the numbers of those Athenians serving as soldiers; the figures for Athenians, foreigners, and slaves preserved in the writings of Ktesikles; the numbers disfranchised by the oligarchies at the end of the fourth century; and, finally, the number of Athenians required to allow the Council to function normally. Each of these involves more space than can be offered here and more detailed discussion can be found elsewhere.[24] What follows is a summary of the main problems.

Military service. In 323/2, all Athenians up to the age of 40 were called up and seven out of the ten tribes were sent abroad, 5,000 infantry in total.[25] The number of citizens in Athens was sufficient to sustain the call-up, the mobilization of 500 cavalry (and the manning of the triremes), and allow the democracy to function. The Assembly continued to grant rights of citizenship (requiring a quorum of 6,000), the magistracies were filled, and the jury sat.[26] These parameters provide the data for Hansen who used the Model life tables developed for historical demography by Coale and Demeny to project the Athenian male population based on the Athenians called up for service at the start of the Lamian war.[27]

Census figures and disfranchised citizens. The purpose of the operation that produced a count of citizens, metics, and slaves during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron remains obscure. Athenaeus reports:

[23] On the benefits of such an exercise, Purcell 1990: 37; although later such exercises are regarded 'a considerable waste of effort' (Horden and Purcell 2000: 352).

[24] The most comprehensive discussion is still Hansen 1985.

[25] Diod. Sic. 18. 10. 2 and 11. 3.

[26] Citizenship grant in 323/2, e.g. *IG* ii^2 448 ll. 1–35 (see Hansen 1985: 39–40 with n. 138).

[27] Hansen 1985: 67.

Ktesikles in the third book of the *Chronicles* says that in Olympiad (?) a census of those living in Attica was conducted by Demetrios of Phaleron, and revealed 21,000 Athenians, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.[28]

Ktesikles the historian is virtually unknown, cited only twice, and on both occasions from the third book of his *Chronicles*, which covered a period embracing at least *c.*318 to 241, the death of Eumenes I.[29] The purpose of the census (*exetasmos*) is uncertain. The prevailing view is that it was a military review.[30] However, during the relatively peaceful period under Demetrios of Phaleron it is not inconceivable that a survey for fiscal purposes was undertaken.[31] Two successive oligarchic reforms in four years, under two different governments, witnessed the first changes to citizenship status at Athens since the end of the fifth century. In 322/1, Antipater imposed a high level of minimum property ownership, 2,000 drachmai, which an Athenian was required to sustain to maintain full citizen status. Those that did not reach this level were effectively disfranchised, and found themselves without rights to participate in political life, and suffered *atimia*, the loss of civic rights. These were offered land in Thrace by Antipater.[32] According to Plutarch, 12,000 Athenians lost their full citizen status as a result of this change;[33] 9,000, according to Diodorus, qualified for full citizenship.[34] The oligarchy, dissolved during 319/18, had been replaced by spring of 318 with a democracy.[35] The short-lived revival of democracy is assumed to have seen the removal of any qualification for citizenship, but the sources are silent. Oligarchy returned in 317. One of the terms that resulted from the numerous peace negotiations with Kassander later in 317 allowed only those who possessed at least 1,000 drachmai to participate in running the city.[36] The numbers affected by this reform are uncertain. Once again Athenians will have lost their full citizen rights. In this context it is clear that, whatever the purpose of the census during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron, the 21,000 is likely to have included the large number of *atimoi* (those without civic rights) disfranchised by the conditions of Kassander's peace in 317.

[28] Ktesikles, *FGrH* 245 fr. 1 = Athenaeus 6. 272C: *Κτησικλῆς δ' ἐν τρίτηι Χρονικῶν ⟨κατὰ τὴν πεντε⟩ καιδεκάτην πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατόν φησιν ὀλυμπιάδα ἐξετασμὸν γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως τῶν κατοικούντων τὴν Ἀττικήν, καὶ εὑρεθῆναι Ἀθηναίους μὲν δισμυρίους πρὸς τοῖς χιλίοις, μετοίκους δὲ μυρίους, οἰκετῶν δὲ † μυρίαδας μ̄.*

[29] Ktesikles, *FGrH* 245 fr. 2 = Athenaeus 10. 445C; I see no overwhelming reason to identify Stesikleides (Diog. Laert. 2. 56) with Ktesikles.

[30] Hansen 1985: 33 n. 106, citing e.g. *IG* ii^2 500 ll. 12–13 (302/1).

[31] Ferguson 1911: 54 associates the census with a peacetime operation.

[32] Diod. Sic. 18. 18. 4; Habicht 1997: 44.

[33] Plut. *Phoc.* 28. 4, which forces the emendation of Diod. Sic. 18. 18. 5. On privileges of full citizen rights, see Sinclair 1988: 30–4.

[34] Diod. Sic. 18. 18. 5. [35] Habicht 1997: 47–9. [36] Diod. Sic. 18. 74. 3.

The numbers disfranchised reinforce the idea that a large number of Athenians had only small plots of land. The subsistence-farm is the minimal unit of property-holding for the self-sustaining family and has been the focus of much recent work on the rural economies of ancient Greece.[37] Comparative and ancient data unanimously agree that such a property was between four and six hectares.[38] It is a unit apparently characteristic in some of the landscapes that have been extensively surveyed.[39] But in most models of property ownership in Attica, there are large numbers of smallholders, many below the subsistence level. Foxhall estimated as many as just under 25 per cent of Athenian householders owned property below the minimum subsistence level, Osborne as many as 40 per cent of citizens; in addition, possibly as many as 5,000 Athenians owned no property at all.[40] The higher (earlier) rate of 2,000 drachmai and lower (later) rate of 1,000 drachmai disqualified large numbers of Athenians. Changes in citizenship status may have had an impact on property ownership in Attica. Some Athenians certainly left the city when they chose to take up Antipater's invitation to participate in the foundation of a city in Thrace.[41] Those that left, and possibly those that stayed in Attica without citizen rights, may have sold their property. If they did, then the two adjustments to citizenship may have accelerated the shift towards the concentration of property in the hands of a minority of Athenians who in the fourth century already enjoyed a disproportionately larger share of property in Attica.

Operation of the Council. A minimum number of adult male citizens were required to supply councillors to the Council of 500 (which increased after 307 to 600, and in 224/3 to 650). The Council was the largest standing organ of Athenian government. Its membership changed every year when a new body of councillors was appointed. The annual cycle of Council membership would have required a population large enough to supply sufficient councillors each year from the eligible citizen body. Ferguson used the membership of the Council to support his claim that by *c.*200 BC, there were 75,000 to 100,000 'free and franchised inhabitants of Attica' to fill twelve or thirteen tribes in a Council of 600 or 650.[42] Hansen concluded that this evidence, combined with the figures for military service during the Lamian war, provide the best indicators for the number of Athenian citizens.[43] Athenians were allowed to serve any number of times as military officials, but only once in all

[37] Gallant 1991. [38] Ibid. 82–7.

[39] e.g the southern Argolid survey, Jameson 1992: 141.

[40] Foxhall 1992: 157 and fig. 1. R. G. Osborne 1992: 24. The proposal of Phormisius at the end of the fifth century would have disfranchised all Athenian non-property holders, Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 32.

[41] Baynham 2003: 26–7. [42] Ferguson 1911: 316 with n. 2. [43] Hansen 1994.

other magistracies, except in the Council. An Athenian could serve twice as a councillor although not in successive years according to the Heliastic oath.[44] It is difficult to determine how many councillors served on two occasions, possibly as many as one-fifth to one-quarter (100–25 until 307, 120–50 after 307). The distribution of the (epigraphic) evidence for Council membership in the Hellenistic period is patchy. However Byrne argues that the preserved evidence suggests that in the Boule of 600 there would have been a greater tendency for multiple office holding than earlier in the Classical period.[45] Selection for service on the Council was by lot but the system seems to have made it possible for those who desired to serve as a councillor in a particular year.[46] Membership of the Council was restricted to citizens who were already 30 years old (and eligible) although Hansen has argued that the de facto average age of a councillor serving for the first time was nearer 40.[47]

The population required to sustain an annual first-time membership of councillors can be approximated. For example, assuming that 400 out of 500 councillors served for the first time each year in the fourth century (before 307 BC), and their average age was 40, a minimum population of 21,000 is required.[48] It is important to know that terms of membership in the Council did not change after 307. No change in either the average age of office or the minimum age requirement or the proportion of citizens serving as councillor on two occasions can be discerned. A calculation with the same criteria for a Council of 600 requires a minimum population of 22,900.[49] The changes in the tribal structure of Athens in 307 permitted adjustments to the quota scheme for the number of councillors provided by each deme. No deme is ever known to have had difficulty in fulfilling its annual membership quota for the Council. Therefore, the size of the Athenian male population required to provide sufficient councillors each year will provide a lower limit on the population size. Additional numbers of citizens must be considered to allow for military service (cavalry and other land forces, and naval activity) and political life (some magistracies).

[44] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 62. 3 The Heliastic oath, Dem. 24. 149.

[45] Byrne (forthcoming) will develop this point made during a paper presented at a conference in honour of Christian Habicht, 2–4 April 2006.

[46] Rhodes 1988: 3–4 indicates lack of competition for membership; cf. Hansen 1985: 57–8. Demesmen may well have been able to put themselves forward for Council membership in a given year, and the selection by lot was probably required to determine from this group of demesmen who was to stand.

[47] Minimum age: Rhodes 1972: 1 with n. 7; average age of service, Hansen 1985: 55–6, 64.

[48] Hansen 1985: 51–64.

[49] Council of 600, average age of 30: population required 17,800; age 40: 22,900; age 50: 32,000.

Although the evidence on which all estimates have been made has changed very little, historians have produced different totals of the adult male citizen at Athens in the fourth century ranging between 20,000 and 30,000 or more.[50] Sallares emphasizes that these figures diverge little from the notional number of Athenian citizens (30,000) found in the majority of the ancient sources.[51]

From this figure the number of Athenians, including children and women, is extrapolated. One method projects from the number of adult male citizens the likely size of the total Athenian population (men, women, and children) using Model life tables.[52] This method is statistically determined by the choice of particular demographic models and the specific mortality level and growth rate.[53] Hansen consistently applies Model West (a generic stable population), mortality level 4, and growth rate of 0.5 per cent. This data shows that an adult citizen body of 30,000 assumes a total of 52,000 Athenian males who will count among a total population of 100,000 (all Athenians, including women and children).

It will be seen that the proportion of constituent categories produced by such modelling is not unparalleled. Possible comparative data exist in the Roman world.[54] Records found in the camp of the defeated Helvetii in the mid-first century BC were brought to the victorious commander, Caesar. At a time of great prosperity, there were 92,000 in the total Helvetii population of 368,000, able to perform military duties (ratio 1 : 4 adult males to total population).[55] In Rome, at a time of crisis, when the countryside had been deserted and the city was overcrowded with both urban and rural communities, 110,000 adult males and three times as many women, children, slaves, and foreigners were recorded by the census.[56] The comparison with the extrapolation based on the Model life tables is, therefore, not unreasonable. But groups in the population require further thought.

3.3.2. Foreigners and Metics

The number of foreigners is much harder to establish. The 10,000 metics recorded by Ktesikles offers a base figure.[57] Most assume this number is too

[50] Whitby 1998: 30,000 or over; Hansen 1985: 39–40, 64, 66–9, 30,000; Sallares 1991: 53: nearer the upper end of 20,000–30,000; Garnsey 1988: 89–92, 135–7: 20,000–30,000; Oliver 1995: 17; 25,000; Jameson 1977: 22,000; Sekunda 1992: just below 21,000; R. G. Osborne 1985: 42–5, 20,000–21,000. Foxhall 1992: 156 assumes the range is 20,000–30,000.

[51] Sallares 1991: 53 with ancient authors cited at n. 14.

[52] See e.g. Hansen 1988*a*: 8–11.

[53] Coale and Demeny 1983.

[54] Sallares 1991: 427 n. 14 indicates the two sources discussed here.

[55] Caesar *Bellum Gallicum* 1. 29.

[56] Dion. Hal. *Antiquitates Romanae* 9. 25. 2.

[57] Hansen 1988*a*: 10–11; Whitehead 1977: 97–8 with n. 178.

low and excludes at least children and probably also women. High and low estimates exist, ranging from a low of 20,000 to around 30,000.[58] There is a general assumption that foreigners and metics were a fluid group within the polis. This may be true for some, but not for all members of the population.[59] The orthodox distinction between a metic (resident foreigner) and a foreigner need not detain us for too long.[60] Some metics may have been 'residing' for only a short time before returning to their own community or next port of call. The Sidonians, residing in Sidon, but active in the *emporia* at Athens, are given an exemption from paying the metic tax.[61] An a priori assumption that metics were more likely than citizens to move can no longer go unchallenged. Athenians too were likely to move in and out of the city, serving as traders or going abroad, becoming themselves quasi-metics elsewhere (see below, Part II). However, this is a red herring.[62] Hansen ultimately prefers to estimate foreigners by establishing the proportion of foreigners to citizens (1 : 3) based on epigraphical evidence (the number of private funerary monuments). Thus, if there were 100,000 Athenians then there would have been 33,000 foreigners. He also argues that the figure recorded by Ktesikles identifies foreigners eligible for military service and excludes short-term metics. Using the demographic model, 17,500 male foreigners would have provided 10,000 men of military age. Adding short-term metics, women and children would increase this total.[63] The range for metics is assumed to lie anywhere from 20,000 to 30,000, but the road to this conclusion is unsatisfactory.

3.3.3. Slaves

Few believe in Ktesikles' 400,000 slaves, dismissing it as an error in the manuscript tradition.[64] But if we must estimate numbers—'an intractable problem'—then we must also take a view on the extent of slave ownership in Attica.[65] If an Athenian foreigner (or even slave) could have afforded a slave,

[58] Hansen 1988*a*: 11 argues for the higher figure; R. G. Osborne 1987: 20,000.

[59] See Whitehead 1977: 18, metics as true 'home changers'; a less stable population, Hansen 1988*a*: 10, 'metic numbers must have fluctuated considerably'.

[60] Whitehead 1977: 7–10.

[61] RO 21 (*IG* ii^2 141).

[62] Hansen 1988*a*: 10 refers to metics and short-term metics.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Sallares 1991: 54 with n. 16. Hansen 1985: 30–1 esp. n. 94; Ferguson 1911: 54 n. 3. Cf. Scheidel 1996: 224, on multiples of 400 in Roman sources, and his cautions on numbers, at ibid. 237 n. 34.

[65] Extensive bibliography, see most recently Cartledge 2001 and Jameson 2001 (171, quotation); an essential reference remains Jameson 1977. Fisher 1993 offers a useful summary of Greek slavery.

would they have bought one? How many slaves would potential slave-owners buy? How many such slave-owners were there? The poorest did not—could not—own a slave. How many had insufficient money? Were these the non-slave-owning, self-sufficient, small-landholding farmers of rural Greece?

One might assume an Athenian or metic hoplite was able to afford at least one slave to accompany him on active service;[66] that some *thētes* also could afford slaves,[67] so that an orator in a trial might like to think that the typical juror owned a slave;[68] that the very wealthy owned many slaves (perhaps 50?);[69] that a few of the elite owned many hundreds for specialized work (mining)[70] or (fewer slaves, but still many) for production (e.g. a shield factory)[71] or for managing and working estates or farms.[72] It is certain that slaves were employed in agriculture, but the big question remains, did the large number of subsistence households employ a slave (for agricultural and non-agricultural tasks)?[73] The answer seems to be yes, although for some households (the poorest ones), slave ownership might have been prohibitively expensive.[74] Gallant's model of the life cycle of a rural household suggests that a family may have bought a slave only when it could afford one.[75] A pluralistic and diverse pattern of slave ownership must be assumed. Most households owned a slave, some possibly two or more, some many slaves, and a few large households employed a workforce of slaves. The 'household slave' surely performed diverse tasks ranging from domestic duties to agricultural work.[76]

Given these qualitative constraints, any attempt at enumerating a total number of slaves within these parameters remains difficult and the parameters may have shifted over time if significant changes in property ownership and agriculture took place (see Part III). But if numbers of citizens and metics provide a basis for calculation, and the proportion of slaves to non-slaves is taken as 1 : 1, then there could have been anywhere in the region of round 60,000 slaves and quite probably more. These suggestions fall far below the early calculations of Boeckh who believed in extensive slave ownership and

[66] Jameson 2001: 171; Thuc. 2. 13. 6, 31,000 citizen and metic hoplites at the start of the Peloponnesian war. [67] Graham 1998.

[68] Dem. 45. 86. [69] Plato *Republic.* 578d–579a.

[70] Nikias, the fifth-century politician and doomed general of the Sicilian expedition, Xen. *Poroi* 4. 15–16. [71] Lysias 12. 19.

[72] The audience targeted by Xenophon's *Oikonomikos.*

[73] R. G. Osborne 1995: 33 (after Jameson).

[74] Cf. A simple no: Sallares 1991: 56, 'The theory that slaves were used on smallholdings should be rejected.' Sallares prefers to emphasize increased productivity by the introduction of new crops rather than greater labour (ibid. 57). A yes: R. G. Osborne 1995: 29–30, 'Athenians of less than the hoplite census would seem regularly not to have had disposable slaves, but may only rarely have had no slaves at all.'

[75] Gallant 1991: fig. 2.1.

[76] Among the indirect taxes in Attica was the tax on slave purchases.

did not reject the slave total given by Ktesikles. Boeckh suggested a ratio of Athenians to slaves at 1 : 4 which was not unrealistic given that a ratio of 1 : 6 existed on American sugar plantations in the early nineteenth century.[77] Few now support his view of such an extensive scale of slave-owning culture.[78]

But numbers of slaves were without doubt high. Hypereides suggests that there were at least 150,000 adult male slaves, the figure he gives for those working in the mines and the rest of the countryside.[79] And the figure of 400,000 by Ktesikles may represent more than slaves. Descat has suggested that the term used by chroniclers that is usually translated as slaves (*oiketai*) should refer not only to slaves but to 'household members' and be accepted.[80] This broader meaning of the noun can be found in other Greek writers.[81] If Descat's interpretation is right, then the figure of 400,000 could refer to slaves, women, and children of all statuses and offer a gross population of 431,000.[82] The numbers game depends not least on one of the greatest uncertainties, the number of slaves. Descat's solution to Ktesikles' figures offers a solution. How does it compare with other players' attempts?

3.3.4. The Numbers Game

Quantification is important in that the size of the population of the Athenian polis determines the demand on resources, and in particular on food. Even if the results obtained are hypothetical, figures can be offered as a range of possibilities and so help to shape answers to problems such as labour requirements, demands on food supply, and so potential demand on local produce. Hansen has suggested in fourth-century Athens a free population of 133,000–186,000 and 66,000–93,000 slaves, a total population of 200,000–250,000.[83] In 1828 Augustus Boeckh joined an already lively debate, suggesting that the Athenian population was around half a million people, numbering 135,000 'free' (90,000 Athenians of whom 20,000 were active citizens) and 365,000 slaves.[84] Since Boeckh, overall estimates of Athenian population have ranged typically between 200,000 and 300,000 for the mid-fourth century, a fall from the fifth century when Hansen suggests there were over 300,000 people in Attica. If it is clear that since Boeckh estimates have dropped dramatically, then Descat's retention of Ktesikles' figures is unusual and harps back to the population estimates produced over 150 years ago. Ktesikles' figure of 431,000

[77] Boeckh 1828: 52–3; for the poor owning slaves, he cites Aristophanes' *Wealth*.
[78] Gallo 1984; Garnsey 1998: 197. [79] Hypereides fr. 29 (Jensen).
[80] Descat 2004: 368–70. [81] LSJ s.v. οἰκέτης 2. [82] Descat 2004: 368.
[83] Hansen 1988*a*: 7–13. [84] Boeckh 1828: 52; 1886: i. 49. Active debate: i. 43 with n.d.

is much higher than the otherwise relatively high estimate of 300,000 proposed by Whitby. This range of suggestions only confirms the pessimism expressed by Scheidel about the estimations of Greek populations. If the population of Attica were 200,000, this might be more in line with the interactions between domestic grain production, imported grain, and the re-export of grain that the fourth-century sources describe.[85] In the late fourth and third centuries all indications are that the population fell as a result of the movements of Athenians (as well as foreigners and slaves) to opportunities outside Attica. There is no definite answer to the question of the Athenian population. The manuscript tradition for Ktesikles' figure of *oiketai* may not be as secure as we would like. If that number is set aside, then the overall population for Attica in the third quarter of the fourth century probably lies somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000.

3.4. MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE: 'A CULTURE FOUNDED ON MOBILITY'

In two very different works on the Mediterranean world, one bound in time to the Hellenistic period the other bound by geography to the Mediterranean, mobility of people is recognized as an important if not a defining feature.[86] For Rostovtzeff mobility is particularly prevalent in the Hellenistic period. 'In Hellenistic times mobility became a salient characteristic of the Greeks' as is evident during the expansive conquests of Alexander the Great.[87] However, for Horden and Purcell, the mobility of people is not to be periodized, but exists as a characteristic of Mediterranean life in general.[88] For Rostovtzeff, emigration and family limitation brought on a fall in population ('race suicide and emigration');[89] for Horden and Purcell, mobility signalled the contrary. Mobility was to be expected and not feared. Mobility was a feature of the mentalities of Mediterranean life. These two different approaches to mobility require the historian to address the question: was the mobility of people into and out of the Athenian polis different in any way in the late fourth and third centuries? Were there factors that suggest a net loss of population or particular parts of the population because of such movements? One well-respected historian of the Hellenistic period might perhaps incline

[85] See Ch. 1 sect. 3.

[86] *SEHHW* and Horden and Purcell 2000 respectively. The quoted phrase in the title of this section is from Purcell 1990: 57.

[87] *SEHHW*: 1112. [88] Horden and Purcell 2000: 358. [89] *SEHHW*: 1021.

towards Rostovtzeff's view: 'mobility in the Hellenistic age meant the massive movement of populations'.[90] The particular reasons and contexts in which mobility took place, its impact on regions and individual poleis, the intensity and diversity of such mobility, these are factors that a historian can explore in time and sometimes space. Although a definitive answer to the question of how mobility of people affected Athens in the Hellenistic period may prove to be elusive, it is critical to consider how one might answer these questions and also whether there were changes in the fourth and third centuries.

Emigration undoubtedly took place from Attica in the early Hellenistic period. Reference has already been made to the 12,000 Athenians who owned property worth less than 2,000 drachmai and accepted the offer of Antipater to take up residence in Thrace.[91] Some of these settlers may have returned to Athens but the outcome of the Thracian adventure of 322/1 may have seen a net decrease in Athenians in Attica.

There is insufficient evidence to perform independent calculations for the absolute population of Attica in the third century. Therefore any assessment must be cast in terms of change, if any, indicated directly or indirectly by a range of evidence starting from the fragile calculations for the third quarter of the fourth century. The potential indicators treated here are largely epigraphical. The number of ephebes serving in Athens might suggest a dramatic fall in population. For between twenty and fifty Athenians seem to be serving regularly in the third century BC,[92] a considerable drop from the 350 to 400 who were listed as serving in 305/4,[93] and the sort of numbers that one would have expected from one tribe in the 330s or 320s.[94] The radical changes to the ephebeia after 307 included reducing the tour of duty from two years to one. Explanations other than a fall in population may therefore lie behind the change in ephebic numbers in the third century. It is highly unlikely that the annual intake of ephebes in the third century represents the total number of Athenians aged 18–19.

The cavalry present a similarly complex picture in which it is dangerous to associate absolute numbers of serving cavalrymen with population size. Despite this caution, however, it is inescapable that the fall from the fifth century force (maximum of 1,000) to the nadir of the 280s (200 before 282/1) reflects a demographic change.[95] In 282/1 the hipparchs and phylarchs raised numbers from 200 to 300.[96] A recently discovered inscription also shows that in the same year the Athenians were supported by a division of Tarentines,

[90] Chaniotis 2005: 249. [91] Diod. Sic. 18. 18. 4–5. [92] Pélékides 1962: 165.
[93] *IG* ii^2 478, with Pélékides 1962: 157. [94] Pélékides 1962: 283–4.
[95] Bugh 1988: 184; Spence 1993: 97–102.
[96] *SEG* xxi. 525, 7–10.

almost certainly a unit of mercenary cavalrymen, commanded by a non-Athenian, Kallistratos, son of Terminios, of Achaea.[97] Cavalry numbers did vary, even during the Peloponnesian war, falling from 1,000 to 650 in 410/9.[98] If the numbers in Pausanias' account of the defeat of the Celts in 279 are to be believed, the Athenians were able to send 500 cavalrymen, perhaps including non-Athenians such as the Tarentines, to fight the invasion of central Greece.[99] These numbers equal the 500 cavalrymen sent with 5,000 infantry and 2,000 mercenaries to support Leosthenes in 323/2.[100] It is not clear whether this earlier force was the total Athenian cavalry force or represented a deployment of seven of the ten tribes (i.e. 500 of a total 715); if the latter, then the total numbers at the end of the 320s are already showing a considerable fall since the fifth century. Ultimately the cavalry numbers do little to prove that population had fallen from *c.*320 to *c.*280. In the late 280s, the officials had to overcome difficulties in raising recruitment of cavalrymen from 200 to 300. The number of cavalry decrees and the tokens from the Kerameikos and Agora in the early Hellenistic period suggest that there was a real concern about the efficient organization of the cavalry.

A simple piece of evidence such as the numbers of mobilized citizen soldiers would allow more definite remarks to be made about population change between *c.*320 and 280. At the time of the revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes in 288/7, all age cohorts were sent to protect the grain harvest, leaving Olympiodoros in Athens to lead a force of the old and the young against the Macedonian garrison on the Mouseion hill.[101] Figures for the Athenian mobilization of this year would allow comparison with the mobilization at the time of the Lamian war, but such evidence is unavailable. In this context, however, the loss of 420 soldiers in an assault against the Macedonian garrison at Mounychia, possibly 286, would have been a considerable blow to Athenian military strengths and may have discouraged future attempts to recover the hill dominating the harbour.[102] Losses on such a scale in the fifth and fourth centuries were rare and usually indicate a severe defeat; the Athenians lost 400 men at the battle of Ephesos in 409.[103] The repeated pattern in the evidence for military service at Athens is that there were fewer men performing the duties undertaken in the second half of the fourth

[97] J. Camp, *Hesp* 65 (1996): 252–8 with pl. 76.

[98] Spence 1993: 98 and n. 230; Bugh 1988: 155–8.

[99] See Camp, *Hesperia* 65 (1996): 257, citing Paus. 10. 20. 5. It is tempting to identify the Tarantinoi who made a dedication from enemy spoils (*IG* ii^2 2975) with the division of these cavalrymen serving alongside the Athenians. Could the Tarantinoi have served in 279, and made such a dedication at Athens after victory at Delphi?

[100] Diod. Sic. 18. 11. 2.

[101] Paus. 1. 26. 1.

[102] Polyainos *Strat.* 5. 17. 1.

[103] Xen. *Hell.* 1. 2. 11; Pritchett 1985: 202–4.

century. This may well reflect a reduction in manpower rather than a collapse in the contribution of citizens to military service.

The citizens were the life-force of the polis community. Athens, like most Greek cities, sought for the most part to protect and preserve its citizen numbers. The more serious losses of citizen numbers probably occurred under oligarchic rule, as a result of disenfranchisement or the need to give up property. Antipater arranged a small exodus of Athenians in 322/1 and further losses seem to have occured when more citizens joined many other Greeks in Ophellas' campaign against Carthage in *c.*309/8.[104] Diodorus explains that the poor conditions in Greece made the venture attractive. His assessment, if applied to Attica, contradicts claims that Athens under Demetrios of Phaleron enjoyed and prospered in a period of peace during *c.*317–7.[105] Demetrios' introduction of a 1,000-drachmai property-owning qualification for citizenship may have encouraged the lower strata in Athenian society to move away. The oligarchic reforms after the Lamian war are much more likely to have benefited the richer Athenians at the expense of the poorer members of the Athenian citizenship of whom many no doubt lost their full civic rights.[106]

It is impossible to quantify how many Athenians will have left the polis. Equally difficult is any estimate at how many Athenians may have returned. Disruptions reverberated in the Greek world when Alexander the Great made his declaration in 324/3 at Olympia that all Greek cities should receive those who had been exiled from their own city.[107] Two associated changes involved Oropos and Samos. The frontier land between Boeotia and Attica, Oropos, had belonged to Athens for the majority of the fourth century but almost certainly left Athenian control in 322.[108] Samos in the late 320s became an island intent on regaining its independence from Athens, the city that had controlled it for most of the fourth century. By the end of the fourth century there are clear signs that people, in particular Athenians, were leaving Samos and returning to Attica. Perhaps the most famous among these new residents of Athens was the philosopher Epicurus.[109] Even less information survives for other losses. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros found themselves shifting in and out of Athenian control in the early Hellenistic period.[110]

[104] Diod. Sic. 20. 40. 6–7. 41. 1 Baynham 2003: 26–7.
[105] Diod. Sic. 18. 74. 3.
[106] De Ste Croix 1981: 610 n. 2. Sallares 1991: 100–1, many migrants were *thētai.*
[107] Worthington 1994.
[108] Diod. Sic. 18. 66. 6; Knoepfler 2001: 183, and 371–87 (on Athenian possession of Oropos from 335 BC).
[109] Diog. Laert. 10. 2, 15 (Habicht 1997: 74).
[110] In more detail, see above Ch. 2, sect. 3.

Among the flow of citizens to foundations abroad must be counted Athenians who were among the Macedonians forming a total of 5,300 settlers of Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, one of eighteen foundations or areas of colonization established by Antigonos Monophthalmos (*c.*306).[111] It is by no means certain that Athenians left Attica in 306 to found Antigoneia, some could already have been abroad.[112] The plans in Athens for the construction of a fleet of 100 ships do not suggest a crisis in manpower if the project was to be realized and the ships manned by rowers, crews, and soldiers.[113] In fact during the early Hellenistic period, Athenians, like many other Greek citizens, enjoyed considerable mobility. Many opportunities to move abroad were available during the period of the Successors. New city foundations, opportunities for mercenary soldiers, and the new economic horizons offered by the continuing spread of Hellenic culture.[114] But similar opportunities had been characteristic of earlier periods, not least for Athenians in the fifth century who had ample occasion to establish themselves as cleruchs and pursue ventures afforded by the expanding Athenian empire.

Much of the evidence for the movement of Athenians in and out of the city is typical of the ancient Greek world in general. In the early Hellenistic period known individuals are found operating abroad as diplomats. Some Athenians left their homeland as a reaction to political circumstances at home: Demochares (nephew of Demosthenes) was exiled;[115] Philippides served at the court of Lysimachos;[116] Kallias of Sphettos with the Ptolemies.[117] Their service abroad rekindles memories of more famous fifth-century movements: Themistokles' stay in Magnesia or Alkibiades' exile from Athens and service with Sparta. Egypt was a popular destination and employer at the time of the Successors: Demetrios of Phaleron,[118] and later the brothers Chremonides[119] and Glaukon,[120] all operated in the Ptolemaic court. Elsewhere Athenians certainly operated as soldiers, and no doubt mercenaries. Some may have sought opportunities abroad. The number of Greeks in Egypt with the ethnic 'Athenaios' peaks in the third century and may indicate a more general movement of Athenians to the Nile region.[121] Certainly a considerable

[111] Ferguson 1911: 112 n. 1; Pausanias of Damascus, fr. 4 in C. Müller, *FHG* iv. 469. On Antigonos Monophthalmos' settlement of cities, see G. M. Cohen 1995: 43–4; Billows 1990: 301. Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes, Diod. Sic. 20. 47. 5–6. [112] Billows 1990: 303–4.

[113] Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 4.

[114] For the possible involvement of Athenians in other foundations, Laodikeia and in Lydia, see Sallares 1991: 100–1. [115] [Plut.] *Vit. X. Or.* 851e.

[116] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 9–10.

[117] Shear 1978: 3–4 (*SEG* xxviii. 60 = Austin 1981 no. 44).

[118] Plut. *De exil.* VII. 601–2, *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 189d; Ael. *VH* III. 17.

[119] Teles, *On exile*, ed. Hense^2, p. 23.

[120] Ibid.; Étienne and Piérart 1975: 51–3 ll. 10–11 = Austin 1981 no. 51.

[121] Martin 1989: 174–7 nos. 50–94; Martin 1992: 25.

community of Athenians could be found in Egypt by the early second century.[122]

The presence of Athenians abroad, or arriving in other communities, is a remarkable feature of the epigraphy of the early Hellenistic period. Several honorific inscriptions reward foreigners for their role in welcoming and assisting Athenians who have come to them in a private (and sometimes in a public) capacity. A small cluster appears in the years immediately after the Lamian war and perhaps refers not only to defeated Athenians struggling to return home but also to others who had been serving in the armies of the Successors or even to those involved in commerce.[123] The early Hellenistic period sees an increase in honorific decrees that recognize such interventions on behalf of Athenians.[124] The safety and return of Athenians to their native polis is a feature of decrees in Athens and other Greek cities, but was not peculiar to the Hellenistic period.[125] Indeed, the capture in wartime of individuals of an enemy state was an important means not only of raising revenue but also of securing a powerful bargaining position. In the Peloponnesian war, one thinks of the offer made by Nikias to the Syracusans in the hope that the Sicilians would accept Athenian hostages rather than annihilate the surviving Athenians. Earlier the more straightforward example of Spartiate soldiers captured and returned to Athens as a result of the successful raid on Sphakteria and Pylos was more than a financial ploy on the part of the Athenians.[126]

Perhaps the best evidence for what appears to be long-term or permanent migration from Athens comes in the early third century. Philippides, the comic poet, was given the highest honours by the People in 283/2 largely for the important role he played in representing the interests of the Athenian

[122] *IG* ii^2 897 ll. 1–12 honouring Zoilos *c.*184, possibly the son of Andron, eponymous priest of Alexander the Great and the Ptolemies, in 196/5, Habicht 1992: 77.

[123] *IG* ii^2 401 ll. 3–5; 450 ll. 14–17; 467 ll. 18–19; 493 ll. 15–16; 495 ll. 14–17; 496 ll. 14–17; 550 l. 5; *Agora* xvi. 94 fr. c+j (with S. D. Lambert, *ZPE* 136 (2001) 67).

[124] Bielman 1994: nos. 8 (*IG* ii^2 493, 303/2), 9 (*IG* ii^2 398a, *c.*322), 10 (*Hesp.* 7 (1938) 303–4, no. 27 = EM 12892 which belongs in fact with the upper part of the *stele*, *Hesp.* 40 (1971) 174–8 no. 25 = EM 13393 and therefore dates 320/19), 12 (*Agora* xvi. 104, 318/17), 13 (*IG* ii^2 492, 303/2), 15 (*IG* ii^2 558 = Osborne, *Nat.* D47, 304/3), 18 (*IG* ii^2 652, *c.*285/4), 20 (*IG* ii^2 657 ll. 20–9, 283/2), 24 (*I Rhamnous* 3 ll. 19–21, Athenians at Rhamnous, non-state decree, *c.*268/7), 25 (*IG* ii^2 1225 ll. 16–20, Salaminian 'cleruchy', *c.*250), 28 (*IG* ii^2 823, mid-third century), 30 (*I Rhamnous* 17 ll. 21–5, decree of the Rhamnousians, the Athenians, and others resident there, *c.*236/5), 31 (*IG* ii^2 844 ll. 8–10, 229/8).

[125] Bielman 1994: nos. 1 (*IG* i^3 125, end of fifth century), 3 (*IG* xii 8, 3, Athenians on Lemnos, *c.*355), 4 (*IG* ii^2 283, mid-fourth century), 5 (*IG* ii^2 284, mid-fourth century), 6 (*IG* ii^2 399 + Add. p. 660, 328/7): honours in the later fifth and fourth centuries for the ransom of prisoners.

[126] Sicily: Thuc. 7. 83. 1–3 with Kallet 2001: 176–81; Spartiates: Thuc. 4. 38, 120 out of 292 prisoners.

people in the court of Lysimachos.[127] The king had performed important services for the Athenians notably in the aftermath of Ipsos when Demetrios Poliorketes was vanquished and his father killed. At this time many Athenians had figured in the army of the defeated kings and had been either killed or captured. Philippides had buried those Athenians who died and intervened, on behalf of those who had been taken prisoner, with the victorious Lysimachos. In this way Philippides not only secured the release of the Athenians but also arranged for those who wished to continue their military service to sign up to Lysimachos' army. For those who preferred to depart, Philippides even gave funds to travel and sent them off wherever they wanted: there were more than 300 citizens who benefited from the poet's assistance.[128] In addition Philippides also asked Lysimachos that those Athenians who had been captured in Asia and imprisoned by Demetrios and Antigonos also be released.[129]

What becomes clear from this text is the relatively large numbers of Athenians who were involved in the warfare between the Hellenistic kings. Athenians were serving as soldiers in the army of the kings defeated at Ipsos in 301 BC and others were prisoners of Antigonos and Demetrios. The inscription reveals that the Athenian soldiers either continued in military service with Lysimachos or left. The inscription does not make it obvious where those Athenians who left (to go wherever they wished) actually went. Moreover, we have a figure—more than 300—for the Athenians who benefited from Philippides' representations to Lysimachos. Here is some solid evidence that not only were Athenians among the many mercenaries fighting in the armies of the Hellenistic kings but a number must have chosen to continue in this occupation. For those Athenians who chose not to continue their service in Lysimachos' army, there is no evidence that they were going to return directly to Athens. Here then is a specific example of what amounts to migration and population decline in Athens. This is the loss of male citizens of military age to the armies of the Hellenistic kings. The opportunity for such service far from Athens was a relatively *new* feature of the Age of the Successors, a time when competing paymasters needed trained soldiers to man the ranks of the armies on which the Successors depended to maintain and expand their power.[130] If (a big if) the 300 (or more) Athenians never returned home, then this would have been a small but significant loss. Three hundred may only represent between 1 and 1.5 per cent of male citizens but what Ipsos reveals about Athenian citizens was no doubt part of a wider trend affecting Athens and many other communities in the early Hellenistic period. Three

[127] *IG* ii^2 657; on such honours, Gauthier 1985; Kralli 1999–2000; Oliver 2007.
[128] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 16–26.
[129] Ibid. 26–9. [130] Austin 1986; Chaniotis 2005: 13, 249–50.

hundred male citizens lost from a population where demographic growth was weak will have had long-term repercussions on family structures and subsequent birth rate.

Losses also occurred in other more specific areas. Athens may have suffered from a small but symbolic movement of sculptors from the city, and perhaps of other craftsmen. There is clear evidence that sculptors once working in Athens had left for new opportunities elsewhere in the late fourth century. Demetrios of Phaleron's sumptuary laws ended the creation of extravagant funerary monuments that had proliferated in Attica during the fourth century.[131] The new restrictions, introduced some time between 317 and 308, are seen at least as part of the reason for the emigration of craftsmen to new opportunities. Craftsmen from Athens are thought to have been working subsequently in Thessaly, western Crete,[132] and Rhodes.[133] This movement can still be viewed in the context of the normal ebb and flow of 'wandering craftsmen' in the Mediterranean.[134] It should not be forgotten that enough sculptors remained in Athens to contribute to the creation of a significant number of statues, both private and public, which were set up in the Hellenistic period despite an apparent loss of commissions for statues and other reliefs in the market for funerary monuments.

The example of craftsmen such as sculptors probably reflected losses of both Athenians *and* foreigners. It is difficult to evaluate the scale of such movements. The insecurity of life in Attica from the last quarter of the fourth century onwards has inspired some historians to conclude that the city was no longer attractive to foreigners.[135] But it should be remembered that many cities in the eastern Mediterranean were suffering similar upheavals in the early Hellenistic period. Certainly, during times of warfare, commerce could be discouraged but this might have affected trade and had less impact on more permanent residents among whom metics numbered. Demetrios Poliorketes deterred incoming merchant ships to the Piraeus in the mid-290s by hanging the merchant and helmsman of one ship.[136] Other data is difficult to interpret, notably tombstones. Funerary monuments for foreigners decrease in absolute numbers during the Hellenistic period.[137] However, despite their potential as sources of evidence,[138] the inscribed tombstones offer methodological problems for those who wish to use them as a direct indicator of change in the foreign population.[139] The fall in numbers of tombstones, for both foreigners and Athenians, coincides with a marked reduction in the

[131] Stears 2001.
[132] Crete: Papaoikonomou, 1981*a*, 1981*b*, and 1982; Thessaly: Wolters 1979.
[133] Stewart 1979: 6–7. [134] Horden and Purcell 2000: 346.
[135] Pleket 1981. [136] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3. [137] Garland 1987: 62–6.
[138] Whitehead 1977: 110. [139] Hansen *et al.* 1990.

epigraphical habit of Athens and, therefore, does not necessarily reflect an absolute fall in numbers of people.[140] Certainly foreigners continued to live in Athens during the early Hellenistic period. The relatively large number of religious inscriptions set up at the end of the fourth and in the third century in Piraeus is a sure sign that cults attracting the worship of groups of foreigners thrived even when non-foreign cults seem to have been less prominent in the epigraphical record.[141] These religious groups persisted after the Chremonidean war.[142] The evidence suggests that non-Athenians were able to pursue and display their own religious affiliations in the early Hellenistic period.[143] An active policy of openness towards religious cults seems to have been a prominent feature of the earlier Lycurgan period and at that time demonstrated a measure to maintain the flow of foreigners (especially merchants) into the city and Piraeus.[144] These conditions of openness continue into the Hellenistic period.

Throughout the Classical period, foreigners received honours including the right to own land and to contribute to military service and the *eisphora* as Athenian citizens already did. *Isoteleia* was also an honour for foreigners. Epigraphical evidence for such awards flourishes in the fourth century, but among them is an exceptional record of two foreigners, Nikandros of Ilium and Polyzelos of Ephesos who had provided *eisphora* from 347/6 to 323/2.[145] The decree recording their careers is fragmentary, and clearly describes two phases. The first dates from 347/6 until the Lamian war, and the second resumes in 307. The worn stone makes it difficult to determine precisely the first phase, but it seems as though the pair may have received an award, perhaps a golden crown. They had contributed to the storerooms for the fleet in the 340s, made a lifetime of *eisphora* payments, and assisted the fleet in the naval conflicts of the Lamian war.[146] Their further assistance to Athens in the preparations for war and defence of the city in 307 and 306 earned them an olive crown, *isoteleia*, *enktēsis*, and the right to pay *eisphora* with the citizens and perform military services and have access to the Council and Demos.[147] The payment of *eisphora* (and performance of military service) is seldom recorded as a contribution made by foreigners to the state, it was seen as a service that was expected. But of the four instances where such duties are mentioned, three belong to the last twenty years of the fourth century.[148] In 319/18 Apol[— —] is honoured by the Athenians for some action with

[140] Meyer 1993; Oliver 2000: 16–17. [141] Mikalson 1998: 103.
[142] Ibid. 139–44. [143] See Ch. 3, sect. 3.
[144] On the encouragement of traditional Athenian cult, Mikalson 1998: 11–44.
[145] See now Chaniotis 2005: 248–9.
[146] *IG* ii^2 505 ll. 9–27. On the naval battle, see now Bosworth 2003.
[147] *IG* ii^2 505 ll. 51–7. [148] For *IG* ii^2 715, see Ch. 8, sect. 1.

Proteas but his military service and *eisphora* payments are also recognized.[149] Later, some time in 306/5 or shortly after, Euxenides of Phaselis, who had paid *eisphora* as metics should do, is praised for his additional (and recent) voluntary provision of twelve sailors and catapult strings and the fulfilment of duties requested by the generals and taxiarchs.[150]

These decrees all recognize and reward resident foreigners, almost certainly all metics, for their services to the city that probably included payment of *eisphora*.[151] Exceptionally, Nikandros and Polyzelos are singled out for their long-term commitment, unique among the surviving decrees of fourth-century Athens. The extension of honours in these civic grants to the descendants of Nikandros, Polyzelos, and Euxenides betrays a desire for such privileged foreign residents and their descendants to maintain their residence and to continue their contributions to the Athenian polis. At the end of the fourth century, Athens for the first time in honorific decrees has cause to emphasize the contributions to the *eisphora* fund made by resident foreigners. This recognition is incidental to other services but in its own right was worthy of mention. It underlined the sort of services that the individual resident foreigner was expected to perform on behalf of the state. Although such services alone were no guarantee of honours, they can be seen as a stepping-stone to greater recognition. The timing of these particular decrees may indicate a desire among Athenians to be seen to be acknowledging and recognizing the contribution of such foreigners. The extension of these awards to the descendants of the honorands further underlines the hope that the honorands' sons would maintain such behaviour and good service. In short, the Athenians wish to express their desire that foreign residents, often long-term residents, are the sort of benefactors that the city is prepared to reward.

That the Athenians should attempt to make sure that the city remained open and attractive to foreigners is nothing new. In the fourth century Xenophon's *Poroi* advocated ways of making the city more attractive to non-Athenians at a time when the economy of the polis was felt to need considerable reanimation.[152] In the last twenty years of the fourth century, the state rewards foreigners and encourages others to follow their example, a policy that expects that other wealthy foreigners exist to imitate such examples. Athens at the end of the fourth century had certainly not lost a foreign population and was making efforts to publicize the fact that it

[149] *Agora* xvi. 102. [150] *IG* ii^2 554.

[151] See e.g. Pečirka 1966, on *enktēsis* and also *IG* ii^2 218 ll. 34–5 (346/5); 237 ll. 27–8 (338/7); 287 ll. 4–6 (before 336/5); 351 ll. 30–2 (330/29); 360 ll. 20–1 (325/4); 516 ll. 2–3 (end of fourth century); *SEG* lx. 68 = *IG* ii^2 540a + *SEG* xxiv. 117 ll. 6–7 (*c.*350–320). Restored: *IG* ii^2 545 ll. 13–14 (end of Lamian war?); 660 ll. 8–9 (last third of fourth century).

[152] Xen. *Poroi* 3–4.

rewarded individuals, especially foreigners, who made important contributions to the well-being of the state.

But not all honours to foreigners were always inspired by the same reasons. Different motivations lie behind specific awards, and different groups or types of individuals were targeted. The Athenians awarded fewer honours of *proxenia* in the later fourth century, and the practice all but disappears in the third century.[153] It was not always the intention that those awarded with Athenian citizenship were expected to take up long-term residency in Athens—Asandros the satrap of Karia is an obvious example.[154] Clearly there were cases where such grants did in fact lead to permanent residence: the doctor Euenor in at least his third set of honours granted by the polis is finally granted citizenship towards the end of the fourth century.[155] But Euenor was already a long-term resident. Timosthenes, of Karystos, had been an Athenian *proxenos* and was granted citizenship in 306/5.[156] Other examples are more difficult to assess, such as Neaios, granted citizenship in 304/3.[157] Another Athenian, Timosthenes, was honoured in 229/8 in a decree that mentions the grant of citizenship to his homonymous grandfather, likely to be the Karystian honoured in 306/5.[158] At what point the family of Timosthenes in the fourth or third century had taken up residence in Athens is not certain. The grant of citizenship was carefully cherished, and throughout the third century Athens continued to distribute this honour with caution.[159] Any change in the award of Athenian citizenship can only be found much later, in the first century BC.[160]

Athens continued to be a community that was attractive for other groups or polities enjoying ties abroad and welcoming sometimes displaced citizens of other communities. Exiles from Thessaly were given special privileges, perhaps some time towards the end of the Lamian war, until they were able to return to their city.[161] The people of Tenos were recognized on special terms.[162] A close relationship between Athens and the Prienians, dating back well before the Lamian war, was revived.[163] In all these instances, the Athenians were offering a self-conscious display to the rest of the world of continuing *philoxenia*. During the early Hellenistic period Athens had little naval power and occupied a much weaker position in terms of oversea

[153] Marek 1984.
[154] *IG* ii^2 450, now Lambert 2000: 486–9, no. E1.
[155] Osborne, *Nat.* D50; iii–iv. 197 = *IG* ii^2 374.
[156] *IG* ii^2 467 + Add. p. 662 = Osborne, *Nat.* D43.
[157] Osborne, *Nat.* D44; iii–iv. 200. [158] *IG* ii^2 832.
[159] The highest honours, such as citizenship, statues, and *sitēsis* continued to be granted sparingly to foreigners, Gauthier 1985 and Oliver 2007.
[160] Oliver (forthcoming).
[161] *IG* ii^2 545 + 2406.
[162] *IG* ii^2 466 and 660 (with Reger 1992).
[163] Osborne, *Nat.* iii–iv. X. 20; *Agora* xvi. 111 (= *IG* ii^2 564 + *SEG* xviii. 18 predates 321).

political powers. However, in terms of the movement of foreigners into and out of the city, Athens remained a potential centre for commercial enterprise. It was a city with a buoyant population and therefore good markets, with a long-standing culture of importing commodities such as grain. The competition for economic activities was changing and the cities like Athens were required to devise new strategies of promoting movements of commodities in the fourth century. The signs are that the commercial potential of Athens never disappeared during the third century although the practicalities of trade may have been affected at times by warfare.[164] Athens in the early Hellenistic period remained a city that wanted to be attractive to foreigners, made life for non-Athenians in the city amenable, and rewarded good service in a way that had not been made so clear before.

One final group is that of slaves. If losses among this group were experienced, it was more than likely to have occurred during wartime, particularly when disruptions reverberated in the countryside. Then the slave-owner was particularly vulnerable to the loss of slaves.[165] In Attica, the slave population that worked in the mines was more than likely to have been affected by rural warfare. There is general agreement that the slaves working the Laurion silver mines in the fifth century numbered among those that fled from Attica when the Spartans occupied the fortress at Dekeleia in 413/12.[166] History is likely to have repeated itself in the late fourth and third centuries BC when Laurion can hardly fail to have been affected by the warfare of 307–301 and subsequent disruptions in the 290s, 280s, and 260s.[167] Evidence for mineral extraction in south-east Attica during the third century exists, but the overwhelming impression is that the mining establishments away from the coastal areas in the Laurion hills were more or less abandoned towards the end of the fourth or early in the third century.[168] Evidence for activity at the known and excavated sites is simply absent from this period. It is almost certain that the difficulty of maintaining the large slave population would have been one of the greatest obstacles to the continuity of the silver-mining industry. If we assume that the Athenians lost slaves from Laurion, then it follows that the slave population of Attica will have fallen considerably from (e.g.) the third quarter of the fourth century to the mid-third century BC. However, the lack of activity in the silver mines in the early fourth-century would suggest that the slave population of fourth century Attica was itself in a state of flux, and that the situations at the

[164] See Ch. 2 on the Piraeus. [165] Aen. Tact. 10. 4.

[166] Thuc. 7. 27. 3–5 = Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977 no. 74.

[167] See further, Ch. 4, sects. 3–5.

[168] On the whole, negative evidence. Little or no trace of third-century pottery is found on the washing platforms such as Soureza, Agrileza, and Kamariza. See Oliver 2001*a*: 43–6 for a survey of evidence.

Figure 3.1. Laurion: a fertile valley floor leading to the Agrileza valley

two ends of the century may have been similar. Whether other aspects of slave ownership were affected in the early Hellenistic period is much more difficult to determine. It is worth noting in passing, however, that even public slaves were considered important enough to receive public honours.[169]

Any suggestion that the loss of specific population groups was an unusually larger problem at Athens compared with elsewhere cannot be sustained. The sort of movements stimulated by the changes in constitution around the time of the Lamian war may well have reduced citizen numbers. In addition, insecurities caused by warfare would surely have made Athens a less peaceful city. But uncertain conditions existed in many regions of the Greek world. For much of the fourth century Athens in fact had enjoyed relatively exceptional security in Attica. Certainly, Athens would have been affected by emigration. But the argument here is that the city does not appear to have suffered the dramatic losses in population that has been claimed for other areas of the Greek world. The inescapable conclusion, however, is that a fall in citizens will have taken place in Attica from the third quarter of the fourth century to the third quarter of the third century.

[169] See *IG* ii^2 502 + Tracy, *ADT* 141–3 (Ag. I 1947 = *SEG* xlv. 88); for a report of the join, see M. B. Walbank *ZPE* 139 (2002) 64–5. I am preparing a full text and commentary for publication.

More light will be cast on some aspects of such losses by archaeological evidence. It has been suggested that less urbanized regions of Greece may have seen a greater movement away from home territory, areas such as Aitolia, Thessaly, and Crete.[170] Was this true of Attica too, where the countryside was so frequently vulnerable to enemy military activity? In section 3.6 archaeology will figure among the evidence examined to explore whether or not there were any changes in the distribution of the population in Attica from the fourth to the third century BC.

3.5. SETTLEMENT AND DEMES IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATTICA

Literary evidence provides little direct evidence for the state of the countryside of the Athenian polis at end of the fourth and third centuries BC. Herakleides Kretikos' description of Athens and Attica is the best account there is.[171] Of the territory of the polis he says:

> (1. 2) The produce of the land is all priceless and delicious to taste, though in rather short supply. But the presence of foreigners, which they are all accustomed to and which fits in with their inclinations, causes them to forget about their stomachs by diverting their attention to pleasant things. (Austin 1981: 151)

Describing the road from Athens to Oropos by way of Aphidna he says that on the day-long journey

> (1. 6) the large number of inns, which have an abundance of all necessities, and the resting places, prevent travellers from feeling fatigue. (ibid. 152).

Although this description was probably written in the last quarter of the third century, it is difficult to conclude much about settlement in Attica from it. The epigraphical evidence from Attica adds further colour, but is still rather patchy and is concentrated largely at the fortified demes of Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sunion. Few inscriptions give as much information about rural life as the decree honouring Epichares, the Athenian general for the coastal countryside district, based at Rhamnous in the early 260s. His actions reveal something about life outside the fortified deme centre in the Chremonidean war. For people in the countryside had been snatched by marauders and Epichares was instrumental in securing their return.[172] The inscription reveals

[170] Shipley 2000: 57.
[171] Herakleides Kretikos = C. Müller, *FHG* ii. 254–61 (Austin 1981: 151–4).
[172] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 19–21; see also Bielman 1994 no. 24; Oliver 2001*b*.

Map 3.1. The demes of Hellenistic Attica (after Traill 1986).

that the prisoners were both slaves and citizens. Here is firm evidence that shows not only a slave population but that slaves were active in relatively rural districts alongside citizens. The slaves were either domestic slaves or, as seems more likely, slaves who performed some agricultural role.

Although deme documents flourished in the fourth century, they become almost non-existent in the third. Only one or two places in rural Attica apart from the aforementioned garrison-demes yield evidence. The existence of epigraphical material in some areas and reference to others on inscriptions

reflects the particular significance of some parts of Attica, notably Halai Aixonides (Vouliagmeni)[173] and the island of Salamis.[174] The find-spots of inscriptions reflect settlement activity in Attica but the huge drop in numbers reflects also the general downturn in epigraphical habit during the third century.

At the heart of the Athenian polis was the deme, the basic geographic form of a community of Athenians. Demes in the Classical period had different spatial characteristics. It is probably true that many demes were nucleated and had a central collection of private residencies and communal 'deme' space such as an agora, temples, and sometimes a theatre.[175] But not all demes took this form. While some had a central nucleus, others had more than one nucleus of population, and a few had a more diffuse nature with settlement spread more thinly and widely.[176] Of course a citizen's patrilineal descent and therefore deme affiliation did not necessarily equate with his deme residency.[177]

Each of the Athenian demes provided representatives on the Council, the central administrative body of the democracy. It is generally held that the larger demes provided more councillors, the smallest demes, the fewest. The extant inscriptions listing councillors reveal a consistent pattern of deme-representation on the Council and a consistent picture of how groups of demes were organized. What is important here is the number of councillors which each deme provided. For instance, throughout the Classical period, the largest deme, Acharnai, is thought to have supplied twenty-two councillors, while average-sized demes such as Kerameis, Kephisia, Anagyrous, and Aigilia each provided six.

Not all of the twenty-two councillors of Acharnai need necessarily have been living in Acharnai when they were appointed. Any attempt therefore to directly equate deme size or membership with absolute population distribution faces several obstacles. However, it is my view that the *changes* in representation of demes in the Council in the early Hellenistic period reflect changes in the relative importance of regions in Attica, a view that Traill has argued. Behind these changes there may well lie some reflection of the differences in the distribution of population in Attica.

[173] *AD* 11 (1927–8 [1930]): 41–2, photograph p. 41, fig. 36, with *Ath. Mitt.* 67 (1942) 10 and Tracy 1988: 311 (the work of the cutter of Ag. I 3238 and 4169).

[174] Early Hellenistic Salamis' epigraphy, see Taylor 1997: 111–13. 'The agora in the Koile' of the Salaminians may not have been in the Sunion area. For the Salaminioi inscription, see RO 37 (with bibliography). The Sunion Agoras: R. G. Osborne 1985: 35–6. The Pasha Limani Agora belongs to the deme Sunion, Lambert, *ZPE* 119 (1997) 96–7 n. 24.

[175] R. G. Osborne 1985: 37–42.

[176] Oliver 2001*b*; Steinhauer 2001: 128–9.

[177] R. G. Osborne 1991: 239–46.

On two occasions during the early Hellenistic period, in 307/6 and again in 224/3, the Athenians increased the size of the Council when new tribes were created to honour royal benefactors. In honour of Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, the Athenians added the tribes Antigonis and Demetrias in 307; in honour of Ptolemy III Euergetēs, the new tribe Ptolemais was created in 224/3. So in 307/6, the number of tribes increased from ten to twelve, and in 224/3 from twelve to thirteen. As a result in 307/6 the Council increased in size from 500 to 600, and in 224/3 from 600 to 650.

All demes belonged to a regional 'trittys' designated by their geographical location in Attica: in the 'plain' (the Mesogeia), the 'coast', or the 'city'. There were ten Attica tribes. Each was made up of one group of demes from each of the three regional constituencies. Each of the ten tribes therefore consisted of one group of coastal demes, one group of plain demes and one group of city demes. This structure remained unchanged until the early Hellenistic period. Each of the ten tribes contributed fifty councillors, and the origin and number was determined by the combination of demes that made up the trittys and therefore the tribe.

Clear changes in the relative adjustments to the quotas of Councillors that the demes supplied can be seen in the later fourth and third centuries. In 307/6, there are significant increases in the numbers of councillors being provided by the demes concentrated in the Mesogeia and the coastal area around Vouliagmeni. It is highly likely that these increases reflect the increased prosperity and success of the families whose origins are traced back to the demes whose quota changed. Perhaps more subtle political motives lay behind such changes, but insufficient evidence prevents any further speculation. When the thirteenth tribe was added later in the third century, the most and highest increase in quotas focused on demes of the tribe Aiantis, in north-eastern Attica. Oinoe (2), Marathon (3), Trikorynthos (3), and Rhamnous (4) gain a total of twelve councillors.[178] The flourish in archaeological and epigraphical evidence from Rhamnous substantiates the argument that the changes reflected an underlying real increase in the importance of and activity in and around the deme itself in the third century, for none of the demes of Aiantis that had their quota increased in 224/3 had seen an earlier rise in councillors in 307/6.[179]

Changes to the original quota of councillors in 307/6 did not display a pattern that suggests all adjustments followed a simple rule. A selective approach seems to have been adopted that reflected a perceived change in

[178] Phaleron, also in the tribe Aiantis, receives an increase of four, like Rhamnous. Only one deme, Aphidna, seems to have been unaffected by quota changes in this tribe (Traill 1975: 62).

[179] Ibid. 60.

the status of the demes concerned. When the Council of 500 became a Council of 600 some time in 307/6, about two-thirds of the demes were not affected despite the net increase in the number of councillors required each year. No deme appears to have had its quota reduced either in 307/6 or in 224/3.[180] There is a clear distinction in the way the urban and rural demes of Attica were affected by these changes. In both periods of adjustment, relatively few urban (and sub-urban) demes of Athens saw their quotas increase. The rural demes saw proportionately bigger rises.[181] The Attic heartland of the Mesogeia, stretching south to the coastal region around Vouliagmeni and Varkiza, consistently received larger increases in numbers of councillors than any other region of Attica in 307/6. Increases occur in forty-nine demes of which thirty-seven gained only one or two councillors. The largest rises were typically in rural areas: Lower Paiania doubled its number of councillors from eleven to twenty-two, the biggest net rise, while its neighbouring demes (Erchia, Athmonon, Halai, Kephale, Pallene, and Gargettos) also saw high rises; the coastal trio of Aixone, Halai Aixonides, and Anagyrous all gained representatives.[182]

It is likely that the number of councillors provided by each deme reflected in some way the deme's ability to provide representatives. Why else would Lower Paiania, alone, see its quota increased from eleven to twenty-two councillors in 307/6? If all demes enjoyed the same increase in citizens, then changes would have been uniform. This pattern does not appear. Although it should be remembered that deme membership does not equate with deme *residency*, it is unlikely that the 100 per cent increase in representation on the Council at Lower Paiania did not in some way reflect an increase in the prosperity and number of families whose origin was in the deme. Rhamnous enjoyed much greater importance in the third century than at any earlier time in its history, and its quota was increased significantly in 224/3. The wealth of evidence from the site makes it difficult not to identify the increase in its quota of councillors with an accompanying increase in both importance and perhaps intensification of settlement at the deme site itself.

It is likely that underlying the changes in the representation of councillors on the Athenian Council are real differences in settlement activity. While deme membership does not equate with deme residency, the relative changes in the quotas in Attica seem to coincide with visible signs of activity that have

[180] Ibid. 59–60.

[181] Piraeus increases by only one in 307/6; it is notable that Phaleron, unchanged in 307/6, receives a further four councillors in 224/3.

[182] Other significant rises see Phyle change from two to six councillors, and Cholleidai from two to five. Acharnai seems to have increased by only three, from twenty-two to twenty-five. Traill 1975: 59.



Figure 3.2. The Mesogeia seen from Merenda (near the deme Myrrhinous)

some reverberation in the demes themselves. The changes at the end of the fourth century reflect the success of families whose demesmen had their origins in the Mesogeia and the coastal area around Vouliagmeni. The changes in 224/3 would suggest that a similar proliferation was enjoyed by the demesmen whose origins lay in north-east Attica.

3.6. SURVEYING CHANGE IN THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF ATTICA

The conclusions based on the evidence of the changes in the quotas for councillors from the demes are rather tentative, but in some ways are corroborated by the archaeological evidence. One would expect archaeological evidence to provide an unbiased reflection of settlement distribution but the interpretation of the material finds is not so straightforward. Not all of Attica has been subjected to the same amount and extent of archaeological examination and no comprehensive survey of Attica has ever been undertaken. Areas which have been studied are relatively small and cannot be

assumed to be typical of the polis as a whole. Attica, as most regions of Greece, betrays a variety of micro-regions.[183] For example, Atene, on the edge of the mining district of south-east Attica, is not typical of Attica as a whole because of the extraordinary economic conditions that the silver-mining operations demanded of the local countryside.[184] Farms with towers may feature in some concentration in the landscape of the mining district of south-west Attica but they may not be characteristic of Attica as a whole. Their function and distribution are probably affected by the neighbouring mining industry.[185] The construction in the 1990s of a new airport in the Mesogeia allowed intensive archaeological examination of the countryside but found considerably fewer towers associated with houses or farms in that region.[186] Economic and social conditions peculiar to the Mesogeia and Laurion hills probably underlie differences in house design and architectural solutions to storage strategies.[187]

The historian must also confront a second problem associated with archaeological evidence and survey results. Not all the material evidence offers evidence for the short-term time interests of the historian. Archaeological survey offers a sweeping vista. More traditional, long-term, and detailed explorations of a major archaeological site can provide the sort of specific finds within a stratified archaeological context that allow archaeological and historical evidence to be juggled. However, the limited number of sites examined in this way is an obstacle. In Attica, the Kerameikos and the Agora are exceptional in providing two detailed archaeological locations with deposits bearing clear stratification. The Thorikos excavations still lack a full publication. The huge responsibilities and burdens of the Greek Archaeological Service impose difficulties in publishing any more than brief reports of often emergency excavations. The recent publication of Rhamnous and the more detailed reports from the Mesogeia have greatly extended the range of archaeological sites that have been examined. Inevitably, the archaeology examined here does not therefore reflect a consistent programme of planned survey of Attica.

The last comprehensive account of archaeology in Attica is now over thirty years old, but despite the numerous excavations in recent years the pattern of

[183] Oliver 2001*b*. [184] Lohmann 1993.

[185] On tower sites in south-east Attica: Young 1941. On the mines and towers of south-east Attica, see now Goette 2000: 86–90.

[186] Steinhauer 2001: 99; the only tower unearthed in the programme of excavations seems to have been associated with a late Classical farm in south-east Mesogeia (possibly in a site to be identified as the deme Kytheros, Traill 1986: 47–51, modern Pousi Kalyerou).

[187] Steinhauer (2001: 131) suggests that different types of property ownership and economic exploitation of the countryside explain the relatively small storage capacity found on the farms excavated in the plain areas of the Mesogeia.

high archaeological exploitation in the fourth century, falling off in the Hellenistic period and reviving again in the Roman, has remained largely unaffected.[188] Recent finds have amplified the material known for the Hellenistic period in Attica.[189] Although some areas were clearly flourishing or

[188] Petropoulakou and Pentazos 1973.

[189] A convenient but not exhaustive starting point for a survey of the archaeology of Attica is Petropoulakou-Pentazos 1973, figs. 25 (sites), 26 (types of site) in the Hellenistic period. Additional material (excluding Athens and Piraeus): *Aigaleos*: early Hellenistic burials, *AD* 34 (1979 [1987]) *Chronika* (*chr.*) B1: 33; *Alimos* (Halimous): Hellenistic material, *AD* 37 (1982 [1988]) *Chr.* B1: 1; *Atene*: Lohmann 1993; *Eleusis*: relatively frequent finds of Hellenistic material in most years confirm the continued activity here, well established by the epigraphy and other sources, burials: *AD* 30 (1975 [1983]) *Chr.* B1: 39, 39–43, 43; *AD* 47 (1992 [1997]) *Chr.* B1: 35; walls/buildings: *AD* 29 (1973–4 [1979]) *Chr.* B1: 67–9, 164, 167–8, 168; *AD* 31 (1976 [1984]) *Chr.* B1: 57; *AD* 33 (1978 [1985]) *Chr.* B1 28–9 (possible Hippodrome area after Travlos), 32 (stoa-like building or peribolos); *AD* 43 (1988 [1993]) *Chr.* B1: 55–7, *AD* 44 (1989 [1994]) *Chro.* B1: 34–6 (hoards of bronze coins of first century BC including one early Hellenistic bronze coin; well with material dating mid-fourth century to Hellenistic era); *AD* 46 (1991 [1996]) *Chr.* B1: 37–40 (road damaged/disrepair in late classical/early Hellenistic era), 41–2 (building); *AD* 50 (1995 [2000]) *Chr.* B1: 44; *Glyphada*: Hellenistic material, burials: *AD* 27 (1972 [1976]) *Chr.* B: 160; *AD* 29 (1973–4 [1979]) *Chr.* B1: 55; *AD* 35 (1980 [1988]) *Chr.* B1: 67, 70; *AD* 37 (1982 [1988]) *Chr.* B1: 52 (building I, Classical or Hellenistic date; buildings II–III later); *Kalisteri* (Oe; north-east of Aspropyrgos, Traill 1975: 49): *AD* 49 (1994) [1999]) *Chr.* B1: 72–5, Platonos-Giota 2004: 339, 342 (remains of Hellenistic and Roman date); *Kallithea*: *AD* 32 (1977 [1984]) *Chr.* B1: 40 (four burials late fourth or early third century); *Kolonos*: *SEG* xxxviii. 265 (destruction of the sanctuary of the Semnai in the third century?); *Laurion region*: Botsari valley, Hellenistic sherds at a mining establishment, *AD* 38 (1983 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 55; Kamariza: *AD* 30 (1975 [1983]) *Chr.* B1: 48 (building with material of second and first centuries), 51 (nearby a sanctuary? of third century?); *AD* 37 (1982 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 59 (large building involved in ore-treatment, late Classical and Hellenistic phases); Pasha-Limani: Salliora-Oikonomakou 1979; *AD* 35 (1980 [1988]) *Chr.* B1: 76; *AD* 49 (1994 [1999]) 68–9 (in Asimaki bay foundations for ore processing in furnaces have pottery dated to the fourth and third centuries); Thorikos region: *AD* 51–2 *Meletes* (1996–7 [2001]): 125–40 (Skitzeri: ore-processing workshops from the fourth to first half of third century, when they were abandoned; workshops east of Phougaros hill, fourth to early third century and Roman use); *Loutsa* (Halai Araphenides): *AD* 30 (1975 [1983]) *Chr.* B1: 37 (sherds from Classical to Roman era in area of the ?propylon structure close to temple of Artemis); *AD* 31 (1976 [1985]) *Chr.* B1: 52–5 (a second phase of Hellenistic date in building 40 m south of the temple) *Marathon*: *AD* 39 (1984 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 47–8 and 48 (1993 [1998]) C*hr.* B1: 63–6 (traces of rural? buildings, older one late Hellenistic; second publication moves date later; earlier publication mentions fragments of an inscribed mortgage *horos*); *AD* 29 (1974) *Meletai*: 242 (Hellenistic? fountain house? with *PAE* 1972: 7); *Markopoulo*: *AD* 38 (1983 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 61 (Hellenistic? burial); *Menidi* (Archarnai): *AD* 34 (1980 [1988]) *Chr.* B1: 77–8 (remains of aqueduct and possible Hellenistic material but probably Roman period as much of the material here, E. Vanderpool, 'The Acharnian Aqueduct', *Χαριστήριον εἰς Ἀναστάσιον Κ. Ὀρλάνδον Ι*, Athens, 1965: 166–75; Platonos-Giota 2004: 182–7); ibid. 425–6, 453 pls. 13–14 (small roadside rural sanctuary with a second building phase in the Hellenistic era); *Porto Raphti* (Steiria/Praisai): *AD* 37 (1982 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 61, *AD* 40 (1985 [1990]) *Chr.*: 66 (Hellenistic material); *Spata*: Steinhauer 1994: 183 (Ag. Asomatoi); Steinhauer in Tsouli 2001: 142, photo 140–1, the Hellenistic estate at Ag. Asomatoi; *Voula* (Aixone): *AD* 42 (1987 [1992]) *Chr.* B1: 73–5, 75, 77, 86–7, 87, 89 (Hellenistic walls, buildings, burials); *AD* 46 (1991 [1996]) *Chr.* B1: 60–1 (on islet of Hydroussa); *Ano Voula* (Halai Aixonides): *AD* 33 (1978 [1985]) *Chr.* B1: 58; *AD* 37 (1982 [1989]) *Chr.* B1: 58; *AD* 40 (1985 [1990]) *Chr.* 57–9; 59–62; *AD* 46 (1991 [1996]) *Chr.*

showing new signs of activity, such as Rhamnous and the coastal areas of Laurion respectively, reduced occupation or even abandonment characterized others in the Hellenistic period. North of Laurion, an unrecovered hoard of silver coins and signs of destruction suggest that the settlement of Thorikos close to the theatre was evacuated in the early third century.[190] The mining establishments in the Laurion hills themselves reflect a similar history, although one on which we still await full excavation reports.[191] There is little evidence that the vast number of silver-processing sites of the fourth century remained in use in the third century. Areas such as the Mesogeia remained inhabited and under cultivation. There are signs that some farms were larger than before.[192] The numerous finds identified with the activities of the Chremonidean war reflect the importance to the polis of the harbours at Rhamnous, Porto Raphti (Steiria/Prasiai), Sunion (at the Cape), and Vouliagmeni (Halai Aixonides).[193] At Brauron an inscription describes an extensive inspection of the sanctuary and its buildings which was to lead to the contracting of repair works at some time in the late fourth or possibly early third century on the grounds of revised date of the inscription.[194] In central Athens itself very little was built during the course of the third century except for the structure located on the Hill of Ares overlooking the Agora and north of the Theseion, and identified as an arsenal.[195]

Even if the regional bias and limited extent of excavation in Attica is considered, the inescapable impression is that less archaeological material survives from the third than from the fourth century. This phenomenon reflects the considerable and visible prosperity of Attica in the fourth century following the recovery of the Athenian polis after their defeat in the Peloponnesian war. In the light of the huge upheavals in the *chora* in 307–4 and the 280s it is little surprise that such levels of affluence were not sustained in the third century. Settlement declined, but not rapidly all over Attica. Some regions suffered more than others. In these respects, settlement in Attica paralleled broadly other regions of Greece. Elsewhere in the Greek world survey results have found a reduction of archaeological evidence in rural

B1: 60 (buildings, burial material, walls; Andreou 1994; *Vouliagmeni* (Halai Aixonides): *AD* 36 (1981 [1988]) *Chr.* B: 53 (Hellenistic ceramics).

190 Thorikos: Bingen 1973: 9. 191 Ellis Jones 1982.

192 Steinhauer 2001: 141–2. A typical large farm is one at Ag. Asomatoi. See also Steinhauer 1994.

193 See Ch. 5.

194 Themelis 2002: 112–16, esp. 113. The inscription is non-stoichedon. Either a *kappa* has been omitted as the first visible letter of line 1 (ibid. 112) or five letter spaces should be read inside the brackets at the start of the line. The former is more likely and other restorations are possible, e.g. Antikles (*LGPN* ii Antikles 31; cf. Themelis 2002: 113).

195 Pounder 1983.

areas later in the Hellenistic period, in the second and first centuries BC, and a less distinct reduction from the late Classical to early Hellenistic.[196]

Only tentative conclusions can be drawn. There is a shift in intra-regional settlement in Hellenistic Attica. The Atene survey typifies the change in one particular micro-region where settlement peaks in the fourth century. Elsewhere in the wider Laurion area what evidence there is appears on the coast, and in particular on the coast south of Thorikos, but not at Thorikos, and inland north of Sunion. If, as is likely, the Macedonians had managed to retain control of the Sunion fortress for the duration of the period between 295 and 229, their presence would have disturbed the dynamics of settlement in south-east Attica during the 280s and 260s. It is surely some reflection of the status quo that the Agora at Pasha Limani dates to the period after the Chremonidean war when the presence of the Macedonian garrison and the Athenian administration was no longer a source of open conflict. In short, and not surprisingly, archaeological evidence in Hellenistic Attica shows a reduction in the intensity of settlement that had characterized the exploitation of the countryside during the fourth century. Then the concern for more marginal land was apparent in a way that is certainly not seen in the third century.

3.7. CONCLUSION: THE FRAGILITY OF HUMAN RESOURCES

The economies of a Greek polis were vulnerable to shifts in population and potential changes made by such shifts to the demand on local resources and commodities. The various economic demands of the Athenian population in the fourth century had already established the importance of imported grain, an aspect which had continued from the fifth century. But the agriculture of Attica itself remained fundamental to the operation of the local economy. The sustaining of local agriculture went hand in hand with the viability of the polis. If the people were to be supported in their consumption of commodities, then local resources were likely to be of the utmost importance. This chapter has reviewed the evidence for the numbers and distribution of people in Attica. Although that evidence is elusive and the results from this examination are limited, general conclusions can be drawn. There was an overall fall in the population of Attica from the fourth to the third century in most categories: citizens and slaves, possibly also foreigners. The evidence for the

[196] Alcock 1994: 177–9.

distribution of the population in Athens and Attica suggests that there were changes. Exploitation of the countryside is less intense from the late fourth century. Various micro-regions in Attica betray more significant change. The decline in activity in the Laurion hills illustrates massive shifts in local economies although the extraction of minerals never disappeared completely from Hellenistic south-east Attica. The importance of Rhamnous meant that north-east Attica remained a region of some importance. The area around the garrison was vital for the local economy of Rhamnous, a micro-region that illustrates well the components of the Athenian territory.[197] The same phenomenon is almost certainly true of Eleusis. The Mesogeia no doubt continued to supply commodities such as grain to Athens, and the importance of the most fertile region of Attica remains central to Athenian history in the third century as the *epidosis* of 248/7 illustrates.[198]

The changes in the distribution of population may have weakened the rural economy. If settlement decline also saw diminished cultivation of the land, productivity may have declined too. If there was any fall in agricultural activity, then remaining cultivation became all the more critical. The operation of rural economies inevitably relied on labour. The loss of citizens and slaves from the countryside around Rhamnous was also a loss of agricultural labour that was necessary to sustain the garrison. The micro-region of Rhamnous in a smaller form operated like Attica. The people providing the labour for producing domestic harvests remained the critical factor: they needed protection in wartime. War—including piratical raids—could disrupt the agrarian economies, and it is time to turn now to see how it did so.

[197] See Oliver 2001*b*. [198] See Ch. 8, sect. 2.

Part II

War in the Athenian Polis

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4

Warfare and the Athenian Countryside

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The countryside—the *chora*—was an intrinsic, if not definitive feature of the polis. For many years the polis was seen as an urban centre until authors such as Robin Osborne "put the countryside back into the picture".[1] It is difficult to imagine work on the Greek polis that does not consider the almost definitive role that its countryside (or territory) played.[2] The impact of political events on the countryside had great significance for the city. Defending the countryside was a central concern for the polis.[3] Warfare affected the lives of the people of the countryside in a way no other human intervention could.[4] The history of the Athenian polis in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods can be read as a sequence of such disturbances. Those disruptions arose for different reasons. Warfare in Attica was brought about certainly by drive for change within some elements of the Athenian population (e.g. 307–304/3; 288/7–282; 268/7–262/1). But Attica suffered warfare also because the polis was associated with one or other Hellenistic power. Athens was an important strategic target for much of the early Hellenistic period. Antipater (323–321), Polyperchon (321–318), and Kassander (318–*c.*299) were all intent on gaining control of the city. The first Hellenistic kings saw the polis as one of the potential bases of power in mainland Greece: Demetrios Poliorketes and later Antigonos Gonatas enjoyed the benefits of control over Athens for lengthy periods of the third century. Opposition to each of these kings resulted on separate occasions with warfare in Attica. In the years after the Chremonidean war, the Athenians suffered from hostile incursions in Attica because the city was aligned with Gonatas. This chapter deals with the impact of such enemy incursions and similarly the attempts made by the Athenians to remove enemy forces installed in the polis. The epigraphical evidence from this period shows a consistent concern for the defence of the countryside and in particular

[1] R. G. Osborne 1987*a*: 9.
[2] Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 70–3, with few exceptions, 'every polis had a territory', p. 70.
[3] Garlan 1973; Müller 1999. [4] Chaniotis 2005: 121–9.

for the successful harvest of the crops. These concerns are, of course, common to the Greek polis, and belong not only to the Hellenistic period.[5]

Warfare affected life in the countryside in many ways: the physical damage (to crops and infrastructure), the psychological impact on the defenders, and the actual disruption of agricultural labour. The damage that an enemy force can inflict on agricultural resources—crops and infrastructure, such as buildings—must not be overestimated but was clearly one way of denying a community its vital economic commodities.[6] A similar result could be achieved by an invading force itself procuring the harvest.[7] The Spartans and their allies were forced to withdraw prematurely during their invasion of Attica in 425 because they had attacked too soon, and were not able to support themselves on the local crops because the grain was not ready for harvest.[8] From the start of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan king Archidamos had led an invasion force into Attica in five of the seven years between 431 and 425. The invasion force was never able to spend more than forty days in Attica, but the timing of the operation was clearly designed to disrupt the harvesting process.[9] The presence of an enemy force active in the countryside inevitably interrupted agricultural life; invasions were timed to disrupt harvests and sometimes sowing. The Athenians invaded Megara twice a year during the Peloponnesian war, once in spring and again in autumn.[10] The Spartans and their allies had tried to ensure that their invasions of Attica during the Peloponnesian war coincided with the moment when the grain crops were ripe (and therefore ready for harvest).[11] The people of Akanthos in Chalkidike came to terms with the Spartan general Brasidas in 425 because he had invaded at the very moment when the harvest was about to take place.[12] The presence of an invading force also inflicted psychological damage, as Foxhall has argued: "the threat *perceived* by individual households to their own subsistence was the enemy's most powerful weapon".[13] But what really disrupted the rural life was the impact warfare and the threat of warfare had on the people in the countryside.

[5] Hanson 1983; R. G. Osborne 1987*a*: 137–64; Foxhall 1993; Chandezon 1999, 2000; Chaniotis 2005: 121–9.

[6] Hanson 1983 esp. chs. 4 and 6–8. On the difficulty of destroying 'primitive' houses, see Gordon 1953 (I thank Professor Michael Crawford for this reference).

[7] Xen. *Oik.* 5. 13.

[8] Thuc. 4. 6. 1.

[9] Ibid. 2. 57. 2.

[10] Ibid. 2. 31. 3 and 4. 66. 1.

[11] Ibid. 2. 19. 1; Hanson 1983: 30–5.

[12] Thuc. 4. 84. 2.

[13] Foxhall 1993: 143 emphasizes the psychological impact, suggesting that 'attacks on crops would almost never actually threaten a city's food supply' (ibid. 141).

Harvest time also required high levels of labour and invasions of the countryside made such operations highly dangerous. The threat of invasion could encourage the local population to escape to more secure areas. The Athenians were threatened by the invading Persian army in 480 BC and fled to Troezen, Aegina, and Salamis; the Phokians took to the mountains.[14] In the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians abandoned the countryside and took to the city of Athens, sending animals and movable possessions to Euboea.[15] Invasion threatened domestic security and could cause the loss of slaves, as happened in Attica in 413 and Chios in 412 BC.[16] Aeneas the Tactician in the fourth century wrote about the importance of removing slaves and animals from the advance of an invading army.[17] Agricultural operations, such as the harvest, conducted in the countryside in the face of an invasion would have required a considerable defensive force.[18]

During the late Classical and early Hellenistic period, the Athenians continued to imitate their fifth-century predecessors in being unable to prevent invasion forces entering Attica.[19] The objectives of invading land forces most often involved denying the Athenians access to the countryside. In order to achieve this position, the control of the garrisons was of central importance. From this position the city of Athens itself could be isolated from its *chora*. Access to the sea could be denied by siege as in 295 or, as often was the case in the early Hellenistic period, by the occupation of the fortress of Mounychia which overlooked the three harbours of Piraeus.[20] In this chapter, it will be seen that the control of the countryside was at the heart of military conflict in late Classical and early Hellenistic Attica. The reasons for this are linked, it will be argued, to the intrinsic importance of the commodities such as grain that the agricultural economies supplied to the people of the polis. Athens lost control over Attica or parts of Attica, including the garrison forts, from 307 to 304, during the mid-290s, and in the years from *c.*287 to the end of the 280s. Later during the Chremonidean war, invasion and loss of control over some areas of Attica had devastating effects. In the 240s, the countryside again required protection. In each of these five periods the relationship between the polis and its agricultural economies was threatened. Warfare disrupted work in the countryside. This survey of warfare in the countryside in early Hellenistic Attica will illustrate the critical role that the forts, and especially the garrison demes, contributed to the defence of Attica.[21]

[14] Hdt. 8. 4 and 32. [15] Thuc. 2. 14. [16] Ibid. 7. 27. 5; 8. 40. 2 (Chios).
[17] Aen. Tac. 10. 4. [18] Hanson 1983: 31.
[19] Ferguson 1911; Ober 1985 (and 1989); Munn 1993.
[20] See above, Ch. 2, sect. 2. [21] Cf. Ober 1985: 220.

4.2. THE YEARS 307–304 BC

In 304 Demetrios Poliorketes drove the Macedonian king Kassander from Attica, pursued him as far north as Thessaly, before returning to Athens. On his return to the city, he handed back to the Athenians the forts of Phyle and Panakton.[22] This was not an empty gesture. It was a moment of great significance and effectively brought to a close the Four Year war which had seen Athens struggle to remove Kassander and his army from the polis. Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Monophthalmos had enabled the Athenians to achieve this position. They had also provided the Athenians the ways and means of re-establishing the security of the polis. Timber for the construction of a fleet of a hundred ships had already been guaranteed. After 307 the Athenians had been busy reconstructing and improving the walls around the city and the Piraeus. Demetrios would clearly recognize that the border forts facilitated control over the routes into Attica from the north and gave an enemy army a commanding position and access to plains south of Parnes mountain. Kassander's occupation of these forts between 307 and 304 had denied the Athenians complete control of Attica.[23]

Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes had begun their campaign of liberating the cities of Greece earlier in 307. In the summer their fleet was admitted into the Piraeus, and Kassander's remaining garrison on Mounychia was encircled. Demetrios of Phaleron, the ruler of Athens who had been supported and installed by Kassander, was removed to Thebes.[24] Mounychia fell at the end of summer. The intervention signalled the revival of a more popular and democratic government. The city and the harbour were again controlled by the Athenians: the forces of Antigonos and Demetrios provided additional security. The situation in Attica is less certain. There is no indication in the sources that Demetrios Poliorketes had pursued the enemy into Attica following the successes in the Piraeus of 307.[25] During subsequent years, 306/5 and 305/4, Athens fought against Kassander around the city and in Attica:[26] Diodoros describes how Kassander and Polyperchon were

[22] Plut. *Demetr.* 23. 1–2. [23] Ober 1985: 220.

[24] Plut. *Demetr.* 8; Diod. Sic. 20. 45. 3 ff. [25] Plut. *Demetr.* 9–10; Diod. Sic. 20. 45. 5 ff.

[26] Inscriptions erected in Athens suggest that Kassander was at war with Athens in 306/5: *IG* ii^2 470, war continuing, *IG* ii^2 467 + Add. p. 671 lines 23 ff., Kassander in Attica; *IG* ii^2 469 dates ?306/5 and refers to Kassander campaigning against the city. The year 305/4: *IG* ii^2 500 ll. 10 ff., the taxiarchs of this year are praised for their defence of the city walls; *IG* ii^2 492 is dated to the siege of the year 304 when Demetrios intervened, see Hauben 1972. The invasion by Kassander mentioned in Paus. 1. 26. 3 and repulsed with the aid of the Aitolians probably belongs to 304, see Habicht 1985: 82 n. 59; 91; Habicht 1979: 107; Hauben 1972; Flacelière 1937: 79 n. 3 dated the alliance to between 307 and 305. On Olympiodoros see Habicht 1985: 90–2.

plundering Greece with impunity during this period.[27] The steps taken to repair the city walls and the Piraeus defences with such urgency were justified, although the operation was designed to take five years.[28] By 305/4 the city itself was being besieged by Kassander.[29] Plutarch tells us that this was the point at which Athens made an appeal to Demetrios for aid and led to the campaign which saw the expulsion of Kassander from Attica.[30]

From 307 to 304 the Athenians will have found great difficulty in exploiting the agricultural resources of the countryside.[31] It is unlikely, given the activities of Kassander in Attica between 306 and 304, that the Athenians enjoyed uninterrupted control of all of the garrisons throughout this period. We know that Kassander had control of Phyle and Panakton, for the forts were returned to the Athenians in 304. Whether he had occupied the forts continuously since 307 is less clear. It is possible that both Phyle and Panakton had been under Kassander throughout the years of 307 to 304 although the current orthodoxy sees the forts as being recaptured from the Athenians in 305/4.[32]

Even less certain is the situation at Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sunion. None of the forts is said to have been returned to the Athenians by Demetrios in 304 which might suggest that these demes had been secured between 307 and 305/4. Arguments from silence are contentious. No Athenian inscription from 307–304 has been found at any of the three main forts of Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sunion. But recent discoveries from Rhamnous are more than likely going to help solve some of these issues. The earliest inscription erected after 307 known from any Attic fort was found during the excavations at Rhamnous in 1993 but has not yet been fully published. The decree, erected by Athenian soldiers, honours the general for the countryside, Kephisophon, with a gold crown, in the year 304/3.[33] Another decree has been found from the following year, 303/2. The demesmen of Rhamnous honoured Adeimantos, the general for the countryside, who had looked after the safety of the farmers.[34] The farmers

[27] Diod. Sic. 20. 100. 6.

[28] Habicht 1997: 70; *IG* ii^2 463 ll. 106–7.

[29] The walls of Athens and Piraeus, e.g. *IG* ii^2 463 + Maier, *Mauerbau.* i no. 11; *IG* ii^2 505 ll. 30–6; *IG* ii^2 1497 ll. 91 ff.; *IG* ii^2 468; [Plut.] *Vit. X. Or.* 851d. The fleet: Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 2 and 4. *IG* ii^2 1492 ll. 123–4.

[30] Plut. *Demetr.* 23. 1. Hauben 1972 reminds us that this was the first time the city had been besieged in 100 years. See Diod. Sic. 20. 100. 5–6 for the peace with the Rhodians and the return of Demetrios Poliorketes to Greece.

[31] For a possible respite in this period, see Ferguson 1909: 319–20. and 1911: 115 and n. 2.

[32] Ferguson 1911: 116 (followed by Habicht 1997: 74), argues that when Kassander re-entered Attica in 304, 'Phyle and Panakton, and the passes which they dominated, fell into the enemy's hands.'

[33] *Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7.

[34] Ibid.: Petrakos provides a summary of what the inscription contains, but it certainly looks as though Adeimantos was protecting agriculture in some way. The full publication will clarify and enable a more complete interpretation.

probably required the same sort of protection to be provided by Adeimantos that in the 260s would be afforded by Epichares.[35] These documents illustrate how the fortresses could protect the farmers working the land around them. Control of the fortresses could facilitate the harvest in rural Attica and in 307–304 their strategic role was clearly recognized.

We have less information about Eleusis. The earliest indication of normalcy there dates to 304/3, when the Athenian calendar was adjusted to allow Demetrios Poliorketes to be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries.[36] It is possible that Eleusis and Rhamnous were controlled by Kassander between 307 and 304 but by no means certain.[37] Kassander, like the Spartan king Archidamos in the fifth century, would not have needed to control these strategic points to move in and out of Attica. An Athenian decree, possibly passed in 304, awards Neaios citizenship and may refer indirectly to the recent recovery of the Eleusis.[38]

There is even less information about Sunion. One decree seems to refer to the events of these years but is not dated.[39] The overall picture in Attica suggests that the Athenians were probably very restricted in their ability to farm much of Attica because of the presence of invading enemy forces. The extent to which the enemy was able to remain in Attica for sustained periods, using strategic points such as the garrison demes, is less certain.[40]

Nevertheless, some of the areas around Athens probably formed part of what amounted to an exclusion zone, an area of land to which the Athenians had some degree of secure access. Certainly in the Peloponnesian War, "areas near the city" had been kept free of enemy forces, and it is possible that this zone had reached Aigaleos, Hymettos, and Penteli.[41] In this region, a significant amount of the city's food supply could have been produced. It was probably somewhere within this zone that Phaidros and Kallias of Sphettos

[35] *I. Rhamnous* 3 = *SEG* xxiv. 154 = Bielman 1994: no. 24.

[36] The argument that 303/2 was the year of the initiation, referred to in Plut. *Demetr.* 26. 1–2, is rather complicated and arises from the discussion of the date of the decree honouring Medon published in *Horos* 4 (1986) 19–23. The inscription contains an intercalated date in 304/3 when normally this was not an intercalary year and 303/2 was (Meritt 1977: 171). Two successive intercalary years would be surprising (see *SEG* xxxvi. 165) and Woodhead (1989) maintained rightly that 304/3 was the year in which the Athenian calendar was compressed to allow Demetrios Poliorketes to be initiated into the Mysteries (see further Ch. 9, sect. 2).

[37] Ferguson (1911: 145 n. 4) suggests that 304 was the only year when Athens did not have control of Eleusis during the war against Kassander.

[38] *IG* ii^2 553 ll. 1–6 (= Osborne, *Nat.* D44). On the date, see Osborne's comments in *Nat.* ii. 118. The decree seems to have been passed after the war, therefore 304 or early 303, and mentions the tribe Oeneis which is known to have held the seventh prytany of 304/3, the tentative date of the decree.

[39] *IG* ii^2 1260 = *SEG* xxv. 150. For the date in the late fourth century, see Ch. 6, sect. 2.

[40] The obvious parallel is the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in 413 BC.

[41] Spence 1990: 103 with n. 82, and Thuc. 2. 19–23, esp. 2. 22. 2, and 3. 1. 2.

had succeeded in protecting the harvest against attacks made by the enemy forces from Piraeus in the 280s.[42] During the skirmishes against Kassander between 307 and 304, cavalry and light troops would have been the most effective force against those attempting to damage crops or disrupt people working in the fields around Athens. In 304 the Athenian cavalry had achieved a memorable victory over Kassander and his generals, a confrontation involving characters named in a lead curse tablet.[43] Pausanias describes a monument, erected at the north end of the Agora, near the Stoa Poikile, which celebrated a victory of the Athenian cavalry over Pleistarchos, the brother of Kassander and commander of the cavalry and mercenaries.[44] The victory clearly reveals that in the war the cavalry had operated near Athens, possibly using tactics similar to the Athenian cavalry operating in Attica during the Peloponnesian War.[45]

Following Kassander's expulsion from Attica, the Athenians regained complete control of their fortresses. Phyle and Panakton retained the strategic importance that was attached to them earlier in the fourth century and throughout the fifth century when tensions between the Athenians and Boeotians had so often focused on the highlands of Parnes.[46] There can be little doubt then that the fortresses of Attica continued to be important to the defence system in the early Hellenistic period.[47] But what is crucial here is the realization that between 307 and 304 the Athenians would have been relatively restricted in their ability to maximize the agricultural resources of the polis. It may not have been possible to rely on the locally produced commodities such as grain during this confrontation.

4.3. THE MID-290s

Shortly after the Four Year war, the Athenian association with Demetrios and Antigonos became unwelcome when the father and son's army was defeated at

[42] Phaidros and Kallias of Sphettos: *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 30–6 and Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 23 ff. with pp. 19–20.

[43] Habicht 1985: 7–82 (cf. Burstein 1977). The lead tablet is republished by D. Jordan, *Ath. Mitt.* 95 (1980): 225–39, no. 2 = *SEG* xxx. 325; see also Billows 1989: 177–9.

[44] Paus. 1. 15. 1. The monument adjoins the west end of the Stoa Poikile, see *Hesperia* 53 (1984): 19–24 and Camp 1990: 100, fig. 56.

[45] On the Athenian cavalry tactics in Attica in the late fifth century, see Spence 1990: 100 and 108 ff.

[46] The relationship between Athens and Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Monophthalmos is notorious, as is illustrated by Plutarch's account of the honours bestowed on the kings by the city at the end of the fourth century, Plut. *Demetr.* 9–14, with a crescendo of obscene honours: Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 2; 11. 1; 13. 1; 23. 2 ff.; 26–7 for honours awarded following the intervention in 304, Plut. *Demetr.* 26 for the fiasco of the Eleusinia.

[47] Contrast Ober 1985: 220: 'By the last two decades of the [fourth] century the forts had ceased to play a decisive role in the overall defense of Attica.' Chapter 5 below examines the role of the garrisons in the defence system.

Ipsos in 301. In the years after this battle, the Athenians were beset with internal problems, reaching a crisis during the period when Lachares, an Athenian general, gained control of the Acropolis and famously melted the gold on the statue of Athena to pay for mercenary soldiers. The brief internal conflict was brought to an end by the arrival of Demetrios Poliorketes. Since Ipsos he had re-established his power and planned to establish his control over Greece in the vacuum left by the death of Kassander in 297. He invaded Attica in 296/5, captured Eleusis and Rhamnous, and settled down to lay waste to the countryside.[48] Fundamental to gaining control of Attica was his capture of these two main fortresses, and following their capture he was able to cause havoc in the countryside: his control of these two strategic points would have obstructed Athenian access to the countryside and so affected the agricultural capacity of Attica. To complete his encirclement of Athens, Demetrios Poliorketes also captured Salamis and Aegina, after which he began to lay siege to the city itself.[49]

Gaining control of the countryside in Attica was therefore one step in restricting the city's food supply. A complete stranglehold on the movement of food into the city was achieved when Demetrios Poliorketes blockaded the city's overseas supplies. He deterred merchants from heading to Athens by the exemplary execution of a grain trader and his ship's captain.[50] The situation in Athens during the siege was desperate: wheat was sold at 300 drachmai for one *modius*. Food was restricted; for example, Epicurus is said to have rationed beans to his associates.[51] The capture of Eleusis and Rhamnous was one stage in the effective domination of the countryside, and illustrated the strategic importance of the fortresses to both invader and defender of Attica.[52] That Poliorketes' immediate target was the control and attack of the countryside suggests the importance of domestic agriculture to Attica. Following the success of Demetrios Poliorketes, he probably occupied the garrisons. A foreign garrison was installed on the Mouseion hill and became a symbol of the suppression.[53] The reinstallation of a foreign garrison on the fortress of Mounychia overlooking the harbours of Piraeus presented a major headache to all future attempts in Athens to reassert control over the polis.

[48] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3.

[49] Salamis and Aegina: Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 7. 5.

[50] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3.

[51] Prices: Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3; Epicurus: Plut. *Contra Epicuri beatudinem* 1097c, cf. problems while Lachares was in Athens, see the comic poet, Demetrios II, *PCG* iv. 11, fr. 1 (1).

[52] Two decrees from Sunion dated 298/7 (archon Mnesidemos; *IG* ii^2 1270 = *ISE* i. no. 11 = *SEG* xxv. 151 and xiv. 134) witness the deployment of Athenian and mercenary troops there, indicating activity and concern to maintain the garrisons. See Goette 2003: 160; 2000: 53–4.

[53] Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 5, and Paus. 1. 25. 7. The fortress of Mounychia was garrisoned at this moment by Demetrios Poliorketes.



Map 4.1. Plan of central Athens

4.4. THE 280s

For the remainder of the 290s, all evidence indicates that Demetrios Poliorketes enjoyed considerable support. An ithyphallic hymn was composed at the end of the decade to celebrate Demetrios and the Eleusinian Mysteries.[54] However his position in Greece was damaged by his own campaigns in the north-west and crucially by the expansive movements of Pyrrhos.[55] Ultimately Pyrrhos' march north towards Macedonia and his connections with Kings Lysimachos and Ptolemy formed an axis of power which encouraged

[54] Habicht 1997: 87–94; *FGrH* 76 fr. 13, on which see now Marcovich 1988: 8–19.
[55] Habicht 1997: 94–5.

the Athenians to re-establish their independence by tearing themselves from Demetrios Poliorketes' control.

Apart from securing the harvest of 287, the Athenians in the 280s had concentrated on three strategic targets: the removal of the enemy garrison installed on the Mouseion hill overlooking the Acropolis was achieved.[56] The recovery of the garrison on Mounychia overlooking the Piraeus failed.[57] An attempt on Mounychia resulted in the death of those Athenian soldiers who made their way into the fortress. Altogether, 420 Athenians and eight generals were involved: it is not clear how many of them survived. Neither is it clear whether the memorial to Chairippos was the result of this particular attack on Mounychia.[58] Finally, the recovery of the garrisons of Attica met with some success. In an honorific decree passed in autumn 283, Philippides of Kephale is rewarded *inter alia* for the request he made for aid from Lysimachos (to recapture the garrisons and the Piraeus).[59]

But over and above these targets, the immediate aim of the revolt was to secure the harvest of Attica during 287. Phaidros, as hoplite general, led the active Athenian citizen army into the countryside. This deployment was an almost total activation of Athenian men. The harvest would have made extensive demands on manpower at Athens, and it would have been an extremely difficult task to defend those working in the fields: very large numbers would have been involved in the task of harvesting the crops. It seems as though the largest possible Athenian army was deployed to defend the workers in particular against the threat from the enemy garrison of the Piraeus.[60] The dangers of the operation, and the risk to the harvest, meant that Phaidros must have taken the majority of the available age cohorts into the countryside leaving only the youngest and oldest in Athens. For Olympiodoros remained in Athens to lead the old men and youths against the Macedonians on the Mouseion hill. Under the veteran Olympiodoros, this force succeeded first in repelling a Macedonian attack and then in capturing the Mouseion fort where the Macedonians had taken refuge.[61] Little has been made of the fact that Pausanias describes the army which Olympiodoros led

[56] Paus. 1. 26. 1–3. For the settlement, see the decree honouring Kallias of Sphettos, Shear 1978: 3 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 32–40 and p. 21–2, following which Demetrios Poliorketes left for Asia (Plut. *Demetr.* 46. 1–2, and *Pyrrh.* 12. 4–5).

[57] For anticipation of the recovery of the Piraeus: *IG* ii^2 657, ll. 31–6; *Agora* xvi. 181 (Ag. I 4266).

[58] Polyainos *Strat.* 5. 17. 1. A memorial was erected for Chairippos, the first to fall in the assault, see *IG* ii^2 5227a Add. + *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45, with Kyparisses and Peek (eds.), Ath. Mitt. 57 (1932) 146 no. 2; Moretti, *ISE* i. 13.

[59] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 31–6.

[60] For the numbers involved in harvesting, see Ch. 3, sect. 2. *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 34–5 seem to refer indirectly to the struggle for military superiority in the countryside; the main threat must have come from the Piraeus, so M. J. Osborne 1979: 186.

[61] Paus. 1. 26. 1.

against the Macedonians as made up of old men and youths. This can only mean that Phaidros had taken the main army into the countryside and this operation, not the assault on the Mouseion, was making the greatest demands for Athenian strategy in the revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes.[62] This new analysis emphasizes the importance of the countryside and reveals that the successful harvest of 287 was the immediate and most pressing objective. Kallias' arrival with 1,000 troops from Andros no doubt relieved the Athenian forces defending those completing the harvest. At some point during the operations of Phaidros and Kallias in the countryside, Olympiodoros captured the Mouseion. The year of 288/7 therefore ended with the successful harvest and the defeat of the Mouseion garrison, and with Phaidros able to claim that he had handed over the city "free and under a democratic government".[63]

An examination of the remaining evidence from the 280s suggests that towards the end of 283 only one of the three strategic objectives had been achieved: the Mouseion garrison had been expelled. The Athenians had still not recovered either the garrisons of Attica or the fortress on Mounychia.[64] The failure to control the countryside and the Piraeus is likely to have caused major logistical problems in moving incoming grain imports to the city. Audoleon, king of the Paionians, was honoured at the end of 285/4 for his role in preserving the city and providing for those Athenians who arrived in his country. He had given a gift of grain to the People, 7,500 *medimnoi* of Macedonian grain at his personal expense and had brought it to the *harbours* of the city.[65] If the harbours of the city are those of Attica we can surely assume that the grain could still not be off-loaded in the main ports of Piraeus at the end of 284.[66] Zenon too had made sure that the grain was delivered.[67] What grain was being moved is not clear since the gift of 20,000

[62] For Phaidros' command of the forces in the countryside, see further Ch. 4.

[63] Kallias' arrival: Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 18–27 (*Agora* xvi. 255d). *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 38–40. Demetrios Poliorketes had probably arrived in Attica *after* the fall of the Mouseion, perhaps in the early stages of Phaidros' second year as hoplite general in 287/6, see Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 27 ff.

[64] On the attempted recovery of Mounychia in the 280s, see Ch. 2.

[65] *IG* ii^2 654 ll. 29–30; the polis is Athens and *καταστήσας* is used in the causal sense, see LSJ s.v. *καθίστημι* A2.

[66] The harbours would seem to be the harbours of Athens: Audoleon has assisted the Athenians with him in Paionia. Timon[—*c.*5—] operating for Audoleon assisted in the export of the grain (*τὴν ἐκκομιδήν τοῦ σίτου*, 654 l. 12), cf. *συνκομιδή* (Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) l. 25) for the escort of the grain from the Attic countryside to Athens. The root (*κομιδή*) appears in *Hesp.* 5 (1936) 201–5 ll. 16–17; restored in l. 15. The decree honouring the eponymous archon of 283/2, Euthios, passed in early 281 mentions the wish that the Piraeus and the city of Athens be united again and proves that in 284 the harbour was still unavailable (*SEG* xxv. 89).

[67] The prefix is restored (*IG* ii^2 650 l. 16) by Kirchner as [*δια*]*κομίζηται*. It is possible to replace it with [*εἰσ*]*κομίζηται*. It is more likely that Zenon is escorting the grain to Attica, with the aphracts protecting the cargo ships. The decree from Ios describes Zenon scrutinizing the crews, suggesting that warships were involved (*IG* xii. 5 1004).

medimnoi of wheat from Ptolemy II dates much later than Zenon's operation.[68] The use of the plural "harbours" in Audoleon's decree suggests that the Athenians were using more than one harbour to receive the grain at a time when Piraeus was unquestionably under enemy control. Several possible harbours may have been used but Vouliagmeni may have been the most suitable and evidence suggests relatively extensive activity there in the first half of the third century.[69]

The logistics of moving grain to and from the harbours to Athens needs consideration. Audoleon gave 7,500 *medimnoi* of grain and, as will be discussed below in more detail, Spartokos gave 15,000 *medimnoi*. The obvious numerical relationship between these amounts may conceal some of the practical solutions to transporting the grain. One *medimnos* of grain would have weighed, very roughly, 40kg.[70] Respectively, 7,500 and 15,000 *medimnoi* represented in weight 300,000 and 600,000kg. Cargo capacities have been calculated on the evidence of an inscription from third-century Thasos which restricted boats from different areas of the harbour according to their size: the smaller size was the 3,000 talent "class", the larger were boats less than 5,000 talents.[71] The two classes suggest that ships were 80 and 130 tonnes—a capacity of roughly 2,000 and 3,250 *medimnoi* of grain. A large ship could have transported 3,000 *medimnoi* of grain. Casson confirms this capacity by comparing the various sizes of gifts of grain.[72] The gifts of Audoleon and Spartokos were transported in at least two and four ships respectively.

Vouliagmeni is more than 20km south-east of Athens. It is likely that the Athenians were using alternative harbours such as this while the Piraeus was no longer accessible.[73] If so, hostile forces based at Mounychia could have threatened transportation overland to Athens. The journey from Vouliagmeni

[68] Shear 1978: 3 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 50–5 (*SEG* xxviii. 60).

[69] A possible choice of sites might have been made from those located in the territories of the following demes Aixone (Voula; see now *AD* 46 (*Chronika* B1) (1991) [1996]: 60), Anagyrous (Vari), Anaphlystos (Anavysso), Atene (Legrana), Sunion, Laurion (Sunion/Thorikos), Thorikos, Prasiai/Steiria (Porto Raphti), Halai Araphenides (Rafina), Marathon, and Rhamnous. This list is based on the identification of potential and actual harbour sites made by Panagos 1995: 54–5.

[70] On cargo weights and volumes see Gill 1991; Wallinga 1964; Casson 1971; Pomey 1978 on the volume and weight of Roman amphoras; McGrail 1989. Wallinga 1964: 9: one *medimnos* of ruddle weighs 125kg, one *medimnos* of grain, 40kg.

[71] Casson 1971: 171 n. 23 with the Thasian inscription, *IG* xii suppl. p. 151 no. 348 + *SEG* xvii. 417 = Austin 1981 no. 108.

[72] Casson 1971: 183–200.

[73] Moving grain over land from other harbours in Attica was of course not new. The harbours on the north-east coast of Attica had been used frequently by grain ships from Euboea during the Peloponnesian war, leaving a lengthy journey of around 50km or more (Thuc. 7. 28. 1 with Westlake 1948 and Burford 1960: 3). On the difficulties of moving commodities and property, in a different context (evacuating one's home), Thorne 2001: 242–5.

to Athens, for example, was possibly a very long single day's work for draft animals travelling at 2–3km per hour.[74] The gifts of grain from Audoleon and Spartokos probably represent respectively 7,500 and 15,000 sacks of grain. Over 500 journey units would probably have been required to move the smaller cargo of 7,500 *medimnoi* from Audoleon.[75] Using figures collected by Burford, a typical cart might have carried ten to thirteen sacks of grain, which would have meant between 570 and 750 single cart journeys to move the gift of grain provided by Audoleon.[76] When the real size of the task is estimated, even in notional terms, one soon understands that the transportation of the grain from harbours, particularly those located in the more remote parts of Attica, would have required a considerable force to offer protection from any enemy.[77] The protection of these operations may well explain the delay in recovering the territory of Attica and in particular the garrisons at Eleusis and Rhamnous.

However, towards the end of the 280s the garrisons of Attica were probably recovered.[78] Demochares is credited with the achievement but the date is less certain.[79] An inscription honouring Philippides for his services to Athens lists a sequence of actions including his *agōnothēsia* in 284/3 (the archonship of Isaios). This office follows his appeal to Lysimachos for aid to recover the garrisons and the Piraeus.[80] T. L. Shear suggested that Athens had already recovered Eleusis by 284/3, because Philippides, while *agōnothetēs*, had introduced a festival for Demeter and Kore to commemorate the city's new

[74] See Burford 1960: 14–15; Raepsaet 1984: 130–3; 2002: 32–7 on the speed and working rates of oxen. For similar calculations on moving household goods, Thorne 2001: 244 using a figure of 550kg for a wagon's load.

[75] Wheeled transport: see the Geometric model of a horsecart with six vessels, from Euboea, National Museum of Athens Inv. 14481 in G. M. A. Richter, *Handbook of Greek Art*, Phaidon, 1974, fig. 328; for other two-wheeled carts, Raepsaet 2002: 168–88.

[76] Raepsaet 2002: 188–9.

[77] It may well have been that problems of logistics determined which harbours Athens might have used: the vulnerability of the route from Vouliagmeni to the garrison on Mounychia may have been a factor; the greater distance to Porto Raphti but the greater security given by the distance from Mounychia may have made this a possible site. Any detailed discussion of the use of alternative harbours in this period has to acknowledge the obstacles of logistics.

[78] Shear (1978: 79 n. 219) follows the suggestion of Tarn (1934: 33 ff.): the remaining garrisons (i.e. Rhamnous) had been returned to Athens by 279 in a settlement made at the time of the invasion of the Celts.

[79] [Plut.] *Vit. X. Or.* 851–2. Note Pausanias (1. 26. 3) describes Olympiodoros' successful defence of Eleusis against the Macedonians, probably dated some time after the alliance with the Aetolians (in 304). Bultrighini (1984: 61–2) suggests that Pausanias has inverted the chronological order, and dates it shortly before, during the Four Year war. Pausanias (1. 25. 2) describes paintings of Olympiodoros at Eleusis.

[80] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 38 ff., the *agonothesia*.

freedom.[81] Shear suggests that the festival would have been held at Eleusis. The fact that the Eleusinia were to be held in the same year as Philippides' *agōnothēsia* suggested to Shear that the new festival for Demeter and Kore would have coincided with the established biennial festival in August 284. Shear's argument is persuasive but one cannot rule out that the Eleusinion, on the edge of the Agora, rather than the sanctuary at Eleusis, would have been a viable venue for the new festival introduced by Philippides.[82] The garrisons must have been under Athenian control by the end of the 280s. Passed in 282/1, the decree praising Euthios for his office as eponymous archon of 283/2 expressed the wish that the city and the Piraeus should be reunited at some time.[83] There is mention neither of the garrisons nor of their future capture. The mention of Demochares' recovery of Eleusis ends a list of achievements following his return to Athens in the archonship Diokles, 286/5. There is no reason to suppose that the list was not in chronological order, and the embassy to Antipatros which preceded the capture of Eleusis will date after 285 and some time before *c.*279 (at the latest), the year of Antipatros' brief rule in Macedon.[84] It is likely that the garrisons were Athenian possessions some time before 281. In the early summer of 281/0, the Athenians had sent six taxiarchs to sacrifice at the Basileia at Lebedeia in Boeotia.[85] These officers would normally be expected to operate on campaign and their participation in this event, held in August/September (during the Boeotian month Panamos) far beyond the northern borders of Attica indicates the levels of security in Attica.[86] Another decree honouring the hipparchs and phylarchs of 282/1 expressed the wish that the increased body of cavalry should "provide good

[81] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 43–5; Shear 1978: 85. Kirchner *Comm. ad. IG* ii^2 657, p. 260 used the text to argue for the recovery of Eleusis. *IG* ii^2 1682 is now dated to the archonship of Diotimos in 354/3 and not 285/4 (Clinton 2003).

[82] For the Eleusinion in Athens, see Camp 1990: 152–5; M. M. Miles, *Agora*, xxxi. *The City Eleusinion*, Princeton: ACSCA, 1998, and e.g. *Hesp.* 9 (1940): 104–11, no. 20 (Ag. I 5228) ll. 26–7 ('the Eleusinion in the city'), an inscription of 302/1 honouring Athenian taxiarchs involved in the festival of Demeter was set up there.

[83] *Agora* xvi. 181 ll. 28–31 (Ag. I 4266).

[84] Shear (1978: 82 n. 227) thinks the list was ordered chronologically. Antipatros is probably 'the Etesian', nephew of Kassandros, see ibid. n. 225; for the *terminus ante quem*, Habicht 1979: 24. The once common belief that Antipatros was the son of Kassander (former king of Macedonia) no longer seems possible. D. M. Lewis (review of Shear 1978, *JHS* 101 (1980): 258) suggests that Antipatros could also have been the governor of the Macedonian garrison in Piraeus, as was first proposed by De Sanctis (*Scritti*, i. 493–6). Another possibility is now Antipatros the grandson of Antipatros and son of Balagros: see Heckel 1987, accepted by Reger 1991*b*.

[85] Schachter 1994: 109–18 on the cult.

[86] *Agora* xvi. 182 (Ag. I 863). For the timing of the Basileia, Schachter 1994: 118 n. 2.

service for the countryside".[87] The language is restrained and does not reflect urgent or recent military engagements.[88] The erection of one of two *stēlai* at the Poseidonion (in Kolonos, outside the city walls of Athens) suggests a level of security.[89] The evidence suggests that by 282/1, if not earlier, Athens had regained control of the garrisons in Attica and the countryside.

The third objective, the recovery of the fortress of Mounychia overlooking the harbours of the Piraeus, probably remained an unfulfilled objective until the foreign garrison was removed in 229. The recapture of the Mounychia and Attic garrisons probably dominated the domestic concerns of the Athenians during the 280s. Enemy occupation of the Piraeus will have threatened agriculture around Athens throughout the 280s. But the changing political circumstances at the end of the 280s—the deaths of Demetrios Poliorketes, Seleukos, and Lysimachos—probably saw the end of military actions in the Athenian polis. It is highly unlikely that Athens was able to exploit the full agricultural potential of Attica throughout the 280s. It will come as no surprise therefore that so much energy was expended on trying to encourage the movement of grain from abroad.[90] The conclusion from the events in Attica during the 280s reveals how important local agriculture was to the polis and that the fortresses remained vital strategic points in establishing control over the *chora*.

4.5. THE 260s: THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR

The relative peace in the Attic countryside ended with the Chremonidean war in the 260s. The international alliance of Athens, Sparta, a collection of other Greek states, and Egypt fought against Antigonos Gonatas and the Macedonians.[91] For Athens, the recovery of the Piraeus may have provided the main reason for their participation. It is argued here that the Athenians never

[87] *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 10–11 = *AD* 18 (1963): 103–9 (Ag. I 767) = *ISE* i. no. 16, (see Bugh 1988: 193).

[88] *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 10–11, cf. similar wording, although not 'for the countryside' but for another object—usually citizens or people: *I. Rhamnous* 8 l. 13; 10 l. 8; 17 l. 27; *IG* ii^2 1272 (= *I. Eleusis* 182) 1. 6; *IG* ii^2 1304b (= *I. Eleusis* 184) ll. 6–7; *IG* ii^2 1299 (= *I. Eleusis* 196) l. 68.

[89] *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 42 ff.; Poseidonion: Threpsiades and Vanderpool, *AD* 18 (1963): 108.

[90] See Ch. 9.

[91] See Habicht 1997: 142–9, and Heinen 1972 for a history of the Chremonidean war, and *IG* ii^2 686+687 = *Syll.*^{3} 434/5 = *SVA* iii 476. On the oddity of the war's name, see Prandi 1989, discussing Hegesander, preserved in Athenaeus 6.250–1.

recovered the harbour during the course of the war, which adds weight to the relevance that the conflict had for the countryside of Attica. The war had started during the archonship of Peithidemos, in 268/7 and ended by the archonship of Antipatros, in 261.[92] The territory of Attica was at the heart of the conflict. In the first year of the war both the main strategic regions around Eleusis and Rhamnous had been affected.[93] The Athenians resisted for several years and finally, as Pausanias says, they surrendered to Antigonos Gonatas after enduring a lengthy siege: "Antigonos [Gonatas] made peace with the Athenians who had held out for a very long time."[94]

Polyainos describes how Antigonos had secured the victory and the Attic territory is again at the heart of the story. A peace was made between Antigonos and Athens during autumn (the year is not given), allowing the Athenians to plant their crops. But Antigonos prevented the Athenians from bringing in the harvest by invading Attica and destroying the crops when they were ready for harvest.[95] Antigonos defeated Athens by denying the city access to its domestic food supply. Clearly the success of the local harvest was essential to Athenian survival. The pattern was already established in Epichares' defence of Rhamnous in 268/7. The speed of Athens' surrender to Antigonos indicates the damage that the loss of the harvest had in Athens, the climax of a long siege. Athens had been able to hold out because of its capacity to exploit the agriculture from Attica.[96] There is no need therefore to reduce the time span of the war, as some have argued, to the years between 265/4 and 263 in the belief that Athens could not have withstood siege or Gonatas for all that time.[97]

How precisely was Athens able to survive for so long? The Chremonidean war consisted of a series of engagements by Antigonos against Athens and Sparta. A narrative has been restored on the basis of the accounts of Justin and Pausanias.[98] The initial year of the war (268) saw the failure of a two-pronged attack by Areus, King of Sparta, and the Egyptian forces against Antigonos in Attica.[99] The following year Areus withdrew to a safer position while

[92] Date of the archon Peithidemos: 268/7 (M. J. Osborne 1989: 229 n. 93 and Tracy 1988: 309, following Heinen 1972: 115 ff. and Habicht 1979: 116 with n. 11). Meritt (1981: 79–80 and 83–4) suggested a later date, 265/4 (followed by e.g. Gabbert 1986*b*), arguing that there was a gradual build-up of hostilities before the 'Chremonidean war' proper began, following the agreement contained in the decree proposed by Chremonides. Manni (1975: 27) offers 269/8 for Peithidemos. [93] *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 15–16; *I. Rhamnous* 3.

[94] Paus. 3. 6. 6. [95] Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 6. 20.

[96] M. J. Osborne 1989: 229 n. 93. [97] Meritt 1981; Gabbert 1986*b*.

[98] Heinen 1972: 213.

[99] Paus. 3. 6. 4. Against the three campaigns involving Areus, see Meritt 1981: 98–9.

Antigonos put down a revolt of Celts at Megara (267).[100] A third campaign saw Areus defeated and killed by Antigonos' forces at Corinth in *c.*265.[101] The first years of the war had forced Antigonos to fight on two fronts. The unsuccessful attempt by Areus and Ptolemy II's forces to attack Antigonos in Attica produced a recurring pattern whereby the Athenians, aided by Egypt, fought in Attica, and Sparta pressed from the south-west. Clearly Antigonos had been stretched by fighting on two fronts, and will have been forced to reduce his fighting capacity in Attica to deal with troubles elsewhere. This may help to explain why the war lasted so long. Antigonos finally captured Athens in the archonship of Antipatros, 262/1, after some years in which his attention had been turned from Attica. In *c.*264 Antigonos had probably been distracted while he fought a war against Alexander, King of Epiros, who had attacked Macedon.[102]

During the Chremonidean war, the assistance from Egypt was also decisive. Patroklos, the commander sent by Ptolemy II, disembarked in Attica to oppose Antigonos' army.[103] He occupied and defended an island (modern Gaidouronisi) off the Attic coast near Sunion.[104] Soldiers from Patroklos' force had been dispatched to aid the Athenians in their defence of Rhamnous in 268/7. Of the many actions he performed, the Athenian general Epichares had also prepared shelter for the soldiers who had come to Rhamnous from Patroklos.[105] The camp discovered at Koroni, near Porto Raphti, also served as a base for the Egyptian forces and a number of others may be identified on the southern coast of Attica.[106] Without the aid of the Egyptian forces and the distractions imposed on Antigonos by the Spartans and then the Epirotes, it is unlikely that the Athenians would have survived so long.

Although the countryside was devastated in the final stages of the siege, pressure from Athenian and Egyptian forces, and Antigonos' distractions in Macedon gave sufficient opportunity to farm and harvest the land, if not

[100] The year is suggested by *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 15–16, with Heinen 1972: 172–5. Justin 26. 2. 1–6: Ptolemy and the Spartans retired to a safer position ('in tutiora'). Megara fell to Antigonos: Polyainos (*Strat.* 4. 6. 3) describes the use of elephants in the attack on the city. See Habicht 1997: 145–6 with n. 86.

[101] Pomp. Trog. 26 and Plut. *Agis* 3. 4. Areus' death must come 44 years after the start of his reign (309/8: Diod. Sic. 20. 29. 1, Plut. *Agis* 3. 4), i.e. between summer 266 and summer 264 (Heinen 1972: 173–4). Heinen suggests a third campaign against Areus must be understood on the basis of Justin (Pomp. Trog. 26. 2. 8) which describes Antigonos' return to Athens from Megara after his success there. On Areus' regency, Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 28.

[102] Justin 26. 2. 6. A point made by Meritt 1981: 99.

[103] Paus. 3. 6. 4–6.

[104] Paus. 1. 1. 1, see McCredie 1966: 18–25.

[105] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 23 ff. Epichares had prepared shelter for soldiers who had come from Patroklos' force.

[106] See Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962, 1963; McCredie 1966: 1–16, and for the correct dating of archaeological evidence, Grace 1974. On the camps, see Ch. 5 below.

throughout Attica then certainly around Athens and in the coastal areas around Rhamnous and from Vouliagmeni towards the city. On two separate occasions Pausanias describes Antigonos destroying the countryside: general destruction had taken place before the arrival of Patroklos perhaps early in the war.[107] The final struggle had probably seen the destruction of the grove and shrine of Poseidon.[108]

The situation in Athens and throughout Attica was surely difficult during the war. The ephebes of 267/6 were praised for the performance of their guard duties through the year and for their defence of the Mouseion hill.[109] The Athenians controlled their vital fortresses at Rhamnous and Eleusis in 267/6.[110] At Eleusis difficulties continued in 267/6 after those confronted by Aristeides in the previous year. The Athenian soldiers suffered problems in the supply of food and praised Dion, secretary to the treasurer of the *sitōnika*, who had performed well in his distribution of the grain.[111] Ensuring the food supply to those at Eleusis and Rhamnous was vital: the survival of the fortresses will certainly have delayed Antigonos' campaign for superiority in Attica.

Our most detailed impression of the impact of the warfare on the Attica countryside comes from Rhamnous. In 268/7, Epichares had successfully protected the harvest of grain around the fortress, secured the crops up to thirty stades from the fort, and provided for those at Rhamnous by purchasing a further 500 *medimnoi* of wheat and 500 *medimnoi* of barley.[112] He had recovered slaves and citizens who had been snatched from the countryside by the marauding enemy (pirates).[113] The decree honouring Epichares at Rhamnous exemplifies just how important it was to harvest the *local* crops; the attention to the protection of local agriculture around Rhamnous probably reflected similar attention to the farming land around Athens itself. However, it is also crucial to remember that Epichares had purchased grain for the fortress too, and sold it to the Athenians and soldiers there at the established price.[114]

[107] Paus. 1. 1. 1.

[108] Ibid. 1. 30. 4. Archaeological evidence for destruction at the sanctuary of the Semnai at Kolonos has been linked to the Chremonidean War, *Horos* 6 (1988): 98 = *SEG* xxxviii. 265.

[109] *IG* ii^2 665 ll. 10–13; passed in early 266/5.

[110] *Ergon* 2003 [2004]: 15–16, the unpublished decree honouring Aristeides son of Mnesitheos of Lamptrai reveals he was Epichares' successor in 267/6 as general for the coastal countryside.

[111] *I. Eleusis* 182. Dion was either a foreigner or a slave, according to Köhler, see further Jacob 1928: 168–71, esp. 170 n. 2 who is not able to decide either way but notes that the service performed by Dion was consistent with those of public slaves.

[112] *I. Rhamnous* 3; Oliver 2001*a*.

[113] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 19–21.

[114] Ibid. 17–19.

The priority attached to the successful harvest of the Attic countryside is all too clear from an inscription honouring the eponymous archon, Nikias of Otryne, possibly towards the end of his year in office (266/5).[115] Among the sacrifices made during his office was one for the health and safety of the Council, the People of the Athenians, and the harvests in the countryside.[116] This final prayer is unusual and reflects the concerns of the period. There can be little doubt that the survival of Athens during the Chremonidean war had depended upon maintaining the food supply to the city. The main source of food was surely Attica itself although imported supplies were also important, not only at Rhamnous, but perhaps also from the Aegean through the support provided by the Ptolemaic kingdom. The ability of the Athenian forces to resist the siege and, with the aid of the Egyptians, to harass the enemy and protect the harvests was therefore essential to the survival of the city. The fact that the collapse of Athens was finally achieved by Antigonos' destruction of the food stocks in Attica confirms the role of local agricultural commodities. The moment when the crops were ready for harvest was the point when food stocks would have been low.[117] When the crops were ripe and "in ear" they were dry and could more easily be torched.[118] During the Chremonidean war it is likely that the Athenians had successfully harvested enough of their crops to feed the city until Antigonos stopped them. Finally with no hope of further external aid the Athenians were forced to surrender to the Macedonian king.

4.6. THE 250s AND 240s

Defeat in the Chremonidean war introduced a period when Athenians and the Macedonian king operated in partnership, a relationship mirrored in other Greek cities. Over one of these, Corinth, ruled Alexander, who also governed Euboea. In 251 he had rebelled against Antigonos and inspired dissent in other neighbouring cities. Principal among those leaders who followed his example was Aratos of Sikyon who overthrew the Antigonid supporters in his city and brought Sikyon into the Achaean League. The League formed an alliance with Alexander, and their struggle against Antigonos Gonatas had considerable impact on Athens and Attica. The first half of the 240s put considerable strain on the Athenians threatened by incursions from the

[115] *IG* ii^2 668. He is praised also for ensuring the procession for the Dionysia (ll. 13–15), the first day of the City Dionysia festival which saw the god's statue brought to the theatre of Dionysus where, presumably, the *stēlē* honouring Nikias was set up (Mikalson 1975: 126).
[116] *IG* ii^2 668 ll. 8–10. [117] Hanson 1983: 32 n. 24. [118] Ibid. 31 and 42–6.

hostile forces of Alexander. An unpublished inscription from Rhamnous reveals again the role that the Athenian general performed in defending the countryside and protecting the farmers. But one of the most remarkable pieces of evidence from this period belongs to the archonship of Diomedon, which can now be dated 248/7.[119]

A decree proposed by Theophemos of Marathon called for volunteers among both the citizens and those who lived in the city to contribute at least 50 and no more than 200 drachmai to a fund; nearly 90 per cent of those listed whose contributions are known provided the maximum amount.[120] Between four and six talents were raised by the appeal.[121] The money collected for the fund was to be at the disposal of the treasurer of the *stratiotika* (stratiotic—or military—fund) and was designated for the defence of the countryside.[122] The money was required for a specific purpose, made explicit in the terms of the proposal: "for the remaining part of the year, the harvests from the land could be gathered in safety".[123] The ultimate implication of the harvest is left in no doubt: following the text of the decree and preceding the list of the contributors, and written in large letters, is the declaration that all those contributing money were providing for the security of the polis and for the defence of the countryside.[124]

The decree was passed on the second day of the tenth prytany, the last day of Elaphebolion, around mid-April,[125] but contributions could be made for only one month, until Mounychion. As Ferguson has said, "the need was, obviously, immediate".[126] The collected money was to be used to provide security for the harvests which presumably the Athenians expected to collect in Mounychion or Thargelion; crops would ripen and be ready for harvest from mid-May to the end of June, and so the beginning of this period would

[119] The date of Diomedon's archonship, M. J. Osborne 2000; 2003.

[120] *Agora* xvi. 213 (Migeotte 1992 no. 17); Ch. 7 discusses this inscription in detail.

[121] Habicht 1982: 30–1. *Agora* xvi. 213 is not complete. A missing wedge-shaped fragment will join the left margin of fragment d to c and complete the list of contributors. Aligning the left edges of fragments d and c in proportion to the taper (flaring towards the base) provides little precision about the number of contributors which this missing fragment contains. After inspection of the relevant stones in the Epigraphic Museum, Athens, some three to five lines are missing. Habicht (1982: 30) suggests that as many as six lines may have been destroyed. See Ch. 7 for a more detailed study of the contributors to the decree.

[122] *Agora* xvi. 213 = *IG* ii^2 791 + *Hesp.* 11 (1941) 287–92 no. 56 = *Syll.*^{3} 491 = *SEG* xxxii. 118.

[123] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 10–12.

[124] In larger letters, 0.006m high, as opposed to 0.004m high elsewhere, *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 30–2. See *Hesp.* 11 (1941): 288 for a photograph of this part of the *stele*.

[125] Habicht 1982: 26–33; Pélékides 1979: 43, cf. Habicht 1982: 28, at the earliest the end of March, but more likely to have been in April.

[126] Ferguson 1911: 204. *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 18–19.

coincide with the end of Mounychion and the start of Thargelion.[127] The specific threat to the crops probably came from the operations of Alexander in his struggle with Antigonos. The proposal made in Elaphebolion anticipated problems in the collection of the harvest which would probably have started just over four weeks after the proposal of the decree. What would this fund (four to six talents) have bought the Athenians? One suggestion has been that the proposal was designed "to meet a temporary increase in the number of the mercenaries".[128] The rate of pay for mercenaries is thought to have been about one drachma per day during the third century, similar to the rate for the fourth century.[129] If the Athenians had wanted to pay the mercenaries for the period of the harvest, and if the harvest lasted around thirty days, then four talents would have paid for 800 mercenaries, serving a month. If, however, the *stratiotika* fund had been exhausted, and the service required from the mercenaries was longer than a month, then the Athenians could have afforded fewer men. The decree, however, emphasized that the money contributed would pay for the protection of the harvest, and I think it was for this very specific purpose that the money was raised. If mercenaries were going to be hired, 800 men serving for a month could have been sufficient. A similar operation might have been carried out in the 280s by the 1,000 troops that were brought by Kallias from Andros to protect the Athenians bringing in the harvest.[130] This force had achieved its aim in partnership with Athenian forces.

The *epidosis* of the year of Diomedon provides the best evidence that the harvest time was *the* crucial period during the year. This was the time when a large number of people were needed to work the fields and would have required protection if threatened by an enemy. The concerns of Theophemos' proposal reflect the urgency of the timing and the importance of the harvest to the city. Why else would there have been such a specific and timely appeal for funds to protect the harvest unless the harvest was vital to the polis?

4.7. THE POLIS AND ITS TERRITORY

The fourth century saw a massive increase in the number of honorific decrees that were inscribed. This is as true at Athens as it is for many other Greek

[127] Hanson 1983: 31; following Jardé 1925: 45 n. 2, harvest in mid-May to mid-June. On variability in ripening times see Sallares 1991: 356. For the ripening of the grain crops later, in June, see Busolt 1900: 573 ff.

[128] Griffith 1935: 86 n. 1.

[129] Ibid. 294–307.

[130] Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 18 ff.

poleis. That trend continued into the Hellenistic period. Among the actions performed that received such honours, the defence of the countryside and in particular the protection of the harvest figured. At Athens, all those who contributed to the *epidosis* in 248/7 were listed as men who contributed "to the safety of the polis and the defence of the countryside". The numerous honorific decrees of the late Classical and early Hellenistic period at Athens include many examples that reward individuals for various actions including saving the local harvests of Attica. Kallias of Sphettos had brought 1,000 soldiers from Andros to Attica to defend the harvest of the crops, and ensured that "as much grain as possible was brought into the city".[131] Kallias' action was required almost certainly because enemy troops from the Piraeus were waging war in the countryside.[132] The revolt of Athens against Demetrios Poliorketes in 288/7 created severe problems in supplying sufficient food to the city. Phaidros, Kallias' brother, received honours many years later for actions that included his part in ensuring that the harvest was brought in from the countryside; during the archonship of Kimon (288/7) he "protected the peace in the countryside . . . and was responsible for bringing in from the countryside the grain and the other crops".[133] The brothers had secured the harvest of 287. When Phaidros' generalship for the countryside ended in 288/7, he handed over the city "free, under democracy and autonomous".[134] There can be no doubt that the grain of Attica was vital to Athens in 287. The city was threatened by Demetrios Poliorketes, who was travelling from the Peloponnese and on the point of laying siege to Athens, the Piraeus was dominated by an enemy garrison on Mounychia, and the countryside was already being disrupted by the garrison.[135]

But these actions were important not only in Athens but also in Attica at the fortified deme site and on the island of Salamis. Inscriptions from Salamis, Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Sunion also recognize the importance of local supplies of grain.[136] Salamis in the early 240s suffered from the military activity of Alexander, the son of Krateros, who had revolted against his uncle Antigonos Gonatas. Herakleitos of Athmonon, the general of the Piraeus appointed by Antigonos, had authority which stretched to Salamis where he had prevented any harm to the countryside and took action against those who had captured Salaminians.[137] The capture of hostages from the countryside illustrates the potential vulnerability and isolation of those in the countryside. On Salamis pirates were a threat to people and therefore to the agriculture. The same

[131] Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 18–27. [132] Ibid. 15–16.
[133] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 30–6. [134] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 38–40.
[135] Shear 1978: 2 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 16–18; see Shear 1978: 16 and Plut. *Demetr.* 45. 1.
[136] Sunion: *IG* ii^2 1260 ll. 24 ff.
[137] *IG* ii^2 1225 ll.10–11, 14–15; hostage taking ll. 16–17 (Bielman 1994: no. 25).

vulnerability was evident at Rhamnous where generals were rewarded for their interventions assisting people in the countryside at the end of the fourth century, during the Chremonidean war, in the 240s, and towards the end of the third century.[138] At Eleusis the stone bridge constructed with funds provided by Xenokles of Sphettos not only facilitated the passage of worshippers to the sanctuary of Demeter but also ensured safety for the farmers and those living in the suburbs of the Eleusinian citadel.[139] Xenokles was not an exception, for others performed similar duties to ease life in the countryside during wartime:[140] for example, in 235/4, the general Aristophanes had looked after the countryside so that the grain could be harvested with safety during the Demetrian War.[141]

These honours underline the interdependency of city and territory, the polis and its countryside. The warfare of the late fourth and third centuries often had a devastating impact on the countryside and frequently saw the Athenians losing possession of significant strategic points in Attica. During the Four Year war against Kassander the loss of the Phyle and Panakton made the complete recovery of Attica impossible. With the military support of Demetrios Poliorketes, the Athenians drove Kassander from Attica and secured the forts on the border. It was to be the recovery of Attica that sustained Athenian independence at the end of the fourth century. The proposed reconstruction of the fleet had less impact than the programme of improving the city's defences. The return of the Attic countryside was vital in the long term. The loss of control over the Attic countryside in 307–304 and the 280s had damaged Athens' food supply. The supply of grain from abroad had become even more important. The complete blockade of both the domestic resources and external supplies, as occurred in the 290s and ultimately at the end of the Chremonidean war, proved catastrophic. Therefore the need to harvest Attica determined many of the military and economic objectives of the polis. The importation of grain from abroad was not sufficient to secure

[138] Years 307–302: *Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7; Chremonidean war: *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 18–23; 240s: *Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7–8 where the land of Rhamnous is called 'Rhamnousia', the first time the region is described in this way; Alexander, we discover, had control of Chalkis (for the context see Knoepfler 2001: 293–4). The Athenian general Archandros, son of Kallippos of Eleusis (see *I. Rhamnous* p. 253), was also honoured by the *paroikoi* (*I. Rhamnous* 27) and Athenians living in Rhamnous (ibid. 28). End of the third century: *I. Rhamnous* 43 ll. 4–7, although this belongs after 229, in the archonship of Diokles, 215/14. For other actions rewarded at Rhamnous, see *I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 16–17. and 19 ff.; *I. Rhamnous* 13 ll. 7–8.

[139] *IG* ii^2 1191 ll. 15–21; dated either 321/0 or 318/17.

[140] *IG* ii^2 1304 (*I. Eleusis* 211) ll. 15–17; *SEG* xxiv. 156 l. 3; *SEG* xxii. 127 (*I. Eleusis* 191) ll. 16–18.

[141] *IG* ii^2 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196) ll. 66 ff. Aristophanes' services all belong to the Demetrian war in the 230s, this example, of 235/4 being the archonship of Ekphantos.

the long-term security of the polis. A policy designed to secure the countryside is most apparent in the 280s and during the Chremonidean war. Then Athens had no access to the Piraeus and importing food supplies from external sources was made difficult and required alternative harbours to the Piraeus to be used. Earlier during the Four Year war, the facilities of the Piraeus were available and yet the city was still hard pressed because of the inability to secure the countryside. The real turning point for the Athenian polis remained the recovery of the Attic countryside in which occupation of the garrisons was so crucial.

The harvest period was critical. It was vital to the polis that the people required to perform the harvest were protected. An inability to protect these people amounted to an inability to save the polis. Enough evidence has survived from the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods to show that the Athenians relied heavily (but not exclusively) on the domestic grain supply of Attica. The civic honours paid to those who had helped to protect the harvest indicate the value attached by the Athenians to maintaining the production of agricultural commodities. Food was vital to all, and harvesting the land of Attica was the most direct means of ensuring survival. But the harvest meant the workers and farmers in the countryside were vulnerable to attack in times of war. During the archonship of Diomedon the Athenians appealed to individuals' sense of civic responsibility to make sure that the harvest could be achieved safely. To some extent therefore the dependence on the harvest of the surrounding countryside in Attica ensured a degree of social unity and interdependence within society.

The evidence not only from Attica, but also from Athens itself, reveals real concern for the protection of the countryside and the work of the people engaged in the agricultural economies. This is hardly surprising and is a feature of Greek cities elsewhere. Commodities grown in Attica, principally grain, were of the utmost importance. The people of Attica and Athens relied on such commodities for their survival and secured production of these commodities whether warfare was suffered as part of an active policy for freedom from a foreign incumbent power or in defence against an invading force.

Primary military objectives for a hostile force operating in Attica were the control of the strategic points (the garrison forts) but also the disruption of people working in the countryside (in order to reduce the supply of the commodities which could sustain the people of Attica and Athens). The relationship between the city of Athens and its countryside was central to the polis, as true for Athens in particular as it was for many other Greek poleis. What made Athens particularly vulnerable was the lack of independent control of the Piraeus. For much of the third century the Macedonian

garrison in Piraeus affected the Athenians in terms not only of strategy but also of institutions. The Athenians did not enjoy military authority over the Piraeus while a foreign garrison was installed on Mounychia between 295 and 229. The pressure on the countryside was felt all the more under such circumstances.

The threat to the countryside was a threat to the state. The protection of the people of the countryside by the state was a central concern in the politics of the polis. This dynamic operates not only in the development of military infrastructure in Attica—garrison demes and military camps—but also in the institutions of the polis, the organization of political life, and especially military authority in the polis. The absence of command over the whole of the territory of Attica was therefore a major issue for the polis. These factors will be explored in the next three chapters.

5

The Dynamics of Defence: Infrastructure

5.1. TERRITORY, AUTONOMY, AND MANPOWER

For most of the Classical period the Athenian polis had exercised its military power deploying its citizen and non-citizen forces in cavalry, infantry, and the fleet. The polis had developed a military infrastructure around a defended urban centre: the walls of the city, the harbour, and the Long Walls joining Athens to Piraeus. Some demes in Attica also had defensive walls, and in the fourth century an increasing number of towers and forts appeared in the countryside, particularly in the areas on or close to the borders of the polis. In the course of the early Hellenistic period, the polis was no longer able to sustain the naval force that had proven so central to Athenian concerns in the fifth and for most of the fourth centuries.

In the early Hellenistic period, the military concerns of the polis, more than ever, focused on the defence of the countryside, the local people, and their economic resources, in short the food supply of Attica. The preceding chapter described how Attica suffered in the early Hellenistic period from frequent military engagements, a considerable change when compared with the earlier, relatively peaceful decades of the fourth century.

In the late fourth century and especially for much of the third century, the loss of the fleet and the difficulty in using the Piraeus changed the circumstances in which warfare in Attica was conducted by the polis. Although the developments in military organization at this time reflected the changing needs of warfare, the threats to the polis were certainly not new, nor were they necessarily peculiar to the Athenian state. It remains clear that in terms of command, infrastructure, and manpower, the Athenian polis had to focus on the protection of the countryside. Partly this was because attempts to recover the Piraeus had failed in the first half of the third century and partly because the control of the Piraeus was not under stable civic or Athenian command from 295 to 229.

The three structural elements of military power—infrastructure, command, and manpower—can best be treated together. Of all the epigraphical evidence from the demes, the decree praising Epichares set up at Rhamnous offers a fine

example of how that integration of infrastructure, command, and manpower functioned on the small scale.[1] Epichares was praised for the defence of the people and the harvest, the human and economic resources of the countryside, the two elements most fundamental also to the polis.[2] Such concerns at Rhamnous reflect on a smaller scale those visible in Attica as a whole: the micro-region of Rhamnous is a good model for the region of Attica.

Epichares had performed numerous services, but of central importance is that Epichares had gathered the harvest of the grain and arboreal crops as far as 30 *stades* (5.5km) from the fortress. To achieve this he had stationed *kryptoi* (men at look-out points) in the countryside to protect the farmworkers, and stayed on alert with his soldiers in reserve.[3] The presence of soldiers in the countryside to protect the harvest reminds one of the operations of Kallias in the 280s, but the decree honouring Epichares provides more details of how the harvest was protected. The presence of *kryptoi* allowed a means of communication to those working in the fields. Aeneas Tacticus describes how people would want to remain in the countryside if, at the time of the harvest, the enemy threatened the crops.[4] Large numbers of people were likely to take part in the harvest (Ch. 3). They would be scattered, but warnings could be relayed via the look-out posts to alert the workers to approaching danger, allowing them time to leave the fields.[5] The description of the *kryptoi* being "in the countryside" carries more weight if we are to imagine that they occupied a series of vantage points around Rhamnous. Moreover, the *kryptoi* would also have been able to call on the main force that Epichares kept in reserve. Clearly the emphasis in the decree is that by the tactical deployment of *kryptoi* at vantage points with a rapid response force in reserve, Epichares was able to protect those harvesting the land surrounding Rhamnous.

The addition, the presence of guard dogs in the fortress would have increased the chance of hearing enemy movements, especially at night; Aeneas Tacticus, in his fourth-century handbook on siege-craft, recommended tethering dogs outside the city walls at night to warn of enemy attack.[6] Guard dogs are mentioned in another recently discovered inscription at Rhamnous, and are known

[1] *I. Rhamnous* 3 (= *SEG* xxiv. 154).

[2] See Oliver 2001*b* for more discussion of this inscription.

[3] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 9–11; Knoepfler 1993: 328.

[4] Aen. Tac. 7. 1 ff. This is the function of the *skopai* around Rhamnous, *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 9–10; 20 l. 6.

[5] The countryside would be occupied by many people at harvest time, Aen. Tac. 7. 1 and Whitehead 1990: 111 with references to Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 14, and Thuc. 4. 88. 1. See also Thuc. 6. 49. 3 for the reluctance to leave the countryside despite an approaching enemy.

[6] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 14–15. On Aeneas, see Whitehead 1990*a*. Aen. Tact. 22. 14. Guard dogs are used at Teos, *SEG* xxvi. 1306; see also Roussel, *REG* 1930: 364–6, and L. Robert, *REG* 1959: p. xiii, Whitehead 1990*a*: 156–7.

from other Greek cities.[7] The new stoa built by Epichares allowed soldiers to rest and, if necessary, to provide immediate help. The stoa probably improved the vigilance of the troops on duty by providing a nearby place of rest for guards who had completed a watch. It provided an advance muster point. Speed and alertness were two qualities ranked highly by Aeneas in the besieged city. The stoa increased efficiency at the fortress and provided a platform from which enemy incursions could be met with the requisite speed and efficiency.[8]

The inscription does not mention the removal of livestock from the Rhamnous area, a tactic recommended by Aineias[9] and employed later at Rhamnous when Dikaiarchos had command at Eretria in the 230s.[10] The omission in the 260s may have been a result of Antigonos' capture of Eretria, as suggested by Knoepfler. Insecurity and piratical activity in the channel between Attica and Rhamnous would have made the removal of livestock to Euboea difficult at the start of the Chremonidean war.[11] Another factor may have been the determination by Epichares to exploit the *chora* of Rhamnous where some of the livestock may have been needed also to move crops into the fortress there.[12] A further hint that livestock may not have been removed from the local area may be read from the 500 *medimnoi* of barley which Epichares had bought in for the garrison from his own funds. Barley, although important for human consumption, was also used for animal fodder.[13]

If we put Rhamnous in the 260s under the microscope we find three factors working with some success. There is a clear structure of command (Epichares). Infrastructure is developed and exploited (look-out posts and a stoa). There is a judicious use and innovation in manpower (*kryptoi* are introduced). In short we see at Rhamnous developments in command, infrastructure, and manpower. If we move to understand the broader regional level of

[7] *I. Rhamnous* 16 l. 9.

[8] Speed: Aen. Tac. 15. 3–4; alertness: ibid. 22. 5a–22. 6.

[9] Aen. Tac. 10. 1–10. 2.

[10] *I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 17–21; l. 19 uses the technical term for the removal of property, see Whitehead 1990*a*: 116–17, and Müller 1975: 136–7, 145 ff.

[11] Knoepfler 1993: 339, who (341 n. 76) also suggests that the area of Euboea directly opposite Rhamnous, Styra, could have provided the grain which Epichares obtained. The utility of Euboea as a source of food is known from the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. 7. 28. 1), when 100 ships had then been assigned to the defence of Attica, Euboea, and Salamis. If Epichares had secured extra grain from Euboea it must have been a dangerous operation to transport the cargo across the channel to Rhamnous. For the traces of the harbour, see now *AR* 50 (2003/4): 9.

[12] In the Peloponnesian war livestock was removed to Euboea and the nearby islands, Thuc. 2. 14. 1, see also Westlake 1948. Thucydides mentions only sheep and draught-animals, and certainly one wonders what effect the loss of the latter would have had on the transport capability within the areas of Attica which were still being farmed. See Ch. 2, sect.2.

[13] Sallares 1991: 311–13 and 368, 'This should not be allowed to obscure the very important role of barley as an item of human food consumption in classical Greece. It was also used as an animal fodder.'

Figure 5.1. The fortress deme of Rhamnous overlooking Euboea

Attica we must explore how these elements functioned at the level of the polis. In the early Hellenistic period Athens faced new threats from strong enemies—Kassander, Antigonos Gonatas, and the invading forces in the 250s and early 240s and 230s.

Although several books and articles exist on the defence of Attica their perspective has invariably been the Classical era and in particular the pre-Hellenistic fourth century. What follows offers a view of Athenian defence in the context of early Hellenistic history and the economies of the polis. From 403/2 until the Four Year war against Kassander (307–304), Attica never suffered a serious enemy incursion. That is not true of the early Hellenistic period when the garrison demes and the defence of the countryside became major theatres of engagement as opposed to military training. Strategic locations within Attica served as central points for the command of military operations within the Athenian polis for the two generals of the countryside in the third century. These changes provide a radically different background for the defence of the Athenian polis after 307. And for the greater part of that period Athens neither enjoyed complete control of the Piraeus nor even possessed a fleet to put in its ageing harbour facilities.

Warfare in Attica and the damage that an enemy could inflict on the countryside and its economic resources had of course been an issue for the

Athenian polis throughout the Classical period. A variety of strategies was employed at different moments earlier in Athenian history. Inevitably shifts in the powers of the eastern Mediterranean and mainland Greece in particular and the different political perspectives prevailing at Athens saw an ebb and flow in strategy and priorities.

5.2. DEFENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IN ATTICA c.500–c.200

During the Persian wars, the Athenians had largely abandoned the *chora* and took to defending the Acropolis with a small force while concentrating their main military resources on the fleet, a strategy that proved successful but highly expensive in view of the damage to the city of Athens in 480/79. In the opening years of the Peloponnesian war, Perikles responded to the Spartan invasion of Attica by overseeing a more limited withdrawal from the *chora* while cavalry forces were used to defend the territory and restrict the movement of invading armies; there was to be no repeat of the Salamis victory, and the Spartans and their allies did not attempt to engage the Athenian fleet.[14] In the later Dekeleian phase of the war, the Spartans had occupied a fortified position in the heart of Dekeleia and so prevented overland movement of commodities through Attica. Protection of localized maritime movements became more important and Rhamnous, Thorikos, and Sunion, lying on the margins of the polis, were all fortified to protect Athenian shipping movements and deny Sparta bases from which attacks on such shipping could be made. These fortified locations could also serve as places of retreat for the populations of the demes and offered a secondary level of defence to local economic resources such as the silver mines (Thorikos and Sunion) and local agriculture (Rhamnous, Sunion, and Thorikos). Indeed, it has been argued that some defensive structures dated in the fourth century have earlier, fifth-century origins.[15] In the fifth century different solutions were devised for different problems, but at no point was there any attempt to protect Attica with a frontier wall, and the archaeological evidence for the numerous towers (and forts) on the margins of Attica dates largely to the fourth century.

It is easy to construct for the Athenian polis an evolving model of defensive strategies that steadily pays more attention to installing a defensive infrastructure in the *chora*. The vulnerability of Attica to invasion by land was all

[14] Spence 1990.

[15] Lohmann 1995: 520–2. Goette 2000: 46 favours a fifth-century date for the main phase of the *enceinte* at Sunion.

too apparent in the last thirty years of the fifth century: successful defence was possible then so long as the city walls remained intact and the people could be supplied by sea. For the majority of the Classical period, the Athenians had enjoyed a powerful fleet and a network of allies in the Aegean, two of the conditions that had enabled Athens to survive for so long in the last phase of the Peloponnesian war. The supply of grain, a third factor, depended to some extent on the first two.[16] Nevertheless the allies overseas (in the Aegean) rapidly evaporated in the last decade of the fifth century. The defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi in 405 brought to an end the only real long-term means of Athenian resistance to the almost overwhelming forces of the Spartans and their allies, notably the Persians whose wealth and power was so important in bringing the war to a close.

The strengths and weaknesses of the Athenian polis were made all too visible by the turn of events in the Dekeleian phase of the Peloponnesian war. Strength lay in adequate urban defences for city and harbour, the fleet, and a strong network of subject 'allies'. They compensated for the essential weakness—the reluctance (more often a strategic decision) to prevent an enemy force invading but especially installing itself on Attic territory. The terms imposed on Athens at the end of the war destroyed the last two strengths: the Athenians were required to dismantle the walls of the harbour and the Long Walls joining Athens to Piraeus and reduce the fleet to twelve ships.[17] Nevertheless, these terms were less severe than some of Sparta's allies would have wished.

The reaction to these terms was evident very soon, in the 390s. The Athenians concentrated their resources on regaining their strengths: they built up their defensive walls, recovered a fleet, and reconstructed a network of overseas (and mainland) alliances. Konon and Euagoras of Cyprus assisted and received extraordinary honours. Suicidal Spartan diplomacy and the ambitions of their discontented allies gave Athens an edge in foreign policy. In the ever-shifting diplomatic world of inter-polis politics, the dealing and double-dealing of the 390s anticipates the nimble diplomatic footwork that Greek poleis were required to display before the competing audience of Hellenistic rulers at the end of the fourth and the third century. In the first half of the fourth century, these diplomatic links were rationalized with the publication of what historians have called the 'Second Athenian Confederacy decree'. Diplomacy required the Athenians to avoid replicating many of the features that were unpopular during their first overseas empire in the fifth

[16] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 10; on the combination of overseas alliances and grain, see Dem. 18. 301–2.
[17] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 20.

century.[18] Nevertheless, the fleet and the system of alliances, built on the secure foundation of a complete system of fortifications protecting the city and Piraeus, restored the essential features that the polis had enjoyed in the fifth century.

But clearly, in the fourth century, the Athenians invested more resources in building a defensive infrastructure in Attica. That infrastructure has been interpreted by Ober as a preclusive (border) defence system, designed to allow Athenians to gain advance warning of an attacking army, meet it with small forces from advanced fortified positions, and harass and obstruct its movement.[19] Archaeological evidence for towers increases in the border areas of Attica in the fourth century.[20] The vulnerable but strategic demes were fortified (Oinoe at Myopoulis[21] and Aphidna at Kotroni[22]) or forts were built nearby (Phyle[23]). All indications are that military command, military organization, politics, and the infrastructure itself had institutionalized 'the defence of the *chora*'.

However, other developments indicate that there was not a consistent policy in the fourth century. For example, the Dema wall, dated to the first quarter of the fourth century, was built, in Munn's view, to withstand a Theban threat, possibly in 378. It cannot be described as a 'border fortification' and could only have been intended to confront an enemy that had already entered Attica. The wall straddles the Aigaleos-Parnes 'gap' and protects the Athenian plain from attack across the Thriasian plain.[24] It was therefore not part of a 'preclusive defence system' nor was it a hastily constructed structure. Therefore, if a border system of forts and towers was being developed in the first half of the fourth century, the Dema wall suggests, if not a change in policy, then at least a change in strategy.[25]

In the light of these developments in the first half of the fourth century, the search for a single defensive strategy may oversimplify the various levels on which military organization operated. Indeed, there may be little point in

[18] RO 22 ll. 20–3 (with comm. p. 100, 101–2 = Tod *GHI* 123; *IG* ii² 43) identifies members of the second Athenian league as being free and autonomous; they enjoy whatever government they wish, receive no garrison nor submit to a governor nor pay tribute (the word is *phoros*).

[19] Ober 1985: 75–80, 191–207; 1989. Harding (1988; 1990) disagrees and Hanson (1983: 67) notes the rarity of such preclusive systems.

[20] Ober 1985: 155–9.

[21] Ober 1985: 75–80.

[22] Aphidna: ?Kotroni (ibid. 140–1). Third century: Prasiai: Koroni fort; Halai Aixonides: fort on Hill 102. The fort at Panakton never occupied a deme site (ibid. 152–4).

[23] Phyle: Phyle fort (ibid 145–7).

[24] Munn 1993: (function and date) 47–57, 97–112, esp. 124.

[25] Lohmann 1995: 522 argues that the Dema wall was built during the war against the oligarchs, *c.*403, but does not discuss Munn's archaeological criteria for a later date.

Figure 5.2. The Athenian fortress at Phyle

pursuing one single policy for this period. The fourth-century literary sources reveal a growing recognition that fortifications *within* the polis were required: Xenophon proposed in the mid-fourth century that a wall to protect the silver-mining region of south-east Attica should be constructed.[26] Other writers of this period also stress the utility of fortified positions within the territory of the polis as opposed to on its border.[27] Clearly there was a dialogue as to what strategy communities should adopt; preclusive defence was one option.[28] The greatest threat to the Athenian state in the fourth century was Philip II. The Athenians followed the opinions of politicians such as Demosthenes and met the aggressor far from their own territory in 338 rather than trust in what might be described as border fortifications. After the Athenians were defeated at the battle of Chaeronea by Philip II, their hasty improvements of the walls demonstrated little faith in their ability to defend the Attic *chora*.[29] Perhaps the urban fortifications had lacked investment since

[26] Xen. *Poroi* 4. 43–8, on defending the Laurion silver mines.
[27] Aen. Tac. 16. 17.
[28] Ober 1985: 70–5 with references, e.g. Hdt. 8. 144. 5, Thuc. 6. 18, Dem. 8. 15.
[29] Lycurgus, *In Leocratem* 44.

the 390s, for shortly after Chaeronea, in 337/6, the Athenians were certainly improving the fortifications of Piraeus and the Long Walls.[30]

The walls of the three major demes of Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sunion were improved in the fourth century. The citadel at Rhamnous was walled in the fifth century and in the fourth century walls were extended south and east of the acropolis.[31] An extensive circuit wall, which may date to the fourth century with alterations in the third century, protected Sunion.[32] Few other Athenian demes could boast such extensive fortifications in the fourth century.

There are four clear elements of defensive infrastructure in the Classical period: urban fortifications (the walls of Athens, Piraeus, and the connecting Long Walls), fortified demes (Eleusis, Rhamnous, Sunion, and Oinoe), border forts (and towers; especially Phyle and Panakton), and rural defensive structures (Dema wall, inland towers and fortifications). This combination of elements does not necessarily support the view that one overriding system of defence was ever in operation, but that defence was multifaceted and often a political decision might prefer one strategy over another (such as in 338).

From the late fourth century to the end of the third century, the defence of Attica is complicated further by the fact that at some point enemy forces or foreign soldiers controlled elements of the infrastructure that were consistently Athenian earlier in the fourth century. Despite these shortcomings, the Athenian defensive priorities remain fairly consistent from the early third century, particularly as long as the Piraeus was in foreign hands. For a brief period after the recovery of the city from Demetrios of Phaleron and Kassander in 307, the Athenians sought to reinvest in walls and ships as they had done in the late 390s.[33] The improvement of the urban and harbour fortifications was expensive, ambitious and probably urgent in the case of the city walls. In addition, a navy was to be rebuilt with the gift of timber from Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios. The hope of restoring naval power to the levels of those at the eve of the Lamian war proved short-lived in the closing years of the fourth century. The walls were tested on several occasions after 307: the war against Kassander, 307–304; the siege by Demetrios

[30] Schwenk 1985: 18–26 no. 3 = *IG* ii² 244 = *SEG* xxxv. 62 = Maier, *Mauerbau.* i. no. 10; see also, Aesch. 3 (*Against Ctesiphon*) 27.

[31] Ober 1985: 156–7 suggests the fourth-century walls belong to the first half of the fourth century. Indicators are masonry style (absence of drafted corners, combination of trapezoidal and polygonal wall sections, and use of stacks). Note, however, the existence of bosses on the faces of the blocks (indication of a later fourth-century date). The earliest section securely dated by the excavators, who reckon a Periclean date for the walls, is the square tower at the entrance to the acropolis (Petrakos 1999 i. 79–80, mid-fifth century).

[32] Karlsson 1992: 96–7; Goette 2000: 46–7.

[33] *IG* ii² 463 + Maier, *Mauerbau.* i no. 11 (*SEG* xxxvii. 85 and *Agora* xvi. 109).

Map 5.1. Military infrastructure in Attica

Poliorketes *c.*295; possibly in the 280s against the soldiers of Demetrios Poliorketes; and during the lengthy siege at the end of Chremonidean war in the 260s. On the other hand, the presence of a foreign garrison in the Piraeus effectively denied Athens the right to appoint a civic magistrate in command there and almost certainly denied the city free access to the harbours of Piraeus. Of course alternative harbours were no doubt in use (such as at Vouliagmeni, see below) but there was clearly insufficient *matériel* for the

Athenians to manage and berth naval ships and equipment without the Piraeus, and the fleet planned in the years following 307 never materialized.

In the years from *c.*307 to 200 different emphases were often necessitated by the occupation of one or more of the elements of defensive infrastructure. The recovery of the Piraeus sees a dramatic shift and a massive investment by the polis in re-establishing the harbours as an element in Athenian territorial concerns. The Piraeus (and Mounychia) was under foreign or Macedonian control in *c.*318–17 to 307 and *c.*295 to 230/29. In the centre of Athens, a fortress built on the Mouseion hill (overlooking the Acropolis) was occupied by the Macedonians *c.*295–287 and *c.*262/1–*c.*255. Finally the garrison demes of Rhamous, Eleusis, Sunion (and probably Aphidna at some points) and the border forts (Panakton, Phyle) were frequently under foreign control. For a brief period after 307 until *c.*304 Kassander controlled Attica (perhaps an earlier date for Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sunion). From the mid-290s until the late 280s Demetrios Poliorketes held sway, and Antigonos Gonatas in the late 260s to early 250s. Sunion probably had an uninterrupted period of Macedonian domination in the third century (*c.*295–*c.*230/29).[34]

A study of the strategic roles of rural defence (particularly in the form of rubble camps and towers) and the development of fortified demes and forts illustrates the problems and the solutions for defending the polis during the third century. A brief review of the epigraphical and archaeological evidence of the fortified demes and the rubble camps establishes their functions not only at the strategic level for the polis but also at the micro-regional level, centred on the garrison and the deme.

5.3. THE FORTIFIED DEMES OF EARLY HELLENISTIC ATTICA

The rich epigraphical evidence from Eleusis and Rhamnous (Sunion has revealed less) speaks largely of the more immediate concerns of the mixed and often overlapping interests of the groups who lived or were based at the garrison demes.[35] These groups were varied and ranged from the demesmen,

[34] See in general, Ch. 4.

[35] For the mixed groups whose interests were served by the honorands at Rhamnous, see R. G. Osborne 1990. Rhamnous (*pace* Osborne) in this period displays a range of mixed groups that were in fact *not* typical of the fourth-century demes of Attica and cannot be used to represent the normal diversity of groups in the Attic demes (see N. F. Jones 1999: 135–43).

to the Athenian soldiers serving there, to the non-Athenian soldiers, almost certainly mercenaries, who served in Attica in different capacities. The majority of the information we have about the operational details of the military garrisons comes from the large body of inscriptions from Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Sunion. Some of the longer decrees praise generals or other officers and describe their services.[36] The significant number of other honorific dedications underlines the extent of the awards that were made to those charged with command at such garrisons.[37] These decisions are not those of the Athenian Ekklesia. But Athenians number large among those who passed the decisions inscribed at the garrison demes. These citizens represent the voices of some of the civic body. Some of those who served in the army in Attic garrison demes also fulfilled duties as important magistrates later in their careers. The details contained in the epigraphical evidence reveals elements of a larger coherent structure that one can identify with the defensive policies of the Athenian polis. Moreover, it can be seen that many of the local concerns at the micro-regional level echo the sort of issues that certainly exercised the citizen body at the state level in the Ekklesia at Athens.[38]

At the fortified demes centres such as Eleusis and Rhamnous, the defence of the local countryside is prominent in the inscriptions. Such concerns are far more prominent than the role of the fortresses as local centres of refuge. People in the countryside were particularly threatened by warfare during harvest time, when they would have been exposed to attack while at work in the fields. Around 215/14 Theotimos had made provision for those farming the land to work in safety by his attention to the defence of the countryside around Rhamnous.[39] Just over fifty years earlier Epichares had made similar provisions, but the methods that he employed are recorded in more detail than in any other inscription of this period: he undertook measures designed specifically to protect the workers harvesting the crops.[40] Such concerns are evident elsewhere. At Aphidna, the Athenian soldiers had honoured the general Nikomachos for his concern for safety in the countryside, ensuring that no harm occurred there.[41] Dikaiarchos, when appointed to the command at Panakton, had cared for the defence of the fort and the remaining countryside of Attica.[42] At Eleusis an inscription honouring Paidikos, in the archonship

[36] See e.g. *I. Eleusis* 182, 196; *I. Rhamnous* 3, 17.
[37] See e.g. *I. Eleusis* 186; *I. Rhamnous* 136.
[38] Oliver 2001*b*.
[39] *I. Rhamnous* 43 ll. 5–7.
[40] Ibid. 3 ll. 10–11.
[41] Ibid. 32 ll. 7 ff.; date, 212/11.
[42] Ibid. 17 ll. 14–17, archonship of Ekphantos, 235/4 (M. J. Osborne 2003).

of Aristion (?289/8), alludes to war in the countryside.[43] In the archonship of Ekphantos (235/4) Aristophanes is honoured at Eleusis for various actions among which was his resolve to make sure that the grain harvest was brought in safely.[44]

Clearly, at all three garrisons, food supply was an overriding concern. Food was supplied from the local countryside surrounding the garrisons. At Sunion, the general for the hoplites was honoured by Athenians on service at Sunion for seeing that the granaries were repaired and grain stored.[45] The Athenians stationed at Eleusis honoured Dion, secretary to the treasurer of the *sitonika*, for being particularly efficient in his arrangements for the provision of grain.[46] The Athenians on service at Rhamnous honoured Thoukritos who had provided sufficient grain for the garrison by purchasing it with his own funds.[47] In the third century feeding the garrison was clearly a role that the general had to undertake and this echoes the concerns of an Athenian general on campaign in the fourth century.[48] The garrisons were consumers of food. Food had to be provided. The strategic role of the garrison was its ability to provide a point from which the countryside and its vital food resources could be protected.

But although the forts were primarily bases from which such operations could be launched, they were also required to be defensible strongholds. Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Sunion were designed to withstand attack and to protect the inhabitants—the residing garrison, the resident demesmen, and those taking refuge. The garrison commander was responsible for the condition and extent of the fortifications, and the provision of arms and weapons.

[43] *SEG* xxiv. 156 l. 3; for the redating of the inscription from the 230s to *c.*290, see Tracy, *A&M* 38–45. Thonemann (2005) suggests that Aristion belongs in 296/5. This requires that the list of Athenian archons preserved by Dionysius Halicarnassus (*Deinarchus* 9) is incomplete, or as Thonemann argues, that the archonship of 296/5, before the shortened archonship of Nikias *hysteros* of the same year, was condemned to oblivion by *damnatio memoriae*. Aristion was removed from the records (Thonemann 2005). Thonemann has Aristion as the first of two archons serving in the disturbed year 296/5. Aristion's term of office ended when Demetrios Poliorketes captured the city of Athens after the prolonged siege and reorganized the civic year as part of his reforms (for which see Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4). Aristion was replaced as archon by Nikias *hysteros*, and for the little that remained of 296/5, abbreviated prytanies (twelve in total, each 8–9 days) fulfilled the rest of that year.

[44] *I. Eleusis* 196 ll. 66 ff.

[45] *IG* ii² 1281 ll. 2–6, dates to *c.*220; for the letter-cutter who worked 229/8 to *c.*203, see Tracy *ALC* 47, 52. Bastion 'D' was identified as the granaries (Staïs, *AE* 1900: 137–8; Kenny 1947: 198), a mint (Svoronos, *Journal International d'Archéologie Numismatique* 1916: 120 ff.), a heroön (O. Picard, *Rev. Arch.* 16 (1940): 5–28), eventually a military structure (Young 1953: 356–7), and finally an artillery tower (Lawrence 1979: 389–9; Goette 2000: 46 with n. 265).

[46] *I. Eleusis* 182, ll. 9–14 (archonship of Menekles, 267/6). For the provision of cheap grain, see *I. Eleusis* 201 ll. 32 ff. (cutter, Tracy *ALC* 47, 54; date: *c.*215).

[47] *I. Rhamnous* 10 ll. 9–10, Thoukritos was general in the archonship of Kallimedes, 253/2.

[48] Timotheus, [Arist.] *Oik.* 1350a–b.

At all three of the garrisons individuals are known to have provided weapons and equipment. The hoplite general honoured at Sunion had made sure that there were projectiles (and grain and other things) which would offer security for the soldiers serving there.[49] Demetrios, a general, was honoured at Eleusis where he too had been responsible for the provision of military equipment, spears, and bows, although probably here for the celebration of the festival of Apatouria at Panakton.[50] It appears that artillery projectiles were also supplied by Aischrion, probably the general for the coastal countryside, to the Athenian soldiers on service at Rhamnous.[51]

The defence of the garrison fortresses was also maintained or improved.[52] At Rhamnous Theotimos had taken over responsibility for the garrisons and made sure that everything was present for their defence and fortification.[53] At Eleusis, probably only a few years earlier, Theophrastos had also taken care of the defence and the fortification of the garrisons.[54] Improvements of, and additions to, particular defensive capabilities are also known. At Eleusis, Aristophanes had paid attention to the walls and defence of the garrisons of Eleusis, Panakton, and Phyle.[55] Some years before, perhaps around the time of the Chremonidean war, one honorand had paid for a gatehouse from his own funds.[56] Thoukritos, general at Rhamnous in the middle of the third century, had built from personal funds not only a gatehouse but also gates and a meeting chamber.[57] Earlier Epichares had built a stoa, two guardrooms,

[49] *IG* ii² 1281 ll. 6–10. The projectiles were perhaps similar to those discovered at the fortress of Sunion (Staïs, *AE* 1917: 201; large stone balls in and outside building 'D' and in the long stoa by the propylaia; some of the spheres were complete, others were broken, and on many were inscribed characters, Goette 2000: 47). Staïs (ibid.) suggested that they were used for exercise; Svoronos, that they were used in the process of minting or the market; but Lawrence correctly saw them as catapult projectiles (Lawrence 1979: 436 n. 2; H. Williams 1992: 183 ff.). The bronze catapult washers, also found by Staïs but not properly identified until H. Williams 1992, belonged to another machine which would have required suitable projectiles (Goette 2000: 47 n. 273).

[50] *I. Eleusis* 194 (some time after the archonship of Antimachos, 256/5, M. J. Osborne 2003): bowmanship and spearmanship were important assets (cf. Launey 1987 ii. 827–8). For a similar concern for soldiers' 'kit', see the honours to Demainetos who had provided money for clothing in all his years of office, always anticipating the maintenance of those soldiers stationed with him, and paying for this from his personal funds, *I. Eleusis* 211 ll. 32–7.

[51] *I. Rhamnous* 26 l. 4 (after 229); the restoration at *SEG* xxviii. 107 shows that the projectiles were for purely military purposes and not for a religious festival.

[52] Cf. Similar improvements in the Piraeus are undertaken by Eurykleides and his brother Mikion, *IG* ii² 834 ll. 14–16 (fortification of the harbours), and *IG* ii² 835 1. 10, for the proposal by the People for an *epidosis*, to fund the fortification of the harbour of Zea.

[53] *I. Rhamnous* 43 l. 23 (215/14).

[54] *I. Eleusis* 207 ll. 20–4 (224/3).

[55] Ibid. 196 ll. 65–6 (the decree is passed sometime after 235/4).

[56] Ibid. 191 l. 18 (*SEG* xxii. 127; dātē, archonship of Antipatros, 262/1).

[57] *I. Rhamnous* 10 l. 12. The *stēlē* was to be erected in 249/8 or 248/7 near the gate, presumably the one Thoukritos had built, where it was found (by the east gate, *PAE* 1989 [1992]: 36).

and a *stratēgeion* near the temple of Nemesis.[58] The epigraphical evidence supplements the archaeological record of the walls and fortifications still preserved at Sunion[59] and Eleusis,[60] and being uncovered still at Rhamnous.[61] Apart from the central importance of food supply, the protection of garrisons is a frequently praised action. It is recognized at Rhamnous among the services of Thoukritos, Kallippos, Dikaiarchos, Philotheos, Theotimos;[62] at Panakton, of Dikaiarchos;[63] and at Eleusis, of Smikythion, Demetrios, Aristophanes, Theophrastos, and Demainetos.[64]

The concerns for defence and food supply overlap in the garrisons, just as they do for the polis as a whole. The micro-regions in which the garrisons operated present the same model that operated at the polis level.[65] Both

[58] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 12–17.

[59] Goette 2000: 46–7; Mussche 1964; Lauter 1989: 11–33. The date of the construction of bastion 'D' (Young 1953: 354–5) involves the reused mid-fourth-century inscription (first seen by Scranton in 1936). It was reused at least one generation after its erection (Young 1953: 355) in the third century. Young proposed that the Macedonians built bastion 'D' in 265/4. Lauter (1989: 15–17) argues for an earlier date in the late Classical; a parallel is the reuse of grave monuments in defensive walls at Athens after Chaeronea and the defeat of Athens in 322, he suggests, may have provided a crisis which demanded such urgent construction of (e.g.) bastion 'D'. Karlsson (1992: 96–7 *pace* Lauter) argues for a construction date in the second half of the fourth century (73), and a complete repair to sections of the curtain wall and towers in the third century (to e.g. bastion 'D', perhaps after 229, p. 86). Goette suggests that the improvements to the curtain wall and addition of Bastion 'D' belong to the Macedonian occupation, sometime in the third century. The major construction phase may well be as late as Karlsson suggests and certainly the addition of Bastion D and extensions to the *enceinte* belongs to the third century and is likely to have been a Macedonian operation.

[60] A Hellenistic tower, possibly of third-century date, stood on the hill west of the main acropolis but was destroyed by the expansion of the Titan concrete factory. For the Hellenistic garrison, Travlos 1988: 105 fig. 105; for a summary of the site, Travlos 1949: 144. For the garrison, perhaps joined to the main site by a fortified road, dated by pottery fragments not older than the third century, see *AD* 16 (*Chr.*) (1960): 52–4. For remains of buildings, occupied and used in the third century, see Kourouniotis 1923: 167 ff.; Ober 1985: 178–9.

[61] Rhamnous: for fortifications see Pouilloux 1954; Ober 1985: 135–7; Petrakos 1999 i. 51–80; the east gate, *Ergon* 1989 [1990]: 4 fig. 4; 1990 [1991]: 1 ff., and location of inscriptions there, ibid. 7. Smaller gates were uncovered in 1990, one in the north wall and three in the west; these would have been open during peacetime for the use of farmers, according to Petrakos (*Ergon* 1990: 7). Petrakos reported the remains of a temporary stone fortification in front of the temple of Nemesis, which protected the entrance to the garrison. Fragments of stone spheres (siege artillery projectiles) were found nearby (*Ergon* 1991: 4–5). Excavation of the south gate reveals evidence of destruction, perhaps the result of siege artillery; construction of the ditch and wall started at the beginning of the third century, *Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 4, 6.

[62] The phrase 'for the defence of the garrison': Thoukritos, *I. Rhamnous* 10 l. 5; Kallippos *I. Rhamnous* 14 l. 5; Dikaiarchos *I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 6, 7, 16; Philotheos (?) *I. Rhamnous* 20 l. 3; Theotimos *I. Rhamnous* 43 l. 10; cf. also (?) *I. Rhamnous* 12 l. 1 could have referred to the defence of the garrison, restorations by Kirchner and Pouilloux (Pouilloux 1954: 135 no. 20).

[63] Dikaiarchos *I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 14–17.

[64] At Eleusis, awards 'for the defence': Smikythion, the peripolarch 'of Eleusis', *I. Eleusis* 80 l. 10; Demetrius, ibid. 194 l. 12; Aristophanes, ibid. 196 ll. 65–6. (restored); Theophrastos, ibid. 207 ll. 22–4, concerning the garrisons; Demainetos, *IG* ii² 847 l. 23, for the defence of the garrisons.

[65] Oliver 2001*b*.

the military and civilian populations in the garrison demes shared concerns for securing safety in the countryside and the harvest of the land.[66] The demesmen could farm their land in safety if the military organization of the garrison was efficient and provided security in the countryside, and the defensibility of the garrison was a factor on which these ambitions depended. Here then were the main strategic requirements of the garrison demes. Fundamentally they provided a secure point from which the countryside of Attica in the region of the fortress-deme could be defended. It cannot be denied that the fortified demes served as a refuge but the epigraphical evidence pays much less attention to this function.[67] The bridge which Xenokles constructed not only allowed those involved in religious processions to Eleusis to reach the sanctuary in safety, but ensured that those living in the *proastion* [suburbs] and the farmers were safe. The implication is that the bridge facilitated the movement of these two groups into Eleusis more quickly if danger threatened; soldiers might also have been enabled to come to their aid faster.[68] The fortresses were therefore not simply points of refuge but had many purposes, primarily serving as well-defended strongpoints from which operations to protect both those working in the countryside and the agricultural resources of Attica could be launched.

5.4. THE RUBBLE CAMPS

Perhaps the most significant development, at least archaeologically, was the flourish of fortified rubble camps (Fig. 5.3).[69] These installations conform to a

[66] War in the countryside and defence of the countryside: *I. Rhamnous* 17, *I. Eleusis* 191, and *SEG* xxiv. 156; restored: *I. Eleusis* 194, and *I. Rhamnous* 13 for the defence of the *chorion*. Specific reference to farmers and grain harvest: *I. Rhamnous* 3, 10, 43; *I. Eleusis* 95, 196.

[67] Cf. Ober 1985: 220, 'The forts . . . served . . . as individual centers of local defense and refuge.'

[68] *I. Eleusis* 95, passed by the demesmen of Eleusis and Athenians on service there (archonship of Archippos, 321/0 or 318/17). On the honorand Xenokles, see F. Rausa, *Ath. Mitt.* 133 (1998) 191–234.

[69] McCredie 1966; 1982; additional sites listed by Langdon (1982: 88 n. 3) and Lohmann 1995: at Ovriokastro (Vanderpool 1975: 26–32; Lohmann 2001 suggesting the site is not Classical/Hellenistic), Beletsi (Garlan 1967: 293 ff.), Pirgadaki (Pritchett 1965: 101), Sagani (Petropoulakou and Pertazos 1973, Addition 2). To this list can be added e.g. a square tower (4. 90m. × 4. 76m, and some outbuildings) in the south-west corner of Salamis on a height just over 3/4km north-west of Agios Nikolaos, on a hill which is marked *Pyrgos* on Sheet XXIII of the *Karten von Attika* (I thank M. K. Langdon for showing me the site, December 1992; on Salamis' towers, I. Dekoulakou, *AE* 2001: 145).

Figure 5.3. The rubble fortress of Koroni overlooking Porto Raphti bay.

type largely because of their construction methods, the use of loose rubble as opposed to the dressed masonry more familiar at the forts and fortified demes. The camps were generally temporary in nature, built 'as economically as possible', and varied considerably in size.[70] They were usually located on a hill, in what can be determined in a loose way as a 'strategic' position. But what was their function? Some may have served as a refuge for the people of the local deme, but archaeological evidence allows in some cases a more specific purpose to be identified. Koroni has received the most extensive archaeological examination and provides the richest evidence and the most debate.[71] The fort itself consisted of buildings built within an *enceinte* defended with towers and punctuated by gates. The location on the coast, close to modern Porto Raphti, an excellent harbour, was an uninviting rock hill which juts out into the sea and is connected to the mainland by a thin strip of land.[72]

[70] McCredie 1966: 100, see also 16, 115–16.

[71] Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962; McCredie 1966; Lauter-Bufe 1989. See also Lohmann 1995.

[72] Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962: 26–7; McCredie 1966: 2–4; harbour investigations: *AR* 47 (2000/1): 8.

The assemblage of finds from the site confirms a short occupation and a consistent connection with the Ptolemies.[73] Controversy raged over the dates but in 1974 Grace established a chronology of Rhodian stamped amphora handles that was independent of ceramics from the Agora and confirmed a date in the 260s for Koroni.[74] The archaeological evidence of the coins and pottery matched the historical context of the Chremonidean war. The plausibility of the connection with the 260s is given additional weight by Pausanias' evidence that the Ptolemies had established a fort just off Cape Sunion, on the small island Gaidouronisi (Patroklou Charax). The remains of a rubble construction provide a useful parallel to Koroni.[75] The discovery of the decree honouring Epichares also provided epigraphical evidence that Ptolemaic soldiers were deployed in Attica during the Chremonidean war.[76] A more recent study argued that the site was in use for a much longer period of time, from 286 to 262.[77] This new argument underestimates the uniformity of the pottery and absence of successive habitation debris, and pays insufficient attention to the dating of the pottery, the coins, and Rhodian stamped amphora handles, and in the end rests more on political context.[78]

Most of the other rubble camps and towers have received less scrutiny and any archaeological evidence amounts to little more than surface sherds. The location of a few examples close to deme sites (compare the fort at Phyle) has led some to see camps as deme-acropoleis.[79] Originally Koroni was thought to have been Prasiai's acropolis; the deme Myrrhinous is at the foot of Merenda on which traces of walls have been found; and the deme site of Aphidna is identified with the defences found there. Halai Aixonides' deme centre lay close to the foot of 'Kastraki' (Hill 102.5m) and may have been a retreat for

[73] Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962: 57 with n. 18; McCredie 1966: 9; of twenty-three excavated coins, thirteen belong to Ptolemy II Philadelphos.

[74] Grace 1963 on a date in the 280s, cf. Edwards 1963; Grace 1974 retracted all previous arguments in favour of a 260s date; ibid. 197: 'The new stamp dating would thus seem to be consistent with the excavators' Chremonidean date for Koroni.' Recognition of Grace's amphora-stamp chronology: Garlan 1993: 150. The site and the date in the 260s meant that the chronology of early Hellenistic pottery at Athens had to be moved down, see Thompson, Thompson, and Rotroff 1987: 5–6; Rotroff 1988; *Agora* xxii. 107–8.

[75] Paus. 1. 1. 1, Strabo 9. 1. 21 (398) and McCredie 1966: 18–25; Lohmann 1992: 40, 45 fig. 20.

[76] *I. Rhamnous* 3.

[77] Lauter-Bufe 1989: 89–91, 101–2; Lauter 1992: 78–9.

[78] Lauter 1992: 77; Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962: 56; McCredie 1966: 8. The argument that the Koroni site has little resemblance to other military sites and that its finds are of a household nature have little weight (Lauter-Bufe at Lauter *et al.* 1989: 76–8, 82). That houses G and H seem more suitable as family houses is subjective in the extreme and assumes that the daily life of the soldier (eating, drinking, cooking) could have been radically different from that of a civilian.

[79] McCredie 1966: 91 with n. 14.

the local deme. The site has been located as the deme's acropolis.[80] But the picture here is more complex and the function of the camp must be considered along with several other important sites in the area.

The site on the headland, Mikro Kavouri, south of the temple of Apollo, at Vouliagmeni consists of 275m of fortifications.[81] This forms part of a complex of other archaeological evidence all of which suggests that Vouliagmeni played a significant role in the first half of the third century. The rubble camp, close to the deme centre of Halai Aixonides at Kastraki, is two kilometres inland from the temple of Apollo on Cape Zoster and overlooks Vouliagmeni bay.[82] The thick rubble circuit wall enclosed an area in which some smaller buildings have been found. Significantly, its chronology has a broader range than Koroni. Although Lauter dates the bulk of the pottery to the early Hellenistic period, study by the Greek archaeological service has found sherds from the early fifth century.[83] So Kastraki was certainly in use in the early Hellenistic period, but earlier too. More material of similar date was found in two circular towers on the bay itself, close to the temple of Apollo.[84] A fragmentary deme inscription of Halai Aixonides, cut by a mason working between 286/5 and 245/4, was found at the temple of Apollo.[85] Although the rubble camp at Kastraki has little bearing on the date of Koroni, the accumulation of evidence at Vouliagmeni indicates a site of some importance in the first half of the third century.[86]

Related to the sites at Vouliagmeni and Koroni is a third 'camp' at Ilioupolis. A combination of identifiable Ptolemy II coins and other chance finds (arrowheads and sling-shots) have suggested that there was a connection here with

[80] Andreou 1994: 192–6, esp. 195, with figs. 1–2, location A; site plan, fig. 4; sherds from fifth century onwards.

[81] Mikro Kavouri: Varoucha-Christodoulopoulou 1953–4: 327–8, coincidentally including another bronze Ptolemaic coin stamped *lambda*; the fortification has evidence of other periods, McCredie 1966: 30–2; the walls, *Eleutherodakis* 1964B: 23–4 map 3; Andreou 1994: 203.

[82] Lauter-Bufe 1989: 96 (cf. Andreou 1994: 194–7); R. G. Osborne 1985: 25 n. 35 (surveyed by Hood in 1950s). The site is marked on the *Karten von Attika* sheet VIII (ed. Curtius and Kaupert) as 'Kastraki'.

[83] Lauter-Bufe 1989: 98.

[84] Stavropoullou 1938: 6–7 n. 1. Tower 2 was 150m. north-east of the priest's house. Most of the finds belong to the fourth and third centuries BC (among the twenty-one bronze coins is a bronze issue of Ptolemy II [25mm, 15.23gm] with the authorization mark *lambda*). I thank M. Oikonomidou for allowing me to examine the coin evidence stored in the Numismatic Museum, Athens. Neither tower now survives.

[85] EM 12671: *AD* 11 (1927–8) [1930]: 41–2 (ph.) fig. 36; with W. Peek, *Ath. Mitt.* 67 (1942): 10; Tracy 1988: 311.

[86] The range of dating criteria and location of the site of Kastraki, just above Palaiochori (Travlos 1988: 475 fig. 597; Steinhauer 1994: 184 fig. 11; Eliot 1962: 30–3; R. G. Osborne 1985: 24 pl. 2; Andreou 1994), does little to support Lauter (1992: 88–9). Lohmann's (1995) theory of depopulation is convincing for south-west Attica but specific to that region's (mining) economy and not applicable as a micro-regional model for Attica as a whole.

the Chremonidean war and possibly earlier in the 280s.[87] The archaeological sites at Vouliagmeni and Ilioupolis and the camp at Koroni played some role in the defence of Attica between the 280s and 260s. One possible scenario is this. In the Chremonidean war of the 260s, the Egyptian forces probably used the site at Koroni to supply troops to Attica and the camp on Gaidouronisi to hold down the Macedonian garrison that probably still held Sunion. It is possible that the circular tower at Atene (Charala-Tal) was an Athenian installation that protected local territory from Macedonian forces in the Chremonidean war and fits into this pattern of more widespread infrastructure during the war.[88] The Ptolemaic presence might have allowed the Athenians to maintain the harvest of cereal crops and, possibly, the movement of commodities up to Athens via ports on the coast of south-west Attica. The dating to the Chremonidean war of a donkey-track over Hymettos near Ilioupolis lacks substantial evidence but is a route that could have been used in antiquity.[89] Vouliagmeni surely played some role during the Chremonidean war and earlier still during the 280s as a port into which commodities and troops might have moved. In the 260s, and possibly earlier in the 280s, the camp at Ilioupolis may have allowed the Athenians and Egyptians to defend movements in the *chora* of people and commodities and the collection of agricultural produce.

The many other rubble camps and towers in Attica elude a precise historical explanation unlike the theory that has been proposed for Koroni, Vouliagmeni, and Ilioupolis. However, it is clear from epigraphical evidence that military installations had come to be an expected part of the landscape of Attica in the early Hellenistic period, and possibly in the second half of the fourth century. A fragmentary lease of the deme Prasiai was presented to the team excavating Koroni in 1960. Its precise origin is not known as the stone had been found by a local tenant farmer while cultivating a field on the Koroni peninsula in the valley below the fortified acropolis and within the area of the fortified peninsula itself.[90] The lease agreed that, if an enemy should introduce a camp and destroy the harvest, the lessor Polysthenes would cover one half of the losses, the demesmen the other half.[91] It is not clear precisely when the lease dates nor who the enemy might have been, but similar provisions are known from a decree found at Merenda, the deme site

[87] Ilioupolis: Varoucha-Christodoulopoulou 1953–4: 321–49; McCredie 1966: 46–8.

[88] Lohmann 1996 published the tower in detail.

[89] Korres and Tomlinson 2002: 145–7.

[90] For location and circumstances of discovery, see Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962: 29 with fig. 2, 53; see also *Horos* 14–16 (2000–3) 71–6 (Brauron Museum no. 1279) for another lease from Prasiai dated to the second half of the fourth century.

[91] Vanderpool, McCredie, and Steinberg 1962: 54–6 no. 138 (= PR12), pl. 23.

of Myrrhinous. The inscription carries a decree of the phratry Dyaleis (dated around 300/299), outlining the terms of the lease of a property where the inscription was set up. The phratriarchs are to lease the property which is to be free from tax, not liable to enemy attack, and not to be the military camp of friendly forces.[92] In *c.*300 it was therefore envisaged not only that enemy action might affect the property but also that the presence of a local military camp might also make demands. Both pieces of epigraphical evidence reveal the degree of vulnerability of the Attic countryside to enemy action, but the second crucially envisages that Athenian military installations may well be established in the heart of Attica in the Mesogeia around 300 BC. It is clear from the extensive distribution of towers and rubble camps throughout Attica that soldiers would have been a feature of the Attic landscape. Their presence at the main fortified sites such as Rhamnous, Aphidna, Phyle, and Panakton is well established. However, it is worth noting that there is strong evidence that at least by the second half of the fourth century, there was almost certainly a military presence in rural Attica, and not just in the border areas.

5.5. GARRISONED ATTICA

The infrastructure for Athenian military activity was therefore unlikely to have been static and a more dynamic and ever-evolving model of military emplacements must be envisaged. Obviously the defensible centres of population of Attica were a central feature of the Attic landscape as much in the late fifth century as the early Hellenistic period. In addition to the forts of Phyle and Panakton, Rhamnous, Aphidna, Eleusis, and Sunion were fortified demes, and Halai Aixonides and possibly Merenda were demes with acropoleis. But in terms of military organization the border sites of Panakton and Phyle and the fortresses at Rhamnous and Eleusis (and to a lesser extent Aphidna and Sunion) were by the third century the keys to the defence of the countryside. It has already been seen how much disruption to the agricultural economies was achieved by warfare. Garrisoned fortified demes at Eleusis and Rhamnous had become important focal points for the control of several regions within Attica. If the Athenians lost control of those garrisons, a significant proportion of the population would lose access to the countryside.

The temporary camps at Koroni and Ilioupolis and at Mikro Kavouri near Vouliagmeni betray another kind of military infrastructure which is a testament to the more fluid strategic demands of warfare. In the later fourth

[92] *IG* ii² 1241 ll. 14–16 = Lambert 1993: 299–307 (document T5).

century the deployment of Athenian troops within the countryside and occupying camps close to deme centres was a feature of the rural landscape. The Ptolemaic interventions in support of the Athenians in the third century are a natural extension of the deployment of soldiers in rural Attica. It is certainly not the case that these camps had 'replaced the massively built border fort as the primary base of most military operations'.[93] For much of the late fourth and third century, the fortified demes played the crucial role in the defence of the countryside, a role that was formalized, as seen above, by the institutionalization of the two generalships for the countryside based at Eleusis and Rhamnous. The wealth of epigraphical evidence from the second half of the third century also confirms that the fortified sites at Phyle, Panakton, and Aphidna continued to play a role in the defence of the Athenian state. The rubble camps (and towers) complemented these other fortified sites and, where the chronology is more precise, clearly formed part of a joined-up military strategy that dovetailed with the fortified demes.

In the years following Antigonos Gonatas' victory over Athens, the fortresses continued to serve as *the* centres of Athenian defensive policy. By this period a well-established organization of command and infrastructure had matured since its development during the closing years of the fourth century down to the 260s. The operation of the fortresses relied heavily on securing the countryside; the local harvests could provide for Athens and the garrisons, and the protection of harvests was the dynamic link that united the fort to its environment. Attica was therefore defended by a system based on the forts at Eleusis and Rhamnous, and the subsidiary establishments of Panakton, Phyle, and Aphidna. The infrastructure, or the physical elements of the system, were provided by the fortresses; the operation of the system was managed by the generals who were elected each year by the Athenian people. The structures of command are dealt with next.

[93] Ober 1985: 220–1.

6

Defending the Polis: Command

6.1. THE STRUCTURE OF COMMAND

Military command was regarded as a specialized magistracy in the Athenian polis. The generalship was exceptional in that individuals could be voted on more than one occasion to this office: the most famous recurrent appointment was Phokion's election to the generalship on over forty occasions in the fourth century.[1] The ability to be re-elected was designed to ensure that the best-qualified individuals served as generals. The same traditions continued in early Hellenistic Athens.

> They also vote all the offices for war: ten generals. Formerly they used to vote one from each tribe, but now they elect them from all the people. And they appoint them [to separate offices] by a show of hands: one over the hoplites, who commands the hoplites whenever they go abroad; one to the countryside, who provides defence, if warfare should take place in the countryside; two to the Piraeus . . . (*Ath. Pol.* 61. 1)

In the hundred years after the *Athenaiōn Politeia* was written, the two generalships for the Piraeus disappeared and the generalship for the countryside was divided into two rural regional generalships. These are among the most significant changes in military command. Some continuity was maintained. The hoplite general remained the most prestigious military official and individuals can be seen working their way through a de facto hierarchy of military posts. The inscription honouring Phaidros describes such a career: he had served twice as 'general for supply' in 296/5,[2] 'often' as general for the countryside,[3] and had been general for the mercenaries 'three times'.[4] It is not possible to prove that these three appointments had been held sequentially but it is symptomatic of hierarchies that the generalship for the countryside has been held on many occasions without specifying the precise number, while the generalship for the mercenaries (three occasions) is specified. Was the latter more prestigious? An absolute judgement remains elusive. Phaidros then served on two occasions as hoplite general, in 288/7 and 287/6,[5] the

[1] Hamel 1998. [2] *IG* ii² 682 ll. 21–4. [3] Ibid. 24–5. [4] Ibid. 24–8.
[5] Ibid. 30–41, 44–8 (and possibly further, in the erasure).

culmination of Phaidros' military career before his final civic office as *agonothetēs* in 282/1, an office he shared with Glaukon son of Eteokles.[6]

The hoplite generalship was de facto the highest military office in the early Hellenistic period. But this was certainly not always the case.[7] The generalship for the mercenaries and the generalship for the countryside probably followed close behind the hoplite generalship in the military hierarchy. Aristeides of Lamptrai was already a 'prominent politician' by the time he served in successive years as general for the countryside.[8] He served at Eleusis (268/7) in the critical first year of the Chremonidean war and at the end of his term handed over Eleusis 'safe and under democratic power' to his successor.[9] He was voted general for the coastal countryside at Rhamnous for the next year of the war (267/6). The inscription provides new evidence that Aristeides had been sent as an ambassador to parley with Antigonos Gonatas in Asia.[10] Aristeides had been part of an Athenian mission in the Peloponnese in the run-up to the Chremonidean war that probably resulted in the Orchomenians honouring Kallippos, Glaukon, and Aristeides as well as Areus king of the Spartans.[11] Not surprisingly Orchomenos was aligned against Antigonos Gonatas in the war.[12] But earlier still in 290/89 it seems that Aristeides had already served as general.[13]

Clearer still is the evidence that in the third century a significant proportion of Athenian generals had already held more junior military positions. Kallisthenes son of Kleoboulos of Prospalta had served as phylarch and hipparch before becoming general.[14] Thoukritos son of Alkimachos of Myrrhinous probably served as hipparch twice before embarking on his numerous (at least four) generalships (including one generalship for the coastal countryside).[15] Epichares had served as hipparch four years before becoming general for the coastal countryside.[16]

[6] [Gl]auko[n E]teokleous Aithalides, *agonothetes*: *IG* ii² 3079 l. 2.

[7] Hamel 1998: 194–5 argues that the hoplite general did not enjoy superior authority in the Classical period. I refer to the period after that dealt with by Hamel and speak in terms of kudos attached to the appointment rather than 'authority'. The position need not have brought any constitutional superiority but it is hard not to draw the conclusion that this was the senior post.

[8] For his career, Habicht 1994: 340–3, quotation 343 (= *Chiron* 6 (1976): 7–10).

[9] *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 15–16.

[10] Ibid. 15. When (and where) precisely Gonatas was in Asia Minor is not yet clear.

[11] *ISE* i. 53–4 (268/7) with Heinen 1972: 126 n. 132. It is possible that the award by the Oropians of *proxenia* to Aristeides dates to the second quarter of the third century, *I. Oropos* 26 = *SEG* xv. 298; date *I. Oropos* p. 504.

[12] Orchomenos: aligned against Gonatas, *SVA* iii. 476 ll. 24, 38.

[13] *IG* ii² 2797 (Moretti, *ISE* i. 12; Habicht 1982: 201): honours for those who had given best service in the Boule in the archonship of Telokles, 'when [Aris]teides of Lamptrai was general'.

[14] *I. Rhamnous* 136.

[15] Thoukritos' generalships: *I. Rhamnous* 11; 61; hipparch: *IG* ii² 1279 (*I. Eleusis* 183) ll. 1–2.

[16] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 5–6.

In the middle of the third century, Demetrios had already served one civic appointment, before being voted hipparch and later general for the countryside at Eleusis.[17] Expertise and experience were certainly valued, and it is likely that many Athenians who became generals had been officers in their earlier careers. However it is striking that the most common position which the generals Kallisthenes, Thoukritos, Epichares, and Demetrios had held was that of hipparch.[18] The cavalry were fundamental to the Athenian polis and evidence of their activities is of considerable importance to our understanding of the nature of Athenian society and democracy. Membership of the cavalry required considerable wealth and the fact that the generals with an identifiable military 'career' were wealthy should come as no surprise when one considers the cost of some of the benefactions they performed during their careers.

But the development of a career pattern did not mean that the generalship or military office had become 'professionalized' or separated from politics, as has been the orthodox belief about politicians and generals in the fourth century (at least to 322).[19] Among the known hoplite generals many were major political figures (although not always *rhetores* or proposers of extant inscribed decrees): Phaidros, Olympiodoros, Glaukon (brother of Chremonides), and Eurykleides. Several gained considerable repute outside Athens: Glaukon was a victor at the Olympics and later honoured by the *koinon* of the Boeotians at Plataea[20] and Olympiodoros was awarded a bronze statue by the Elateans.[21] However, among the known and named generals, I can find no individual who also proposed a state decree between 307 and 229. But generals were politicians. The division between *rhetores* and politicians may not be so instructive in the early Hellenistic period. Certainly much has been made of an alleged division between generals and politicians or *rhetores* in the fourth century particularly when the contrast is made with the fifth century.[22] However in each of the three centuries from *c.*500–200, the correlation between generals and proposers of decrees (that have survived on stone) is *consistently* weak.[23] But the importance of the generals, especially in the first half of the fourth century, has been blurred by the emphasiz on the generals' military concerns and the 'political' concerns of others who proposed decrees in the Assembly. It is worth noting how the polis had started to

[17] *IG* ii² 1285 (*I. Eleusis* 194).

[18] A typical trajectory but not quite a *cursus honorum*, so Couvenhes 1998: 717.

[19] Hansen 1983; Connor 1971: 143–7.

[20] Glaukon at Plataea: Étienne and Pierart 1975; Olympia: Habicht 1985: 86 n. 76.

[21] Olympiodoros: Paus. 1. 26. 3 and 10. 18. 7; Habicht 1985: 90–2.

[22] Ferguson (1909: 323) describes the hoplite general as 'the sole heir of the mixed military and political powers which had once belonged to the united board [of generals]'.

[23] Proposers of decrees and generals: Hansen 1983; 1991: 269–70.

honour its military leaders. Generals and not politicians were the individuals rewarded with statues from the 390s onwards. It was some time later that the predominantly political leaders became eligible for the greatest honours.[24]

6.2. THE HOPLITE GENERAL

There is little evidence of hoplite generals before the third century.[25] The earliest reference is the passage already quoted from the *Athenaiōn Politeia*. Only a few of the office-holders are known (see App. 2) but the post was clearly the most important military office in Athens at this time. The generalship continued to be appointed after the Chremonidean war.[26] The foremost politicians often held the office. In the fragmentary list of officials of 266/5 found in the Agora excavation, Glaukon, as hoplite general, heads the military officials.[27] Eurykleides the son of Mikion of Kephisia served towards the end of the 240s in this position and is named after the eponymous archon and *agonothetēs* of the Panathenaia but precedes the general *epi tēn paraskeuēn*.[28] Beyond 229 the hoplite general remained prestigious: his primacy is confirmed in a list of Athenian military magistrates from *c.*200.[29] By the Roman era the office was perhaps second only to the eponymous archon.[30] In the first century BC, the hoplite general was responsible for the grain supply and other civic concerns at Athens and Piraeus.[31] His authority covered the city and its welfare. During the first half of the third century, and surely later too, domestic security had almost certainly become the hoplite general's main concern. Athens engaged in very few foreign campaigns outside Attica in the early Hellenistic period: the exceptional overseas campaign against the Celts in 279 was led by Kallippos, probably the hoplite general.[32]

In spite of this reduction in foreign campaigns, the hoplite general remained the principal military office. In 288/7, Phaidros had almost certainly led the large Athenian army which was made up of most of the available age

[24] Lycurgus, *In Leoc.* 51; Gauthier 1985: 106–7; Kralli 1999–2000; Oliver 2007.

[25] Sarikakis 1951.

[26] Cf. Habicht 1982: 47.

[27] Habicht 2000–3: 92 ll. 5–6 (*SEG* xxv. 186 = *Hesp.* 37 (1968): 284–5 no. 21, Ag. I 2462).

[28] *SEG* xxxii. 169.

[29] Papadopoulos 2004: 227 ll. 5–6. The hoplite general is the first named on the list of Athenian generals.

[30] Geagan 1967: 18 ff.

[31] Ibid. 21 ff. collects the evidence for the hoplite general's involvement in the grain supply during the first century BC.

[32] See Paus. 2. 3. 5; Habicht 1979 ch. 7. Athens is said to have sent 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry (Paus. 10. 20. 3).

classes in operations in Attica to defend the harvest.[33] This had left the aged Olympiodoros to assume the leadership of the young and old men in Athens against the Macedonian garrison on the Mouseion overlooking the Acropolis. The following year (287/6) saw Phaidros appointed hoplite general for the second year running. His honorific inscription underlines that Phaidros' generalship was the first to have been appointed for 287/6.[34] Epigraphical evidence for the hoplite general is rarely found outside the city of Athens. One of the few exceptions is the decree from Sunion honouring Eurykleides around 230.[35]

6.3. THE REGIONALIZED GENERALSHIP FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE

The defence of the Attic countryside had become institutionalized in the fourth century. The earliest securely dated appointment of a general to the countryside at Athens is in 352/1.[36] Philochoros describes the dispute over the demarcation of the sacred *orgas* when the Athenian general for the countryside, Ephialtes, marched against the Megarians in 350/49.[37] It is possible that the 350s (or even earlier) first saw the regular appointment of a general to the countryside.[38] By the third quarter of the fourth century, the author of the *Athenaiōn Politeia* reported that the defence of the countryside was one of the main topics on the agenda at the principal meeting of the Assembly every month.[39] The countryside had by this time become one of the four statutory appointments among the ten annually elected generals, the hoplite general and two generals for the Piraeus being the other three.[40]

But in the third century, the general for the countryside was not the only commander likely to operate in Attica. Phaidros, as hoplite general, took responsibility for the Athenian army during the revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes in the 280s. There is no evidence that the Athenians did or did not vote a general 'to the countryside' in the 280s. Of course the institutionalization of military officials should not be seen as static or fixed. Military appointments were subject to a high degree of pragmatism: 'they create the offices of generals and hipparchs and other offices for war in the Assembly, in whatever way they think right'.[41] At some point in the third century, and

[33] See above, Ch. 4, sect. 4.
[34] *IG* ii² 682 ll. 44–5. Cf. Shear 1978: 67; M. J. Osborne 1979: 188.
[35] *IG* ii² 1300. [36] RO 58 (*IG* ii² 204; *I. Eleusis* 144) ll. 16–23 with comm. at p. 278.
[37] Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 fr. 155. [38] Ferguson 1909: 321.
[39] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 43. 4. [40] Ibid. 61. 1. [41] Ibid. 44. 4.

probably at the latest in the first year of the Chremonidean war (268/7), the Athenians began to appoint *two* generals for the countryside. One was allocated as general for the countryside at Eleusis, the other general for the countryside on the coast. Eleusis and Rhamnous became their respective headquarters.[42] The holders of the generalships for the countryside may not have been as well-established political figures as others but were individuals of some reputation. The first known to have served as generals for the countryside in the third century are the two regional generals of 268/7. Epichares, based at Rhamnous, was general for the coastal countryside and Aristeides son of Mnesitheos was general (probably for the countryside) at Eleusis in the same year.[43] In 267/6 both garrisons remained in Athenian control, Aristeides gave up his post to his successor and himself took over at Rhamnous from Epichares.[44] At the end of the fourth century the division of the generalship for the countryside into these two regional appointments may not yet have taken place.[45] One general honoured in a fragmentary decree that has not been dated securely describes the magistrates as responsible for 'Sunion, and [Rhamnous and] all the other coastal (countryside)'. The appointment anticipates the subsequent regular division of the generalship for the countryside into regional appointments.[46] For the phrase used here to describe the office appears nowhere else for the general of the coastal countryside and may indicate that the appointment of regionalized generalships had not yet been regularized as it was by the second third of the third century. The most likely date for the reform of the generalship for the countryside is probably a period when the Athenians had recovered their garrisons, sometime before Aristeides and Epichares served, therefore between the late 280s and 268/7.

[42] Most of the honorific decrees for these generals and dedications come from Eleusis (*IG* ii² 1285 = *I. Eleusis* 194; *IG* ii² 3460 = *I. Eleusis* 186 [crown IV]; *IG* ii² 1287 = *I. Eleusis* 187; *IG* ii² 1299 = *I. Eleusis* 196; *IG* ii² 1303 = *I. Eleusis* 207; *IG* ii² 1304 = *I. Eleusis* 211) and Rhamnous (*I. Rhamnous* 3, 10, 18, 20, 23, 32, 50, 129, 136, 145, *Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7 with Petrakos 1999: i. 32–3 = Rhamnous inv. no. 1235); Petrakos 1999: i. 33 = Rhamnous inv. no. 1138; two (for the general for the coastal countryside) have been found at Sunion (*IG* ii² 1302, 2857; *IG* ii² 1260, dating late fourth century, the work of the cutter of *IG* ii² 1262, who worked *c.*320–296, Tracy *ADT* 139).

[43] Epichares of Ikarion: *I. Rhamnous* 3; for the demotic, see *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 16; Aristeides son of Mnesitheos of Lamptrai (*LGPN* ii s.v. Aristeides 66): *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 15–16 (unpublished decree).

[44] *Ergon* 2003 [2004] 16. The next known instance of the general for the countryside at Eleusis belongs to the 250s or earlier but the official's name has not survived, *IG* ii² 1287 (= *I. Eleusis* 187) associated by Habicht 1979: 132 n. 91 with *IG* ii² 3460 (= *I. Eleusis* 186).

[45] Evidence: *Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7 = Petrakos 1999: i. 32–3 (Rhamnous inv. no. 1235); *IG* ii² 1260, 1302, 2857.

[46] The general honoured in *IG* ii² 1260 may well have been Kephisophon son of Antikles of Konthyle, honoured at Rhamnous in ?304/3 as general for the countryside (*Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7 = Petrakos 1999: i. 33 (Rhamnous inv. no. 1138)).

This shift in the command structure of the Athenian state should not be underestimated. In the 320s two generals for the Piraeus were appointed, one for the countryside and the hoplite general, but by the middle of the third century, two generals for the countryside and a hoplite general were the major named offices. There was no longer a civic general for the Piraeus. Obviously the loss of the harbours to a foreign garrison for most of the third century (from 295 to *c.*230) explains that change. But the greater emphasiz in the number of generals appointed to the countryside reflects the way in which



Map 6.1. Military command in Attica, *c.*250

Athenian concerns had narrowed and responded to the reality of the threat of war in the countryside (see Map 6.1). The reality signals that the polis was no longer able to keep its enemies at arm's length as had been attempted at Chaeronea in 338. In fact, the fifth century offers some parallels for the Athenian strategies and tactics adopted in the early Hellenistic period.

6.4. ROYAL INTERFERENCE

Another major change in military authority was the influence of the Hellenistic kings (see App. 3). For almost all the early Hellenistic period the Athenians had continued to appoint their generals in the traditional way by a vote, first selecting the generals and subsequently appointing them to specific commands (or not, as the case may be). The indisputable evidence for this two-stage process is Epichares' election to the generalship which was followed by assignment to an office.[47] But there were two exceptions to the rule that the Athenians always appointed their own magistrates, notably at the very end of the fourth century and for a few years immediately after the Chremonidean war.

The first instance is more difficult to assess given that the only notice is a recently found, but at the time of writing still unpublished, inscription from Rhamnous. Petrakos' notice of the inscription identifies honours for Adeimantos and indicates that the inscription reveals the general for the countryside was appointed (exceptionally) for two years in 305–304.[48] Interpretation of the new inscription is difficult when the full text is still not available but the implications of King Demetrios appointing an individual to a civic magistracy in the period of the Four Year war are significant. Demetrios Poliorketes enjoyed excessive privileges in Athens and the heights (or depths) of the honours granted by Athens through Stratokles, as Plutarch presents it, drove a wedge into what fragile political harmony Athens enjoyed in the initial years after the removal of Demetrios of Phaleron in 307. Not long after Adeimantos' generalship it would seem other Athenians left the city, although not all would have departed for ideological reasons. Philippides of

[47] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 5–6.

[48] *Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7 which dated the generalship to 303/2; now Petrakos 1999: i. 32–3 (Rhamnous inv. no. 1235) which gives the following excerpts (without line numbers or indications of line breaks, *[Ἀδ]ε̣[ί]μαντος [καταστ]αθεὶς στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴ[ν χώραν ὑ]πὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Δημητρί[ου ἐπὶ δυ]ο̣ ἔτη* ('Adeimantos [appoin]ted general for the [countryside] by King Demetrios [for two] years') and *π̣ολέμου περικατα̣λ[αβόντος ἐπεμελή]θη τῆς συγκομι[δῆς τῶν καρπῶν]* ('with war pressing from all sides, looked after bringing in the harvests'; *περικατα̣λ[αβόντος* is restored by Habicht 1979: 33 n. 126).

Kephale served with King Lysimachos and used his position to continue to aid Athens well before 287.[49] The same cannot be said for Demochares whose record of services for the polis has a glaring omission following his exile in *c.*303 and later return in 286/5. Laches' decree makes clear that in this respect his father Demochares was unique among his contemporaries.[50] Olympiodoros for example stayed in Athens and served under different regimes in the late 300s, the 290s, and 280s.

The second example belongs to the turbulent years shortly after the Chremonidean war when for a limited period the Athenians were forced to endure another foreign garrison on the Mouseion hill until its removal probably in the middle of the 250s.[51] Apollodoros' appointment to the generalship of the countryside sees a regular civic nomination apparently dictated by an external power.[52] It is not certain that Gonatas interfered in the appointment of all Athenian generals at the time of Apollodoros' office, but the practice is not repeated in subsequent years. Demetrios of Phaleron's grandson, also called Demetrios, had considerable authority in the years after the Chremonidean war when his appointment as *thesmothetēs* was assisted by Antigonos Gonatas.[53] Around this time, Gonatas had installed governors in a number of Greek cities such as Alexander in Corinth and Euboea.[54] It is conceivable that a similar individual was appointed to Athens for a brief period after 262, but the only testimony is a brief notice preserved in a fragment of Apollodoros.[55] There is no evidence either to confirm or identify the appointee. One recent assessment of Athens *c.*262–255 supports the view that any external interference by Gonatas in Athenian organization was probably very limited and certainly short lived.[56] Moreover Antigonos' actions did not necessarily weaken Athenian military organization. Certainly his exploitation of Athens as a strategic base was to make the Athenians and their territory a potential target for those who

[49] Philippides spent time away with King Lysimachos (*IG* ii² 657 ll. 9–10) probably from the end of the fourth century; he was already sufficiently 'in' the king's entourage at the time of Ipsos to make representations for the release of Athenians captured by the king after the battle; like Demochares ([Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851–2) during his absence from Athens, he did nothing against democracy (*IG* ii² 657 ll. 48–50).

[50] [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851d–f. The decree seeking honours for Demochares was passed in 271/0 on the proposal of his son, Laches.

[51] Oliver 2001*a*: 36–8.

[52] There is no distinction between the two participles (appointed and voted) commonly used to describe the appointment of officers. Apollonios and Dikaiarchos (*I. Rhamnous* 17) were appointed for the defence of the garrison which, strictly speaking, cannot be the generalship for the countryside.

[53] Oliver 2001*b*: 39–43; Oetjen 2000.

[54] Habicht 1997: 162. Gonatas and Euboea: Knoepfler 2001: 390–4. Although I have offered (*CR* 53 (2003): 454–8) an alternative date for Knoepfler 2001: no. 15, Knoepfler's (2001: 273–304) discussion of the 260s and 250s in Euboea is comprehensive.

[55] Apollodros *FGrH* 244 fr. 4. [56] Oliver 2001*a*.

opposed the Macedonian king. But in terms of the overall military defence of Attica, there seems to have been a distinct allocation of military command in the period from the end of Chremonidean war to *c.*230.

6.5. THE PIRAEUS AND SALAMIS UNDER MACEDONIAN LEADERSHIP

There was no Athenian civic appointment from *c.*261 to 230/29 to the Piraeus and Salamis because Gonatas installed one of his own 'friends' (see App. 3). The Athenian, Herakleitos of Athmonon, general of the Piraeus after the Chremonidean war, can be described best as a 'royal general'.[57] Two honorific inscriptions for him have survived. A *probouleumatic* decree of the Athenians refers to benefactions performed by Herakleitos including improvements to the Panathenaic stadium in Athens and a dedication to Athena Nike commemorating the actions of Antigonos on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks against the Gallic ('barbarian') invaders of the 270s.[58] The decree must date to the period after the Chremonidean war but there is no direct evidence that the honorand was already the 'royal general'. Herakleitos enjoyed a position within the entourage of Antigonos Gonatas before being appointed to the Piraeus. This is made clear in the other decree, passed by the People of Salamis and set up on the island where a flurry of other inscriptions appeared in the years after the war.[59]

Herakleitos had recently been appointed by the king as general 'for the Piraeus and the other assignments along with the Piraeus'.[60] Before this he has helped those Salaminians who have come to Antigonos in a private capacity, making sure that their approaches are successful.[61] The decree passed by the Salaminians makes clear that following the Chremonidean war a general was

[57] Habicht 1997: 162.

[58] *IG* ii² 677 = *Syll.*³ 401; Habicht 1979: 71 n. 18 (with the alternative reading for line 4 by A. N. Kontoleon, *Akte des IV. internationalen Kongresses für griechische und latinische Epigraphik* (Wien, 17. bis 22. September 1962). Vienna: H. Böhlaus, 1964: 196–7; cf. *BE* 1965: 142). Note that a fragment of another (?)Athenian decree which had connected Antigonos Gonatas with a war and the freedom of the Greeks (B. D. Meritt, *Hesp.* 30 (1961) 214–15 no. 9 (Ag. I 5653) = *SEG* xxi. 380) must now be seen as an honorific decree for a certain Antigonos The[— —] and not an Antigonid king (*Agora* xvi. 197).

[59] *SEG* ii. 9–10; *IG* ii² 1225. On *SEG* ii. 9 see now M. J. Osborne 2003: 69–73; for a slightly different interpretation of this inscription, with an archon year omitted between Kydenor and Eurykleides in column II, see Tracy *A&M* 121–4; Tracy 2003: 59–60.

[60] *IG* ii² 1225 ll. 7–9. The proposer is otherwise not known (Chairedemos, son of Epicharinos of Kolonai, *LGPN* ii s.v Chairedemos 29).

[61] *IG* ii² 1225 ll. 1–7.

appointed by the Macedonian king to control Piraeus and de facto Salamis. The last of the 'royal generals' for Piraeus was Diogenes, whose expensive compliance with Eurykleides and Mikion finally saw the Athenians buy off the mercenaries on Mounychia and so recover control of their harbour.[62] Whether Diogenes also controlled Salamis at this point is less evident but likely, since the island seems to have fallen outside the Athenian civic command structure. Clearly Herakleitos and Diogenes are examples of the numerous appointments typical of the Hellenistic kings. Those closely associated with Hellenistic kings were normally chosen to hold positions of responsibility, a group for which the term 'friends' gives a deceptively familiar and informal sense.[63]

Salamis (and Piraeus) were crucial not only to the control but also the defence of Attica. On several occasions, Salamis was either attacked or captured by enemies intent on conquering the Athenian *polis*. Demetrios Poliorketes in the 290s had captured the island (along with Aegina) before laying siege to the city itself.[64] In the 250s the Salaminians were protected by Herakleitos from attacks of 'pirates' during the war between Alexander and Antigonos.[65] The countryside was threatened by attacks and Herakleitos made sure that defensive walls that had fallen into disrepair were renovated. In addition he secured the release of those who were carried off from the islands by such attacks and punished those responsible. Salamis was clearly a soft target for those attacking Athens. The command structure that Antigonos Gonatas developed facilitated the defence of the island, its people and countryside. The 'royal general' exercised his responsibilities in defending the people and the countryside, performing actions similar to those of Athenian generals assigned to defend the countryside of Attica from either Rhamnous (e.g. Epichares) or Eleusis (Aristophanes) during the same period.[66]

In the troubled years after the Chremonidean war it would appear that military command in Athens and Attica respected clear boundaries. Athenians appointed by the state oversaw the mainland territory of Attica while the royal general took care of Piraeus and Salamis. The simple distribution of command reflects broadly the same sort of deployment of authority that existed when the *Athenaiōn Politeia* was written in the third quarter of the fourth century.

[62] Habicht 1997: 173–5; Habicht 1985: 88–9; the sum of 150 talents was paid with 20 talents given by Aratos (Plut. *Arat.* 34. 5–6; cf. Pausanias 2. 8. 6 who says one-sixth which would be 25 talents; for the aid, cf. Habicht 1982: 79–93; for Thebes and Thespiai (*IG* vii. 2406 and 1737–8 respectively) see now Migeotte 1989.

[63] Cf. Herman 1980–1; Shear 1978: 23 n. 41.

[64] Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 7. 5.

[65] *IG* ii² 1225 ll. 10–20.

[66] Aristophanes: *IG* ii² 1299 = *I. Eleusis* 196; Epichares: *I. Rhamnous* 3.

Specific generals were appointed then to the Piraeus while a single general was responsible for the countryside. Hellenistic kings less frequently interfered with the *internal* workings of the cities which came under their power. Clearly Gonatas recognized the strategic organization that was required for Attica, and his own 'royal general' fitted into a wider military structure. For all the underlying resentment and hostility that a foreign garrison (and commander) in Piraeus brought to the Athenians, the 'royal general' was an essential element in the defence of the polis between *c.*261 and 230/29.

6.6. MILITARY COMMAND IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS

It should be no surprise to learn that the structure of military command at Athens changed in time. The authority of the *Athenaiōn Politeia* emphasizes the appointment of the hoplite general, generals for the countryside, and the Piraeus, but such regular commands were not always the case. External factors required adjustments and changes were enforced when a foreign garrison controlled the Mounychia garrison in Piraeus (between 295 and *c.*230). It is clear, however, that the years after the Chremonidean war saw some continuity when the Athenians reasserted their own authority over Attica and appointed their own generals, probably after a brief period of interference from Antigonos Gonatas immediately after the war. Of all appointments it was the general for the countryside that has the richest history in the Classical and early Hellenistic eras.

During the second half of the third century, and perhaps for at least one if not two decades before, the Athenian people, their harvests, and their property were protected by the two generals for the countryside. In 248/7 (archonship of Diomedon), Athenians and foreigners (including metics) responded to an appeal to contribute money (up to 200 drachmai) to the defence of the countryside.[67] Despite the presence of Antigonos' forces in Piraeus during these years, the Athenians could not and did not depend on the Macedonian king for military aid and defence. Numerous honours given to the generals for the countryside throughout the late fourth and third centuries reflect the attention that the Athenians paid consistently to the protection of the land and in particular their harvests. These priorities continued after the Chremonidean war.

The structure of command in the Athenian polis gave the defence of the countryside significantly greater attention in the fourth century and the

[67] *Agora* xvi. 213.

division of the generalship into two regional generalships for the countryside underlined Athenian priorities in the third century and continued the trend. The fortress demes of Eleusis and Rhamnous became institutionalized as focal points in the defence of Attica and the Athenian polis. They were no longer only important strategic strongholds but now the base and headquarters for two regular generalships in Attica. As demes they were less than typical in the early Hellenistic era. The most senior (hoplite) general operated from Athens where his presence may have confirmed the slightly lower status of the generalships for the countryside. The defence of the polis involved protection of the *asty* but the larger part of the evidence supports the view that rural Attica in the third century was the most important strategic and tactical area of operation.

The presence of the Macedonian garrison in Piraeus from 295 to 229 denied the Athenians the ability to install their own official *in situ*. The contrast with the period after the restoration of Piraeus is all too clear. By *c.*200, the Athenians appoint three generals to the Piraeus as a poorly preserved list of civic generals reveals.[68] A specific general is also appointed to Salamis. These two strategic areas did not fall under Athenian jurisdiction in the years after the Chremonidean war. It is not clear when in the years preceding the Chremonidean war the Athenians had introduced their regionalized generalships of the countryside but by the end of the fourth century the role of the Attic regions around Rhamnous and Eleusis was already developing. The concentration of Athenian military effort was as much a necessity as a virtue. Civic infrastructure, command, and manpower were organized by the Athenians only in those areas over which the polis was able to exercise authority. For much of the third century, domination by the Macedonian king curtailed Athenian control of its local territory. The deployment of manpower is the third area that requires investigation.

[68] Papadopoulos 2004: 227 ll. 9–12.

7

Military Manpower

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The command structure and infrastructure of the fortified garrisons has revealed how the defence of rural Attica was a central focus for the Athenian polis in the early Hellenistic period, particularly given the absence of state control over the harbours of Piraeus. The deployment of manpower, evolving in the late Classical and early Hellenistic period, complements these two areas. Epigraphical evidence from the fortress demes and to a lesser extent from the city of Athens, reveals a great deal about how the polis organized and deployed soldiers, particularly its own citizens. This chapter argues that the polis depended considerably on those citizens in both major military operations and garrison duties in Attica.

The absence of a large fleet for most of the early Hellenistic period, and almost certainly from the 290s onwards, had enormous impact on the demand on manpower. No fleet removed the need to provide the 170-strong crews for triremes. However, any downward shifts in population in the last quarter of the fourth century may have more than compensated for this major fall in demand on manpower for military purposes from the fourth to the third century. It has also been suggested that if there was any loss of population in the late fourth century, men of military age most likely made up a significant part. All evidence points to smaller forces operating in Attica than in the fourth century. The cavalry (7.2) and ephebic forces (7.3) were much smaller. But the size of the force of other Athenian citizens deployed in Attica is much more difficult to assess. The citizens provided the backbone of soldiers in the garrisons (7.4) where tactical needs made specific demands on military roles (7.5). Non-Athenian soldiers were certainly important (7.6) but the citizen-soldier was still being mustered for important campaigns and provided significant forces for the garrison demes.

7.2. PROTECTING ATTICA: THE CAVALRY

The numbers of Athenians serving as cavalrymen had fallen dramatically from the fifth century to the early third century. In the early third century,

200 cavalrymen are likely to have made up the regular cohort in service until the hipparchs and phylarchs of 282/1 reorganized the military muster and improved the administration of the cavalry.[1] Their successful administration raised the cavalry force to 300.[2] In the *chora* the magistrates made sure that the cavalry were well provided for.[3] The difficulties of cavalry recruitment were clearly not only a case of personnel but also logistics. The magistrates of 282/1 were honoured for providing grain for the cavalry so that every month the cavalry would be well fed and fit for service.[4] The monthly grain dole had presumably been an issue before in 300/299 when the cavalry had praised the treasurers of Athena for making sure that they were given the grain that was owed to them.[5] Despite the apparent problems, it is worth underlining that the procedures for the cavalry remained stringent and the Boule continuing to exercise its responsibility of overseeing administration.[6] The polis continued to maintain its citizen cavalry force and was required to finance operations: it may have cost as much as 9,000 drachmai per month to keep the cavalry in the field.[7] Inevitably, individual officers had scope for using their own finances to support the cavalry, as is known from decrees that mention the honours for services such as that of Theophrastos in the archonship of Menekrates.[8] The tactical role of the cavalry in the 280s was probably similar to the actions it fulfilled in the 420s against the Spartan invasions of Attica.[9] The mobile defence of the countryside was surely its primary role, and presumably Athens remained the focus of its operations.[10]

[1] See further Oliver 2006*a*.

[2] *SEG* xxi. 525 (Moretti *ISE* i. no. 16); for the consequence on manpower, see Ch. 3, sect. 3.

[3] *SEG* xxi. 525, ll. 10–11.

[4] Ibid. 18–21.

[5] *IG* ii^2 1264 ll. 2–8. It is possible that this oversight, resolved by a payment from the treasurers of Athena may have been connected with tensions between the generals Charias and Lachares. When Charias took control of the Acropolis with his soldiers (*P. Oxy.* 17. 2082 fr. 1 with new readings by Thonemann 2003) he had the People feed his soldiers. It is quite likely that any public reserves of grain (or moneys?) designated for that purpose had been exhausted and left the cavalry without their own grain dole which the treasurers had restored with a cash payment.

[6] *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 6–7, 15, 16–17.

[7] Oliver 2006*a*.

[8] *I. Eleusis* 207 (*SEG* xxv. 157 ll. 14–20, trans. of ll. 14–17): Theophrastos 'cared for cavalry matters (*to hippikon*), provided feed for the horses of all cavalrymen, and so that they might be the best equipped gave to the unit officers (*lochagoi*) 10 *mnae* (600 drachmai) as a contribution (*epidosis*)' and was crowned for this by the Boule and the Demos and the Cavalrymen.

[9] Tactics: Spence 1990.

[10] Consider the support that the cavalry seem to have made in the late fourth century. A decree proposed by Stratokles in 302/1 honours an unknown benefactor who during the previous war, presumably the recently ended Four Year war, had provided 'aid' in the countryside. The honorand was involved in a military operation with the cavalry (*IG* ii^2 503 l. 15: *βοήθεια* implies an action by the honorand, cf. Shear 1978: 3 (Ag. I 7295) l. 49; *I. Rhamnous* 31. 13 where the soldiers will provide aid to the countryside).

The absence of the cavalry from the fortified demes suggests that areas of operation were well distinguished for some Athenian military forces. The cavalry in the Peloponnesian war had been confined to duties around the city of Athens itself and not the borders.[11] The same model seems to have applied in the early Hellenistic period. While some of the officers honoured at Eleusis and Rhamnous had previously served as cavalry commanders, there is no indication that they held cavalry appointments at the fortified demes.[12] The cavalry's role as protectors of Attica was therefore confined to the regions of Attica closer to the city, rather than the regions controlled by Eleusis and Rhamnous.[13] The countryside referred to in the honorific decree from the late 280s in reality may have been only a limited area of Attica around the city of Athens itself, or at least away from the more distant garrison demes.[14]

7.3. EPHEBES

The other Athenian mobile fighting force of the Classical period had been greatly affected by the general downsizing at the end of the fourth century. It almost certainly had lost its earlier operational role on the frontiers of Attica in the third century, although this responsibility would later be recovered.[15] For at least part of the second half of the fourth century, the most significant regular detachment of Athenian soldiers to border forts was ephebic.[16] In the course of their two-year ephebic service, the cohort of 18- to 19-year-old Athenian males served in the Piraeus and in their final year on border duty in the "guardposts" (*phylakteria*).[17] But this regular deployment almost certainly ended in 307 when ephebic service was reduced to one year.[18] The inscription from Piraeus set up in 305/4 honouring the ephebes of the previous year suggests that 300 ephebes now served, as opposed to the 500–600 of the

[11] Spence 1990: 102–4 with map 2.

[12] See Ch. 6, sect. 3.

[13] Cf. Bugh 1988: 191–2.

[14] *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 9–11 (Ag. I 767).

[15] The ephebic oath emphasized the corps's commitment to the territory and its frontiers, RO 88 ll. 16–20: witnesses, however strange or anachronistic, include 'the boundaries of the fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olives, figs' (see RO 88: 446).

[16] Pélékides 1962 in need of revision, remains the fundamental work on the Hellenistic Athenian ephebeia. See De Marcellus 1994; Perrin's forthcoming study of the Hellenistic ephebeia, based on his 1996 doctoral dissertation, promises to address some aspects.

[17] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42. 3–4 with Rhodes 1981: 508; epigraphical evidence for ephebes serving (*c.*340–307) at Eleusis: Reinmuth 1971 no. 3 (*IG* ii^2 1189 = *I. Eleusis* 84, 334/3); *I. Rhamnous* 102 (333–324); Rhamnous: *I. Rhamnous* 98 (333/2); 100 (331/0).

[18] Reinmuth 1971 no. 17 = *IG* ii^2 478.

Lycurgan period.[19] After 307, the ephebes served in Piraeus (until the loss of Mounychia) and the city.[20] This second area becomes prominent as revealed by later decrees. In 266/5 the ephebes of the previous year were praised for fulfilling their guard duties and especially for their defence of the Mouseion.[21] The list of ephebes indicates that a corps of thirty-two (excluding their officers) served at the height of the Chremonidean war. Another decree passed during the troubled years of the early 240s rewarded the ephebes of 250/49 when the corps was twenty-nine strong.[22] None of the other ephebic inscriptions from 262/1 to 230/29 gives any indication of a specific military role.[23]

Although the ephebic numbers seem to have fallen to around thirty per year, a fraction of the corps's strength in the Lycurgan period, the ephebes' training did not become entirely ceremonial or cultural. Later, in the second century they continue to be associated with military actions and recover their association with the frontier forts although by this time foreigners were able to serve as ephebes.[24]

7.4. GARRISONING THE FORTIFIED DEMES

If the border forts were no longer manned by the ephebes in the early Hellenistic period, how were they garrisoned? The epigraphical evidence shows clearly

[19] On the fall in numbers, see Reinmuth 1971: 106 ff.

[20] Service in the Piraeus, ibid. no. 17.

[21] *IG* ii^2 665 + *Hesp.* 57 (1988) 306–7 nos. 1 a–b (Ag. I 6801 + Ag. I 3370; cutter, Tracy *A&M* 82).

[22] Tracy *A&M* 21: EM 12801 (unpublished) + *IG* ii^2 681 + *Hesp.* 59 (1990) 543–7 (Ag. I 7160). For the identification of the fragments as parts of the same *stēlē*, see Tracy *A&M* 21 n. 20; 128; 133 n. 5 (Tracy had previously dated *IG* ii^2 681 + Ag. 7160 to the Chremonidean war before being informed of the new fragment, EM 12801, that gives a secure date).

[23] Ephebes of archonship of Thymochares: *IG* ii^2 700 + *Hesp.* 7 (1938) 110–14 no. 20 (Ag. I 2054); of Thersilochos (passed Polyeuktos): *Hesp.* 7 (1938) 121–3 no. 24 (Ag. I 4323; the restoration by Meritt at l. 8 of defensive duties can not be sustained by any parallel and should be removed); of Philoneos (passed ?Kydenor): *IG* ii^2 766 + Ag. I 3319 + 4162 + 1367 (*Hesp.* 17 (1948) 4–7) + *IG* ii^2 750 + Ag. I 3722 + EM 12800 + EM 2463 (*Hesp.* 57 (1988) 317–19); of Kimon (passed ?Ekphantos): *IG* ii^2 787 + *GRBS* 20 (1979) 331 ff. (= *SEG* xxix. 114); the 230s: *Hesp.* 2 (1933) 158–60 no. 6 (Ag. I 61) (with Tracy 1982: 160, *c.*232); *Hesp.* 16 (1947) 185–7 no. 92 (with readings of Tracy *A&M* 143; Ag. I 4495, *c.*235); mid-third century (265/4–245/4): *Hesp.* 23 (1954) 234–5 no. 3 (Ag. I 3605; *SEG* xiv. 61) + *Horos* 14–16 (2000–3) 67–70 (BA 1153; the date, p. 70); *Hesp.* 36 (1967) 64 no. 8 (Ag. I 1028 with Tracy 1990: 251).

[24] e.g. *IG* ii^2 900 l. 15 (ephebes of the archonship of Eumolpos, 185/4; the *kosmetes* is associated with 'security and de[fence]', significant even it if turns out to be formulaic, see Tracy's restoration of another ephebic text, Tracy 1982: 58–60 = *SEG* xxxii.129 ll. 11–12, *c.*185); *SEG* xxi. 451 l. 13 (*Hesp.* 15 (1946) 199–201 no. 40; Ag. I 166) (archonship of Antigenes, 172/1).

that both Athenian citizen soldiers and non-Athenians (mercenaries) were operating in the fortified demes and forts in the third century. A survey of the different groups involved in the award of honours as recorded on the inscribed decrees and dedications in the fortified demes shows the mixed composition of those stationed in the garrisons. Athenian citizens, citizens as local demesmen, mercenaries, and a range of names to describe such groups are a distinctive feature of the epigraphy from the garrison demes of Attica and peculiar to those demes (see App. 4).[25]

Although there is a wealth of epigraphical evidence, the content is largely honorific and does not always allow us to answer questions about the organization of manpower in Attica. How were Athenians deployed to the garrison demes? Were Athenians liable to undertake "tours of duty"? If so, were such stints at Rhamnous or Eleusis, for example, short or did Athenians serve for a lengthy period of time in such garrisons? And how many Athenians were deployed in this way?

The epigraphical evidence from the garrisons makes all too clear the degree to which Athenian manpower was committed to rural defence and the protection of the polis. But citizen soldiers who served in the garrison demes may have burdened their own households. Were all Athenians liable to be called up and deployed in the garrison demes? Responses to such issues had important ramifications for the society and economies of the polis. If, for example, there was clear evidence of tribal deployment (and deployment by age class) then one could conclude that many an Athenian could expect to find himself serving at some time in the garrisons. The ephebic system had been one way of controlling such regular deployment of Athenians within the polis. But there is no evidence that the Athenians deployed specific age classes to the garrisons in the early Hellenistic period. In fact it remains very difficult to prove one way or the other that soldiers were sent to these posts in Attica by the traditional call-up methods. In the Lamian war the Athenians had mobilized all Athenians up to the age of 40 and allocated three of the ten tribes to defend Attica for what was presumably envisaged as a relatively short-term operation.[26] In 288/7 it is likely that the whole Athenian army was deployed under Phaidros of Sphettos to protect the countryside. Those left to assault the Mouseion were the youngest and oldest. Without doubt the call-up by age cohorts persisted into the 280s and there is little evidence to suggest that the traditional tribal deployment had stopped.[27] Tribal officers

[25] Esp. R. G. Osborne 1990.
[26] Diod. Sic. 18. 10. 2 with Hansen 1985: 37–8.
[27] Paus. 1. 26. 1 for the historical context, see Ch. 4, sect. 4.

continue to be appointed and both taxiarchs[28] and phylarchs[29] are honoured and sometimes receive specific praise for their services to the tribe. But taxiarchs never appear as honorands in the decrees from Eleusis, Rhamnous, or Sunion.[30] When praised at Athens, the taxiarchs had sometimes contributed to the defence, on one occasion providing equipment for defence and maintaining observation posts (*ephedriai*).[31] These honorific inscriptions, set up at Athens, do not hint at any relationship with the garrison demes: the taxiarchs probably had little to do directly with Rhamnous and Eleusis. Within the Athenian command structure, these two garrisons were under the direct and almost certainly exclusive control of the two generals for the countryside.[32]

Two inscriptions give some hope of solving the problem. Of a committee of eleven Athenians responsible for organizing the honours awarded to the general Aristophanes of Leukonoe, six or possibly seven out of twelve tribes were represented. But the primary reason for their selection was to represent men at the three garrisons: five men to represent soldiers stationed at Eleusis, another five for those at Panakton, and one for those at Phyle.[33] In an honorific inscription from Rhamnous, the eight known demesmen chosen to administer awards for an unknown honorand come from only four demes (Rhamnous (four), Eitea (two), Trikorynthos, and Thria) of which only one (Thria) was outside the Rhamnous region.[34] These two documents provide no clear answer on how Athenians were deployed. But the lack of variety in the second inscription, and the absence of any tribal distinction among the distribution of the eleven Athenians in the former inscription, suggests that

[28] Taxiarchs: *AD* 8 (1923): 79–81 no. 2 (*c.*330, taxiarch honoured by *epilektoi* of Antiochis); *IG* ii^2 500 (taxiarchs of 305/4 praised in 302/1); *Agora* xvi. 123 (taxiarchs of 302/1 praised in 302/1); *Agora* xvi. 182 (taxiarchs of 281/0 praised); *IG* ii^2 685 (taxiarchs of 276/5 praised); *Agora* xvi. 185 (taxiarchs of 275/4 praised); *Agora* xvi. 187 (taxiarchs of 272/1 praised in 271/0). There is no evidence to show that only ten taxiarchs were appointed during the period of the twelve tribes (Woodhead at *Agora* xvi. 187 p. 271).

[29] Phylarchs honoured: *I. Rhamnous* 136, passed by cavalry, ll. 3–4; by Boule and People, ll. 8–12; *IG* ii^2 3079.

[30] Taxiarchs continue to be honoured at Athens into the second century BC, see *Agora* xvi. 295 (163/2); *IG* ii^2 956 ll. 49, 52 (161/0); *IG* ii^2 958 ll. 45, 48 (155/4); *IG* ii^2 961 ll. 11, 14 (*c.*140).

[31] *SEG* xiv. 64 ll. 15–16 (taxiarchs of 272/1) and (respectively) *Hesp.* 2 (1933) 156–8 no. 5 ll. 13–14. *Ephedriai* is used to denote reserves in the singular (see also Pritchett 1985: 59 n. 174), but in the plural, observation posts (LSJ *s.v.* ἐφεδρεία).

[32] King Antigonos (Gonatas) seems to have visited the Athenians stationed at Eleusis some time after the Chremonidean war, *I. Eleusis* 193 (= *IG* ii^2 1280) with Habicht 1982: 59–62 (this is followed by Tracy *A&M* 21–2 and Clinton). Habicht suggests the visit coincided with Gonatas' displacement to Corinth in 245–243 for the marriage of his son (see Knoepfler 2001: 288–9) but the precise date must remain less certain.

[33] *I. Eleusis* 196 ll. 37 ff. with Launey 1987: 1041–2. Tribes: Antigonis or Erechtheis, Demetrias, Aegeis, Leontis, Akamantis, Hippothontis. Perhaps Aristion of Phyle (l. 86) represented the soldiers there?

[34] *I. Rhamnous* 28, with comments and references by B. Petrakos, *PAE* 1984 (1989) 205.

Athenian soldiers *stationed* at Eleusis and Rhamnous were not in fact deployed by the established system of tribal call-up.

Indeed, it seems likely that individual Athenians served repeated tours of duty in the garrison demes. At Rhamnous, Apollodoros, a serving general gave land to soldiers who were Serapiastai, members of an association of Serapis. It is possible that the creation of a cult site of the *koinon* of the Serapiastai, and the fact that soldiers were identified with the *koinon*, may indicate that some Athenians served for some considerable period of time in the garrisons. Apollodoros himself owned land in the fortress that he gave to the association. How did he come to acquire the land? The behaviour of the soldiers at Rhamnous (and indeed of the general Apollodoros) does seem more consistent with Athenian soldiers spending some extended time, over a period of years, in one location as opposed to being moved annually from one location to another. There is little evidence in the garrison demes for the tribal officials one normally associates with military organization in the Athenian polis. The *loachagoi*, for example, are a feature of urban Athenian military administration, as are the hipparchs and taxiarchs.[35] The evidence is very thin, but the suggestion here is that the Athenians who served at the garrison demes were not selected by the standard tribal call-up and probably served multiple tours in Attica, often based in the same garrison.

7.5. SPECIAL FORCES

Where clear evidence for tribal military action is found, it is associated with the *epilektoi*. Athenians who served as *epilektoi* are noticeable by their absence from the garrisons.[36] *Epilektoi* included not only the Athenian infantry operating in the successful repulsion of the Celts in 279, but also a group of soldiers from the tribe of Demetrias some time in the third century.[37] *Epilektoi* were almost certainly organized in a tribal fashion:[38] those of the tribe of Antiochis praised their taxiarch Prokleides in *c.*330;[39] the *epilektoi* of Kekropis

[35] Lochagoi: *I. Eleusis* 207 (operating with the taxiarch).

[36] On *epilektoi*, see P. Roussel, 'Sur quelques inscriptions attiques', *RA* 18 (1941) 220–1, and Tritle 1989.

[37] *Epilektoi* and cavalry fighting the Celts: *IG* ii^2 680; Paus. (10. 20. 3) says the Athenians sent 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. *Epilektoi* of Demetrias: *Hesperia* 9 (1940) 72–7 no. 10 (Ag. I 4008 *et al.*).

[38] The praise by fellow demesmen of *epilektoi* does not contradict this statement (*IG* ii^2 1209; see Tritle 1989: 55 n. 8; on the date, (?)318/17, see Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 493 ff.). For the loyalty of fellow demesmen serving in tribal units, see Lys. 16. 14–15: Mantitheos gave *ephodia* to two fellow demesmen but laments also that many fellow tribesmen had died.

[39] The elder *epilektoi*, *SEG* iii. 116 = *AD* 8 (1923) 86–96.

are honoured in the archonship of Archippos (?II, i.e. 318/17).[40] Finally, the volunteer *epilektoi* of the Athenians honoured Demetrios the Great with a bronze equestrian statue in the Agora, possibly in 303, in recognition of recent military successes against Kassander.[41] Although a firm conclusion remains elusive, the balance of evidence—and admittedly its silence—suggests that the Athenians were *not* deployed by tribe to the garrisons. Tribal organization persisted on "campaign" in Attica (or beyond) and also when serving as part of the more select (elite or crack force) of *epilektoi*.[42] Athenians who served in the garrisons answered to and praised their general in recognition of services that honorands had performed for them.

The later development of military organization at the fortress demes moves further away from the traditional military organization of the Athenian army. Innovations in "unit types" (perhaps too grand a description) are found at the fortified demes, and only there. A variety of terms, almost certainly indicators of military function and/or composition, flourished in the third century: *kryptoi*, *hypaithroi*, *paroikoi* all appear at Eleusis and Rhamnous, but nowhere else. Of course, specific terms for such "types" are not peculiar to the third century. For example, *peripoloi* and their commander the *peripolarch* had been a feature of the fourth-century, possibly the late fifth-century army, and perhaps were forerunners of the ephebeia. Aeschines served as a *peripolos* in the 370s and the *peripolarch* operated closely with generals.[43] *Peripoloi* can be identified with rural defence.[44] Nevertheless evidence for them almost completely disappears in the third century, recurring again in the last quarter of the third century when a Demetrios of Phaleron is named as *peripolarch* in a list of Athenian officials.[45] The *peripolarch* survives into the second century.

[40] *Agora* xvi. 105 = *SEG* xxxi. 209. The list of the *epilektoi* of this tribe may in fact be the block made of the composite of fragments, *SEG* xxxvi. 155.

[41] The alternative date in the mid- or late 290s is not supported here. See *ISE* i. 7 for text and Italian translation. First edn. *Ath. Mitt.* 66 (1941) 221–7 with improvements by A. Wilhelm, *Wiener Jahreshefte* 35 (1943) 157–63 (EM 12749); see also Raubitschek 1962: 241 nn. 25–6. For other Athenian celebrations of Demetrios' campaigns in 303, see *Agora* xvi. 114.

[42] *Epilektoi* may not have been a permanent, but were surely an elite, force (Tritle 1989: 56: 'a permanent elite force' of 'battle hardened veterans').

[43] Fifth century: Thuc. 8. 92. 1; *SEG* xxix. 426 col. II 35. Aesch., *In Ctes.* 3. 167–8. See Munn 1993: 186–7. n. 5 (*pace* Lewis *CR* 8 (1958) 108 on the date of Aeschines' ephebeia). Fourth century: Kroll and Mitchel 1980 with L. Robert *Hellenica* 10 (1955) 291–2. For *peripolarchs* see *I. Rhamnous* nos. 92–6.

[44] e.g. Kroll and Mitchel 1980: 88.

[45] Demetrios of Phaleron (*LGPN* ii s.v. Dēmētrius 452): *Ath. Mitt.* 67 (1942): 22 no. 25 ll. 3–4 (similar in type to *IG* ii^2 1708) is redated from the mid-second century to 229–208 (Tracy *ALC* 49). Among other offices, after his entry follows the treasurer of the Stratiotic fund (Polycharmos of Azēnia), the treasurer of the grain fund (Dōsitheos of Myrrhinous) and the treasurer of the prytaneis ([— —]genes of Melite). Two names precede Demetrios' but description of their office does not survive.

It is not clear that *peripoloi* had survived or been recreated but it would be no surprise to find evidence for them in the 230s or later, when other new military groups were appearing. These years were a significant period of change.[46]

The way in which manpower was organized in the Athenian army in the second half of the third century shifts: special units appear in the garrison demes. *Paroikoi* are found for the first time in the 240s, *hypaithroi* appear in the 230s.[47] The *hypaithroi* should be soldiers pitched in temporary camps, typically in tents, an association confirmed by one inscription from Rhamnous in which the *hypaithroi* (principally Athenians) praise Aischrion of Phyle for ensuring that the tent accommodation was well set up.[48] Of the six inscriptions set up by or involving the *hypaithroi* in Attica, the earliest is also the only one that undeniably suggests that both Athenians and non-Athenians are *hypaithroi*. They are clearly a force of Athenians (which could include mercenary soldiers) on campaign in the region and staying in temporary camps, in this case around the fortified demes. They are to be distinguished from those Athenians stationed regularly in the garrison.[49] In all cases the *hypaithroi* honour an Athenian, in four examples a general, and were under the direct command of an Athenian officer and secretary.[50] It is not clear that the *hypaithroi* exercised some specific task peculiar to them and it may well be that the term is applied to Athenian forces (and supplementary mercenaries) on campaign in Attica as opposed to those deployed to the garrisons. Their equipment (which included spears and bows) is not peculiar to their composition as *hypaithroi*: Athenian soldiers stationed at Eleusis used similar weapons.[51]

The *kryptoi* may have been so called because of the nature of their military operations. *Kryptoi* first appear in Attica during the Chremonidean war where they operated under the generalship of Epichares in the countryside around

[46] Cf. Kent 1941: 348; Griffith 1935: 88; in fact *IG* ii^2 1260 belongs at the end of the fourth century.

[47] *Hypaithroi*: Chaniotis 2005: 86. *Paroikoi*: see sect. 6 below.

[48] *I. Rhamnous* 26 ll. 9–10, those chosen to supervise the erection of the decree include two Athenians and Aristokles of Histiaea (a mercenary?). Cf. *I. Eleusis* 198, which is fragmentary; *I. Eleusis* 200 has two Athenians responsible for the decree and partial names of two other unidentified men; *I. Rhamnous* 55 has an Athenian proposer.

[49] Two decrees make clear the separation between the *hypaithroi* and the Athenians stationed at Eleusis and Rhamnous: *I. Eleusis* 211 distinguishes the *hypaithroi* from the Athenians stationed at the garrison, *I. Rhamnous* 47 distinguishes the *hypaithroi* from those citizens serving at Rhamnous.

[50] Honours for Athenian generals: *I. Rhamnous* 26, 49, 55; the Athenian commander and secretary of the *hypaithroi* are Ph[il]oti[?mos] of Rhamnous and Ariston [of Prasiai], *I. Rhamnous* 26.

[51] Arms used by *hypaithroi*: *I. Rhamnous* 26 ll. 12–13; similar equipment for soldiers at Eleusis, *IG* ii^2 1285 (*I. Eleusis* 194 l. 25).

Rhamnous. They defended the agricultural harvest and workers and provided warning of enemy attack from vantage points.[52] When they are encountered a second time during the 230s their role is less clear although they are composed of both Athenians and non-Athenians (mercenaries). The fact that copies of a decree in honour of Philotheos, the general for the coastal countryside, were to be set up in both Rhamnous and Sunion shows that their role was relevant throughout the territory under the command of the general.[53]

All these developments were found *only* at the garrison demes, and from around the middle third of the third century onwards. Alongside citizen soldiers, mercenaries served among both the *kryptoi* and *hypaithroi*. The manpower requirements of the garrisons at Eleusis and Rhamous for much of the third century would have affected the life of individual citizens, particularly if, as seems likely, Athenian soldiers were serving there for most—or all—of the year. In the 330s duties at the border forts had been fulfilled by the ephebes as part of a two-year detachment to military duties. In the 230s the regular deployment of such a group had long disappeared. New solutions had been required, particularly from the late 280s onwards, and perhaps sporadically before. The later distinction between *hypaithroi* and Athenians stationed at Rhamnous and Eleusis reinforces an argument that Athenian soldiers were detached regularly to the garrisons, possibly for a season of service, possibly longer.[54]

The epigraphic habit of Athenian soldiers stationed at the garrisons reflects a tendency to behave in every way as though a microcosm of Athenian political society on detachment to either Eleusis or Rhamnous. The focus of the honorific decrees was not only the honorand(s) but also future officers. The soldiers wanted to make clear that incoming commanders should follow such examples. The implication is that in the garrisons the universal needs of the soldier community were ever present: adequate accommodation, the supply of food in a crisis (and at a good price), and sufficient arms. The frequency and intensity of the epigraphic habit of the soldiers (and demesmen) does indicate that these concerns were immediate and localized. The publication of honours for officers in the garrison demes rarely extends beyond the space for which such officers were responsible. In the 230s, however, the Athenian soldiers had the statue and crown for the general Aristophanes declared not only at Eleusis in the Haloia and at Panakton in the Festival for Demeter but also at Athens in the City Dionysia: that

[52] *I. Rhamnous* 3 with Knoepfler 1993.

[53] *I. Rhamnous* 20.

[54] Cf. Pouilloux 1954: 494 n. 6; Kent 1941: 349, *hypaithroi* are 'either mercenaries or ephebes, or a mixture of both'.

restriction still seems to be in force as the declaration is made in the name of the Athenian soldiers stationed at Eleusis, Panakton, and Phyle.[55] Nevertheless, this is a rare intrusion into Athens of the honours awarded by those soldiers stationed at and citizens of the garrison demes.

7.6. NON-CITIZEN SOLDIERS

The distribution of manpower to the garrisons was almost certainly a major issue for Athens. Athenians soldiers may have carried the brunt of military duties but non-citizen soldiers, assumed usually to be mercenaries, supported them.[56] The non-citizens in certain periods may have been installed with the (financial?) support of the Macedonian king (from the 260s to *c.*230). But here it is suggested that the Athenian polis was responsible for engaging the foreign soldiers in the garrisons.

Except for one or two exceptional cases, Macedonian and Athenian military command remained relatively distinct for much of the relevant period during the third century (see Ch. 4 sects. 4–5). An Athenian general had been assigned to non-Athenian soldiers for some time (*epi tous xenous*). An unknown Athenian was praised for several achievements including his service as general for the non-Athenians before *c.*320.[57] Phaidros had occupied this position on three occasions, possibly in the early third century; Lachares held the position in the 290s; and in the 230s, Philotheos of Phrearrioi had the post before progressing to the generalship for the coastal countryside.[58] Athenian generals who were assigned to one of the two countryside generalships at Eleusis or Rhamnous commanded at the same time both their fellow-citizen soldiers and also the non-Athenians.[59]

In Attica during the third century the general *epi tous xenous* is not seen. If mercenaries can be referred to as *xenoi* or *misthophoroi*, such terms are never used directly to describe non-Athenian soldiers in Attica. *Xenoi* is implied

[55] *IG* ii^2 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196); see Demosthenes *On the Crown* 18. 121 and Gwatkin 1957. On this point see further Oliver 2007.

[56] Kent 1941: 350 n. 15. 'Soldiers' need not refer to mercenaries; Griffith 1935: 84. On such problems of vocabulary, see the useful cautions of Couvenhes 2004: 79–81. I avoid the term mercenary. It is not always clear how payment for the non-Athenian soldiers in Attica was financed.

[57] *IG* ii^2 379.

[58] Phaidros: *IG* ii^2 682 l. 25; Lachares: *P. Oxy.* 17. 2082; Philotheos: *I. Rhamnous* 20, during the archonship of Lysanias, 234/3.

[59] e.g. *I. Rhamnous* 8 (the Antigonid-appointed Athenian general, Apollodoros); 10–11 (Thoukritos); 20 (Philotheos); 23 (Dēmostratos); 26 (Aischriōn); 27–8 (Archandros); 38–9 (Telesippos); *I. Eleusis* 196 (Aristophanes); 210 (Ekphantos).

when a leader of non-Athenian troops is referred to as *xenagos* but the term *hēgemōn* is more widely used for commanders of non-Athenian or mixed forces.[60] At Eleusis, the non-Athenian soldiers who contributed to the awards given to the Athenian general Aristophanes are identified with their own leader (*hēgemōn*) Gnosias of Phokis.[61] Another Eleusinian inscription sees a mixed group of (mostly) Athenians and some non-Athenians under the leadership of Artemon who seems to be an Athenian but also *hēgemōn*.[62] The term *xenagos* distinguishes a commander of non-Athenian soldiers at Rhamnous where its use seems to be interchangable with *hēgemōn*.[63]

Although it remains almost impossible to quantify the numbers of non-Athenian soldiers serving either in the garrisons or in the city of Athens, the evidence suggests they were a minority.[64] Indeed the evidence of the largest single presence of foreign—presumably mercenary—soldiers comes from the city of Athens itself on a stone that preserves ethnics for most of the 151 foreign men from at least fifty-four different locations.[65] In contrast, the list of forty-six non-Athenians under Gnosias' command who joined in giving honours to Aristophanes almost certainly made up a fraction of the forces there.[66] It is possible that not all the non-Athenians had contributed to the setting up of the statue for Aristophanes.[67] But the eleven Athenians, listed before the foreigners, clearly *represent* their fellow citizens and were voted in proportion to the relative numbers of citizens at the forts.[68] If the number of Athenians had been equal to, or not considerably higher than, the non-Athenians, then both the Athenians and the foreigners would have been listed by name. But the foreigners were only a *small* proportion of the total force that praised Aristophanes. Nevertheless they are given respect and rewarded

[60] Couvenhes 2004: 87–8.

[61] *IG* ii^2 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196): he is *hēgemōn*, l. 94; the non-Athenian soldiers are 'those deployed with Gnosias' (*hoi meta Gnōsiou tetagmenoi*), l. 42.

[62] *I. Eleusis* 210 ll. 5–6 (*IG* ii^2 1958): Artemon is assumed to be from an Athenian deme, Diomeia (or possibly Deiradiotai; *LGPN* ii s.v. Artemōn 37). The list of names includes the secretary Pythōn who is from Lamptrai, an interpretation which depends on reading two different abbreviations for the same demotic (*Lampt* and *Lam*; *LGPN* ii s.v. Python 16). This is an example of the variety of abbreviations for demotics that can occur in a single document (Whitehead 1990*b*: 106).

[63] *Xenagos*: Sopolis So[— —] of Phokis (*I. Rhamnous* 57) and Sarap[. . .] (*I. Rhamnous* 56); *hēgemōn*: Timokrates (*I. Rhamnous* 11) and As[- - -] (*I. Rhamnous* 18). Dionysios of Klazomenai may have been a *hēgemōn* (*I. Rhamnous* 13).

[64] Cf. Kent 1941: 350 argues the *high* proportion of mercenaries decreases after 230/29.

[65] *IG* ii^2 1956, from the Erechtheion, on the Acropolis; Rosivach 2000*b*.

[66] *I. Eleusis* 196 (*IG* ii^2 1299), at ll. 118–41, assumes the list of broken names is of non-Athenians.

[67] The non-Athenians listed are 'the following of the non-Athenians who joined in setting up (i.e. of the statue)', *I. Eleusis* 196 l. 93.

[68] *IG* ii^2 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196) ll. 38–9, 81–92, the selection of the eleven Athenians and their names; Gnosias and mercenaries, ll. 93 ff.

for their personal contribution to the honours by being named individually unlike all the Athenians serving at Eleusis.[69]

The Eleusinian inscription recording honours for the general Ekphantos provides conclusive evidence for the strong presence of Athenian as opposed to non-Athenian troops. In *c.*210 the Athenians and foreigners who honoured the Ekphantos of Thria are named individually.[70] Of the sixty-four identifiable names only nine are *not* Athenian.[71] Athenians provide both the leader and the administrator.[72] The high proportion of Athenians to foreign troops shows not only that far more Athenians were among those honouring Ekphantos but also that the soldiers serving at the garrisons were predominantly Athenian.

Mercenaries were, of course, an important factor in the military manpower for the Athenian polis and may sometimes have provided extra help in significant areas of expertise.[73] Some mercenaries may have been provided by external powers such as the Macedonian king, a possibility for the force led by Gnōsias at Eleusis. The Tarentine detachment of (?)cavalry serving at Athens in the later 280s may also have been a mercenary force. They would have provided much-needed additional numbers to the cavalry which had fallen to a low of 200 in the 280s but could also have been a type of cavalry unit as opposed to one with a specific ethnic origin.[74]

The composition of the non-Athenian troops serving in Athens almost certainly changed with time and circumstances. The foreign soldiers at Eleusis serving under the Athenian general Aristophanes were part of the forces defending Attica in the Demetrian war.[75] The non-Athenians present a distinctive Macedonian-oriented force, as might be expected when Athens was

[69] *IG* ii^2 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196).

[70] Clinton's date, after Habicht 1982: 161–2.

[71] *I. Eleusis* 210 (*IG* ii^2 1958), ll. 10 (Byzantium), 16 (Keos), 17, 69 (Tanagra), 23, 49 (Thessaly), 46 (Magnesia), 48 (Soli), 64 (Gortyn).

[72] Over twenty demes and most of the Athenian tribes (out of a possible thirteen if the inscription dates to *c.*210) are represented. Aegeis is the only tribe not definitely represented but that depends on whether demotics refer to Upper (Antigonis) or Lower Anykle (Aegeis), and Halai Aixonides (Kekropis) or Halai Araphenides (Aegeis) (*I. Eleusis* 210 ll. 18, 43, 71 (Ankyle) 40, 78 (Halai); *IG* ii^2 1958, different line numbers). The deme origin of the Athenian soldiers has no relationship with the size of the deme that might be reflected by quotas for councillors. At least four (possibly six if Epi- is not Epieikidai, Whitehead 1990*b*: 120–1) come from Epikephisia, which provides one councillor each year for the Boule.

[73] I do not see that the proxeny decree *IG* ii^{2}732 + Add. p. 666 (with *SEG* xxxiii. 120) provides much evidence for the employment of mercenaries, *pace* Habicht 1997: 165 n. 61. Tracy *ALC* 259 says it dates before 229.

[74] Camp, *Hesp.* 65 (1996): 252–8 with pl. 76. For the fall to 200, see *SEG* xxi. 525 ll. 7–11. Tarentine cavalry had for some time served in various Hellenistic armies, e.g. for Demetrios Poliorketes in 312, Diod. Sic. 19. 82. 2.

[75] Athens and the Demetrian war (239–229): Habicht 1997: 159, 163–6.

aligned with the Macedonian king (Demetrios II) who was sending soldiers to support the Greek communities in their efforts to resist the incursions launched by Aratos in central Greece.[76] The troops come from communities who had strong links at one time or other with Demetrius II.[77] The later inscription listing a few non-Athenians is less focused and the foreigners' origins more diverse. The difference in composition may reflect the stronger royal influence on the supply of non-Athenian troops in Attica in the Demetrian war.[78]

One specific term is associated with non-Athenian forces serving in Attica. *Paroikoi* at Rhamnous appear as early as *c.*248/7 on the dating now assigned by Petrakos to *I. Rhamnous* 27. This is one of three inscriptions to have honoured the Athenian general Archandros, son of Kallippos of Eleusis who is the subject of an unpublished decree from Rhamnous that mentions his generalship of the countryside at Rhamnous in the archonship of Diomedon (248/7).[79] It is likely that both published decrees for Archandros (*I. Rhamnous* 27, of the *paroikoi*; 28, of the *koinon* of those living in Rhamnous) were passed at the same time and inspired by the same events. *Paroikoi* do seem to have been non-Athenian soldiers serving at Rhamnous but invariably with Athenian officers. In one decree the *paroikoi* honoured the Athenian Demostratos, almost certainly a general, along with the officer appointed to command the *paroikoi*, and the attendant.[80] Both these last officials were Athenian but the three men from the *paroikoi* who were chosen to take care of what had been decided were non-Athenians.[81] One of the three, Ktēsōn from Herakleia, spends a significant amount of time at Rhamnous and operated at a high level among his fellow *paroikoi*.[82] Ktēsōn, like some Athenians such as the

[76] Hammond and Walbank 1988: 325 for the mercenaries sent by Demetrios II.

[77] The mercenaries included Argives, Cretans, Macedonians, an Opountian, Phocians, a Plataean, and Thessalians. Only two individuals, from Megara and Megalopolis, represented communities fighting alongside Aratos (Megara: Hammond and Walbank 1988: 329; Lydiades released his tyrannical control over Megalopolis and the city fell in with Aratos, ibid. 330–1; Plut. *Aratus* 26–30).

[78] *I. Eleusis* 210.

[79] The other two are *I. Rhamnous* 28 and the unpublished *Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7–8; he is also named at *I. Rhamnous* 118.

[80] *I. Rhamnous* 23; honoured by Athenian soldiers at *I Rhamnous* 22.

[81] *I. Rhamnous* 23 ll. 20–1: Ktēsōn from Herakleia (*FRA* no. 2021); Nikōn from Astakos (*FRA* no. 1283); and Akmaios from Demetrias (*FRA* no. 1486).

[82] Ktēsōn is chosen to perform similar duties honouring the Athenian Aristophon (a general, as he receives a gold crown): the crown is not specified as one given by *paroikoi* but simply by 'the soldiers' (*I. Rhamnous* 25); the same soldiers also honour Athenian officials, an attendant and a secretary. In a third decree Ktēsōn plays the same role: the *paroikoi* honour the Athenian officer commanding them (*I. Rhamnous* 39 l. 10). In a fourth decree, the *paroikoi* on the motion proposed by Ktēsōn, honour both the Athenian general Telesippos and the Athenian commander of the *paroikoi* he has appointed (Antimachos of Oinoe); Ktēsōn is chosen again by the *paroikoi* as one of three to supervise the execution of the decree. The other three inscriptions

contemporary commander of the *paroikoi*, Antimachos of Oinoe, clearly spent several years at Rhamnous performing military duties.[83] It is perhaps this feature of the *paroikoi* that has promoted their status beyond what might be expected of a non-Athenian serving as a soldier in the Athenian polis.

Important questions about the role and status of non-Athenians serving in Attica are raised by terms such as *paroikoi*.[84] Gauthier challenged the assumption that *paroikoi* was a term synonymous with *metoikoi* and suggested that it described the status of non-citizens *vis-à-vis* their resident polis.[85] For Pouilloux had considered that *paroikoi* in Attica were mercenary soldiers who had stayed on to enjoy a better status than other non-Athenian soldiers. These enhanced non-Athenians (Pouilloux's *paroikoi*) were entitled to the same financial rights as citizens but not the political benefits.[86] In a wider study of the institution of *paroikoi*, Papazoglou also claimed that *paroikoi* in Attica were neither metics nor native citizens but former mercenaries given a particular status without political rights.[87]

Certainly the inscriptions show they are non-Athenians but also that they continued to fulfil a military function under Athenian leadership.[88] The novelty is that the *paroikoi* were responsible for their own decrees *independently* of other Athenian soldiers or demesmen.[89] The nearest parallel to such

lack the upper parts that recorded the proposer (*I. Rhamnous* 38 ll. 1, 20). A little later, Ktēsōn, no longer part of the *paroikoi* establishment, is absent from subsequent *paroikoi* decisions (*I. Rhamnous* 43, 47, not fully preserved; 51). Had he died? No evidence for commemoration and he is not apparently among the homonymous Herakleots recorded on tombstones in Attica (*FRA* nos. 2022–5; *IG* ii^2 8705, 8616, 8706, 8787). Note another Ktēsōn (from Sinope) had been prominent at Rhamnous a few years before (*I. Rhamnous* 20 l. 34).

[83] The Athenian Antimachos was appointed commander of the *paroikoi* under at least four separate generals at Rhamnous (*I. Rhamnous* 23 ll. 11–12, 26–8; 38 ll. 13–15; 40 and 42; 43), proposed a decree there (ibid. 45), and was a member of the Amphierastai who helped to restore the cult sanctuary in *c.*214 (*I. Rhamnous* 167 l. 30, col. I).

[84] Papazoglou 1997: 190–3, inscriptions P17a–g.

[85] Gauthier 1988 with Papazoglou 1997: 157–8.

[86] Pouilloux 1954: 134; 1956: 73 (with Papazoglou 1997: 149–50) and Gauthier 1988: 37. In Asia Minor, however, they were civil foreigners not only distinct from the local residents *katoiokoi*, but part of a clear hierarchy (see e.g. from Ephesos, *isoteleis*, *paroikoi*, *hieroi*, *eleutheroi*, *xenoi*, *Syll.*^{3} 742, 45).

[87] Papazoglou 1997: 211.

[88] Non-Athenians: *I. Rhamnous* 38, 43, 51. For Athenian generals: Telesippos, Theotimos, Laches (restored), (?)Demostratos, see respectively *I. Rhamnous* 38, 43, 47, *Ergon* 1991 [1992] 4; for their leader Antimachos and *epimeletes*, Leon, see *I. Rhamnous* 40–2, 38, 43, and 40 respectively.

[89] *I. Rhamnous* 11 seems to have been passed by a group of mixed Athenians and non-Athenians (ll. 23–6) but its poor state of preservation prevents identification of specific named groups. This decree is also notable for the rather unusual description of the soldiers as those stationed under [T]im[o]krates. He might be a *xenagos* (as Sarapiōn, *I. Rhamnous* 56 l. 3, and Sōpolis son of Sosistratos of Phocis, *I. Rhamnous* 57 ll. 5–6, are elsewhere described) or play a role similar to that of the earlier Poseidōnios who is present at Rhamnous with soldiers appointed to him but who may not have held an Athenian office (*I. Rhamnous* 4).

decision-making in the fortified demes is the decree of the *isoteleis* in the 250s at Rhamnous.[90] In the third century, non-Athenian soldiers had often been party to decisions and decrees passed by Athenian soldiers on other occasions but rarely appear alone. *Paroikoi* may have been former or indeed serving mercenaries enjoying an elevated status at Rhamnous (for they appear only here) but they did not enjoy the range of possibilities accorded to *paroikoi* in Asia Minor.[91] There is indeed little to suggest that their concerns were different from those of other soldiers in the garrison demes: in 215/14 they praise the general Theotimos for ensuring that the farmers could work the land in safety, a concern familiar from other decrees of Athenian soldiers. But there is no indication that they owned land or had any other specific rights. Certainly some *paroikoi* might have operated in what could be the higher circles of garrison life, such as Nikōn of Astakos who was the only non-Athenian listed among the Amphierastai to contribute to restoring the sanctuary.[92] Indeed, there is little in the epigraphical evidence to suggest that the Athenian experience of non-citizens in local rural garrisons was one that created the sorts of tensions and problems that are seen in other parts of the Hellenistic world.[93]

7.7. MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN ATHENS AND ATTICA

Ultimately this survey of Athenian and non-Athenian soldiers has placed some emphasiz on the Athenian contribution to the defence of their own territory. The actual evidence suggests that the Athenian polis relied less on mercenary soldiers than older studies of Hellenistic cities might have led us to believe.[94] Indeed it is now no longer the case that the Hellenistic period is seen as a time when civic pride and military service performed by the citizen soldier had disappeared.[95] The use of manpower at Athens shows the crucial role performed by non-Athenian soldiers, but underlines that citizens defending their own territory performed the bulk of the operations in Attica.

The organization of manpower underlines the move towards discrete areas of operation within Attica. Taxiarchs, cavalry, and possibly even orthodox tribal deployment, all seem to be absent from the garrison demes. Instead

[90] *I. Rhamnous* 8.
[91] Asia Minor: Bertrand 2005.
[92] *I. Rhamnous* 167 l. 30, col. II.
[93] Chaniotis 2005: 88–90.
[94] Couvenhes 2004 is a useful assessment of this earlier work.
[95] Chaniotis 2005: 20–5; Baker 1991 is an important turning point in this revisionist process.

the fortresses enjoyed protection from Athenian troops supplemented by mercenaries on a relatively long-term basis, possibly all year round. The relevant regional general for the countryside and his subalterns who commanded units such as the *paroikoi* were the military hierarchy in the demes. Here we do not see the officers associated typically with the tribal structures of the Athenian army. The tribal operation of the Athenian military is witnessed at Athens where cavalry and infantry commanders (taxiarchs, hipparchs, phylarchs) receive praise from both the state and the relevant soldiers (cavalrymen or tribal infantrymen). Their spheres of operation seem clear. The cavalry was based in Athens, could operate further afield in Attica, and be deployed (although rarely) abroad. The same was true for infantry deployed by tribe. Exactly how deployment to the fortified demes was organized is not clear and further evidence would be most welcome. The view offered here is that the garrisons had specific detachments of Athenian (and non-Athenian) soldiers. These forces were supplemented by additional Athenian armies in times of extra tension, as in the 230s.

The deployment of manpower in Attica complements the infrastructure—the garrison demes—on which defence of the polis had developed. Athenian soldiers were deployed to these demes on terms and conditions that differed significantly from those called up for service by tribe. Such a structure is absent in the fourth century. In short, military institutions in Attica reveal a clear regionalized division of command. The hoplite general continued to be the principal military office in the Athenian polis, was responsible for Athens, and would lead campaigns abroad. The two generals for the countryside, one in the coastal district, the other in the inland district at Eleusis, were the masters of their respective regions. The soldiers under their command, citizen and non-citizen alike, turned to these generals for support. That these generals were so accustomed to responding to the needs of their soldiers has created a disparity of evidence in their favour in the form of the decrees and honours awarded to them at Eleusis, Rhamnous, Sunion, Phyle, and Panakton. Despite this distortion in the quantity of evidence, there was a clear hierarchy of command.

A system of defence in the Attic countryside reveals the priority that the Athenian polis gave to its agrarian economies on the regional and micro-regional levels. And the citizens of Athens made their own contribution to the manpower that was required to defend the polis. That contribution in terms of serving in the army, as ephebes, as cavalrymen, as military leaders, was a major civic contribution to the protection of the state. But Athenians and non-Athenians alike contributed in many other ways to preservation of the polis, and these are explored in the final section.

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Part III

Polis Economies: Finance, Food, and Friends

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8

Saving the Polis: Civic Finances

8.1. CIVIC FINANCES IN EARLY HELLENISTIC ATHENS: REVENUES

The finances of the Greek polis depended on the regular revenues from its residents (citizen and non-citizen) and taxes on transactions and sales.[1] Commerce was one of the most important sources of revenues for the Greek poleis.[2] In the fourth century Athens' sales taxes, harbour duties, fees for auctions, and metic taxes all depended to some degree on the commercial prosperity of the polis.[3] In early Hellenistic Athens the contributions that individual citizens made to the polis continued to be an important source of money in terms both of direct taxation and extraordinary payments.[4] We have already seen the degree to which citizens were performing military duties in Attica as soldiers and military officials (Chs. 6 and 7). The wealth of the local population, and not just the civic body, played a crucial role in financing other ways of supporting the polis. Individuals at Athens were praised for all kinds of aspects of polis life such as providing sacrifices, financing festivals, and funding building projects. Some individuals enjoyed a level of wealth that allowed them to pay vast sums towards the operation of the polis: Eurykleides spent large sums of money probably when treasurer of the stratiotic fund, paid seven talents when serving as *agōnothetēs*, in addition to many other expenditures.[5] This chapter looks at the civic finances of Athens and in particular focuses on the contributions that individuals and especially Athenian citizens made within the institutions of the polis. Athens in the early Hellenistic period, like many other poleis, was able to draw on the wealth of its citizen and non-citizen population and the readiness of the former to serve on and contribute finances towards civic magistracies.

[1] Bresson 2000: 252: 'l'État restait donc avant tout une machine à collecter et à redistribuer les *prosodoi*', and, in general, ibid. 243–61 (first published in *Ktema* 23 (1998) 243–62).

[2] Migeotte 1995; Purcell 2005.

[3] See Ch. 1.

[4] Migeotte 2003.

[5] Eurykleides: *IG* ii^2 834 + Add. 668 (*Syll.*^{3} 497); ll. 1–5, actions before 229: Gauthier1985: 83; Habicht 1982: 118–19.

Athenian revenues must have taken a plunge in the early Hellenistic era. Mining silver had almost certainly been abandoned at least for most of the first half of the third century and recommenced in the period following the end of the Chremonidean war, but then only in a limited capacity.[6] The overseas territories no doubt remained an important economic resource and perhaps source of revenue.[7] Revenues from trade are likely to have been affected by changes in the late fourth and early third centuries. Two principal conditions will have disrupted the movement of commodities and affected revenues. First, during wartime or civic unrest some merchants could be discouraged from sailing to sell commodities or from arranging trading voyages. At Athens Demetrios Poliorketes had deterred such agents by the execution of a trading ship's helmsman and merchant in 295. How much impact specific events had on such movement of commodities over anything other than the short term is difficult to gauge. The realities of the economies of ancient Greece meant that traders could and did seek markets where good prices for their commodities could be found. Secondly, the submission of some powers to an external force *may* have required a polis also to yield areas of administration from which revenues were derived. For example, when the Athenians lost control of Mounychia to a foreign garrison, they lost the powers to install a civic military official in the Piraeus. Did such change also affect the normal appointment of civic officials in the Piraeus to supervise transactions and extract revenue from the *emporion*? If so, did the polis lose the revenues from commercial operations in the Piraeus?

It is difficult to know whether either Demetrios Poliorketes or Antigonos Gonatas took advantage, in addition to the military benefits, of the revenues that they might have been able to extract from the markets of communities such as the Piraeus. Did the Athenian polis also lose the revenues from the Piraeus when they had already lost the fortress of Mounychia and wider military authority in Piraeus? It is very difficult to answer this fundamental question either way. There is every indication that the Hellenistic kings did in fact develop ways of exploiting the economic resources of the territories under their control. Billows has argued that Antigonos Monophthalmos did not necessarily set out to damage the local economies of the polis.[8] The way Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes treated Athens after 307 indicates efforts to reinvigorate the local economy as the gift of wood for the construction of a hundred ships would suggest.[9] The same might be true

[6] Oliver 2001*a*; cf. Day 1942: 13, resumption only after 229 BC.

[7] *IG* ii^2 1492 ll. 133–4, 305/4 for money from Lemnos and Imbros.

[8] Billows 1990: 286–92. For taxation on the scale of the Hellenistic Kingdom, see Aperghis 2001; 2004.

[9] Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1; transported (?) mid-305, *IG* ii^2 1496 col. B ll. 118–24.

of Demetrios' later plans for a large fleet with which he could recover the lost territory of his father.[10] Certainly, when Athens was openly hostile to the Hellenistic king who controlled the Piraeus garrison, it was unlikely that the polis could draw revenues from the Piraeus. That possibility may well have existed in the years 295–288 or 262–230.

The Athenian desire for the unification of Piraeus and Athens in 282/1 does suggest that the harbours were not likely to have been incorporated either as territory or as fiscal space within the Athenian polis during the five years of conflict with the Macedonians.[11] The same is probably true of the period 268/7 to 262/1. Decrees from the Piraeus in these years belong to a foreign cult and do not necessarily prove that Piraeus was integrated with the polis.[12] Taylor's image gives the right impression: "They [residents of Piraeus] and their fellow Athenians could not have failed to feel the ignominy of the walls, gates and checkpoints manned by the Macedonians. It would be clear to them that the Peiraieus was no longer fully Athenian." If circumstances such as these had existed, it is certain that the polis would not have extracted revenues from the Piraeus. These conditions would not, however, have prevented whatever communities remained in Piraeus from enjoying the opportunities that the Macedonian control might have offered.

Whether the Athenians had the right to draw revenues from the Piraeus at other times (e.g. 295–288; 262–230/29) is less clear.[13] Officials with responsibilities for commercial activity may well have been involved directly with trade in the Piraeus. When the Athenian constitution attributed to Aristotle was written *sitophylakes* were appointed to both Athens and the Piraeus.[14] After 307, only one inscription explicitly mentions the board and there is nothing to suggest that the officials were divided in such a fashion that six operated in the Agora of Athens and the other six in the Piraeus.[15] Other operations performed by Athenian officials are likely to have needed access to the Piraeus. The *sitōnai*, a board of Athenian officials whose existence is known from several inscriptions, are likely to have needed commercial operations to go via the Piraeus. But it is not certain that their activity required administration of the Piraeus to be controlled by the Athenians. Inscriptions referring to the

[10] Plut. *Demetr.* 43. 4.

[11] *Agora* xvi. 181 ll. 30–1 = *SEG* xxv. 89.

[12] *IG* ii^2 1273 passed in the archonship of Euboulos (II), 265/4, see M. J. Osborne 2004.

[13] On the separate identity of the Piraeus in the Hellenistic period, see further Oliver 2006*c*.

[14] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3.

[15] *Agora* xvi. 194. Note that *Agora* xvi. 127, identified as a decree honouring the *sitophylakes*, is now dated *c*.325, Tracy, *ADT*: 124. For the division of operations of the *sitophylakes*, see *Agora* xvi. 200. It was only much later, in the middle of the second century, that a specific secretary for the *sitophylakes* in the *asty* (i.e. in Athens) is known, *Hesp.* 6 1937: 460–1 no. 8 l. 8 (Ag. I 113; *c*.150, Tracy, *ALC* 249, for the date).

sitōnai who served in the archonships of Olbios, Lyistheides, and Diomedon give no indication that their role extended beyond the Agora of Athens where inscriptions in their honour were set up.[16] The question of the extent of Athenian state control of administration in the Piraeus cannot be answered with certainty. The hypothesis suggested tentatively here is that the polis was not able to install its own officials in the Piraeus so long as a governor was a foreign appointee. Herakleitos of Athmonon was appointed general of the Piraeus and operated in line with the policy of Antigonos Gonatas.[17] The decree passed in his honour by the Salaminian residents gives no impression that Herakleitos' appointment was part of the Athenian civic administration. But after Athens recovered the Piraeus the polis very quickly reabsorbed administration and control of the space. Individuals who are praised for transporting grain to Athens are now obviously using the Piraeus, a fact that is not evident from the epigraphical record between 295 and 229; state decrees were set up in the harbour; even assembly meetings were held there.[18]

Although the evidence for the operation of state revenues in Athens during this period is very poor, some aspects of civic finances can be seen. Athens was like any typical Greek city in the history of the polis in that it relied on not only the community of citizens but also its non-citizen residents. Men of substance, especially the Athenian "propertied families", not only continued to serve in magistracies or as cavalrymen (and no doubt as soldiers) but also used their wealth to support the polis. In the Classical period such services to the polis consisted of liturgies. But there had been major changes to this indirect taxation on the wealthy when the liturgy system was reformed in the period of Demetrios of Phaleron and the years following his expulsion from Athens in 307. The *chorēgia* had ended by 307. The polis then became the *chorēgos* and an *agōnothetēs* replaced the many *chorēgoi* as the presiding official.[19] Of the trierarchy nothing is heard in the early Hellenistic period until the remarkable reference to Menandros son of Tisandros of Eitea who was "appointed trierarch for the archonship of Niketes (225/4)". He spent from his own funds, for the fitting out of a boat, as much money as those who had been appointed to this task indicated.[20]

[16] *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 (Olbios); *Agora* xvi. 188 (Lysitheides); ibid. 216 (Diomedon; passed in the archonship of Kydenor).

[17] *IG* ii^2 1225 ll. 7–9 for his appointment; following Antigonos Gonatas' policy, ll. 15–16.

[18] The Athenian Assembly meets in Piraeus: e.g. *SEG* xxxiv. 91; a decree (probably) set up in Piraeus: *IG* ii^2 834 + Add. 668 (*Syll.*^{3} 497), the stone was found in the Piraeus where it is most likely to have been set up in view of the honorand's contributions to the harbour's liberation (dated *c.*215, Habicht 1982: 120–4; cf. Liddel 2003: 91–2); transporting grain: 176/5, *IG* ii^2 903 ll. 7–9 = *SEG* xxxii. 132 = *REG* 95 (1982) 275–90 with Tracy, *ALC* 134.

[19] Wilson 2000: 270–6; Lambert 2000–3 on the first *agōnothetai.*

[20] *I. Rhamnous* 31 ll. 3–7. The remains of a representation of a trireme decorating the pediment of this decree have survived above the moulding.

The loss of the fleet had affected not only the use of resources but also, and presumably in a positive way, the wealth of the richer citizens (and metics). There is little evidence that Athens has anything more than a small number of ships for the greater part of the third century. Of course, there is some indication that Athenian ships had responded to the threat of the Celtic invasion in 278/7 but Pausanias' testimony may well exaggerate the role of the Athenians.[21] It is likely therefore that any significant duties as trierarch had disappeared almost certainly by the end of the fourth century: there is no evidence that Athenians continued to act in this capacity until we hear about Menandros in 225/4. During the Chremonidean war, a fragmentary list of Athenian magistrates in 266/5 suggests some citizens had responsibility for some sort of maritime operations, the precise details of which are unfortunately obscure.[22] It would seem that apart from cavalry service, the wealthiest Athenians were relieved of major financial burdens by the start of the third century. Even here there had been some change as the numbers of serving cavalrymen had fallen dramatically to a low of 200 before 283/2.[23]

Another of the important liturgies in the Classical period was the *eisphora*. The polis continued to raise revenues from this source in the early Hellenistic period, unlike the *chorēgia* and the trierarchia. But evidence for the *eisphora* thins out in the third century and one has to ask whether this form of taxation also disappeared. The lease of property by the phratry Dyaleis in 300/299 shows that at this date property was still assessed for *eisphora* and payments would in other circumstances still be expected. However, in the case of this property, payments of tax duties and *eisphora* were to be waived if the property was affected by invasion or the installation of (Athenian) military camps.[24]

In the Classical period the raising of *eisphora* affected the wealthiest residents of Attica, both citizens and metics. But unlike other liturgies, *eisphora* seems to have survived the political transitions in the last quarter of the fourth century. A fragmentary honorific decree referring to the *eisphora* probably dates to some time between the 280s and 260s.[25] Hermaios Hermo[— —] is honoured for his military service, the payment of *eisphora* and ten *mnae* of silver for the safety of Athens. The *eisphora* payment could have been made

[21] Habicht (1997: 131–4) explains that various additions to the Athenian role in Pausanias' account (10. 19. 4–23, 1. 3. 5–4. 4; 7. 15. 3) are inspired by Herodotus' account of the Persian invasion of 480 and therefore the description of the large naval contingent sent by Athens in 279/8 is a mirage (Habicht 1982: 87–94).

[22] Habicht 2000–3: 92 ll. 10–13, at least three, perhaps four, magistrates responsible for the (?) of the sailors.

[23] On the third-century cavalry, see Oliver 2006*a*.

[24] *IG* ii^2 1241 ll. 13–17.

[25] Ibid. 715.

earlier during Hermaios' career if the decree was one that honoured a long life of services to the polis. But it is just as likely that the inscription was set up in the light of recent events and services performed for Athens in the struggle against Demetrios Poliorketes. Evidence for *eisphora* after this example is rare. In the years after Sulla *eisphora* was being exacted, but had its collection lapsed some time in the second half of the third century or later?[26]

The latest evidence that is used to support an argument that *eisphora* was still being raised towards the end of the third century is a fragmentary inscription from Athens.[27] The inscription honours a non-Athenian, (?)Apollas, and grants him an olive crown, the status of *proxenos* for himself and his descendants (his two sons are named, Tharrynōn and Agamenes), the right to purchase property (*enktēsis*, buildings for up to 1 talent, and land for up to 2 talents), and the honour of having the decree written on a *stēlē*.[28] (?)Apollas has performed several services, the most identifiable of which is his financial assistance in fortifying the Zea harbour in Piraeus.[29] (?)Apollas has made a financial contribution on behalf of himself and his sons to the *epidosis* that raised money for this operation. Prior to this service, however, Apollas had made a contribution of money that seems to have been connected to "freedom".[30] In 230/29 the Athenians needed the vast sum of 150 talents to pay off Diogenes, the garrison commander, and his garrison. The payment would secure Mounychia and therefore bring the Piraeus back under Athenian control for the first time in sixty-five years. The necessary funds were raised helped by twenty talents that came from Aratos.[31] Apollas, probably a metic, gave 2,000 *drachmai* as a contribution.[32] Migeotte associates the payment made by Apollas concerning "freedom" with the collection of funds to pay Diogenes and argues that the language in the honorific decree is appropriate to that used for a collection of *eisphora*.[33] Elsewhere I have argued that the language identified by Migeotte as part of an *eisphora* payment should in fact be interpreted as a voluntary

[26] *IG* ii^2 1338 l. 36.

[27] Ibid. 835 (Maier, *Mauerbau*. 80–2); partially republished as Migeotte 1992 no. 18; see Migeotte 1989: 195–7. The hand of the letter-cutter is not securely identified but Tracy (*ALC* 63) says that the inscription is cut in the style of the cutter of Agora I 7181 (whose career lasted from 224/3 to 188/7).

[28] *IG* ii^2 835 ll. 22–32.

[29] Ibid. ll. 9–15.

[30] ll. 5–7.

[31] Plut. *Arat*. 34. 5–6; Paus. 2. 8. 6.

[32] Migeotte 1992: 36–7 with Migeotte 1989: *κ[ατ]ὰ δὲ τὸμ προδανεισ[μὸν τῶν] [πολ]ιτῶν [εἰ]ς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπ[- - -]|[. . .] δισχιλίας προεισήνεγκεν δραχμὰ[ς οὐχ ὑπὸ]|[τοῦ δήμ]ου [ἀξι]ωθείς, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἑκὼν [τῆς τοῦ]|[δή]μου [χρ]είας στοχαζόμενος·* (*IG* ii^2 835 ll. 5–9). The amount is in line with the larger sums discussed in the Classical period for *eisphora* payments: Brun 1983: 69–70.

[33] Migeotte 1989: 194–8; 1992: 36–7.

payment made by Apollas to a special fund of loaned moneys raised by the polis.[34] If my interpretation is correct, and if the action of Apollas is connected to the money raised to pay off Diogenes in 230/29, then this operation was not the product of an *eisphora* but a payment made up from various sources including money loaned by individuals such as Apollas. The conclusion relevant to the wider argument here, however, is that Apollas' payment was not part of an *eisphora*. This piece of evidence cannot therefore be used to show that *eisphora* payments continued in the last third of the third century.

Eisphora seems to have disappeared from the epigraphical evidence at Athens in the later third and second century BC. Arguments from silence are dangerous. Nevertheless one might have expected evidence from other honorific decrees of this period to have referred to this institution if it continued to be one to which the wealthy men contributed in Athens. The lack of evidence for *eisphora* is taken here as a sign of its absence. Reasons for its disappearance in the course of the second half of the third century (or earlier) may be more elusive still.[35] The role of the deme in maintaining registers of property liable for *eisphora* payments may be linked intrinsically with the disappearance of the institution of the *eisphora*.[36] The administrative structures that had been the foundation on which the institution of *eisphora* had been built were much weaker in the later third century. This reasoning may also explain at the same time the rise in the importance of another way in which the polis raised funds, the *epidosis*.[37]

The *epidosis*, the giving of money to a fund for a specific purpose, was a widely used institution that allowed the polis to raise revenue from its citizens and foreigners.[38] It had the benefits also of not having a complex bureaucratic infrastructure based on registers of payments required for properties, the weakness of the *eisphora* operation at Athens. The subscription was typically an appeal made in the short term for a very specific purpose: a construction project, the purchase of grain, or the defence of the countryside.[39] Of all the known subscriptions that concerned defence, Athens in the Classical and Hellenistic periods is the best-represented polis. Of the twelve examples known of subscriptions for defence seven originate from Athens.[40] One of the most important of these is the well-known *epidosis* of the archonship of Diomedon in 248/7 which collected money destined for the treasurer of the

[34] Oliver 2006*c*.

[35] What follows is a summary of more detailed arguments in Oliver 2006*c*.

[36] Dem. 50. 8–9; Hesychius s.v. *ναύκλαροι*.

[37] Migeotte 1992: 46.

[38] Migeotte 1983 and 1992; 'In some times of crisis the state resorted not to extra taxes but to appeals for voluntary contributions', Rhodes 1972: 98.

[39] Migeotte 1992: 327–48.

[40] Ibid. 347.

stratiotic fund because the money was "for the defence of the countryside".[41] The inscription reveals a great deal about the financial organization of the polis and the role played by the citizens and non-citizens and demands closer analysis.

8.2. THE *EPIDOSIS* OF DIOMEDON'S ARCHONSHIP (248/7)

The *epidosis* of 248/7 raised money to ensure that the local Attic harvest could be brought in safely.[42] At an Assembly meeting in late March or April 247, Theophemos son of Telokles of Marathon put forward a proposal.[43] The decree provided the treasurer of the *Stratiōtika* with enough money so that for the rest of the year the harvest could be gathered in safety.[44] The motion, drafted in a previous Council Meeting (a *probouleumatic* decree), invited the citizens and those people living in the polis to contribute money voluntarily. A short time was given: the process had to be completed by Mounychion, the harvest would be expected in Thargelion.[45] Nobody was to give more than 200 drachmai or less than 50 drachmai. The names of the contributors were to be written up on a *stēlē* that was to be erected in the Agora. The motion concerned the supply of money to the stratiotic fund and was passed "for the defence of the countryside".[46]

The inscription has been discussed extensively elsewhere not only because it sheds light on the problems of defence in Attica but also because of its relevance to the sequence of Athenian archons in the middle of the third century.[47] Diomedon's position in the list of Athenian archons has been established as 248/7 with the help of two unpublished inscriptions. A fragment of an ephebic list has determined where Diomedon fits into the sequence of archons and an unpublished inscription from Rhamnous has

[41] *Agora* xvi. 213 (Migeotte 1992 no. 17).

[42] *Agora* xvi. 213 = *IG* ii^2 791 + *Hesp.* 11 (1942): 287–92 no. 56 (*SEG* xxxii. 118).

[43] The date: the second day of the tenth prytany, the thirtieth (*embōlimos*) day of Elaphebolion, an intercalated day added to the festival month.

[44] The date of the motion: Habicht 1982: 28: 'war Diomedon der Archon von 244/3 und gehört mithin die Epidosis ins Frühjahr 243, frühestens Ende März, wahrscheinlich in den April'.

[45] For the agricultural year, see R. G. Osborne 1987: 15.

[46] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 27–8.

[47] Archon lists: see e.g. Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947: 82; the problematic demotic of the secretary, Phoryskides, Pritchett and Meritt 1940: 28–31; for the demotic 'A[lopekethen]' see Kroll 1977: 105; 121 no. 54; prosopographical treatment, Habicht 1982: 26–33; historical considerations, e.g. Pélékides 1979 (*SEG* xxix. 113).



Figure 8.1 Detail showing names of the contributors to the *epidosis* of 248/7 (*Agora* xvi. 213 col. I, ll. 63–7; col. II ll. 63–74; EM 7405; copyright Epigraphical Museum, Athens)

confirmed the context for the *epidosis* of Diomedon's archonship.[48] Advanced notice of this second text indicates that Archandros, the general for the countryside in the archonship of Diomedon, has performed many actions on behalf of those at Rhamnous against piratical raids. The general figured among those who contributed 200 drachmai to the *epidosis* in the same year.[49]

The identity of the contributors illustrates the depth of concern felt among the upper echelons of Athens for the successful defence of the harvest.[50] Habicht found that of sixty-five names only twelve could not be identified with known families. Eleven contributors belong to families of established wealth,[51] and possibly twenty-three had served as cavalrymen.[52] Among the contributors were the philosopher Lykon and Kallimachos, the poet so famous that his

[48] M. J. Osborne 2000. The Rhamnous text: *Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7–8. Petrakos should be thanked for so quickly publishing an outline of the contents of this inscription. We await now the publication of the full text.

[49] See Petrakos 1999 ii. 253, s.v. *Ἄρχανδρος*.

[50] Appendix 5.

[51] Members of propertied families (Habicht 1982: 33 n. 96; Davies 1971): Demophilos (*APF* 3738); Drakontides (*APF* 4549); Dromeas and Diokles (*APF* 126); Euagides (*APF* 5232); Thymochares (*APF* 13964); Lysitheides (*APF* 7305); Nikosthenes (*APF* A143); [X]anthippos (*APF* 4549), a member of the clan of the Eteoboutadai; [X]enokles (*APF* 1234); Praxiteles (*APF* 8334).

[52] Cavalrymen: Apollophanes (II. 68); Ariston (II. 63); Asklepiades (II. 57–8); Lysimachos (I. 81); Chairephon (II. 62); Nikomachos (III. 76); Philotheos (II. 75); Phyromachos (II. 66); Spoudias (II. 37); Thoumorios (I. 55); Thymochares (II. 70); and also possible identifications, Antiphon (I. 33); Apollodoros (I. 68f.); Aristophon (II. 34); Diopeithes (I. 66); Nikeratos (I. 78); Pausias (II. 51); Theaitetos (III. 67); and Thoukritos (III. 71); somewhat less certain are Hierokles (II. 35); Lysitheides (II. 74); Nikomachos (III. 76) and Simias (III. 74).

name exceptionally stands alone without any further qualification.[53] Most of the contributors played an active part in society throughout the third century. A few were high magistrates: archons or generals or taxiarchs. Exceptionally, Eurykleides and possibly Sosikrates (the name is restored) were respectively current and former holders of the office of the treasurer of the stratiotic fund.[54] Some had served as ephebes.[55] Others were at some point councillors.[56]

The majority of the contributors presented the maximum amount, 200 drachmai: sixty-nine donated 200 drachmai, seven 100, and two 50. Although the contributors are mainly Athenian, foreigners do appear and the four, identified by the survival of their ethnics, provided the maximum 200 drachmai.[57] The limit of 200 drachmai suggests that an identifiable amount of money was envisaged and that the appeal was expected to raise the required

[53] A suggestion made by Professor D. M. Lewis, see Oliver 2002.

[54] High office: Autias: taxiarch (*Agora* xvi. 182, l. 24; proxenos at Oropos, *IG* vii 4266) and *sitōnēs* in 275/4 (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904). Eriotos of Melite a *sitōnēs* of 275/4 (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 ll. 20 ff.). Seven eponymous archons, Antiphon, Eurykleides, Lysiades, Lysias, Antipatros, Thymochares, and Aristion (Habicht 1982: 33); possibly also Chairephon (archon of 219/18: see W. S. Ferguson, 'The Athenian Archons of the third and Second Centuries BC', *Cornell Studies* 10 (1899) 43, and Kroll 1977: 124 no. 61). Eucharistos son of Chares of Aphidna is *proxenos* of Oropos (*SEG* xv. 267), *proedros* in the archonship of Lysiades (*IG* ii^2 775 + 803 = *Hesp.* 28 (1959) 174–8 no. 3 l. 32, and proposed *Agora* xv. 130 in the archonship of Menekrates. Kephisophon of Athmonon was priest of an unknown deity (*IG* ii^2 4675). Pausias of Paiania was an *epimeletes* of the Asklepieion (*IG* ii^2 1534 B l. 124, see Aleshire 1989: 95 and 309). Praxiteles son of Timarchos of Eiresidai was priest of Asklepieios (*IG* ii^2 1534 B l. 268; a statue, *IG* ii^2 4440) Generals: Archandros (*Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7–8) is honoured in the early 240s (*I. Rhamnous* 140). Asklepiades, son of Xenon, of Phyla is honoured by the *hypaithroi* at Eleusis in 225/4 (*IG* ii^2 2978 = *I. Eleusis* 200: see *PA* 2618 and Sarikakis 1953: 284); Eurykleides, hoplite general; Philotheos son of Aristonikos of Phrearrioi honoured in the archonship of Mnesides at Rhamnous (*I. Rhamnous* 20) and by the soldiers (*I. Rhamnous* 21); Thoukritos (*I Rhamnous* 10, 11, 129–30).

[55] Ephebes in the contributors' families: Theaitetos probably ephebe in the archonship of Antiphon (*Hesp.* 7 (1938) 110–14 no. 20 (Ag. I 2054); Dromeas and [Dio]kles have a relative (brother?) either Diokles or Dromeas son of Dromeas, ephebe in the archonship of Ekphantos, (*IG* ii^2 787 + *GRBS* 20 (1979) 334 ff. = *SEG* xxix. 114, with Habicht 1982: 183–5 for stemma); Thymochares, son of Phaidros of Sphettos, has a son, Phaidros (III) ephebe in the archonship of Menekrates (*Hesp.* 15 (1946) 190 no. 37 l. 15); Nikeratos of Phlya is probably ephebe in the archonship of Menekles (*IG* ii^2 665 col. III l. 43).

[56] councillors: Apollophanes the son of Neoptolemos (Braun 1970 no. 37) and secretary in the archonship of Euboulos (*IG* ii^2 678 = *Agora* xv. 85 l. 101); Diopeithes was councillor in the 260s (*IG* ii^2 2437 = *Agora* xv. 125 l. 17 (date: Tracy 1988: 306–7); Timon of Sphettos councillor in *Agora* xv. 97 l. 7, (see *LGPN* ii Timon no. 40).

[57] [Diogen]ēs of Macedon (as restored by Wilhelm 1909: 81; Pélékides 1979: 45 n. 30 thought he was an Athenian, son of Pausimachos, following Beloch (1912–27) 4. 2. 456, but Osborne (*Nat.* iii–iv T100) proposes that Pausimachos' daughter in fact married Diogenes and so Diogenes' subsequent descendants, continuing the citizenship that Diogenes had obtained, were members of the deme Kolonos, esp. Osborne *Nat.* iii–iv: 93 n. 304; Wilhelm's restoration is attractive but not the only possibility); [Z]opyros of Syracuse; Phi[l]oklēs of Corinth; Lykōn, the philosopher; Hekataios of Mesembria; Sosibios (and his son Dionysios).

amount—otherwise it is hard to see why a ceiling on contributions was imposed. At least forty-three further contributions were made and a further nine to eighteen may have been included in the missing fragment. At least 24,000 drachmai (four talents) were collected. The appeal was designed to meet a specific short-term need and probably financed soldiers in the defence of the harvest. For instance, Kallias of Sphettos had brought 1,000 men from Andros to protect the harvest in Attica during the 280s. A sum of four talents might have paid 800 mercenaries for a month's service.

The deme identity of the Athenians who contributed to the *epidosis* has fuelled a discussion of the domination of Athenian politics by a regionally distinctive group of individuals of the Mesogeia. Ferguson saw in the response to the *epidosis* an "energetic movement of Attic defence".[58] He was the first, as far as I know, to propose that a *regional* political force lay behind it: "the Mesogeia furnished the largest subscriptions, the greatest number of subscribers, and the leaders of the whole undertaking".[59] This is based on the number of Athenians whose demes are located in the Mesogeia. Notwithstanding the fact that deme identity has little to do with deme residence, it is now clear that Ferguson's observations are unlikely to reflect regional political factions.[60] Instead, the *epidosis* of 248/7 provides excellent evidence for the care that the wealthiest Athenians displayed towards the defence of Attica and, in particular, the successful harvest of the grain produced in Attica.[61]

The deme origin of the Athenian contributors is less likely to have inspired the response to the appeal than the fact that most of the contributors were simply the richest members of society and therefore likely to have been the main landowners.[62] Foxhall's model of the distribution of land-holding in the fourth century indicates that "much of the food supply [of Attica] would have been in the hands of the wealthy because of their direct control of so much of the means of the primary production".[63] There is no evidence to suggest that the model had changed in the third century. The participation of so many prominent Athenians in the collection of money to protect the harvests demonstrates that the rich and successful among the Athenians identified directly with the need to protect the countryside. On a local level we have seen how inscriptions from Rhamnous and Eleusis dealt with the defence of the countryside near the garrison demes. Here on the scale of polis

[58] Ferguson 1911: 204–5 (quotation 205 n. 3).

[59] Ibid. 204, followed by Day 1942: 11–14. For Ferguson's regionalized view of Athenian politics, see ibid. 230–1, esp. 231 n. 5.

[60] Appendix 6.

[61] This aspect lies behind much of Ferguson's (1911: 231–2) own arguments, of course.

[62] See above and App. 5.

[63] Deme membership cannot be used as a basis for identifying the location of an individual's land holding. On the ownership of land see Foxhall 1992.

an appeal for contributions illustrates how those same concerns for the successful harvest affected the top echelons of Athenian society. The contributors should be identified as an active Athenian elite rather than as a new Mesogeia-focused political faction. Many are known to have been religious, civic, or military officials, ephebes, and cavalrymen. The ties between the individual contributors and Athens are very strong. Nevertheless what is important is that the Athenians used an *epidosis* rather than the *eisphora* to raise the necessary funds. To understand the reasons for this it is worth considering the operation of the *epidosis* in this period.

8.3. *EPIDOSIS*: HONOURS FOR BENEFACTORS

Honorific decrees regularly publish a clause encouraging other individuals to emulate those who have performed services worthy of honours.[64] The *epidosis* of 248/7, like so many honorific decrees, contains such an exhortatory clause but extends the wish that the decision to set up on a *stēlē* the decree in honour of those who made contributions "would make clear to everyone the *philotimia* of those who wish to perform benefactions for the People".[65] Normally such clauses urge others to emulate such behaviour when decrees honour benefactors or Athenian officials.[66] But the decree qualifies clearly those who have contributed to the *epidosis* as individuals who wished to perform services, i.e. be benefactors or *euergetai*.[67]

Although such a clause has not survived on the three other documents that record *epidoseis* in this era, it is worth looking in turn at them. The first is a decree honouring Aischias, the second another honorific decree possibly inspired by the same events, and the third is a decree for the son of [Cha?]rias of Kydathenaion.[68] [Aisch]ias son of Akrotimos of Pergamon was honoured at Athens towards the end of the archonship of Antimachos (probably 256/5) for services that had included contributions to the defence of the polis, a sum

[64] The hortative formula: Henry 1996; Knoepfler 2001: 216–17 n. 728.

[65] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 24–5: *ὅπως ἂν φανερ[ὰ] ἦι ἅπασιν ἡ φιλοτ|ιμία τῶν βουλομένων εὐεργετεῖν τ[ὸν] δῆμ[ο]ν*, with Woodhead at *Agora* xvi. 305. For *philotimia*: Whitehead 1983.

[66] Henry 1996; benefactors: e.g. Philokles of Sidon, *Agora* xvi. 173 ll. 1–2; officials: ibid. 185 ll. 16–17.

[67] For some alternatives, see A. S. Henry, 'Some Observation on Final Clauses in Hellenistic Attic Prose Inscriptions', *CQ* 16 (1966): 294 and esp. 296–7.

[68] (1) [Aisch]ias: Migeotte 1992 no. 15, *IG* ii^2 768 + 802, fragments joined by Wilhelm (*IG* ii^2 Add. p. 667); for cutter and revised text, Tracy 1988: 313, 319; now *A&M* 137–41; see also Kuenzi 1923: 54. (2) *IG* ii^2 729 + 442, associated by A. Wilhelm, *Ath. Mitt.* 39 (1914) 266; id. (1916); *Kleine Schriften* i. 1, *Akademieschriften* (Leipzig 1974) 435–7 as revised by Tracy *A&M* 134–7. (3) The son of [Cha?]rias of Kydathenaion: *IG* ii^2 798; Migeotte 1992 no. 16.

of money restored as 200 drachmai, and an amount of grain, apparently barley, and possibly two thousand medimnoi.[69] The text and circumstances can be better understood as a result of Tracy's work on this and another text.[70] Kuenzi not unreasonably thought the *services* dated to the Chremonidean war but troubles in the 250s must now be understood as the context for an appeal for money from individuals at Athens and the services that Aischias performed.[71]

The second of the three inscriptions is an honorific decree for an unknown individual who has contributed 1,000 drachmai almost certainly for the defence of the polis.[72] It is likely that the honorand, like Aischias, is a foreigner although this cannot be certain. The similarity of the wording of this inscription and the epigraphical features such as the letter size, stoichedon, and letter style all indicate that it and the decree for Aischias were passed in the same period, and perhaps even on the same day.[73] If that is the case, then in Antimachos' archonship there were probably two *epidoseis* made by the Athenians which required money and grain to facilitate the defence of the polis.

The third decree honours the son of [Cha?]rias of Kydathenaion who had served as *agōnothetēs* and, almost certainly in the same year, contributed to the defence of the countryside.[74] The proposal was made by a fellow demesman in the seventh month but the archon name designating the year has not survived and the precise date is therefore not known.[75] Although the line detailing the *epidosis* is broken, Tracy has read a partial *chi* which would indicate that [Cha?]rias' son had contributed a large amount of money, at least 1,000 drachmai. However this contribution was for the defence of the countryside unlike [Aisch]ias and the unknown contributor who provided for "the defence of the polis'.[76] It is tempting to associate the contributions made

[69] *IG* ii^2 768 + 802 at 768 l. 12, following Tracy's restorations, and the current restoration of the patronymic (e.g. *LGPN* ii Charias no. 50). The decree was passed in the ninth month of the year at the principal Assembly in Thargelion.

[70] See Tracy *A&M* 135–41. Date of Antimachos: M. J. Osborne 2003. M. J. Osborne 1989 suggests Antimachos is 252/1 or 251/0; Meritt 1977 and 1981 had suggested 233/2. See also Habicht 1979: 128–33 on the chronological problems.

[71] Kuenzi 1923: 54–5.

[72] *IG* ii^2 729 + 442 ll. 3–4 (as presented at Tracy *A&M* 135).

[73] Tracy *A&M* 137.

[74] *IG* ii^2 798 ll. 9–20 make up the details of his services, ll. 9–19 his *agōnothēsia*, and 19–21 the *epidosis*.

[75] Habicht 1982: 22 (n. 38) and 23: *IG* ii^2 798 was passed in the archonship of Antimachos.

[76] *IG* ii^2 768 l. 12, for the defence of the city; *IG* ii^2 798 ll. 19–20 for the [defence] of the countryside. The two *epidoseis* may belong to the archonship of Antimachos. But the distinction between defence of the city and countryside may be a problem and it should be noted that an alternative year for Archias' *agōnothēsia* remains possible—either Antiphon or Alkibiades, for example.

by the demesman of Kydathenaion with the other two decrees referring to contributions. Indeed Habicht had suggested that *IG* ii^2 798 was also passed in Antimachos' archonship.[77] It is significant here that the primary reason for honours to this citizen are his actions as *agōnothetēs*: he has clearly given a large sum of his own money, more than one talent, for the festival (the Dionysia).[78] This is a very large sum indeed and must mark out the honorand as one of the elite Athenians who filled civic magistracies. The *agōnothēsia* was by definition one of those positions that qualify individuals in Davies's category of Athenian propertied families and the honorand certainly belonged to a family of some standing in this respect.[79]

There is good evidence for intensive military activity in Antimachos' archonship. At Eleusis an inscription honours the general there with three crowns. A stone from Rhamnous honours a hipparch of the same year, Kallisthenes son of Kleoboulos of Prospalta.[80] The most likely scenario is the early years of the struggle between Athens and Alexander. At the end of the 250s the Salaminians resisted attacks with the help of Herakleitos of Athmonon and subsequently honoured the "royal general'.[81] These attacks and the military activity suggested by the other honours awarded in the archonship of Antimachos are a likely context for the *epidosis* in defence of the countryside to which [Cha?]rias' son contributed and the *epidoseis* that [Aisch]ias and the other unknown honorand supported.[82] These individuals received civic honours. The son of [Cha?]rias was a member of the Athenian elite and was awarded at least a gold crown. The decree honouring [Aisch]ias is broken, may well have mentioned other actions, and awards the privileges of *isoteleia*. Both the son of [Cha?]rias and [Aisch]ias both served Athens in ways similar to those of the contributors to the *epidosis* in the archonship of Diomedon. The *agōnothetēs* honoured in *IG* ii^2 798 had much more substantial payments

[77] *IG* ii^2 798 ll. 10–11.

[78] The decree contains a tantalizing reference to Aitolians staying in Athens (*IG* ii^2 798 ll. 13–4) and reinforces the evidence collected by Lefèvre (1998: 68) that diplomatic relations between Athens and Aitolia existed in the years after the Chremonidean war (*CID* iv. 30 = *SVA* iii. 470) and went far beyond honours for heralds and kitharodes (see also *IG* ii^2 833 = *SEG* iii. 101 with Habicht 1982: 104 n. 114). Athens and Aitolia enjoyed good relations (see esp. *CID* iv. 12 = *IG* ii^2 1132), marked by the help given to Athenians captured during their journey to or from the Delphic celebrations in 286/5 (*IG* ii^2 652), see further Lefèvre 1998*b*: 67: the Athenian presence among the *hieromnemones* ends in 262/1 (Delphic archonship of Pleiston, ibid. n. 314; *CID* iv. 38, 40).

[79] *APF* 5604.

[80] *IG* ii^2 3460 (*I. Eleusis* 186) and *I. Rhamnous* 136.

[81] For the war in general see *IG* ii^2 774 for the relations between Athens and Alexander. *IG* ii^2 1225—whose mason is not recognized by Tracy—describes some of the sufferings on Salamis and Herakleitos' services while he was the garrison commander in Piraeus. The honours awarded to Herakleitos in *IG* ii^2 677 probably belong to this time, see Habicht 1979: 71 n. 18.

[82] *Ergon* 1993 [1994] 7–8.

to make than the *epidoseis* required. None of the honours awarded seem excessive but reveal the sort of actions that the polis was ready to honour and therefore encourage.

Similarly, the honours proposed for all those who made contributions in 248/7 were not extravagant. Then the Athenians did not appeal to individuals to make *unlimited* donations of money. The emphasiz in the archonship of Diomedon was that the contributions were voluntary.[83] Although the individual was playing an important and valuable role in benefiting the state, the state's reliance on these individuals was controlled and the honours granted them were measured. The city rewarded the contributors in the archonship of Diomedon moderately but explicitly and prominently. The recording and display of the names of the contributors on a *stēlē* erected in the Athenian Agora was thought a sufficient compliment to such services to the polis. As so often on Athenian decrees, the text frequently advertises the purpose of the decree in an exhortatory clause; in this case "so that the *philotimia* of those who want to perform benefactions for the polis may be clear to all". By definition the contributors have performed a benefaction for the People and such actions are rewarded in Athens.

Benefactors in Athens could receive all kinds of honours. The major benefactors received the "highest honours" (*megistai timai*) which for a non-Athenian included citizenship. The top honours (*sitēsis* in the *prytaneion*, a statue, or a front seat (*proedria*) at public festivals) were given to Athenians who had served the polis over the course of a lifetime.[84] Few of the Athenian honorands in the early Hellenistic period had performed military actions and none seem to have been rewarded for an outright military victory as was the pattern in the first half of the fourth century. Demochares, Demosthenes, and Lycurgus and the two Philippides can best be described as politicians although both Phaidros and Kallias had won significant military achievements, as had Olympiodoros.[85]

A similar hierarchy of honours operated in the garrison demes. At Rhamnous the gold crown was typically reserved for a general, the olive crown for his lieutenant or for sub-ordinate officials.[86] In Athens the proclamation of a

[83] Contrast the Amphierastai who appeal to individuals to contribute as much as they wish to the repair of the sanctuary (*I. Rhamnous* 167). Selected contributors are given olive crowns: Onesimedes of Rhamnous, the *archeranistēs* Diokles son of Dion of Hamaxanteia, and the treasurer Archestratos son of Aischines of Erchia and the rest have their names inscribed.

[84] Gauthier 1985: 79–80; Kralli 1999–2000; the award by the polis of honorific statues, Oliver 2007.

[85] Phaidros: *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 33–4, 38–40; Kallias: Shear 1978 (Ag. I 7295) ll. 31–2; Olympiodoros: Habicht 1985: 91–2, 100.

[86] Gold crowns for generals at Rhamnous, include Apollodoros of Otryne (*I. Rhamnous* 8); Thoukritos of Myrrhinous (*I. Rhamnous* 10–11); Dikaiarchos of Thria (*I. Rhamnous* 17);

crown (granted to citizens from the end of the fourth century onwards),[87] or the grant of *proedria* (without *sitēsis*) was awarded only on a high level. When not awarded as part of the highest honours, *proedria* was more likely to be granted to boards of civic officials, such as taxiarchs, *sitōnai*, or ephebes rather than to individual Athenians.[88] The award of statues or the less extravagant "image" was not monopolized by the polis because other groups also gave such honours.[89]

This rapid survey of the distribution of honours to Athenians suggests that those who contributed to the fund to protect the countryside and bring in the harvest in Diomedon's archonship could not possibly have been serving the state *merely* to receive honours. Similarly both [Cha?]rias' son and [Aisch]ias had performed services in addition to their contributions to *epidoseis*. The honours that were granted to the contributors in 248/7 were neither excessive nor extraordinary. The inscribing of their names on a stone and the erection of the stone in the Agora was a distinction. No crowns were being offered.

Prosopography confirms that the contributors were wealthy. It is difficult to see the *epidosis* as the action of a regional political power group.[90] Clearly the list displays an unusual proliferation of demes from the Mesogeia *trittyes* but the geographical bias is not so strong and the broken text may well have contained individuals from north-west Attica. The main lesson to be learnt from the text is that the concern for the defence of the *harvest* was felt throughout the upper levels of Athenian society. The Athenian polis encouraged individuals to make extraordinary contributions to such funds as the *epidoseis*. The appeal to *philotimia* was a normal feature of Athenian civic ideology. A moderate public honour was sufficient reward for the raising of necessary funds in 248/7. An *epidosis* was used probably because of the urgency of the problem in hand. A limited amount of money was required.

Philotheos (*I. Rhamnous* 20); Aischrion (*I. Rhamnous* 26); Nikomachos (*I. Rhamnous* 32); olive crowns for subordinates: the *epimeletes*, Endios of Aithalidai, the *pyloros* Ophelas son of Ophelion (*isotelēs*) (*I. Rhamnous* 8); secretary, Kallistratos of Aphidna, leader of the *kryptoi*, Athenodoros of Oa (*I. Rhamnous* 20); leader, Philotimos of Rhamnous, secretary, Ariston (*I. Rhamnous* 26).

[87] Henry 1983: 29. Excluding Phaidros, Kallias, Philippides of Kephale only the phylarchs and taxiarchs (*SEG* xxi. 357, 286–262), Herakleitos of Athmonon (*IG* ii^2 677, 250s) and the ephebes (*SEG* xxvi. 98, 205/4; *SEG* xxxv. 98, *c.*200) have crowns *proclaimed* in the third century.

[88] Boards receiving *proedria* (*c.*307–*c.*200): see Henry 1983: 291 ff. Taxiarchs: (*IG* ii^2 500, 302/1; *Hesp.* 2 (1933) 156 no. 2, 275/4; *SEG* xiv. 64 = *Hesp.* 23 (1954) 288–96 no. 182, 271/0); *sitōnai* (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904, 275/4, *Agora* xvi. 188, 271/0); hipparchs and phylarchs (*SEG* xxi. 357, 286–262), ephebes (*IG* ii^2 665, 266/5; *SEG* xxvi. 98 = *Hesp.* 43 (1974): 246–59, 204/3). Foreigners rarely receive *proedria*: (*IG* ii^2 555, 307–303; possibly *SEG* xxi. 343), the Erythraians, (*IG* ii^2 708) and Antioch of the Chrysoreans (*Hesp.* 47 (1978) 49–57, 203).

[89] Henry 1983: 294, 'the Athenians were sparing in voting statues to citizens and foreign benefactors'. See now Oliver 2007.

[90] Ferguson 1911: 205 and n. 3.

The mechanisms of an *eisphora* may have been insufficient, overcomplicated, and perhaps even no longer suitable to raise the necessary funds in this period. In addition, if properties were like the one leased by the Dyaleis in 300/299, the presence of Athenian military operations or enemy incursions may well have made void any demand for *eisphora*. In the end the time scale and the property-base of the *eisphora* system itself probably made the *epidosis* the best option.

8.4. THE SALVATION OF THE POLIS AND DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE

If *epidosis* was a more flexible financial institution than *eisphora*, it is also worth considering whether special conditions allowed the polis to give priority to certain financial operations. The *epidosis* of 248/7 was "for the salvation of the polis and for the defence of the countryside". Both these terms merit further investigation not least because they suggest some degree of interdependence. "For defence of the countryside" also appears in the *epidosis* of 248/7 as a technical term at the end of the decree in a clause that states "all is in defence of the countryside". The same phrase occurs in three other Athenian inscriptions from the fourth century.[91] This concentration is unusual and significant compared with the rest of Greek epigraphy: the designation appears seldom elsewhere and only at Magnesia is there definitely a function for this phrase.[92] But the precise meaning of the term at Athens is not clear because the documents do not betray a consistent set of concerns or circumstances. It may indicate special conditions under which the Council could make additional enactments.[93] However emergency measures invoked by the Council to direct resources or to raise emergency funds could also be understood: the *epidosis* in 248/7 and the expedition to the Adriatic in 325/4 *reallocated* funds or *matériel* for military operations.[94] The appeal in Diomedon's archonship allowed the harvest to be gathered in for the remainder of the year. The time available

[91] The term without the definite article: *IG* ii^2 435, 13 honours an exile after 336/5; RO 100 ll. 270–1 (whose comm. does not discuss this clause; = Tod *GHI* 200; *IG* ii^2 1629) concerns the settling of a colony in the Adriatic to protect against pirates in 325/4; *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 350 ff. on the dispute over a ship wrecked by a storm, 325/4 and 324/3. The inscriptions have been collected and discussed by Rhodes 1972: 231–5; Rhodes with Lewis 1996: 31; Gschnitzer 1983 compares this type of document across the Aegean and Asia Minor.

[92] *I. Magnesia* 2 l. 68. More regular concerns for the defence of the countryside: *I Magnesia* 99 l. 28; 160 l. 12 with *IC* iii. IV. 9 l. 40 (Itanos and Prasiai).

[93] Rhodes 1972: 232: RO 100 and *IG* ii^2 435.

[94] RO 100.

for the collection is short for several reasons including the fact that gathering the harvest was a time-critical operation. The decree is passed at the end of Elaphebolion and the money is to be brought in before the end of the following month (Mounychion).[95] The decree establishing the arrangements for the expedition of the Athenian general Miltiades to the Adriatic in the 320s specifies the *immediate* reallocation of ships and equipment and the assignment of funds because the colony has to be sent out as *quickly* as possible.[96] Both decrees are to some extent "emergency' measures.

The other two decrees seem neither exceptional nor significantly urgent to be described as "emergency measures". However, they may concern the recovery or dispensing of civic finances.[97] *IG* ii^2 435, an honorific decree, offers protection to a person or persons and makes it clear that the honorand intends to return to or be restored to his own state. This operation will in some way involve or affect the people (?) or objects which seem to have been kept safe following warfare.[98] If the restoration of the exile(s) is imminent, if money is required or involved, then special circumstances may have justified or demanded the designation "for the defence of the country".[99] It would of course transform our appreciation of the events if we knew either the person(s) or place involved in the text. The fourth text is a complicated case involving Sopolis of Kydathenaion, his brother, Kephisodoros, and charges following Sopolis' failure to return oars to the dockyards in the Piraeus in 325/4, subsequent arrangements for the return of the oars, and the penalties if the procedures are not completed successfully.[100] The decree is described here

[95] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 11–12 and 18–19.

[96] RO 100 ll. 173 ff. The speed of the mustering and dispatch is underlined by the timing of the associated procedures: the trierarchs are appointed to bring their ships to harbour before the 10th Mounychion, ready to sail. Appeals are to be heard in court on the 2nd and 5th Mounychion (ibid. ll. 204–17). The supervision of the mustering and dispatch of the fleet is meticulous. The Council is to remain continuously at the jetty until the fleet sails, a function distinct from holding the occasional Council meeting in the Piraeus (cf. Rhodes 1972: 35: e.g. ML 65 ll. 53–4 in 426/5 and *IG* ii^2 783 l. 4, 163/2, see Tracy *ALC* 143).

[97] *IG* ii^2 435 l. 13, dated after 336/5 BC by Kirchner; and *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 350 ff., the naval lists of 323/2 refer to a series of events which started in 325/4.

[98] The privilege of protection was extended to a variety of non-Athenians, *proxenoi*, benefactors, allies, and exiles, Henry 1983: 171 ff.; for exiles: 172 n. 47. Normally non-Athenians would be invited to *xenia*, Athenians to *deipnon*, although there are exceptions, Henry 1983: 271.

[99] Any prospect of action in the near future is probably concealed in the break at *IG* ii^2 435 ll. 9–10. Comparison might be made with *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 35–6 (for Philippides of Kephale's actions and the desired, speedy return of the Piraeus and the garrisons of Attica); *SEG* xxv. 89 ll. 29–31 for the return of the Piraeus; *IG* ii^2 545 ll. 11–12 (the decree for the Thessalian exiles). It is likely that *IG* ii^2 435 responds to an appeal by a recent exile or political refugee whose cause the Athenians are ready to support. At first sight it is difficult to envisage why this inscription receives the special title, but the mention of *ephodia* (funds for travel, l. 3) and of the general may indicate a military and/or financial commitment by the Athenians.

[100] *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 343–403.

as "for the defence of the country" since "it concerns the collection of money".[101] The Athenians paid considerable attention in the 330s and 320s to a high profile collection of naval debts.[102] The original case has already been brought before a jury and harsh penalties are to be incurred for any maladministration by the officials involved in the handling of Sopolis' details.[103] The financial aspect of the case qualifies the decree as "for the defence of the *chora*"4, and it is likely that this qualification designated the money in a special fund or category which brought with it a higher priority.

The weight of evidence suggests that "for the defence of the *chora*" was a special status that involved finances or resources of the polis. The three to four talents raised in the archonship of 248/7 were required extraordinarily so that the treasurer of the stratiotic fund could pay for protection of the harvest.[104] Kephisophon's decree for the dispatch of Miltiades' expedition to the Adriatic in 325/4 had justified the reallocation of resources (triremes, quadriremes, triakonters, and equipment).[105] The decree of the Boule concerning Sopolis' debts in 324/3 explains that the decree is "for the defence of the *chora*" because it concerns the collection of money.[106] The inscription relating to the restoration of exile(s) may involve finances and perhaps conceals a degree of urgency. These examples confirm that the designation "for the defence of the *chora*" does not *necessarily* refer to the actual defence of the countryside. The designation probably allowed the raising, or redirection, of state moneys and resources. The distinction between the three decrees "for the defence of the *chora*" in the fourth century and the later *epidosis* of 248/7 is clear. The latter was directly concerned with the Attic countryside and its harvest, a theme that appears frequently among the services that other benefactors have performed for the Athenians and for which honours were awarded.

Several honorific decrees reward services performed by individuals and groups for the salvation and/or defence of the polis. It can be difficult to distinguish actions "for the salvation" and "for the defence": both terms are

[101] *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 401–3.

[102] I thank M. G. Clark for pointing out the importance attached to the recovery of naval debts in this context, and his comments here; see Clark 1993: 21–2, 122–4. For non-payment of naval debts, see [Dem.] 47. Oars were not easy to replace, and would therefore have had a high value attached to them.

[103] *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 351–6: the secretary of the Eleven was to erase any payments from the debt. Why would the Eleven be involved unless they were overseeing the debtor in the public gaol until the debt was repaid? See Rhodes 1981: 581. The *epimeletai* of the dockyards were to be charged with *eisangelia* if there was any misdemeanour in the resolving of Sopolis' debts and the receipt of the oars (*IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 384–401), a severe threat.

[104] *Agora* xvi. 213 l. 28.

[105] RO 100 ll. 165–71. Miltiades' appropriation of ships and equipment, with ll. 173–90.

[106] *IG* ii^2 1631 ll. 401–3.

used when individuals have assisted in some way the supply of grain to the city.[107] Rhodes suggested that "the safety of the city" was not a specific technical term but a general category, unlike "for the defence."[108] However "safety", "defence", or "salvation" can refer to similar types of service.[109] "Salvation" (*sotēria*) is associated in honorific decrees with a range of services from assisting the supply of grain to Athens from abroad to the health and safety of the harvest at home.[110] Sometimes *sotēria* is used in a more literal sense: Nikias of Otryne included rites for the harvests in the sacrifices that he performed during his office 266/5 at the height of the Chremonidean war when the harvest from Attica was under threat and so crucial to Athenian war effort against Antigonos Gonatas.[111] On other occasions *sotēria* has a wider, more formulaic sense and insured against potential harm in the context of sacrifices performed by the prytaneis.[112] "Saving" the city can relate to real events that contributed to saving the city, but such language has a rhetorical index. The "*sotēria*" of the city or People or even the "common *sotēria*" are found in a number of honorific decrees. However, underlying the rhetoric is a reality that is rooted in the economies of the polis.[113]

[107] *IG* ii^2 283 honours Ph[— —] of Salamis who had brought grain from Egypt and had more recently given money for the 'defence'. The decree dates to the 330s or earlier. *IG* ii^2 479–80 honours Pyr[— —] of Heraklea who had given money for the salvation of the city.

[108] Rhodes 1972: 234.

[109] Safety: e.g. *SEG* xxii. 127 (*I. Eleusis* 191) ll. 16–17; defence e.g. *I. Rhamnous* 43 l. 5, salvation, e.g. *IG* ii^2 1281 l. 9.

[110] e.g. *IG* ii^2 650 ll. 14–17, Zenon appointed by Ptolemy I helped to bring grain to Athens and co-operated in the struggle for the *sotēria* of the demos. The archon, Nikias son of Philon Otryne, of 266/5 is honoured, and the health and salvation (*sotēria*) of the harvests were included among the prayers and sacrifices performed by the eponymous archon (*IG* ii^2 668 ll. 8–10); they were added to the more usual range, cf. Euthios' office 283/2 (*Hesp.* 7 (1938) 100–9 no. 18 = *SEG* xxv. 89 ll. 10–17). Cf. Rhodes 1972: 43 n. 6 for other decrees honouring officials who have performed their duty. On 'salvation' more generally see Kearns 1990.

[111] *IG* ii^2 668 ll. 8–10.

[112] e.g. *Agora* xv. 78 ll. 9–10 in 273/2, the *prytaneis* of the tribe Antiochis sacrificed for the health and safety of the Council, the Demos of the Athenians, and of all other things, see other examples at ibid. 71 ll. 12–14 honouring Aiantis in Euthios' archonship of 283/2; partially restored for Akamantis, ibid. 70 ll. 9–10; for Pandionis, ibid. 76 ll. 14–15. In the archonship of Philinos, Macedonian royalty was included among the sacrifices, and thus later erased, ibid. 89 ll. 10–13. They are, however, preserved in the proposal of the Council in Polyeuktos' archonship (probably a few years after Philinos) when the sacrifice performed by the priestess of Aglauros included the health and safety of the Council, Demos of the Athenians, children and women, and King Antigonos [Gonatas], and Phila the queen and their offspring (*Hesp.* 52 (1983) 48–63 = EM 13371 = *SEG* xxxiii. 115 ll. 19–25).

[113] e.g. *IG* ii^2 744 l. 3, and *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 31–2 the *sotēria* of the polis; *IG* ii^2 650 l. 17, the *sotēria* of the demos; *IG* ii^2 682 l. 32, the 'common *sotēria*'.

8.5. BENEFACTORS OF THE ATHENIAN POLIS: BUYING FOOD

To have contributed to the defence of the countryside or to the defence of the city was to have participated and assisted in the salvation of the polis. The defence of the territory of the polis was a fundamental feature of Greek history.[114] Numerous inscriptions from the rest of the Hellenistic world display similar concerns "for the defence of the countryside".[115] It was, of course, not only for *epidoseis* that individuals received rewards at Athens. Direct participation in military campaigns or specific engagements often led to honours. Phaidros of Sphettos played a more well-known part in the protection of the grain harvest in the early stages of the revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes in 287.[116] Individuals fought and died for the city and received recognition from the polis: Pausanias describes the tombs of those who fell in the assault on the Mouseion in 287, the first casualty named as Leokritos.[117] Another memorial commemorated those who had died in an unsuccessful assault on Mounychia.[118] The range of actions worthy of decoration by the state was extensive: those given to the contributors of the *epidosis* of 248/7 fit into several important contexts.

The people of Athens—the citizens and foreigners—were prepared to finance the protection of the harvests in times of warfare. This was undertaken in pursuit of *philotimia* but the recognition gained can amount to a *measured* recognition of the community's regard for such services. The benefactions that we know of invariably appear in honorific decrees. However, the phenomenon of the wealthy members of Athenian society paying for operations that protect the polis are not confined to the countryside as the

[114] Chandezon 2000.

[115] There is no surprise to find that inscriptions outside Athens pay similar attention to 'the defence of the countryside'. For variants of the phrase see *I. Iasos* 95 l. 5; Ios, *IG* xii 5. 5 ll. 3–4 (early Hellenistic period, cf. *IG* xii 5. 8 l. 13; 9 l. 8); *I. Ilion* 196 l. 12 (*c.*80); *I. Teos* 48 ll. 51–2; *I. Erythrae* 18 l. 9 for the countryside along the coast; Kyme, *I. Kyme* 12, ll. 9 ff. (early second century). Ephesos (*I. Ephesos* ia 8 (= *Syll.*^{3} 742) ll. 15 ff., 24 ff., 86/5) offers an important parallel to the situation in Attica. However, the phrase without the definite article seems to be a designation in Magnesia (*I. Magnesia* 2 l. 68; 99 l. 28; cf. 160 l. 12 with *IC* iii. IV. 9 l. 40 (Itanos and Prasiai)) and at Kyzikos (*I. Kyzikos* i. 1485 ll. 6, 13).

[116] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 30 ff.

[117] See Paus. 1. 26. 3 for the thirteen Athenian casualties.

[118] Polyainos *Strat.* 5. 17; Paus. 1. 29. 10 (420 dead), probably in 282/1. Note *IG* ii^2 5227a (Moretti, *ISE* i. 13) honours Chairippos of Aphidna (the demotic, E. Vanderpool, *Hesp.* 39 (1970) 45) for an assault on Mounychia which could have been the attack in 307 or the recapture led by Olympiodoros which may belong in the 290s (see Ch. 2 for the date; thus De Sanctis 1936; Gabbert 1996: 61–2; Paus. 1. 26. 3, see Moretti *ISE* i. 27).

example of the repairs to the city walls of Athens, Piraeus and the Long Walls in 307/6 illustrates.[119]

Following the liberation of Athens in 307 from Demetrios of Phaleron the city was faced with the problem of defending itself against Kassander who was still at large in Attica. The call for individuals to contribute money to rebuilding the walls of both Athens and the harbour was urgent and only possible with the money from those living in Athens. Individual citizens played an important role in the financial resources of the polis, and this was no less the case in the 280s during the revolt or in the 240s when money was required for the defence of the countryside. That Athens made no specific provision, and had no special secure reserve fund for the protection of the countryside in the 240s is entirely consistent with the fiscal policy of most poleis in the Classical and early Hellenistic era. In the same way the walls of Athens and Piraeus could only be repaired and rebuilt with the financial support of individuals. The role of individuals in the defence of the countryside and the city was a typical feature of Classical and Hellenistic *poleis*.[120]

The Athenian institutions that facilitated the contribution of individuals to the defence of the countryside and polis ranged from direct military action to financial support. In the classical period the *eisphora* was an essential element in financing military activity. *Epidoseis* fulfilled a similar, probably complementary role in the early Hellenistic period. However the *eisphora* was an obligation while the *epidosis* was not. The former depended, as argued in this chapter, on a complex bureaucracy. The latter was less cumbersome. But both methods of gathering money depended on the individual. An *epidosis* was much more likely to be remembered in association with a specific problem whereas as payments to *eisphora* were an expected, perhaps regular, burden.[121] The property base on which *eisphora* was assessed may well have been one of the weaknesses of its operation. In addition it also relied on the demes for its operation. Therefore in periods when the demes themselves were pressed by constant invasion, *eisphora* may not have been the most useful way of raising money quickly. Moreover the system of collecting *eisphora* may have been too clumsy. A speedy collection of a fixed amount of money was required in 248/7. The *epidosis* lacked these problems. It was voluntary and of the moment: the people who were there could approach the Boule or the generals

[119] *IG* ii^2 463 + (*Agora* xvi. 109 = Maier, *Mauerbau*. i no. 11) and *IG* ii^2 505, see also ibid. 1487 ll. 91 ff., and ibid. 468. ibid. 554 ll. 16 ff. may refer to appeals by generals and taxiarchs to metics for contributions to the defence of the city.

[120] Cf. Garnsey 1988: 163: 'Athens after Chaeronea was in effect already showing some of the essential features of the typical Greek city of the Hellenistic period, above all, a chronic tendency to food crises, and a dependence for their resolution on wealthy and generous individuals, whether residents or outsiders.'

[121] *IG* ii^2 505 ll. 11–17 suggests annual *eisphora* payments of some form, from 347/6 to 323/2.

to register their donations.[122] There was not such a complex bureaucracy to operate and these reasons may well explain the use of *epidosis* in the 250s and 240s at Athens for the defence of the countryside and elsewhere in the Hellenistic world. Of course, to contribute to an *epidosis* allowed individuals to express their *philotimia*.[123]

The Athenians and foreigners who contributed money to finance the harvest in Diomedon's archonship did so *voluntarily*. This *epidosis* prevented any one person from outshining another by limiting contributions to between 50 and 200 drachmai. There was, therefore, no encouragement by the state to allow any *one* individual either to dominate or to capitalize on the city's position by providing more money than anyone else to the *epidosis*. Nor was it possible for the money to be diverted to anything other than the specific purpose for which it was needed. The treasurer of the stratiotic fund in Diomedon's archonship was to allocate the money that had been collected so that the harvests could be brought in safely.[124] In short the appeal was designed to encourage the widespread participation of the Athenian elite in defence of the countryside and state.

But the *epidosis* of 248/7 was not the only mechanism in operation this year. At the same time, the *sitōnai* also fulfilled their duties with distinction. In the archonship of Kydenor, probably three years after their term in office, the *sitōnai* of 248/7 were honoured for their actions.[125] The *sitōnai* are generally understood to buy in grain and may well have had a specific fund from which to make their grain purchases, although evidence for neither of these two features survives for this year. *Sitōnai* may have had general responsibilities to make grain available to purchase: the *sitōnai* of 248/7 were honoured because they had made sure that grain "as good and as abundant as possible could be bought in the market for the People".[126] Whether there had been a specific grain fund or they bought grain on behalf of the polis is not clear. However, the simultaneous operation of the *epidosis* and the *sitōnai* in 248/7 says a great deal about the general problems in supplying grain to the people in this year. But the *epidosis* of 248/7 makes clear that the money raised for the defence of the harvest was "for defence of the polis" and controlled by the treasurer of the stratiotic fund.

This distinction may have been necessary because other (similar) funds were raised by *epidosis*—by the act of making a contribution—that consisted not only of contributions of money but also of grain. For example, the honorand Aischias of Pergamum had made contributions of two forms "for the defence of the polis': an amount of barley and a sum of money, possibly

[122] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 17–18. [123] Whitehead 1983. [124] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 9–12.
[125] Ibid. 216. [126] Ibid. 216 ll. 10–12.

200 drachmai. There is no apparent reference in the inscription for Aischias that indicates that the fund or *epidosis* concerned a *sitōnia* and enough of the text, even in its restored state, suggests that no such reference was made.[127] This particular inscription seems to refer to two *epidoseis*: "since [Aischias] continues to be of [good-will] to the Athenian People and, now *epidoseis* have been made, he has given [to the People for] the defence of the polis [(*a number*) *medimnoi*] of barley and [2]00 hundred drachmai of silver."[128]

It is not always certain that in years when a *sitōnia* took place that there were not other mechanisms employed by the polis that saw individuals contributing either money to protect the countryside (for the collection of grain) or grain (for the "defence of the countryside'). Nor was the *sitōnia* the only institution that saw individuals contributing grain. Indeed a *sitōnia* could encompass several kinds of activity and some comparison with the earlier evidence in Lycurgan Athens is also worth considering.[129] *Sitōnia* at Athens is better known in the fourth century.[130] In 328/7 Herakleides of Salamis had given 3,000 drachmai to a *sitōnia*, a public subscription to a grain-purchasing fund for which Garnsey says there is "no known parallel in Athenian history".[131] Demosthenes had given one talent to a *sitōnia*.[132] Chrysippos and his brother gave one talent.[133] There is no indication that Demosthenes served as *sitōnēs* on this occasion, but in 338/7 Demosthenes had been chosen as *sitōnēs* and was later charged with embezzlement.[134]

One of the significant developments in the early Hellenistic period is the appointment of a board of *sitōnai* as opposed to a single officer. There may have been several reasons but a board may have been less likely to embezzle finances and the responsibilities of a *sitōnia* may have required more personnel than a single official could maintain. Either way, it is clear that membership of the board of *sitōnai* was an important office in early Hellenistic Athens. Not only did the Athenians elect citizens to this office by vote but important figures were also chosen to serve. There is no indication that *sitōnai* were selected in random fashion (i.e. by lot) as seems to have been the case with the *sitophylakes*, for example. For the six *sitophylakes* of the archonship of

[127] Tracy, *A&M* 134–41: *IG* ii^2 768 + 802 ll. 11–13.

[128] *IG* ii^2 768 + 802 ll. 9–13.

[129] For a useful reconstruction of the way the office operated see Gallant 1989: 406–8.

[130] The earliest named *sitōnēs* is the famous orator, Demosthenes, Dem. 17. 248. Develin 1989: 276 lists Kallisthenes as *sitōnēs* in 357/6 but the text itself mentions only Kallisthenes' management of grain from Leukon which had raised fifteen talents (Dem. 20. 33) and makes no mention of either *sitōnia* or *sitōnēs*. It is possible that Kallisthenes operated in a way similar to the later named officer, but the absence of the title leaves Demosthenes as the first known *sitōnēs*.

[131] *IG* ii^2 360 ll. 10–12, 70–2; Garnsey 1988: 163.

[132] [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851b.

[133] Dem. 34. 39.

[134] Dem. 18. 248; [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851f; Develin 1989: 344.

Athenodoros (239/8) are in all but one case unknown and their secretary is explicitly appointed by lot.[135] It is likely that the *sitophylakes* therefore continued to be appointed by lot and were less likely to number among the notables of the Athenian citizen body.[136]

In the fourth century there were ten *sitophylakes* (five for Piraeus and five for Athens) and by the third quarter of the fourth century as many as thirty-five *sitophylakes* (twenty for the city and fifteen for Piraeus) according to the *Athenaiōn Politeia*.[137] It is possible that a distinction continued into the third century, but the status and control of Piraeus, particularly in the period after the Chremonidean war, makes it unclear how the running of the Piraeus was achieved.[138] Only six officials—five *sitophylakes* and one secretary—of Athenodoros' archonship were honoured, and they probably represent half a panel of twelve, and possibly were the *sitophylakes* responsible for the polis as a whole as opposed to distinct officers for the city (*asty*) and Piraeus.[139] A reduction in officials from thirty-five to twelve is significant but marks largely a return to the norm of the earlier fourth century before the extraordinary increase to thirty-five.[140] It is impossible to know when the reduction in numbers occurred but equally clear that tribal representation remained the fundamental principle behind the election of civic officers: the six men crowned in this decree are from six separate tribes—ordered randomly.[141]

Unlike the *sitōnai*, the *sitophlakyes* were concerned exclusively with the actual markets and sale of grain rather than its supply. The honours in the archonship of Athenodoros offer little to explain their services.[142] It is difficult

[135] *Agora* xvi. 194 ll. 5–8, 20–3. Athenodoros belongs to 239/8 (M. J. Osborne 2003; or 238/7, Tracy *A&M* 84; previously e.g. 254/3, M. J. Osborne 1989; 256/5, Meritt 1981). Note that the *athlothetai* honoured in Athenodoros' archonship (*IG* ii^2 784) were responsible for the *Lesser Panathenaia* festival (Nagy 1978: 310); they were honoured on the final main Assembly of the civic year suggests that *athlothetai* held office until the end of the civic year.

[136] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Herakleitos of Athmonon served Antigonos in the 250s as 'general for the Piraeus and the other areas designated with Piraeus', *IG* ii^2 1225 ll. 7–9. The additional spheres of control are not known but were clearly important: Herakleitos' activity in Salamis would indicate that he had some responsibility here.

[139] *Agora* xvi. 194. Crosby (*Hesp.* 6 (1937) 416) suggests that the six were either the Piraeus or the city officials.

[140] Scepticism on the thirty-five *sitophylakes* in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3, Rhodes, *Comm.*: 577–8; the text may be corrupted (ibid. 55). The number of officials may have been increased to thirty-five in the 320s (ibid. 577 with references, Garnsey 1988: 141).

[141] Tribes: Antigonis, Demetrias, Aegeis, Leontis, Oineis, and Antiochis. The order in which the names are written is different in fragment A (ll. 5–8: IV, VIII, I, XII, II, VI) and fragment B (ll. 7–10: IV, VIII, II, I, XIII, IV). Little can be made out from the prosopography of the *sitophylakes*: Agatharchos is surely the son of Pyrgion, the *epistates* in *IG* ii^2 672 l. 3 (Woodhead after Crosby, *Agora* xvi. 194, p. 283).

[142] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3.

to offer any definite scenario in which the *sitophylakes* had performed their office but it may be relevant that the *athlothetai* of this year also received honours.[143] The *sitophylakes* may well have ensured that grain was available at a crucial time or simply that the markets ran efficiently.[144] In the fourth century *athlothētai* found themselves involved with *agoranomoi*, and had also at one stage been involved in the organization of crowns awarded to two individuals who assisted in the grain supply.[145] Uncertainty in the archon list in the surrounding years and the unsettled position of Athenodoros make speculation dangerous. It is tempting, though, to consider that the internal supervision of grain sales in Athens and the successful performance of the Panathenaia or other festivals connected somehow the honours for the *sitophylakes* and the *athlothētai* for this year. The appearance of an *agōnothetēs* in an uncertain context in the decree for the *sitophylakes* seems to support this theory.[146] If problems were experienced in Athens in 239/8, it need not have been one connected with a grain crisis but could have reflected civic concern for the successful performance of religious festivals that were of central importance to the identity of the polis.

Unlike the *sitophylakes*, the citizens who served as *sitōnai* are invariably men of considerable wealth and repute, familiar with public service. For example, two inscriptions from the 270s preserve decrees honouring the board of the *sitōnai*. Neither of the two inscriptions preserves a complete list of officials because the earlier text survives only partially although it seems to have been very similar to the text of the decree passed a few years later.[147] The names of the twelve *sitōnai* of 275/4 were arranged in four columns, and four names can be recovered completely with some degree of certainty, and a further one can be tentatively restored.[148] Deinias son of Deinon of Erchia served nine years later as *agōnothetēs* of the Panathenaia during the Chremonidean war, a position that required great personal financial resources.[149] Two contributed

[143] *IG* ii^2 784.

[144] It is unclear whether the role of *epimelētai tou emporiou* and *sitophylakes* remained distinct in the third century, the former are not mentioned.

[145] *Athlothetai* and (a) the *agoranomoi* (*IG* ii^2 380) and (b) grain suppliers, *IG* ii^2 212, see Nagy 1978: 308–9.

[146] *Agora* xvi. 194b l. 16.

[147] The similarity of the texts has been remarked upon more recently by Michael Osborne who has made restorations to *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 (*sitōnai* of 275/4) on the strength of analogous phrases in *Agora* xvi. 188 (passed in 271/0).

[148] *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 ll. 16–22. The *sitōnai* of the archon [Ol]bios (l. 5; restoration, Meritt, *Hesp.* 4 (1935) 564 n. 1). Tracy (1988: 309–10; *A&M* 84) identified the letter-cutter mason and prefers Meritt's restoration of the year [Ol]bios and early date (as M. J. Osborne 1989: 221–2) to Pritchett and Meritt's (1940: 99, reaffirmed later in Meritt 1981: 91) later date (Habicht 1979: 125–6 favoured a date in the third quarter of the third century).

[149] *Horos* 14–16 (2000–3) 89–93 = *Hesp.* 37 (1968) 284–5 no. 21 (Ag. I 2462) l. 3 in 266/5 (Meritt 1981: 91 n. 58).

to the *epidosis* in the archonship of Diomedon.[150] Three of the six preserved names were members of the elite of Athens, the propertied families.[151] Unfortunately the later decree of 271/0 preserves more detail of the decree, but of the names of the *sitōnai* only one can be restored with any confidences but and he is almost certainly the son of a *syntrierarch* and therefore a member of the Athenian elite.[152] Enough of the demotics are preserved to show, however, that the officers were listed in tribal order in an arrangement different from the previous example.[153]

It is likely that in the third century the *sitōnai* was a board of Athenians, often chosen from among the more active members of the elite, who would have been appointed almost certainly for a whole year.[154] The appearance of honours to boards of *sitōnai* in the 270s does not prove that the officials were now being elected regularly on an annual basis.[155] But both *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 and *Agora* xvi. 188, referring to the *sitōnai* who had been serving for a specific year, suggest a regular tenure of one year. It is likely that each Athenian tribe was represented by a *sitōnēs* drawn from one of the tribe's demes.[156] The

[150] *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 col. III ll. 19–20: the official of Akamantis is probably Au[tias Autokleous Acharneus]. He was taxiarch in 281/0 (*Agora* xvi. 182 l. 23). He was honoured as a proxenos and benefactor of the Oropians probably in 281 (*I. Oropos* 9 = *IG* vii 4266; dated to the first quarter of third century by Knoepfler 2001: 150 n. 277, and at 197 n. 588 no later than *c.*280) on the occasion of his mission with the other taxiarchs to Boeotia for the agonistic festival of Zeus Basileia (see Schachter 1994: 109–18, the timing of the festival is not discussed). That festival has surely just taken place in Metageitnion and the taxiarchs are honoured on their return to Athens. Athens and Boeotia became free simultaneously in 287 according to Habicht (1979: 77 with n. 12). The celebration of the festival would certainly suggest that by 281 Boeotia was free: Schachter proposed that *Agora* xvi. 182 is linked to the revived federal festival under the *koinon* of the Boeotians (Schachter 1994: 117 n. 1). Autias contributed to the *epidosis* in Diomedon's archonship, *Agora* xvi. 213 col. ii, l. 72; cf. *LGPN* ii Autias nos. 3 and 4 = *PA* 2700). *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 col. I 19–21: [E]riotos Demophilou of [Melit]e, the *sitōnēs* of Demetrias contributed to the *epidosis* of 248/7 (*Agora* xvi. 213 col. i, l. 62; that had originally prompted Pritchett and Meritt to date *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 to the second half of the third century (also Meritt 1981: 91 n. 59) but [Ol]bios is secure now in 275/4).

[151] Deinias Deinonos of Erchia: see Deinias (I) of Erchia, *APF* 3163; Chairippos Philippou of Lamptrai: see Polyeuktos of Lamptrai, *APF* 11948; [E]riotos Demophilou of Phrearrioi: see Demon Phrearrioi, *APF* 3738.

[152] It is tempting to restore the *sitōnēs* of the tribe Antigonis (*Agora* xvi. 188 l. 52) as an elite Athenian, Archestratos son of Phanostratos of Gargettos, i.e. son of Phanostratos (*LGPN* ii s.v. Phanostratos no. 14; *APF* 14100, syntrierarch and investor in silver mines).

[153] The names in *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 are arranged in four columns but in *Agora* xvi. 188 a single-column list, as in many other honorific decrees.

[154] The People chose the *sitōnai* (*IG* ii^2 744 l. 8, [σι]τώνας ἑλομένου τοῦ δ[ήμου]); date, middle third of the third century, Tracy, *A&M* 133, in the style of the cutter of *IG* ii^2 788.

[155] *Sitōnai* of 275/4: *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 (see Tracy *A&M* 89–90 for the publication of the joining fragment, Ag. I 1904); 271/0 (for *sitōnai* of 272/1): *Agora* xvi. 188. The broken lines of *Agora* xvi. 188 ll. 10–12 may have helped to determine this point.

[156] *Agora* xvi. 188 ll. 52–8, the (broken) list of the names of the *sitōnai* of 272/1 is in tribe order and seven of the twelve tribal representatives are partially preserved.

preservation, although incomplete, of three inscriptions for the *sitōnai* of the archonships of Olbios, Lysitheides, and Diomedon indicates that this magistracy was indeed a familiar feature developed to facilitate the purchase of grain in the mid-third century but it is not certain that the *sitōnai* had become a regular appointment every year.[157]

Although there was a delay of some years before the *sitōnai* of Diomedon were honoured, it is significant that the honours were granted on the same day as honours were given to the *agoranomoi* who had served in the year immediately before Kydenor.[158] The day of the principal Assembly meeting of the month was also the last available day before the Dionysia took place. Earlier in the century at the same time of the year in Elaphebolion, the *sitōnai* of Lysitheides had been honoured in 271/0 (archonship of Pytharatos).[159] Dinsmoor collected Athenian decrees from other years that had been passed on this day and found that all those dating after the 290s honoured Athenian boards of officials.[160] The decision to honour the *sitōnai* and other Athenian officials at the Assembly just before the Dionysia was surely self-conscious and significant. No specific explanation can be found in the text of the decrees themselves but it is highly likely that the public award was timed in particular to make a symbolic gesture to the citizen body at the time of one of the major civic festivals.

Two decrees in 271/0 honoured officials of the previous year. While honours for the *sitōnai* were delayed until Elaphebolion, the taxiarchs of 272/1 were honoured relatively quickly in the principal assembly early in the second prytany of 271/0. The *sitōnai* of 272/1 were honoured in 271/0 at the last Assembly meeting before the City Dionysia with a gold crown, the front seat at all festivals that the polis holds, and an inscribed decree on which their names were written.[161] It is surely the intention that the board of officials were to take up their honorary seats in the front row of the theatre in the most important annual civic festival of the year, an award that had been granted at the beginning of the year to the taxiarchs. Indeed in 271/0, Thrasykles son of Thrasyllos of Dekeleia was to commemorate his *agōnothēsia* with a monumental inscription that he added, when Hippothontis won the boys' dithyramb and Pandionis won the men's, to his father's monument.[162] It is highly likely that the *sitōnai* and *agoranomoi* were awarded in the archonship of

[157] Woodhead (*ap. Agora* xvi. 188, p. 273) assumes the *sitōnai* remained an extraordinary appointment.

[158] *Agoranomoi* of 246/5 (Philoneos) honoured in 245/4 (Kydenor): *Agora* xvi. 217 (= Pritchett and Meritt 1940: 23–7, Ag. I 5191).

[159] *Agora* xvi. 188.

[160] Dinsmoor 1954: 307.

[161] *Agora* xvi. 188 ll. 38–44.

[162] *IG* ii^2 3083.

Kydenor the privileges that had been given to the taxiarchs and *sitōnai* of 272/1. Several officials in Athens received the honour of front seats at the theatre.[163] The Athenians exploited their major festivals to give privileges (and therefore public recognition) to the individuals who served on boards (e.g. taxiarchs, *sitōnai*, or *agoranomoi*).[164] A surge in the setting up of such honorific decrees for Athenian magistrates began at the end of the 280s when hipparchs and phylarchs, taxiarchs, and *astynomoi* all received honours.[165]

Despite the similarities, the reason for the delay between the honours awarded to the taxiarchs and *sitōnai* of 272/1 is not explained. One possible reason for the delay in regard to the *sitōnai* may relate to the time when their actions were seen to take effect. Comparison with the conditions imposed by Agyrrhius' law on the sale of the grain from the islands is instructive. In the fourth-century law, the sale of grain brought from the islands was not to be put to the vote before Anthesterion (the month before Elaphebolion). As Stroud pointed out in his commentary on the law, the date coincides with a low point in the sailing season when "existing supplies of grain were often low, and prices presumably approaching their peak".[166] However, the Dionysia took place in Elaphebolion when one would normally expect a large audience and an event of some attraction to those visiting the city at the start of the sailing season. It is a remote possibility that similar limits were imposed on the sale of grain brought in by the *sitōnai* and that Anthesterion served also as the month in which sales of grain reserves could be proposed. If this were the case, then Elaphebolion 271/0 would naturally be the month in which the benefits of the *sitōnai* of 272/1 would take effect.

Whether or not the years in which the taxiarchs were honoured were years in which they had seen active service in Attica is not always clear. Certainly the officers of 281/0 were honoured for their role in a religious festival in Boeotia on behalf of the polis.[167] However in two years, 275/4 (the archonship of

[163] *Agora* xvi. 185 ll. 25–6 (with gold crowns); ibid. 187 ll. 30–1 (with gold crowns); on *proedria*, see above, Ch. 8, sect. 3.

[164] *Agora* xvi. 217 l. 22. The one sufficiently preserved name of the *agoranomoi* is [Teles]inos of Erchia whose son Kallistratos proposed the decree (l. 8) and (?significantly) 'happened' to be the *proedros* who put to the vote the decree of 248/7 passing the *epidosis* of the archonship of Diomedon (*Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 6–7). It is highly likely that both had been contributors to the subscription but their names have not been preserved and may have followed fellow demesmen Dromeas and Diokles at col. i, ll. 38–44.

[165] Ignoring honours for the *prytaneis*, hipparchs are praised in 282/1 (*SEG* xxi. 525); taxiarchs praised in 281/0 (*Agora* xvi. 182); in 276/5 (*IG* ii^2 685); in 275/4 (*Agora* xvi. 185); in 271/0 (*Agora* xvi. 187); *astynomoi* honoured in 272/1 (*IG* ii^2 704); *sitōnai* in 275/4 (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904); and in 271/0 (*Agora* xvi. 188).

[166] Stroud 1998: 73.

[167] *Agora* xvi. 182.

Olbios) and 272/1 (archonship of Lysitheides), the serving taxiarchs and the *sitōnai* were both to receive civic honours in the year following their term of office.[168] Had there been problems in Attica which forced the taxiarchs to engage in some sort of action in these years? If so, then had such action threatened the grain harvest in Attica to such an extent that the *sitōnai* had shown particular qualities that justified subsequent honours? It is impossible to test these hypotheses without more evidence for warfare in Attica in 275/4 and 272/1. The complete text of the decree passed in 271/0 for the taxiarchs of the previous year does not say anything explicit about military action but emphasizes only military preparedness and how the officials furnished each of their tribes with excellent equipment for defence duties, fortified posts, and military review.[169] These duties may have been regular tours for soldiers rather than commands in specific actions.[170]

Athenian *sitōnai* did not, it appears, supply money to the fund from their own resources. The *sitōnia* at Athens was not a quasi-liturgy but may well have seen Athenians contributing money and possibly grain. Nor is it clear that the *sitōnia* enabled individual officials to exploit the office to gain power financially or politically over other citizens in ways which evidence from other Greek cities sometimes suggests.[171] This last point, however, may be a result of the evidence but it should be noted that the insistence in third-century Athens is on a board of officials who probably all come from wealthy and politically active backgrounds that might have prevented a single Boulagoras-style figure from dominating domestic politics on account of wealth. There is then no evidence from Athens for the sort of monopolization by *sitōnai* of debt and capital which is evident in some other Greek cities. The *sitōnia* probably incorporated a fund of money that the sale of grain was expected to replenish, a practice found in other Greek cities. *Epidoseis* at Athens, however, would not normally have served as loans but as one-off donations.[172] In these respects,

[168] Officers of 275/4: *Agora* xvi. 185 (taxiarchs) and *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 (*sitōnai*); of 272/1: *Agora* xvi. 187 (taxiarchs) and 188 (*sitōnai*).

[169] Woodhead at *Agora* xvi. 187, p. 240: the hortatory clause 'emphasizes . . . an administrative concern to be seen to do the right thing'. See Henry 1996.

[170] An unknown taxiarch who became general was honoured by the People for serving as taxiarch at fortified posts in the third century, remembered at Rhamnous, *I. Rhamnous* 132 crown 6 (ἐφεδρεύσαντα). Ephebes of 215/14 (*SEG* xxix. 116 l. 22, ἐφεδρεύοντες) operate in this manner. For more detailed actions rewarded (not by the polis but by soldiers at Rhamnous, *I. Rhamnous* 3 for Epichares who had commanded his troops in the Chremonidean war and stationed troops in lookout positions, *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 9–10, [παρεφε]δρεύων; see Knoepfler 1993.

[171] As, for example, Boulagoras on Samos (*SEG* i. 366 = Austin 1981 no. 113), and Protogenes in Olbia (*Syll.*^{3} 495 = Austin 1981 no. 97), on which see Gallant 1989: 408–9.

[172] A. H. M. Jones 1940: 217, 'it would seem that these funds [for the purchase of grain] were capital sums, which the sitonae spent each year on buying corn, and repaid as the corn was sold, and that the corn supply did not ordinarily involve the government in a loss'. Boulagoras of Samos paid back all the money the city had to borrow after grain had been brought into the city,

then, the Athenian institution of the *sitōnia* was far more resistant to the exertion of any outstanding individual. In other Greek cities this may not have been the case for, as Gallant has pointed out, in some places a "prodigious sum . . . could be made by men of wealth and influence who . . . could simply manipulate food supplies within the framework of this type of communal institution".[173] That does not seem to have been true at Athens.

The preservation of a board of regulators of the grain trade in Athens and the development of a board to deal with the supply of grain from overseas indicates the extent to which civic institutions were in place to help ensure the city was supplied with grain. The publication of civic honours for magistracies and the continuing award of benefactors for institutions such as the *sitōnia* or *epidoseis* were more apparent in the rest of the third century than they were in the 280s. Then there was a greater balance between civic honours for magistracies and awards to foreign benefactors for one-off services. The extraordinary *epidosis* of 248/7 recognized a limit on the need for individuals to finance this particular difficulty during the war in Attica and revealed a response among both the Athenian and non-Athenian members of society.

8.6. THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE POLIS

A complex organization of institutions involving Athenians serving as magistrates and both citizens and foreigners contributing to specific funds, such as the *epidoseis*, was an integral part of the financial organization of the early Hellenistic polis. Finance continued to be one of the main concerns of the Boule, but the chief responsibility for the allocation of money for much of the early Hellenistic period rested with specific financial officials. The payment for the erection of inscriptions has left a trail that allows us to pursue some aspects of the changing history of financial management in Athens.[174] For much of the fourth century the treasurer of the People was assigned to

SEG i. 366 = Austin 113. Migeotte 1983: 147: 'par définition . . . celles-ci [souscriptions athéniennes] faisaient appel à l'effort collectif, mēme si la réponse de la population n'était pas toujours aussi large que la cité le souhaitait'.

[173] Gallant 1989: 408. At Athens we do not find men loaning money to the state (cf. ibid. 409) and in this way political authority does remain, at least in Athens, at the level of the community because the elite continued to look to the People for legitimization of power even in the second half of the third century (ibid. 410). It may well be that Athens was able to protect itself from some of the problems being felt in other Greek cities which Gallant (ibid.) identifies (see also Gallant 1991 ch. 7).

[174] Henry 1984: 49–73.

oversee payment for the erection of inscriptions.[175] Towards the end of the fourth century, several changes in this sphere took place.[176] In 303/2 and 302/1 any one of a number of officials undertook these duties, but the treasurer of the People no longer operated after 302/1.[177] In the 290s, a brief period existed when the distinctive and possibly oligarchic officials, the *exetastes* and *trittyarchs*, took over these duties, giving way from 295 to the single officer for the distribution. From *c.*286–262 that single officer had given way to a board for the distribution. After the Chremonidean war several bodies fulfilled this function and were variously assigned to pay for the setting up of inscriptions: the single officer for the distribution, the board for the distribution, and the treasurer of the stratiotic fund.[178] After 230/29, the payment of moneys for the erection of inscriptions continued to be undertaken by several officials (principally as before).[179] These changes reflect something of the ongoing complexity of Athenian finances. But they also indicate which were the main positions of financial responsibility and the one which seems to dominate the early Hellenistic era is the treasurer of the stratiotic fund.

This official was witnessed at Athens for the first time in 373 and the office remained important throughout the Hellenistic period.[180] The treasurer of the stratiotic fund was responsible for state finances in times of war and became the principal financial official of the polis in the early Hellenistic period. In the late fourth century, the office had been held by Habron son of Lycurgus of Boutadai, who at the end of his office (306/5) had been responsible for the money transferred to fund the safe escort of the wood given by the kings Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes for the construction of Athenian warships.[181] In the following term (305/4), only one month later, Habron's successor, Philippos son of Nikias of Acharnai was charged, with some members of the Areopagite Council, to oversee the transfer of state moneys.[182] Both examples illustrate the central role that this treasurer provided and that his concerns were far-ranging.

[175] Henry 1989: 256–67.

[176] Ibid. 267–70.

[177] Year 303/2: treasurer of the People; treasurer of the stratiotic fund; the single officer for the distribution (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῆι διοικήσει*); 302/1: treasurer of the People; the single officer for the distribution. Henry 1984: 56–7.

[178] Rhodes 1993; Henry 1988*a*; 1989: 277–80.

[179] The single officer for the distribution, the board for the distribution, and the treasurer of the stratiotic fund: Henry 1988*a*: 134–6; 1989: 280–5.

[180] First appearance: Brun 1983: 170 (with [Dem.] 49. 12); its survival: Geagan 1967: 79, 89–90. The institution of the stratiotic fund (and its treasurer) merits a complete study in itself. Rhodes 1981: 513–17.

[181] *IG* ii^2 1492 B ll. 119–24.

[182] Ibid. ll. 124–38. For Philippos, see *LGPN* ii s.v. Philippos 41.

Hebesarchos of Paiania may have held the position in 266/5.[183] Shortly after the Chremonidean war, in the early 250s (?259/8), Sosikrates of Sphettos had held the office and was subsequently praised by citizen soldiers stationed at Eleusis.[184] Later Eurykleides of Kephisia was the treasurer of the fund in 248/7 when the Athenians were at war with Alexander.[185] Towards the end of the 240s, the office was held by the son of [— —]rokleidēs who may be the well-known Athenian, Thrasyphon of Xypete.[186]

The treasurer of the stratiotic fund almost certainly found himself in positions where he was required by public decision to make sure that religious festivals were celebrated. Certainly the suggestion of the decree from Eleusis is that "the laws and decrees of the Boule and the People" probably required him to attend to religious matters.[187] A public decree in 273/2 decided that he and the financial board should be instructed to make public moneys available for the celebration of the Chalkeia for Athena Archegetis.[188] In the later fourth century the treasurer also facilitated state religious activity when he provided the 300 *drachmai* that was required by the councillors of Akamantis serving as *prytaneis* that month for the sacrifice and setting up of a dedication to Athena Nike, *Agathē Tychē*, and the Saviour Gods, i.e. Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes.[189]

The evidence for the treasurer is much richer after 230, but there is sufficient material in the third century to confirm that he was indeed one of the most important officials in early Hellenistic Athens.[190] In the important fragmentary list of civic magistrates from the end of the 240s, the treasurer of

[183] For an improved text, Habicht 2000–3: 89–93 (originally published as *Hesp.* 37 (1968) 284 no. 21—*SEG* xxv. 186; Ag I 2462). Hebesarchos is known only from this inscription.

[184] *IG* ii^2 1304b (*I. Eleusis* 184), treasurer of the stratiotic fund in the archonship of Philinos. For the archon date, see M. J. Osborne 2003: 73.

[185] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 1–2.

[186] *SEG* xxxii. 169 ll. 8–9 (= *Hesp.* 8 (1939) 45–7 no. 13 (= Ag. I 3951) + *Hesp.* 57 (1988) 314–15 no. 2 (= Ag. I 922) + IG ii^2 1705). End of the 240s: Habicht 1997: 155 n. 18 but more recently Habicht 2000–3: 93 follows Tracy's 1988: 314 date for this inscription (*c.*245). On Thrasyphon son of Hierokleides of Xypete: S. Dow, *GRBS* 20 (1979) 334–42; *LGPN* ii s.v. Thrasyphon 4. He proposed two decrees concerning Eleusis: a state decree, *I. Eleusis* 192 = *IG* ii^2 683, honouring the *epimelētai* of the Mysteries in the archonship of Hieron, 249/8; a decree of the Kerykes and Eumolpidai, *I. Eleusis* 201 l. 2 = IG ii^2 1235 l. 1, honouring the *Hierophant*, dated by Clinton, *c.*225, Tracy *ALC* 47; and possibly a third decree of 235/4, praising the ephebes of the previous year, Kimon's archonship (*IG* ii^{2}787 + *SEG* xxix. 114; Tracy *A&M* 131). The restoration at *SEG* xxxii. 169 l. 9 ([*Θρασυφῶν Ἰε*]*ροκλείδου* [*Ξυπεταιών*]): alternative patronymics, Androkleidēs, Herokleidēs, Patrokleidēs or Prokleidēs, produce no identifiable individual as suitable as Thrasyphon.

[187] *IG* ii^2 1304b (*I. Eleusis* 184) ll. 3–5, 12–13. Cf. *I. Rhamnous* 65.

[188] *IG* ii^2 674 ll. 16–17, 19–20.

[189] *SEG* xxx. 69 ll. 17–19 with Mikalson 1998: 34.

[190] See Pounder 1983: 248–50. For details of the official's role after 230, see e.g. *I. Rhamnous* 44 ll. 6–12 (after 216/15).

the stratiotic fund appears high up and follows the *agōnothetēs* and two generalships.[191] The same hierarchy is evident in the earlier list from the Chremonidean war.[192]

The evidence for the *epidosis* of 248/7 underlines the high-profile status of the treasurer of the stratiotic fund (*stratiōtika*). He was the official who would receive the funds raised by this *epidosis*. The title of the post and the official's name heads the inscription set up to record the decree and the names of the contributors to the *epidosis*. Its holder that year was Eurykleides. This wealthy politician was of great importance to Athens in the second half of the third century. Late on in his career he almost certainly received the highest honours (*megistai timai*) which were probably awarded in the decree of which only part now survives.[193] The fragmentary text refers to Eurykleides' term as treasurer and to a later occasion when he spent money when his son held office.[194] No doubt the position of treasurer allowed the richest members of society to use their own personal wealth for the public. This is what Eurykleides seems to have done and for which, among other achievements in his long career, he was later remembered. It is possible that the same decree refers also to the time when as treasurer in 248/7 he used the money raised by the *epidosis* to defend the harvest.[195] Although the connection between the two events is not assured, the decree describes a scenario that would fit in with the difficulties that existed in 248/7, although other opportunities would have presented themselves later in the 230s: the fields were not sown and Eurykleides acted in a way that allowed the cultivation to be completed and the crops sowed.[196] The manipulation of the funds raised by the *epidosis* in 248/7 was Eurykleides' direct responsibility and the memory of this action is consistent with the text preserved by the later honorific decree.

Operations such as *epidoseis* allowed the polis to raise funds for specific projects. The financial magistrates of the city were entrusted with the handling of such projects, as Habron in 306/5 or Eurykleides in 248/7. It is for this reason that the treasurer of the stratiotic fund is relatively prominent in the written evidence. What is less obvious, particularly in the years between 295 and 229, is the mention of officials or activities that suggested the Athenians

[191] The hoplite general and the general *epi tēn paraskeuēn*: *SEG* xxxii. 169 ll. 8–9 (= *Hesp.* 8 (1939) 45–7 no. 13 (= Ag. I 3951) + *Hesp.* 57 (1988) 314–15 no. 2 (= Ag. I 922) + IG ii^2 1705).

[192] *Horos* 14–16 (2000–3) 89–93 = *Hesp.* 37 (1968) 284–5 no. 21 (Ag. I 2462).

[193] *IG* ii^2 834 + Add. p. 668 (*Syll.*^{3} 497).

[194] Ibid. l. 4. His son, Mikion III, Habicht 1982: 182 for the family stemma (improving Kirchner's, *PA* 5966, p. 390).

[195] Ibid. ll. 7–10, after Habicht 1982: 121 n. 13, following Kirchner 1940: 506.

[196] Ibid. ll. 7–10: *καὶ [τῆς χώρας κατὰ] | τοὺς πολέμους ἀγροῦ καὶ ἀσπόρου οὔ[σης αἴτιος ἐγε]||νετο τοῦ ἐξεργασθῆναι καὶ σπαρῆναι [χρήματα πορί]||σας κτλ.*

made full use of the Piraeus and benefited from their civic magistrates operating there. Nevertheless, the Athenian polis maintained a complex network of annual officials and boards and was able to raise extraordinary funds when needed. Both Athenians and non-Athenians contributed to the latter, especially in the form of *epidoseis*. But in this survey of civic finances, it has been difficult to discern the extraction of revenues from the Piraeus: honorific state decrees at Athens are relatively silent about the administration of the facilities in the port. The Athenian institutions adapted to the circumstances. Some did not survive in the early Hellenistic period, perhaps *eisphora* was abandoned at some point in the middle third of the third century. Others thrived. But the basis of them all was the contributions made by the Athenian and non-Athenian residents of the polis. It is now time to turn to consider how the polis operated with individuals from outside Athens and used their own citizens and civic resources to support the economies of Athens from overseas.

9

Friends Abroad: Food, Commerce, and the Economics of Benefaction

9.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter concentrated on the civic economies of the Athenian polis, the contributions that individuals made to the operations of the state, the holding of financial offices, and the function of institutions such as the *epidosis*. The perspective of that chapter concentrated on the internal dynamics of state operations, the membership of boards of magistrates and the wealth of the resident population. But the Greek polis also exploited complex external relations with other individuals and polities to support the economies of the community. One of the principal concerns of the polis in these external relations was the supply of food to the city.

Networks of formal and informal associations were established or continued by the polis throughout the east Mediterranean, and sometimes beyond. These networks relied on individuals. Formal relations might include, for example, the participation of the community in festivals of international (the *Pythia*, *Ptolemaieia, Antigoneia*) or regional (*Lebadeia*) importance. Civic magistrates or individuals appointed for the specific occasion of a festival represented the polis at such festivals. The Greek institution *proxenia* offered a formal connection between a community, typically a polis, and an individual member established in another community.[1] But less formal contact flourished especially in the Hellenistic period. As is well known, the rise of powerful Hellenistic rulers, the Successors and later kings, saw the flourishing of a diverse entourage of individuals who carried out varied functions on behalf of these powerful leaders. The majority of individuals who made up what amounted to a very loosely organized "court" are referred to often in our sources as "friends" or sometimes as "those who spent time in the company of" such a leader.[2] These "friends" offered polities alternative means of access to

[1] Proportionately fewer inscriptions awarding *proxenia* seem to have been set up at Athens in the third century. Marek 1984.

[2] Herman 1997.

the Hellenistic rulers that complemented routes such as embassies or formal religious missions.[3] Some Athenians operated among the "friends" of kings and promoted or looked after Athenian interests. The doors that these friends opened allowed access in two directions—for the kings to approach poleis and the reverse.[4] Such contacts between individuals and the poleis are of course well known and lie at the heart of the Hellenistic and the Classical periods.[5] Although the mobility of individuals and the relations of such individuals with Greek polities is a particular feature of the polis in all periods, the creation of competing supra-polis courts gives the Hellenistic period one of its distinct essences.[6]

Using these familiar features as its backdrop, this chapter considers how the Athenian polis was able to extract economic advantage from its relations with foreign individuals and communities. Several avenues can be followed, but the principal focus here is how the economies of food from overseas were facilitated and why.[7] Offered here is an analysis of the evidence for the movement of grain to Attica from outside of the polis (App. 8). The bulk of the documents are extracts from honorific inscriptions from Athens, the context of which must also be considered. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first (9.2) explains what aid overseas benefactors provided to the Athenian supply of grain and why such aid was provided when it was. The examples of aid correspond to the timing of the problems the Athenians faced in cultivating their own territory in Attica. The next three sections (9.3–5) look at the commercial and institutional infrastructures of redistributing grain: prices (9.3), sources of grain (9.4), and the intervention of the polis in the commercial supply of grain from abroad through the institution of *sitōnia* (9.5). The chapter therefore develops some of the economic issues that have been considered in Ch. 1 and brings together (sect. 9.2) the relationship between the warfare in Attica (Ch. 4) and the importation of food.

9.2. THE NEED FOR GRAIN FROM OVERSEAS

The context of the gift from Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes of 100,000 *medimnoi* of grain is connected to the power change

[3] Herman 1980–1.
[4] The 'friends' were 'the human hinges of hellenism' (Davies 2002: 11).
[5] See e.g. Mitchell 1997; Herman 1987.
[6] Savalli-Lestrade 1998.
[7] Bringmann 2001 offers a more general survey of the relationship between benefaction and the grain trade. Migeotte 1997: esp. 191–5 on benefactors and the economy.

at Athens. The city, recently relieved of Kassander's forces, was not yet free from their presence in the territory of the polis in greater Attica. Indeed Demetrios' fleet and army in central Greece from the summer of 307 to 306 no doubt made huge demands on the produce that could be supplied from Attica and the movement of commodities such as grain in the region as a whole. The conditions of this gift of grain are therefore linked closely with the exceptionally difficult circumstances faced by the Athenians in 307/6. The pressure that Kassander continued to exert on Attica dominated the Four Year war (307–304) for the Athenians. It was not until Demetrios Poliorketes' second intervention in 304 that the countryside of Attica was finally returned to Athenian control. All examples of assistance to Athens in the supply of grain to the city that belong in this period correspond to the huge difficulties that the Athenians had in exploiting the food supply produced from their own local territory. And so the theme is set: aid in the supply of grain from outside Athens invariably coincides with periods when the cultivation of the Attica countryside is impossible, difficult, or at best disrupted (see Table 9.1).

The tendency to reward those involved in the provision of imported grain to Athens invariably corresponds to periods when the territory of Attica was under threat or disrupted by warfare or occupied by enemy forces.

The evidence that allows us to determine who possessed the fortresses of Attica is difficult to establish but it is likely that Kassander enjoyed territorial control in Attica for much of the Four Year war. Diodoros describes Kassander and Polyperchon laying waste most of Greece (20. 100. 6). In 306/5 and 305/4 the Athenians lacked the large armies of Demetrios Poliorketes although some forces may have been left behind to help the defence.[8] Demetrios and Antigonos may appear to have been intent on consolidating their maritime control over the Aegean and not interested in securing the territory of Attica in 306. Events far from Athens required Demetrios to campaign with his father Antigonos. Among several operations, success at the battle of Salamis off Cyprus saw Antigonos and Demetrios adopt the title of king. The siege of Rhodes that followed in 306/5 earned Demetrios the sobriquet Poliorketes ("the besieger").[9] But while events took place in the east, Kassander was able to make a recovery in the see-saw struggle for central Greece as the balance tipped in his favour. These two years were pivotal also for the Athenians who

[8] Habicht 1997: 74–5. On the defensive forces see useful comments by Billows 1990: 151, 389 (no. 48), 430–1 (no. 102), 443 (no. 125) esp. on *IG* ii^2 1492 B ll. 106, 116.

[9] Diod. Sic. 20. 92. 2; Will 1979: 69–74. The towers constructed to lay siege to Rhodes (Diod. Sic. 20. 85. 1–3; 20. 91) drew admiration and fascination, especially among the Rhodians who wished to keep one to commemorate the defence and their own bravery (Plut. *Demetr.* 20. 4–21. 2).

Table 9.1. *The relationship between domestic cultivation in Attica and imported supplies of grain to Athens*

Events	Impact on grain production in Attica (or other factors)	Overseas grain services
307 to 304 Four Year war and its legacy	Presence of Poliorketes' army; warfare in Attica and *sitōnia* in 305/4	Antigonid gift of grain (Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1 and Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 4); Pyr[-] of Herakleia (*IG* ii^2 479 + 480); [— —]ides service (*Hesp.* 5 (1936) 201–5); wheat for Athens (*IG* ii^2 499)
Early 290s	Difficulties in Attica—failure of crops and *stasis*	Lysimachos' 10,000 *medimnoi* of wheat (*IG* ii^2 657 ll. 9–14)
Mid-290s	Relief after the end of lengthy siege	Demetrios Poliorketes' 150,000 *medimnoi* of grain (Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4)
Late 290s or early 280s (e.g. 288/7)	(Uncertain date—Atheno-Ptolemaic diplomacy)	Phaidros' embassy to Ptolemy I secures grain and money (*IG* ii^2 682 ll. 28–30)
280s—conflict in Attica following liberation of Athens in 287	All associated with the problems arising out of Athenian revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes in 287: lack of complete control over Attica, loss of Piraeus and attempts to recover it	Zenon's assistance (*IG* ii^2 650); Habron and Matrias (*IG* ii^2 651); Lysimachos' grain (*IG* ii^2 657); Spartokos' gift of grain (*IG* ii^2 653); three Rhodians (*Agora* xvi. 106g); Audoleon's gift of grain (*IG* ii^2 654); Timon[—]'s assistance (*IG* ii^2 655); Ptolemy II's gift in 282 (Shear 1978: 3 ll. 43–55); Thibron and *sitōnia* (*IG* ii^2 670a)
No specific events	No known events although disruptions after Celtic invasions may be relevant	*Sitōnai* of 275/4 (*IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904); *sitōnai* of 272/1 (*Agora* xvi. 188); *taxiarchs* honoured for both years
250s–240s	War with Alexandros, serious disturbances in Attica	*Sitōnai* — Xenokrates (*SEG* iii. 92); Aischias (*IG* ii^2 768 + 802) *sitōnai* of Diomedon's archonship honoured (*Agora* xvi. 216; *epidosis* of same year, *Agora* xvi. 213)
No specific event	Likely to reflect internal distribution during Panathenaia	*sitophylakes* of Athenodorus' archonship (*Agora* xvi. 194 + unpubld. fr.)

were forced to fight Kassander with whatever local help they could muster until Demetrios returned to Greece.[10]

Demetrios Poliorketes came back in 304 to free the Greeks and to do so took control of the heart of central Greece—Chalkis.[11] If Eleusis had not

[10] Local help for Athens: Billows 1990: 151. Aid from a Karystian: *IG* ii^2 467, Eretrians and Chalkidians: *Agora* xvi. 113.

[11] Diod. Sic. 20. 100. 5–6.

already been recovered it seems certain that it was returned to Athenian possession by 304. Demetrios' extraordinary initiation into the Mysteries of the Eleusinia by Stratokles' compression of the two ceremonies into one probably belongs to this year.[12] The relationship between Athens and Demetrios Poliorketes at this point was particularly strong. The Athenians (notably Stratokles) passed many decrees in honour of the friends of the kings. Demetrios Poliorketes apparently interfered, probably during late 304/3, in the appointment of an Athenian general for 303/2.[13] This helps to explain the outrage felt by some politicians at Athens at the dissolution of the power of the People. Demochares, the principal figure according to the literary sources, went into exile as a result of his dispute with Stratokles. The literary evidence was right to have held the latter responsible for the proposals in favour of Demetrios and his entourage.[14]

The Athenian alignment with Demetrios became untenable in 301 when Antigonos died and Demetrios fled following their defeat at the battle of Ipsos. The year 301 therefore signalled a change in policy at Athens. The vanquished Demetrios set out for Athens in the hope of a favourable reception, but his arrival was anticipated near the Cyclades by an Athenian delegation. The embassy reported that the Athenians had passed a decree to prevent the admission of any of the kings to Athens, and that Poliorketes' wife had been escorted from the city to Megara.[15] Athens refused entry to the king and agreed only to release the ships that had been in the Piraeus.[16] Poleis, individuals, and kings realigned themselves in the wake of the battle. Movements of people were affected and stimulated by these changes.[17] Kassander briefly reasserted his presence in Athens as contacts were renewed but these were cut off when he died in 297. The other new power broker to appear at Athens was Lysimachos the King of Thrace.[18]

[12] Woodhead 1981.

[13] On the Athenian general, Adeimantos, see *Ergon* 1993 [1994) 7–8.

[14] At some stage it had been decided at Athens that all that Demetrios Poliorketes decreed should be considered right in the eyes of the gods and mankind, Plut. *Demetr.* 24. 4–5: the year 304 seems the most likely context. The rift depicted by the ancient sources between Stratokles and Demochares may well have been connected to this extension to the adulation of Demetrios (Plut. *Demetr.* 24. 6 for Demochares' exile). It was not until the 280s that the Athenian politician returned. Observations about the confusion of financial responsibilities (as changes occur in who is designated to pay for the cost of erecting inscriptions) in 303/2 and 302/1 may in some way reflect how the political difficulties were affecting civic organization, see Henry 1984: 53, 91. The transfer of financial control, indicated by the change in formulae for the payment of civic decrees, to the *exetastēs* and *trittyarchs* from 301 seems to confirm the level of difficulty (Henry 1984: 63–8; see also Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 144–53). The earliest secure date for the *exetastēs* and *trittyarchs* is *IG* ii^2 641 + 818 ll. 20–32, day 21, prytany 2, 299/8.

[15] Plut. *Demetr.* 30.

[16] Ibid. 31.

[17] Typical of the way the sources treat the end of the fourth century is ibid. 31–2.

[18] On Lysimachos: Lund 1992; Franco 1990: 119 ff.

A gift of 10,000 *medimnoi* of wheat, given to the city by Lysimachos in 299/8, is recorded in a decree honouring the comic poet Philippides of Kephale. In 283/2 Philippides received the highest honours at Athens for a range of services of which most had involved his interaction with the Thracian king. It is therefore from Philippides' role in securing a gift of wheat distributed to all Athenians in 299/8 that we learn of Lysimachos' donation.[19] What is the context for this gift? Two factors are critical. First the literary sources reveal that severe climatic problems damaged the cereal crops in Attica in 302.[20] Secondly Demetrios Poliorketes' attacks on the Thracian Chersonese may have affected maritime routes of grain from the Black Sea or disrupted the movement of commodities into (and out of) the Aegean.[21] The Athenians at the same time were also linked to Kassander as a decree honouring Posidippos suggests (dated at the start of 299/8). Posidippos had played an important part during the visit of an Athenian embassy to Kassander, evidence therefore of diplomacy between the Macedonian king and the Athenians during the archonship of Euktemon (299/8), the same year as Lysimachos' gift of grain. The Athenians were prepared to set up honours for Posidippos because he had clearly assisted in some way the contact made between Kassander and the Athenian ambassadors who had presented themselves at the king's court.[22] Here was another "friend" who oiled wheels. In the context of such rival diplomatic activity the gift of grain from Lysimachos gains greater significance. But was the grain needed or was it a gift from which the Athenians would profit? For in the fourth century, Demosthenes was able to boast that a gift of grain from the Bosporan king Leukon had been so vast that the Athenians were able to sell the surplus at a profit of fifteen talents![23]

The gifts of grain in the final years of the fourth century were particularly important because of the difficulties involved in harvesting Attica during the war with Kassander. In the early years of the third century Attica was no

[19] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 12–13. It should not be assumed that the Lysimachean grain was given away for it is just as likely to have been sold, perhaps at an uninflated price. For the use of the verb, cf. διέδωκε at *I. Rhamnous* 3 l. 18.

[20] Plut. *Demetr.* 12. 3–4; Lund 1992: 85–6. Different techniques could limit the effects of bad weather, see Sallares (1991: 329) for the spring sowing of wheat and Xenophon on staggering the sowing of wheat to ensure some rainfall on the seed, Xen. *Oik.* 17. 6, with commentary by Pomeroy 1994 : 325–9.

[21] Lund 1992: 86: Demetrios' campaign in 300/299; the gift of grain dates to 299/8. The gift from Lysimachos served to establish his goodwill to Athens which was particularly important since Lysimachos, as King of Thrace, was in a strong position to control the trade route from the Black Sea (Franco 1990: 121 n. 46).

[22] *IG* ii^2 641 + 818 ll. 12–18 (on the joining fragment, Tracy, *A&M* 38). Posidippos was awarded an olive crown. The proposer of the honours was the other well-known Philippides son of Philomelos of Paiania, who received honours later in the 290s (*IG* ii^2 649 + Dinsmoor 1931: 3–15).

[23] Dem. 20. 33; Whitby 1999: 125.

longer embroiled in any dispute with an external power, as far as we know. But a lease of land belonging to the phratry of the Dyaleis of 300/299 is symptomatic of the general uncertainties of the period and stipulates that the land is not to be charged with taxes and *eisphora* if there is warfare or a friendly military camp nearby.[24] Another inscription reveals that cavalrymen honoured the treasurers of Athena in 300/299 for their help in securing grain for the horsemen.[25] Here is a sign of difficulty but what sort of difficulty? The cavalrymen praised the treasurers for ensuring that the grain *owed to them* was supplied. The emphasiz in the passage of the decree concerning the gift of grain from Lysimachos the following year is that the grain was distributed to all Athenians.[26] To the same period is the dedication of a statue to Prosperity in honour of the eponymous archon Euktemon and Philonides, probably one of the board of *sitophylakes*, set up by their fellow archons and *sitophylakes* respectively.[27] Euktemon was the eponymous magistrate of 300/299. Both Euktemon and Philonides are honoured for their *dikaiosynē*.

There is a consistent pattern. The cavalry of 300/299 had not got the grain that was due to them until the treasurers of Athena stepped in. One member of the board of *sitophylakes* of the following year is honoured for his *dikaiosyne*. He and the eponymous archon are honoured with a statue of Eueteria, prosperity. In 302 there has been a poor year for the harvest and in 300/299 Demetrios had been on campaign close to a major maritime route past the Thracian Chersonese. The emphasiz in the decree of Philippides on the distribution of the gift of 10,000 *medimnoi* to all Athenians suggests that one of their functions was the fair and just operation of the distribution—both Euktemon and Philonides are specifically remembered for their

[24] *IG* ii^2 1241, see also A. Wilhelm, *Archiv für Papyrologie* xi (1935) 200–3. A notable feature of this lease is the option to purchase the land under agreement after ten years. What does this option-to-buy say about the stability or instability of the time? See R. G. Osborne 1988: 288 n. 14 that the option 'made for worry-free caretaking'. On the establishment of military camps affecting lease agreements, see also the lease from Prasiai, *SEG* xxi. 644 (second half of the fourth century); on war damage, a lease from Teithras, *SEG* xxi. 151 (mid-fourth century), and another from Aexone, *IG* ii^2 2492 ll. 12–14 (345/4); see also *IG* ii^2 411 ll. 34–7 (second half of the fourth century).

[25] *IG* ii^2 1264 esp. ll. 2–8 (proposed by Antiphon, l. 1, Tracy 1990: 146). See now Oliver 2006*a*.

[26] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 12–13.

[27] M. Th. Mitsos, *AE* 1960 [1963] 38–42 = EM 1927; see Franco 1990: 119 ff. The statue base is first linked to 299/8 by Raubitschek in *Hesp.* 35 (1966) 242–3. The implications of it and the relationship to the gift of Lysimachos are examined further by Burstein 1978*a*. He suggests that the crown recorded in the inventory of *IG* ii^2 1485a at ll. 28–9 represents that decree by the Athenians to the Thracian king in 299/8. Eueteria (= Prosperity) has been compared with the Roman Anona, see further on the former personification Raubitschek ibid. and Robert *BE* 1966 no. 137 and 1967 no. 187. For an agricultural connotation to Eueteria, see e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 4.

dikaiosynē.[28] The Athenians seem to have been suffering from residual shortfalls in the local grain supply that were exacerbated by problems in maritime trade. This had led, it seems, to difficulties in the redistribution of public resources: the cavalry suffered. The operation that distributed Lysimachos' gift of grain to all Athenians was probably overseen by the *sitophylakes* whose role it was to ensure the fair distribution of grain and its sale. In addition to these difficulties, the finances of the polis were also suffering problems at the very end of the fourth century. The *exetastēs* and the *trittyarchs* had replaced the previous treasurers as the officials responsible for the payment and setting up of decrees.[29] There was clearly a financial crisis.

One further major development must also be accounted for. A *stasis* in the form of the tensions between two generals at Athens, the hoplite general Charias and the general for the mercenaries, Lachares had developed.[30] For a reason not apparent in the sources, of which the principal document is the fragmentary chronicle preserved on papyrus *P. Oxy.* 17. 2082, a *stasis* broke out between Charias and Lachares. A new reading of one fragment reveals the early stages of these disturbances when Charias occupied the Acropolis and made the Athenian people feed the soldiers he had with him.[31] Lachares removed Charias from the Acropolis and in a subsequent trial had the dissident generals condemned to death on the motion of Apollodoros. Elsewhere Pausanias reveals that Kassander had persuaded Lachares to become the foremost politician and take up tyranny. A siege took place in Piraeus and Kassander died in 297, by which time Lachares seems already to be ruling Athens. The fragment of the comic poet Demetrios II describes the time under Lachares as a period of hunger, characteristic perhaps of the years of Lachares' tyranny in general.[32] At some point after the death of Kassander, Lachares removed the gold from the treasuries and cult statue of Athena to pay mercenaries: it is with this period of his dominance at Athens that one can identify Lachares as a tyrant.[33] This series of difficulties was the only period

[28] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 12–3 on the distribution of the grain; for the role of the *sitophylakes*, see Gauthier 1981: 18 nn. 39–40.

[29] The different financial officials, 303/2–302/1, Henry 1984: 51–63; the *exetastēs* and *trittyarchs*, Henry 1989: 267–70. See above, Ch. 8, sect. 6.

[30] The chronology of the first half of the 290s is notoriously difficult, and I have preferred to follow the reconstruction offered by Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 144–50.

[31] Thonemann 2003.

[32] The struggle is best documented by the papyrus fragment *P. Oxy.* xvii. 2082 (see Ferguson 1929 and Jacoby *FGrH* ii. 257a): the identity of the author of this text is important but uncertain: A. S. Hunt suggested it is the work of Phlegon of Tralles, freedman of the Emperor Hadrian (at *P. Oxy.* xvii. p. 82).

[33] The action is criticized in the ancient sources, Pausanias 1. 25. 7 and 1. 29. 16; Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 149. Athenians died in the struggle against Lachares, and Pausanias saw their graves,1. 29. 10. Lachares' tyranny: Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 7. 5 and Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 1. Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 150

when external powers were not the direct cause of problems in Attica that saw assistance in the grain supply.

The next gift of grain is set against this highly fluid situation at Athens in the 290s. The collapse of the Lachares regime was followed by Demetrios Poliorketes' siege of Athens. The submission of the city to Poliorketes was sweetened by the king's large gift of 100,000 *medimnoi* of grain in 295.[34] Ptolemy tried to intervene in vain. After receiving Athenian embassies, Demetrios the king entered the city where he addressed the People in the Theatre of Dionysus, introduced offices favourable to them, and contributed 100,000 *medimnoi* to the city.[35] It is quite clear that the grain was given to raise Demetrios' profile among the Athenians. Dromokleides presented Mounychia and Piraeus to the king and a garrison was introduced on Mouseion as well as in the harbour.[36] The grain was certainly necessary to compensate for the exhaustion of food supplies experienced during the siege. Military action—the occupation of Attica and the blockade of the Piraeus—fostered the gift of grain. The Athenians had been unable to exploit their own crops and imported grain shipments.

Apart from Phaidros' embassy to Ptolemy, the next series of actions all related to the Athenian revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes in 288/7 and the subsequent struggle to recover control of Piraeus and the Attic countryside. For much of the 280s, the Athenians were unable to recover complete control of the countryside and failed to recapture the fortress of Mounychia that dominated Piraeus. In these circumstances, all the evidence for aid to the grain supply in the 280s is closely linked to the efforts made by the polis to support its struggle against Demetrios. The inability to use the Piraeus forced the city to exploit other harbours.[37] Athenian embassies approached different powers; Athenian "friends' in the courts of the kings exploited their positions to further the interests of the city. Philippides and Kallias gained important help from Lysimachos and the Ptolemies. The honours awarded in the 280s

n. 648. These years fall in the period that is characteristic because of the destruction of the People's power ([Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851f and Shear 1978: 3 ll. 79–80; Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 151 n. 653).

[34] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3. Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 131: Lachares was deposed in spring 295, i.e. at the end of 296/5.

[35] Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4. The offices 'favourable' to the People make it important to distinguish between the sides or bias of the evidence when considering the oligarchic or democratic nature of Athenian government. It is notable that neither Kallias of Sphettos nor Demochares of Leukonoe renewed contact with Athens until after the revolt of 287. The double archonship of Olympiodoros in 294/3 and 293/2 surely marks a shift in overall leaning towards a more oligarchic system. This seems to be confirmed when in 292/1 exiled *oligarchs* returned to Athens, among them Deinarchus and those associated with Theophrastos, [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 850d (Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 151 n. 653).

[36] Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4–5.

[37] *IG* ii^2 654 ll. 29–30.

reveal several instances where the grain supply was assisted or grain was given to Athens. The theme already established in the Four Year war reverberates: when Attica was under threat, the pressures to find additional supplies of grain were greater.

It is difficult to deny that supplies of grain from abroad became critical in order that Athens could maintain its struggle against the forces of Demetrios Poliorketes in these years. Such a scenario explains why individuals who helped in that respect are said to have been concerned for the salvation of Athens (Zenon, Audoleon, and Philippides)[38] or assisted in the restoration of "freedom" (Audoleon and Philippides).[39] Of course assistance in the food supply was not the only means of earning honours from the Athenians as the decree for Strombichos shows.[40] But if those inscriptions rewarding Athenian officials during the revolt of the 280s are excluded, more than half the honorific decrees from this period involved (sometimes *inter alia*) assistance in the grain supply.[41] Athenian policy exploited all possible diplomatic avenues. Although many sources of grain can be recognized, the assistance from the Ptolemies and Lysimachos in their respective circles of influence or immediate entourage (their subordinates or "friends") is particularly striking.[42]

The political climate at the end of the fourth century and in the 280s had proved relatively favourable to the city, its embassies, and pro-Athenian "friends' working in the entourage of the Hellenistic kings. But similar actions are rare in the 270s. Little is known about the decade and many of the state decrees from Athens are honours for civic officials. It is likely that conditions for the Athenian polis improved in this period. The countryside of Attica had

[38] 'Salvation': *IG* ii^2 650 l. 17; *IG* ii^2 654 l. 21; *IG* ii^2 657 l. 33; so Phaidros (*IG* ii^2 682 l. 32) and Kallias (Shear 1978: 3 (Ag. I 7295) l. 32).

[39] 'Freedom' (*eleutheria*): *IG* ii^2 654 ll. 16 and 34; *IG* ii^2 657 l. 31.

[40] Strombichos and salvation of Athens: *IG* ii^2 666 l. 14; 667 l. 2; freedom: *IG* ii^2 666 l. 11. Phaidros (*IG* ii^2 682 l. 38) had ended his generalship in 288/7 with the city free and democratic. Kallias' decree nowhere refers to 'eleutheria'.

[41] Eight out of fifteen: Zenon (*IG* ii^2 650), Habron and Matrias (*IG* ii^2 651), Philippides of Kephale (*IG* ii^2 657), Spartokos (*IG* ii^2 653), Audoleon (*IG* ii^2 654), Timon [—*c.*5—] (*IG* ii^2 655), Kallias of Sphettos (Shear 1978: 3 (Ag. I 7295) = *SEG* xxviii. 60), Thibron (*IG* ii^2 670a) and possibly the Rhodians (*Agora* xvi. 106g) had all been involved in some way in supplying grain to Athens from abroad during the 280s. Other honorific decrees which reward assistance in the revolt or individuals during the 280s include Strombichos (*IG* ii^2 666 + 667 = Osborne, *Nat.* D78A/B), Aischron (*IG* ii^2 652 = Osborne, *Nat.* D75), Demochares of Leukonoe ([Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851e), Artemidoros (*Agora* xvi. 172 = *IG* ii^2 662 + *Hesp.* 26 (1957) 29 no. 2 (Ag. I 6560) + *IG* ii^2 760), Bithys (*IG* ii^2 808 = Osborne, *Nat.* D87), Philokles (*Agora* xvi. 173 = *Hesp.* 9 (1940) 352–4 no. 48 (Ag. I 5039) = Osborne, *Nat.* D77).

[42] What is particularly striking about the honours for Philippides is the frequency with which the text names Lysimachos or refers to him (Franco 1990: 127–8). The same observation can apply to Kallias of Sphettos' decree and references to the Egyptian royal family (Shear 1978: 3).

probably been recovered, but not Piraeus.[43] Another equally significant improvement for Athens was the recovery of Lemnos, and presumably Imbros, in 281.[44]

The precise nature of Antigonos Gonatas' relationship with Athens in these years is elusive. Certainly there was a great deal to distract the new King of Macedonia and these diversions perhaps allowed the Athenians much greater latitude for recovery and consolidation. First the Celtic invasion had been repelled from central Greece in 279 at Delphi. Second Antigonos' accession as King of Macedonia in *c.*278/7 will have made considerable demands on his resources particularly in the aftermath of the movements of the Celtic tribes through northern Greece, Macedonia, and Thrace into Asia Minor.[45] It is quite likely that archaeological evidence will confirm the devastating impact of the Celtic invasion on the territory of Antigonos Gonatas. Excavations in southern Macedonia such as at Tria Platanion in the region of Phila and Heraklion have already uncovered signs of destruction on rural estates at the time of the Celtic invasion of the 270s.[46] What evidence there is for resolving problems in the movement of grain commodities in these years appears in the form of honours for civic officials, *sitōnai*, as opposed to the public display of honours for individuals who have performed identifiable benefactions.[47]

In the 260s and especially during the Chremonidean war there is almost no evidence for the movement of grain from overseas to Athens. Epichares had commodities bought in to Rhamnous to supply the local fortress-deme population but evidence for similar actions is missing from the city of Athens.[48] The absence of such evidence is typically not indicative of absence of activity. It is possible that the Ptolemaic forces led by Patroklos assisted in this respect as had Philokles and Zenon in the 280s. Indeed, less epigraphical evidence exists at Athens in the 260s than from the years after the revolt of the 280s or even from those that followed after the Chremonidean war. It is possible that the Athenians did set up inscriptions in the years of the Chremonidean war and that these stones were torn down in the aftermath of defeat. If so, surprisingly little has survived. The flight of Chremonides and

[43] Piraeus and the 270s: Dreyer (1999: 273–8) argued that Piraeus was finally recovered in 280 only to be lost again to Antigonos Gonatas at some point from 276 onwards. It is not clear how Antigonos intervened and captured Piraeus in 276 or afterwards, as Dreyer envisages. His restoration of events has not been followed: Athens did not recover Piraeus either in the 280s or 270s.

[44] Lemnos and Imbros: Habicht 1997: 130 with n. 33. Note that *IG* ii^2 672 has been redated to 269/8 (App. 1 under 269/8 and Tracy, *A&M* 169 n. 3).

[45] Tarn 1913: 201 ff.; Gabbert 1983: 130–1, 133.

[46] Tria Platanion: Adam-Veleni, Poulaki, and Tzanavari 2003: 56–60.

[47] *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 and *Agora* xvi. 188 passed in 274/3 and 271/0 respectively for the officers of the preceding years.

[48] *I. Rhamnous* 3 ll. 17–19.

Glaukon to Egypt, the apparent execution of Philochoros, and Antigonos' installation of a garrison on Mouseion certainly support a climate similar to that Antipater had imposed in Athens after the Lamian war when inscribed monuments had been knocked down.[49] Nevertheless the Chremonidean war is a relatively barren period for evidence of imported grain although these years saw the continued support of the Ptolemies for Athenians. Energetic activity on the part of Athenian embassies had preceded the Chremonidean war. The progress of the war demanded lengthy resistance by Athens. Although evidence for assistance in supplying grain to Athens often corresponds to times of difficulty such as this, the inverse is not true. Warfare in Attica does not always present a context in which honours for benefactors are passed.

A further shift in the evidence is found in the years between the defeat in the Chremonidean war and the recovery of Piraeus in 229. For much of this period the Macedonians dominated Athens: the Antigonids were prominent in the rituals of the city and maintained their strategic control of Piraeus and Salamis. Inscriptions from Athens reveal that sacrifices were made "on behalf of" Antigonos and Phila his queen.[50] At Rhamnous, Antigonos' received "godlike" honours where the demesmen made sacrifices "for" him on the occasion of the festival of the Nemesia.[51] There was possibly some form of quasi-"ruler cult" for Antigonos.[52] Whether the worship of Antigonos existed not only at Rhamnous but also in the urban centre as a civic cult is not clear, for no evidence of priesthoods survives. But the explicit abolition of religious offices associated with Philip V and his Antigonid predecessors at Athens in 199 suggests not only that such priesthoods had existed but also that they had continued to function (along with the festivals and rites) despite the fact that all other epigraphical evidence for these apparently godlike honours stops in 236/5.[53] The evidence from Rhamnous is essentially a local response that awards Antigonos significant but explicitly godlike honours and probably

[49] See e.g. *IG* ii^2 448 with Oliver 2003*b*; Chremonides and Glaukon: Teles, *Peri Phyges* (ed. Hense) they became '*πάρεδροι καὶ σύμβουλοι*'; Philochoros' execution: Suidas s.v. *Φιλόχορος*.

[50] See Mikalson 1998: 160–1 which lists the evidence.

[51] *I. Rhamnous* 7. On the significance of the dative, Mikalson 1998: 161 with n. 74 notes a difference between the religious worship in the urban centre of Athens (not cult) and at Rhamnous (cult) based on the difference between sacrifices 'on behalf of' and 'for' Antigonos respectively.

[52] It is thought that Antigonos was uncomfortable with divine honours, Mikalson 1998: 160 n. 71. Polities institute 'ruler cult'. 'The strategy of divine cult was adopted by the cities without overt initiatives from the king' (Price 1984: 36).

[53] Livy 31. 44. 4 refers to the abolition of the religious days, rites, and priesthoods relating to Philip V and his ancestors ('diesque festi, sacra, sacerdotes') that suggests that such priesthoods did in fact exist and perhaps continued beyond 236/5 (the latest evidence being *IG* ii^2 1299 (= *I. Eleusis* 196) ll. 10–11, see Mikalson 1998: 161).

reflects what was going on in Athens.[54] The award of such honours and religious worship for a Hellenistic monarch were not, however, signs of political constitution.[55] The Athenian democracy had made extravagant awards for Gonatas' father and grandfather (Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Monophthalmos) in 307.

There is nevertheless evidence that in the years that followed the Chremonidean war Antigonos may have restricted Athenian autonomy. For not only did he maintain a garrison on the Mouseion hill until *c.*255 but he apparently interfered in the appointment of Athenian officials, notably the Athenian general Apollodoros.[56] When a similar intrusion had happened before in 304/3 it coincided with a serious split in Athenian politics between Stratokles and Demochares leading to the latter's departure from Athens until the mid-280s. Such intrusions probably lie behind the later claims that the years between 303 and 287 saw the dissolution of the power of the *dēmos*.[57] Of course, claims like this are loaded with rhetoric and come from individuals who had left Athens, some under duress.[58] Some loss of civic autonomy in the years immediately after the Chremonidean war may have been experienced at Athens, but it was certainly short-lived.

The relatively small amount of evidence for activity in supplying grain from overseas may therefore reflect the complex political situation in Athens. One document illustrates the services of a non-Athenian and two honour civic

[54] *I. Rhamnous* 7 with Habicht 1996 and Kralli 2003. Kralli argues that the demesmen of Rhamnous introduced godlike honours at Rhamnous in the light of the end of the war against (and death of) Alexandros (*c.*245). This is a sensible suggestion although there is some need to consider the deme's initiative as being more closely in line with the polis as a whole. For the dating of Kallimedes to 253/2 pushes back even earlier references of the inclusion of Antigonos in sacrifices (see *IG* ii^2 780 ll. 10–12). The *stēlē* was evidently still standing in Athens in 199. The missing words must have been restored because they had been removed by the Athenians following the city's decision to erase references to Philip V and his ancestors (Livy 31. 44).

[55] The continuity beyond 230/29 down to 199 is important in this respect. The recovery of the Piraeus did not mark in 230/29 a constitutional change. The same politicians that exerted power in the 240s did so after 230/29 (not that this is sufficient to believe in constitutional continuity but it is a factor; Phaidros of Sphettos' political career is a good example of disruption that reflects the political mood of the polis, *IG* ii^2 682). There is no evidence that 'democracy' did not exist in the years after the Chremonidean war, see Rhodes with Lewis 1996: 52 and Oliver 2001*a*. Knoepfler now makes the same case for the persistence of democracy at Eretria under Antigonid control but suggests that 'republican' (rather than democracy) better describes government there and elsewhere in the Hellenistic world (Knoepfler 2001: 302 with n. 236: on the terms 'republican' and 'democratic' he suggests 'bien qu'ils soient pratiquement équivalents pour caractériser le régime des cités hellénistiques').

[56] Oliver 2001*b*: 39–43.

[57] Habicht 1997: 72 n. 17, cf. Dreyer 1999: 174–80.

[58] The likelihood is that Kallias (like Demochares in *c.*303) had been exiled and had his property confiscated, something which he did not pursue after 287 evidently (Shear 1978: 4 ll. 79–83 echoing the departure from Athens of Demochares, Plut. *Vit. X Or.* 851f with Shear 1978: 47). On the exile of Demochares see Plut. *Demetr.* 24. 4–5.

officials.[59] The weight of epigraphical evidence reveals major civic operations in Attica not only to protect the domestic grain harvest but also associated with military operations based at Eleusis and Rhamnous.[60] The absence of epigraphical evidence that honours individuals for importing grain to Athens may suggest that the primary concerns of the polis were the defence of the countryside. But it is also possible that the epigraphical evidence indicates that there was not such a need to be seen to honour benefactors assisting in the supply of grain to Athens. A darker interpretation might view the change in the evidence as a reflection of the power Antigonos had over Athens. Alternatively one might read a wider change in the climate of benefaction in Greece during the second half of the third century. For although the overall trend does not prove that grain was no longer imported, all things being equal the nature of the evidence does indicate that the Athenians *honorific* practices in the polis had undergone a significant change from the 280s.

No further evidence for the supply of grain to Athens from abroad by the Antigonid kings—i.e. Antigonos Gonatas or his successor Demetrios II—is found. Grain from abroad was in considerable demand at Athens when the countryside was disrupted. The evidence for such aid in the major periods of disruption before the Chremonidean war is relatively rich. But during the war and the years that followed there is surprisingly little corresponding evidence. Attica continued to be disrupted in the 250s, the 240s, and the 230s but these years are dominated largely by the epigraphical record from the garrisons concerning the defence of Attica and the honorific decrees in Athens itself often for the performance of civic institutions. The evidence suggests a tendency towards relying more on civic institutions to address problems of importing grain. Fewer instances are found in the years after *c.*270 of individuals involved directly in transporting grain to Athens and providing grain at a good price. Indeed the smaller amount of evidence reveals less variety in the sources of grain. Civic officials become more prominent in the epigraphical record. The *sitōnai* in particular had responsibility for grain purchasing.

9.3. GRAIN PRICES

One of the greatest problems for the polities of the eastern Mediterranean was to secure grain at a good price. This was obviously a concern for Athens in the 330s–320s when several honorific inscriptions single out individuals'

[59] *SEG* iii. 92; for the *sitophylakes* of Athenodoros' archonship, *Agora* xvi. 194; the *sitōnai* of Diomedon's archonship, *Agora* xvi. 216.

[60] The *epidosis* of 248/7 (Ch. 8) and the operations in the garrisons (Chs. 4, 6–7).

deliveries of grain at a price that was evidently below what could have been expected. Those same inscriptions reveal fluctuations in price.[61] Similar concerns continue, unsurprisingly, in the early Hellenistic era. An honorific decree from 302/1 praises someone for contributing 5,000 *medimnoi* of wheat 'at the established price' for matters relating to grain funds (*eis ta sitōnika*).[62] Troubles in the provision of domestic harvests could be assuaged by grain imports, but commerce arrived at a price. When Demetrios Poliorketes besieged Athens in 295 he already had control of Attica. Demetrios deterred incoming movements of grain by sea and scared off other merchants.[63] In the subsequent crisis commodity prices escalated and food was hard to come by. We are told that a *medimnos* of salt rose to forty drachmai, and a measure of wheat (*modios*) to 300 drachmai.[64] Such was the shortage of food that Epicurus is said to have rationed his followers.[65] It is perhaps to this period that we can date Epicurus' letters of thanks to a friend who sent grain during a crisis.[66] The evidence indicates well the movements in price on the local level and similar phenomena are visible elsewhere, such as on Delos.[67]

But grain was transported within an environment where different (competing) consumers existed. An example of the interaction between regional problems, overseas trade, and movements in price appears in the late 280s when Ptolemy II supplies a gift of 20,000 *medimnoi* of wheat to the Athenians.

> When the younger King Ptolemy had succeeded to the Kingship and Kallias was staying in the city of Athens, the generals called upon him and made clear the situation in the *polis* and invited him to make haste on behalf of the *polis* to King Ptolemy so that there might be assistance as quickly as possible for the city in both grain and money. Kallias in a private capacity sailed up to Cyprus and meeting there with the King in love of honour on behalf of the *polis* he secured for the People 50 talents of silver and a gift of 20,000 *medimnoi* of wheat which were measured out from Delos for those sent out by the People. (Shear 1978: 3 ll. 43–55)

Kallias of Sphettos' mission to Ptolemy on Cyprus illustrates well the relations between poleis and Hellenistic powers that depended on the informal

[61] In 330/29 Herakleides provides grain at 5 drachmai per *medimnos* (*IG* ii^2 360 ll. 8–10, 51–6, 66–70). A decree passed in the late 330s, possibly 333/2 (*IG* ii^2 408), honours Mnemon and [-]ias of Herakleia, who transported 4,000 (?) *medimnoi* of wheat at 9 drachmai per *medimnos* and barley at 5 drachmai per *medimnos*.

[62] *IG* ii^2 499 ll. 15–17. The restoration of ll. 16–17 is probably *τῆς καθισαμένης τιμῆς* (Reger, 1993: 313 n. 45; thus *IG* ii^2 400 l. 8).

[63] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3.

[64] Ibid. 33. 4.

[65] Ibid. 34. 2.

[66] Plut. *Moralia* 1097c–d.

[67] Inscriptions from Delos reveal prices of barley for human consumption ranging between 4 and 5 *drachmai* a *medimnos* in the third and second centuries; on Delian grain prices in this period, see Reger 1994*a* app. III, tables III. 4 (barley) and III. 5 (wheat).

contacts of 'friends' with kings. The Athenian generals approached Kallias and asked him to approach Ptolemy and he did so in a private capacity.[68] For a reason that is not given, the Athenians were in urgent need of grain and money and looked to Ptolemy. The request dates to the time when Ptolemy II was sole king[69] and probably in Cyprus to confront a potential challenger, a son of Euthydike.[70] The gifts predate the Ptolemaieia and the celebration of the Panathenaia at Athens, possibly the first to be held after the revolt.[71] The dates of these two festivals are controversial but it is likely that the gift of grain falls in 282 before the Greater Panathenaia of that year and a festival in honour of Ptolemy I.[72]

The Kallias decree shows that at some point in 282 and before Hekatombaion Ptolemy had 20,000 *medimnoi* of *wheat* weighed out on Delos. This represents six to seven standard boatloads. Here evidence from the island of Delos casts some light on the wider economic context of such movements of commodities. The accounts of the *hieropoioi* of Delos record several changes

[68] Kallias' approach may have coincided with an Athenian delegation to Ptolemy that had been initiated by Demochares, Shear 1978: 25 with [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 851d–f.

[69] Between December 283 and spring 282, following the death of his father Ptolemy I.

[70] Paus. 1. 7. 1 with Hazzard 1987: 150.

[71] Shear 1978 ll. 55–69, 50–5, 31 dates the gift to 282. It is less likely that the decree refers to the accession of Ptolemy II to the joint kingship in 285/4 (*CAH* vii^2: 138 with n. 41, Hazzard 1987: 149 with Nepos 21. 3. 4).

[72] Habicht 1992: 70 n. 10. Shear (1978: 33 ff.) dates the Ptolemaieia to 279/8 assuming that the Panathenaia is (1) the first after the revolt, the ordinal being completely restored here, and (2) that the Ptolemaieia immediately preceded the Athenian festival (Shear 1978: 37). A date for the Ptolemaieia in winter 279/8 is now proposed by Foertmeyer 1988 (accepted by Habicht 1992; 70 n. 10). However Habicht (ibid.) suggests that the festival in 279/8 was the first of the penteteric celebrations, following on from a one-off celebration organized in 282. The need to restore a crucial word on the decree of Kallias of Sphettos has been central to the debate on the dates of these two festivals: 'when the People were about to hold then [for the first time] after the city had been recovered the Panathenaia for Archegetis' (Shear 1978: 3 ll. 64–6). Two Athenians, Phaidros of Sphettos (*IG* ii^2 682 ll. 53–6) and Glaukon son of Eteokles of Aithalidai (*IG* ii^2 3079) were honoured in separate inscriptions as *agōnothetai* in the archonship of Nikias. On the double *agōnothēsia* in 282/1 (the archonship of Nikias), Dreyer 1999: 209 n. 62. Tracy 1988: 305 and *A&M* 86 recognizes *IG* ii^2 3079 ll. 5–20 as the work of the cutter of Ag. I 3238 and 4169. Glaukon is restored as one of the phylarchs honoured with two hipparchs in a decree of uncertain date (287–261?; [Glaukō]n Aithalidēs; *SEG* xxi. 357 = *AE* 18 (1963): 110 no. 2 col. I l. 17). Sean Byrne (pers. corr.) underlines that that award corresponds to the crown given to Glaukon when phylarch recorded on *IG* ii^2 3079 (crown II). For Glaukon's career: Pouilloux 1975; Buraselis 1982; for the Plataian decree after the Chremonidean war, *AAA* 6 (1973) 375–7; Roesch 1974; Étienne and Piérart 1975. Three possible years are known when Nikias was archon in this period, 296/5, 282/1, and 266/5. In a list of officials for the archonship of Nikias of Otryne (266/5), the *agōnothetai* are known: Deinias of Erchia and [L]ysimachos of Athmonon. The former seems to have been specified as the official with responsibilities for the Panathenaia (Habicht 2000–3: 89–93 = *Hesp.* 37 (1968) 284–5 no. 21, Ag. I 2462). The balance of evidence suggests both Phaidros and Glaukon were *agōnothetai* in the same year, when Nikias (II) was eponymous archon (282/1). If this is the case it seems reasonable to believe that 282/1 was the first Panathenaia after the revolt and not the festival four years later in 278/7.

in the prices of grain during the archonship of Kleostratos (App. 8) and these prices seem to reflect 'fair market prices'.[73] The first obstacle to interpreting these accounts is the date. Does Kleostratos' archonship belong to 282 or 281?[74] Jardé had originally linked the price changes and disappearance of wheat with the conflict leading to Korupedion and accordingly dated the battle to 282. Shear linked the absence of wheat on Delos in the final three months of Leostratos' archonship and the earlier rises in wheat prices to disturbances in the Aegean but dated the archonship of Kleostratos to 281 when Korupedion was fought.[75] The gift of grain from Ptolemy, argues Shear, predates the year of difficulties on Delos under Kleostratos' archonship (i.e. 282). If so much wheat was available at Delos to be given to the Athenians, conditions on the island were unlikely to have forced the administrators to buy barley, he reasons. The Delian accounts of Kleostratos belong to 281, Shear suggests, because the gift of grain dates to 282 and the price changes on Delos are distorted by the campaign of Seleukos against Lysimachos in 281.

But the preferred chronology dates Kleostratos' archonship on Delos to 282. The price fluctuations may well have some relationship to events beyond Delos. This is an unfashionable position to hold. Many academics reacted to the arguments of Jardé and Shear, suggesting that the Delian prices do not necessarily mirror international relations and need not reflect "histoire événementielle".[76] Reger and Chankowski both emphasize the regional nature of the economies on Delos and to some extent their treatment of the *hieropoioi* accounts reflects the models of the Delian economy. The sanctuary, argues Chankowski, has an impact on the local economy and the prices reflect this. But if the regional economy of Delos and the surrounding region is so localized then explanations are still required for the peculiar behaviour of cereal prices in Kleostratos' archonship.

It is not unreasonable to consider that local prices are affected by local events. At the same time, events beyond the region can also have an impact. Wheat prices on Delos rise from 4½ drachmai per *medimnos* in Artemision to a high of 10 drachmai per *medimnos* in Bouphonion (August/September) and then barley replaces wheat in the final months of the year because wheat had presumably become too expensive. If the build-up to Korupedion had any

[73] *IG* xi. 2. 158A ll. 37–50: the *hieropoioi* account for the money spent over each month of the year. Market prices: Shear 1978: 30–2; see further Reger 1994*a*: 11.

[74] Jardé (1925: 166–78) for the effect of disruptions on the Delian accounts. Delian chronology, Shear 1978: 31 with n. 70. For the grain prices for this year, Reger 1994*a*: 116–19, 123–6; 306–7 (cf. Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 90 table 4).

[75] Sherwin-White 1983: 266–7. Shear 1978: 32. He therefore followed Dinsmoor's 1931: 495–8, 503 argument for Kleostratos. The highest price of wheat in Bouphonion (Aug./Sept.) therefore would coincide with Seleukos' assassination.

[76] Chankowski-Sablé 1997: 77 is a clear warning.

impact, the early stage of the campaigns would perhaps have had some wider effect from late 282. The Babylonian chronicle dates the start of Seleukos' campaign towards the end of 282. The battle of Korupedion near Sardis and the death of Lysimachos followed in early 281, January or February.[77] Sherwin-White suggested Seleukos' campaign against Lysimachos started in June/July 282.[78] If so, this would mean that if Kleostratos belongs to 282, the months of Thargelion to Bouphonion correspond to the opening months of this campaign. The prices could therefore have been affected indirectly by the greater demands on regional sources of grain made by the armies of Lysimachos and Seleukos I and the diversion of resources that such activity required.

Jardé is surely right to have thought that wheat became too expensive at the end of the year. The increase in wheat prices therefore explains why barley was purchased. The price for barley compares with the cost of similar produce (for human consumption) in the third and second centuries on Delos when prices range between 4 and 5 drachmai per *medimnos*.[79] The same comparisons should be made for wheat prices. For the high cost of wheat in Bouphonion 282 is paralleled by similar high prices known on Delos in late years: 190 BC: 10 dr.; 178 BC: 10 dr.; 174 BC: 11 dr.; 169 BC: 10 dr.[80] There is good argument for suggesting that price *changes* in 282 reflect more general changing economic conditions. Such changes need not serve as a barometer of Hellenistic history but it seems unreasonable to assume that wider economic conditions did not have an impact on localized regions.

It is also possible that the region around Delos in 282 suffered a bad harvest. If so one might expect the wheat harvest at least to have provided sufficient grain after Thargelion and at a reasonable price, but high prices and storage strategies of grain suppliers could have encouraged an upward movement in price even on a regional level. The decision to buy barley instead of wheat in the last three months Apatouria to Posideon suggests that wheat was either scarce or too expensive. However one constructs the regional nature of the Delian economy the surprising shifts in grain prices in the archonship of Kleostratos (282) require further thought and the interpretation offered here sees connections between the regional economies of Delos and the wider economies of the Aegean and the peripheral mainland.[81]

[77] See Will 1979: 101–3. Seleukos was killed in 281 August 25 or September 24, seven months (Just. 17. 2. 4) after the battle; Dreyer 1999: 227.

[78] Sherwin-White 1983: 266–7.

[79] Reger 1994*a*: 306 table III. 4. In the archonship of Sosisthenes, thirty-two years later barley never exceeds $3\frac{1}{3}$ drachmai although it is used as feed for the geese and so may not be of the same quality (Prētre 2002: 87–141 = *IG* xi. 2. 287 A and B (250 BC); summary, Jardé 1925: 167–8).

[80] Reger ibid.

[81] The use of Delos as the area of collection raises important questions about its role: Shear had argued that the activity in the 280s marks Delos as 'a clearing-house for . . . grain trade' and

If the archonship of Kleostratos therefore reflects the movements of price in 282, then Ptolemy's intervention in the redistribution of grain becomes relevant. He had 20,000 *medimnoi* of wheat measured out at Delos for the Athenians. It is tempting to see the fall in price in Artemision from 6 to 4⅚ drachmai as the month when a great deal of grain arrived at Delos. A comparison with the arrival of the grain convoy from Sicily is not completely appropriate as at Delos the grain was destined for Athens.[82] The presence of the Ptolemaic gift may have increased wheat supplies on the local market and pushed prices down. This assumes that the grain from Ptolemy comes from outside Delos and its region. It may have originated in Egypt from where grain earlier arrived in the fourth century but there is no way of telling.[83] At the same time a hungry Athens could attract those involved in moving grain in 282 in search of higher prices. The Athenian market could push up prices elsewhere if conditions in Athens had knock-on effects. None of this requires Delos to be viewed as a hub for the international movement of commodities. But the reconstruction recognizes that *suppliers* of grain in the Aegean and particularly in regional economies such as those around Delos may not have been immune to the *attractions* of other markets. Suppliers could move elsewhere to fetch higher prices for their commodities. That is one possible way in which local prices of commodities such as grain may have increased on Delos.[84]

This examination of prices of grain argues that at Delos local prices of regional commodities could be affected by wider considerations.[85] Reger has argued that Delian grain was drawn essentially from local resources but does not pay much attention to the shifts in prices in 282.[86] Prices of commodities

assumed that large stores of wheat were present on the island. There is no evidence that Delos in fact enjoyed the luxury of large grain stores, it may have been that it had been selected as a convenient location, particularly in view of its role as the meeting place of the *synedrion* of the Nesiotic League (Reger 1994*a*: 32). Reger (ibid. 115 ff.) denies that Delos played this sort of role in an Aegean market, and emphasizes the local (as opposed to international) nature of commerce and the grain trade on Delos. This view reverses Rostovtzeff (1941: 676, 692) who suggested that Delos controlled the Black Sea trade in the third century before Rhodes took over in the second century. Reger differs from Casson (1954) who argued that Rhodes was the main transit port for grain and that Delos served *only* to distribute grain to its Cycladic neighbours. Vial (1984: 341) suggests that Delos fed itself from the grain trade because 'la production céréalière de Délos et Rhénée était insuffisante et Délos se souciait de la sécurité de son approvisionnement'.

[82] Dem. 56. 9.

[83] Garnsey 1988: 151–2.

[84] Bresson 2000: 282–3 offers a less detailed but similar interpretation of the prices on Delos in 282.

[85] Ibid. 279–80 also refines the regional approach to the Delian economy and similarly wishes to emphasize the possibility of importations from outside the Cyclades.

[86] Reger 1994*a*: 123 ff. argues that conditions in grain supplying and purchasing regions would not have had much of an impact on prices in Delos, and that the island relied on the

are not necessarily a barometer of relations between Hellenistic kings but they may well have something to do with Hellenistic economies. These economies were isolated neither from what Hellenistic kings did nor from other factors. Thus the prices on Delos reflect several possible dynamics which may have affected economic activities but do not reflect alone the large movements of armies in Asia Minor and the impact they will have had on the demand and movement of grain.

The large gift of wheat to the Athenians fits into these dynamics. Ptolemy's provision of 20,000 *medimnoi* of wheat, measured out on Delos, will have brought Athenian ships or those merchants intent on returning the promised cargo to Athens, to the small Aegean island. Acts of benefaction such as this had real consequences. The movement of commodities in large amounts and the potential impact on price of such movements were an intrinsic part of Hellenistic economies.[87] This construction of trade helps explain why polities such as Athens were likely to honour individuals for bringing grain to the market at a good price or an agreed low price.

9.4. SOURCES OF GRAIN

The collected evidence for imported grain to the polis informs us also about the various sources that the Athenians were trying at various times to exploit. It is not always clear from the evidence where the grain had been produced. Where did the 150,000 *medimnoi* given by Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes come from? Lysimachos' provision of 10,000 *medimnoi* could easily have been provided from his territory in Thrace or even from the movement of commodities by sea from the Black Sea. The source of Poliorketes' 100,000 *medimnoi* for hungry Athens in 295 is also unknown. Ptolemy's gift of 20,000 *medimnoi* in 282 could have come from Egypt or perhaps the Aegean. But for many other of the gifts or forms of assistance, the origin of the grain can be reasonably well established and clearly no one region is prominent in the evidence.

The west continued to be an important source of grain. In the mid-third century two inscriptions refer to Athenian operations in Sicily. Xenokrates of Chios is honoured for helping Athenian *sitōnai* to reach Sicily, perhaps several

Cyclades for most of its grain supply (p. 125); Delos would have fed nearly 10 per cent of its population from domestic production (p. 99).

[87] Oliver 2001*b*: 140, 'the multiplicity of regional layers of economic activity'.

destinations there including Syracuse.[88] The decree, passed in the archonship of Polyeuktos, 250/49, belongs to the period when the Athenians were suffering problems in Attica and Alexander was invading the countryside and raids were being carried out at Rhamnous. The second inscription is fragmentary and lacks any secure dating criteria apart from Tracy's recent identification that it was cut in the *style* of a cutter who worked between *c.*260 and *c.*235.[89] This is the evidence that dates the inscription after the Chremonidean war.[90] The honorific decree mentions action by the honorand for 'the salvation of the polis', foreigners, probably money that had been given, *sitōnai*, and Sicily. All of these elements fit quite comfortably in a mid-third century context. The reference to Xenokrates' assistance to activity in Sicily fits well with the mention of Sicily and *sitōnai* in *IG* ii^2 744. It is possible that the two decrees refer to the same events that took place in or shortly before 250/49.

These two inscriptions suggest that Athenian *sitōnai* tried to secure grain from the rich and fertile city of Syracuse and perhaps other locations in Sicily in the mid- to late 250s. At the time Hiero ruled Syracuse and after he formed an alliance with the Romans in 263 we are told he enjoyed considerable security.[91] Contacts between Greece and the west—Magna Graecia, Sicily, and Carthage—were probably quite extensive. There was significant contact in the middle of the third century between Greece and the west. Xanthippos, a Spartan, arrived at Carthage with a large number of soldiers, presumably from Greece, in 255.[92] In the other direction, Timaeus, the author of a vast history of Sicily, spent fifty years of his life in Athens.[93]

Nor is it such a surprise that Athenian *sitōnai* appear in Syracuse. Sicily after all was an excellent source of grain.[94] In the 330s, possibly 335/4, the Athenian general Diotimos had appointed [Dionys]odoros (or possibly his son [Olympi]odoros) to take charge of the escort of grain.[95] It seems as

[88] *SEG* iii. 92b ll. 6, 8. Wilhelm's restoration gives at least the sense, see Marasco 1988: 171–4. Metapontum cannot be certain as one of the destinations (cf. Coviello 2003: 100). For the low fares he charged, cf. the new readings offered for *IG* ii^2 283 l. 3 by Lambert 2002.

[89] *IG* ii^2 744.

[90] Tracy *A&M* 133, in the style of the cutter of *IG* ii^2 788 (whose career dates to *c.*260–235).

[91] Polyb. 1. 16. 8–11.

[92] Ibid. 1. 32. 1.

[93] *FGrH* 566 fr. 34. Habicht 1997: 117–19.

[94] Dem. 56. 9. Westlake 1969: 309 n. 119 emphasized how important Sicily was for the grain supplied to Athens in the time after Alexander the Great; see also Garnsey 1988: 151, 153–4. Thuc. 3. 86. 4: Sicilian grain for Greece in the fifth century.

[95] *IG* ii^2 408. Diotimos' mission against pirates is probably the same occasion when the Herakleots performed their services, 335/4 (*IG* ii^2 1623b ll. 276–85; the appointee, [Olympi]odoros, see *APF* 4386, p. 164; Garnsey 1988: 153; Kirchner, *IG* ii^2 408, comm. ad l. 7). Tracy *ADT* 34 n. 20: the decree was passed in 333/2 according to one possible restoration by Habicht. The identification of the appointee as Olympiodoros, the son of Diotimos, and also the famous Athenian general is attractive (*APF* 164–5).

though two Herakleots had taken part in this mission. They gave to the city several thousand *medimnoi* of wheat at a price of nine drachmai and as much barley as they were carrying at five drachmai. On the basis of the reports of [— —]odoros and Diotimos the Herakleots were honoured by the Athenians. This grain seems to have come from Sicily.[96] The mission of Miltiades in 325/4 was designed to bring grain to Athens and provided protection against piracy in the Adriatic.[97]

The evidence for the continued exploitation of the west after 307 is much thinner. A decree passed in 302/1 honouring an unknown benefactor who facilitated the grain supply clearly involves trade with the west. Sicily seems to be in some way connected with the 5,000 *medimnoi* of wheat given to the *sitōnika* at a good price but the difficult surface of the stone makes any more precision difficult.[98]

Although it is difficult to identify Egypt as a specific origin of grain the Ptolemies were an enormously powerful presence in the eastern Mediterranean. In 308 Ptolemy I captured Andros and was given control of Corinth and Sikyon by Kratesipolis (widow of Alexander, son of Polyperchon).[99] In 307 the fleet of Demetrios Poliorketes approaching the Piraeus was mistaken for an Egyptian armada, an indication of the level of Ptolemaic activity that there must have been at the time. In the mid-290s 150 Egyptian ships appeared off Aegina during the siege of Athens.[100] But despite the evidence for extensive activity no precise example of Ptolemaic assistance in the supply of grain is known until Phaidros of Sphettos' honorific decree refers to grain given to Athens. The decree describes Phaidros' participation in an embassy to Ptolemy I that secured grain for the people before his hoplite generalship of 288/7 and 287/6. The date of this embassy cannot be confirmed but probably belongs somewhere between 294 and 287.[101]

An earlier date is possible for during the years following his double generalship in the archonship of Nikias (296/5), Phaidros served as general for the countryside and for the mercenaries.[102] The embassy follows the

[96] *IG* ii^2 408 l. 12.

[97] RO 100.

[98] *IG* ii^2 499 ll. 14–17, the restoration of Sicily at l. 14 is sound.

[99] Habicht 1997: 65; Diod. Sic. 20. 37. 1–2.

[100] Plut. *Demetr.* 33. 3; Demetrios' ships are mistaken for Egyptian vessels, ibid. 8. 4.

[101] Dreyer 1999: 231 n. 163.

[102] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 21–4: I follow Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 149 against the very different view of Gauthier 1979. Phaidros' generalship *epi tēn paraskeuēn* which in *IG* ii^2 682 is read by Osborne as being held on two occasions in the archonship of Nikias, but by Gauthier as Phaidros serving twice, in different years, once during Nikias' archonship and again on another occasion. Osborne interprets the double holding of the generalship in the same archon year as a product of the changeover from the tyranny of Lachares to the 'freed' Athens following the restoration of offices favourable to the People by Demetrios Poliorketes (Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4; see also Ferguson 1905: 161). Osborne

description of these offices and precedes Phaidros' hoplite generalship in Kimon's archonship of 288/7.[103] The order in which Phaidros' achievements are described seems the strongest grounds for resisting Habicht's suggestion that the embassy of Phaidros dated *after* the revolt between 287 and 283.[104] But it is at first difficult to see when from 294 to 287 there might have been such an embassy to Ptolemy. Several factors make clear the position of Demetrios in Athens: the resurgence of Stratokles (proposer of honours to Philippides),[105] the return of exiles in 292, the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios, and his establishment of the Pythia at Athens in 290. This period may be an unlikely context for Phaidros' diplomatic activities unless one follows Ferguson's argument that the recall of the exiles in 292 was Demetrios Poliorketes' reaction to a growing anti-Demetrian feeling in Athens.[106] Moreover, the increasing influence of Ptolemy in the Aegean gives pause for thought. In 294 Ptolemy I had captured Cyprus, a crucial base for his naval power.[107] The transfer of the League of Islanders from Demetrios Poliorketes to Ptolemy I belongs in the late 290s.[108] Phaidros' embassy that secured grain and money from Ptolemy may well have followed the successes of Ptolemy in Cyprus and

therefore assumes that the Athenian decrees dated Nikias and Nikias Hysteros refer to the same civic year of Nikias, 296/5 but specify Lachares and post-Lachares periods of government (Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 144 n. 622 for the decrees of this year: *IG* ii^2 644, *IG* ii^2 645, *Hesp.* 11 (1942) 281 no. 54). Gauthier, however, argues that the decrees dated to Nikias Hysteros in fact refer to the Nikias of 282/1, and that they were named in this way as a result of the Athenian recovery (by negotiation) of Piraeus (supported by Reger 1992). However, I do not follow Gauthier's reconstruction because it depends on the belief that Mounychia and Piraeus were recovered in this year (see above Ch. 2). For the remaining offices, see *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 24–8.

[103] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 28–30.

[104] See Habicht 1992: 71 and n. 14, and Habicht 1979: 59 and n. 60. Our lack of knowledge of the second half of the 290s, of Olympiodoros' double archonship, and Phaidros' own commands should weaken Habicht's belief that Ptolemaic aid to Athens before the liberation of 287 is unthinkable, particularly if Ptolemaic activity in the Aegean had increased significantly in the second half of the 290s.

[105] Stratokles proposed the decree honouring Philippides, *IG* ii^2 649 + W. S. Dinsmoor 1931: 3–15; the exiles, [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 850d; their return, including Deinarchus, Dionysius Hal. *Dein.* 9; ithyphallic hymn, Duris of Samos, *FGrH* 76 fr. 13, with Marcovich 1988: 8 n. 1 for a full bibliography see Thonemann 2005. It is notable that some of the sources will have been anti-Demetrios, e.g. Demochares *ap.* Athen. 6. 253b–d, Philochoros *ap.* Athen. 15. 697a. The Pythia of 290 took place in Athens following a dispute between the Aetolians and Demetrios, Plut. *Demetr.* 40. 4.

[106] This is the view offered by Ferguson 1911: 141 and 1905: 161. More thought on the Ptolemaic presence in the Aegean in the late 290s is required. Ferguson's original idea is still feasible despite his position, no longer tenable, on Phaidros' decree, Ferguson 1911: 142 n. 1.

[107] Ptolemy I captures Cyprus: Plut. *Demetr.* 35. 3. Bagnall (1980: 246) for an early transfer. The capture of Cyprus in 294 suggests that Ptolemy may have controlled the League of Islanders.

[108] For naval supremacy in the Aegean in the early third century, Will 1979 i. 96–7; Bagnall 1976: 137–8 on the *nesiarch* Apollodoros of Kyzikos; Reger 1991*a* argues Apollodoros was appointed by the Antigonids and was succeeded by Bakchon, the *first* Ptolemaic *nesiarch*.

the change in leadership of the Nesiotic League.[109] Alternatively, it could be dated close to or even in the year of his hoplite generalship in 288/7 in the months immediately before the outbreak of the revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes, when Ptolemy approached Greece with a fleet.[110] Athens and the Saronic Gulf were an important interface between Ptolemaic power and the rest of Greece and this rise in Ptolemaic presence may have offered the Athenians an opportunity to exploit Ptolemaic interests in the Aegean and Greece.

In the years immediately after the revolt of the city of Athens against Demetrios Poliorketes there is rich evidence for assistance from Ptolemy and those in his entourage. The earliest securely dated decree following the revolt rewards Zenon the commander of the *aphracts* for bringing grain to Athens.[111] It is not clear whether this command preceded his appointment by the *nesiarch* Bakchon on Ios but he was clearly operating as part of the Ptolemaic presence in the Aegean.[112] Other Ptolemaic officials honoured by the Athenians at this time include Philokles, King of the Sidonians, who received citizenship and probably in the same decree a statue.[113] He was the overall commander of the fleet. Whether he was superior to Bakchon (*nesiarch*) is not clear but they were both superior to Zenon.[114] The fleet and the League of the Islanders gave the Ptolemies considerable capacity to support Athens and facilitate the supply of grain. The best illustration is the use of Delos as a location for weighing out the gift of 20,000 *medimnoi* of wheat that Ptolemy arranged for the Athenians to collect there in 282.[115]

Similar forms of aid are not evident in the next two decades. This does not mean that the Athenians did not receive such help nor that help was not needed. During the 270s the influence of the Ptolemaic court on Greek and Athenian politics was felt. The 270s saw Kallias return to service with Ptolemy

[109] *IG* ii^2 682 ll. 28–30.

[110] Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 2.

[111] *IG* ii^2 650. Habicht 1979: 48–50, and 1992 : 71 with n. 14.

[112] *IG* ii^2 650 ll. 9–10; Zenon is left behind on Ios by the *nesiarch* Bakchon, *IG* xii. 5. 1004 l. 2. The principal obstacle is that most of the evidence for Bakchon dates to *c.*280 and later, see Rigsby 1980; Austin 1981 no. 268.

[113] *Agora* xvi. 173; statue base, *IG* ii^2 3425 = *ISE* i. 17. Ferguson associated the honours with the revolt from Demetrios (followed by Merker 1970: 144 but in 286/5; cf. Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 161 ff.: 286 or shortly afterwards; Habicht 1992: 71: between 287 and 278). Shear 1978: 34 n. 79 thought a later date and link with the Ptolemaieia more suitable. It is tempting to see the honours for another Sidonian as connected somehow with Philokles and the Ptolemies (287–270) but not enough of the text survives to provide details, *IG* ii^2 711 (the stone's cutter works between 305/4 and 270, Tracy, *A&M* 77).

[114] On the uncertainty of the dating, see Hauben 1987: 418 n. 24. Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 162–3; Merker 1970: 143 and 150, Hauben 1987: 418–19 for the hierarchy, and 420 on the uncertainty as to Philokles' official title, king or *nauarch* or general? The last, used by Polyainos *Strat.* 3. 16, is favoured by Hauben.

[115] Shear 1978 3 ll. 43–55 (Ag. I 7295).

II, occupying a post in Halicarnassos, whence he continued to serve Athenian relations with Ptolemy by assisting embassies and *theoroi*.[116] The decree of Chremonides from 268/7 indicates that a rapprochement between Athens and Egypt existed already before this statement of policy and strategy against Antigonos was enacted.[117] The decree of Kallias itself, passed in 270/69, identifies Ptolemy II as a major international ally of Athens, and illustrates another significant direction of Athenian diplomacy during the 270s. The resources available to Egypt were extensive, their territorial control ranging from some parts of mainland Greece such as Methana across the Aegean to Cyprus.[118] The Ptolemies with their extensive economic resources and naval power were a major presence in the Aegean until the mid-240s. Athenian contact with the Ptolemies gave access to the resources of the extensive Egypt-based empire so rich in grain.

The Black Sea had been, of course, the bread-basket of the Athenian polis for much of the fourth century. In the early Hellenistic era, however, there is far less evidence for the levels of redistribution of cereals from the Bosporan Kingdom after the peak much earlier in the mid-fourth century.[119] The region remained an important source of grain in the 330s and 320s when clearly the Athenians were actively pursuing grain from several regions.[120] But no evidence exists after the Lamian war until a crown of Spartokos is recorded in the inventory lists of Athena under 307/6.[121]

[116] Shear 1978: 45 with n. 122 may be right to identify the unnamed honorand of the decree from Halicarnassos with Kallias of Sphettos, see Frost 1971. The decision in Halicarnassos to send someone to Athens to publish honours there as well is certainly in line with the wording of the decree of Kallias passed in 270/269, which indicates that Kallias is still in Halicarnassos (Shear 1978: 4 (Ag. I 7295) l. 71).

[117] It originally may have involved the queen Arsinoe: *IG* ii^2 687 ll. 19–20 and Shear 1978: 46. See Habicht 1992: 72–3 for a recent assessment, and the suggestion that Arsinoe died after 270, and perhaps closer to the actual date of the coalition formed by the agreement known as the Chremonides decree.

[118] Methana: Mee and Forbes 1997: 74–5. The Egyptians maintained a strong presence on Methana where fortifications were established and the city was renamed Arsinoe (in the Peloponnese) possibly in the 270s, see *IG* xii 3. 466 ll. 12–13.

[119] Garnsey 1988: 124 and 137–9; Brashinsky 1971; Gernet 1909: 314–19. Isokrates 17. 57 claims that the Bosporan kings always saw to the Athenian grain supply in the fourth century; 17. 20 and 52 for the regular navigation between Athens and Pontos. On the early history of Athenian grain trade with the Black Sea, see Keen 2000; Burstein 1999.

[120] Lambert has adjusted considerably the various fragments that made up a decree honouring individuals in 330s–320s at Athens who operate in the Black Sea: S. D. Lambert, *ZPE* 136 (2001) 67–9 = *Agora* xvi. 94c + j (cf. Osborne, *Nat.* ii. 95). See Burstein 1978*b* and Garnsey 1988: 138 on the underlying personal contacts in the fourth century. Demosthenes' selection as 'grain commissioner' in the 330s may well have been influenced by his close contacts with the Pontic kings (Dem. 18. 248).

[121] *IG* ii^2 1485a l. 22 (*SEG* xxviii. 114; Burstein 1978*a*; dated by D. M. Lewis *ap.* Garnsey 1988: 138 n. 9 to 306 or 305; Hind, *CAH*^{2} vi. 500 n. 87). Spartokos III succeeded to the throne in 304 and ruled for twenty years, suggesting he died in 284/4, Diod. Sic. 20. 100. 7.

King Spartokos (III) was honoured in 285/4 for supplying 15,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Athens.[122] The gift was a product of an Athenian embassy sent to the king. A further three Athenians were chosen to return to Spartokos to inform the king of the decision of the Athenians to honour him and to ask him for continued assistance.[123] The Athenians Spartokos had assisted in his kingdom may have included merchants, but this is not certain.[124] It is not clear how fruitful the return embassy announcing the honours to Spartokos III was but the king's death in 284/3 surely interrupted any favourable conditions that had been renewed briefly in the 280s. How far Spartokos had been able to assist Athens in the years between 304 and 285/4 is unclear. Changes in the control of territory in the Bosporan Kingdom may have complicated affairs and reduced the King's ability to direct all the resources harvested each year.[125] But the most important obstacle to Athenian connections with the grain-producing regions of the Black Sea was competition from other polities and the difficulties of access to the region.

The Black Sea was a significant producer of grain but the maritime route through to the Aegean was extremely vulnerable at several points. Hostile powers that controlled the passages into the Aegean either at Byzantium and Chalcedon or in the Thracian Hellespont could divert shipping, as happened frequently in the fourth century.[126] Both Chalcedon and Byzantium had diverted ships carrying grain in 362.[127] Whoever controlled Byzantium controlled the route from the Black Sea.[128] Another major factor that affected this source was as true for the Black Sea as anywhere else: local disruption. Local difficulties as well as regional shortfalls in the harvest would have affected

[122] *IG* ii^2 653; see Burstein 1978*b*. *IG* ii^2 653 ll. 33–4 could be [*ἐκ τοῦ Π*]/[*όντου*] (giving a line of 38 letters) and suits Burstein's restoration of *IG* ii^2 1485a l. 22 (*SEG* xxviii. 114). Köhler's adjective [*Βοσπ*]/[*όριον*] is less common and suits a poetic context. The ethnic one usually finds for citizens of the Bosporan Kingdom is *Βοσπορίτης*. This description may not suit the king in 285/4—it did in 307/6 although this was three years before Spartokos succeeded Eumelos to the crown.

[123] *IG* ii^2 653; see ll. 20–1, 43–50.

[124] *IG* ii^2 653 ll. 9–13.

[125] This depends on how one restores and dates *CIRB* Add. no. 4 (Vinogradov, *BE* 1990 no. 600). The honorific decree from Gorgippia on the Asiatic Bosphoros awarded the familiar *proxenia* (surely not Vinogradov's restoration of *politeia*, ll. 4–5?) and commercial privileges ([*ateleia*], *enktēsis*, import and export rights). The grant is awarded by [Sele]ukos son of Eumelos, as the original editor Boltunova restored the text (line 1), and someone else (perhaps his sons or, less likely, suggested by Vinogradov, Spartokos III). The secure reading of line 1 suggests Seleukos (II) was in control of part of the Bosphoran Kingdom while Spartokos's seat was at Pantikapaion. The date of the inscription is difficult to specify and could belong sometime between *c.*304 and *c.*280.

[126] Garnsey 1988: 142–4.

[127] [Dem.] 50. 6, 17.

[128] Polybius 4. 38. 2 ff. and on the current, 4. 43. 7; see Walbank 1951. On the importance of Byzantium and Perinthos to the grain supplied to Athens, Didymos, Schol. *Dem.* 10. 41–2.

production and exportation. At times grain was imported into the Black Sea as well as exported in the Hellenistic era.[129]

The exploitation by Athens of the grain supply from the Black Sea in the third century is a shadow of the movement that was such a dominant feature of the mid-fourth century.[130] The presence of Athenian ceramic material in the Black Sea region reflects the activity of *emporoi* moving commodities directly from Athens or trade involving the resale of such commodities in markets by traders working the Aegean–Black Sea route. It is clear that Athenian ceramics had a reduced presence in the third century from that of the fourth century. Throughout the third century Athenian material appeared less and less.[131] It is difficult, therefore, to prove that the Bosporan kings continued to dominate the supply of grain to Athens or even regularly supplied grain to the city in these years. Athens was not the only community with commercial contacts in the Black Sea in the Hellenistic era and many more competing products were finding considerable popularity there.[132]

Not all the benefactors of Athens were the most powerful of Hellenistic kings and the final region considered here is Thrace and Paionia. The King of the Paionians, Audoleon (and his aide Timon[. . . .]) were both honoured by Athens. A consignment of 7,500 *medimnoi* of grain was brought to Athens some time before the end of 285/4.[133] The kingdom was not new to partnerships with Athens: in the 350s they had formed an alliance with Athens alongside Thrace and Illyria against Philip II.[134] Audoleon himself appears to have been a long-standing opponent of the Antigonids. His hostility towards Demetrios Poliorketes is symbolized by the marriage of Pyrrhos to Audoleon's daughter in the late 290s.[135] Paionia's aid to Athens parallels the assistance in grain and money secured from Lysimachos during the 280s.[136] It is not unlikely that Lysimachos and Audoleon co-operated in some way during this period.[137] Their aid illustrates the continuing importance that the mainland north of the Aegean played in Athens.

[129] Polybius 4. 38. 5 with Hind 1994: 504.

[130] See Ch. 1.

[131] Bouzek 1989: 258 fig. 8.

[132] Thasian wine, among others goods, was arriving in the Black Sea in enormous quantities, see Garlan 1999; 2000: 173–92; for links with the Ptolemies, Archibald (forthcoming).

[133] *IG* ii^2 654 and 655 respectively.

[134] Paionia: alliance with Athens in 356/5, *IG* ii^2 127 and Diod. Sic. 16. 22. 3. For Paionia in general, see Merker 1965.

[135] Plut. *Pyrrh.* 9.

[136] *IG* ii^2 657 ll. 31–6.

[137] See e.g. Lund 1992: 105. Lysimachos is said to have tried to install Ariston on the Paionian throne following Audoleon's death: Polyainos *Strat.* 4. 12. 3 (cf. Diod. Sic. 21. 13). Ultimately Lysimachos took control of Paionia following Audoleon's death; perhaps he was dissatisfied by Ariston's rule, Merker 1965: 49.

Here it is necessary to recall also the importance that the cleruchies could have had in the provision of grain and revenues to the polis. The cleruchies were in Athenian hands after 307. Having been lost again in the 290s, Lemnos (at least) had been recovered by the Athenians after *c.*281. There is good evidence for the continued interactions between the island and polis in the mid-third century.[138] The Athenians enjoyed huge economic benefits from the islands in the fourth century.[139] The same advantages no doubt could still be served in the late fourth and third centuries. There is no reason to doubt, despite the absence of evidence either way, that grain was moved from the cleruchies to Athens. Certainly the administrative, honorific, and military movements between Athens and Lemnos is consistent with such ongoing interaction and the zeal with which Athens pursued its territorial control over its distant 'peraea' certainly suggests that the economic interests that served the city in the fourth century remained as relevant in the third. The northern Aegean and the mainland of Thrace, Macedonia, and beyond had been an important resource throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. Lemnos also enjoyed a strategic role in this area that was of some interest to the regional powers. The Athenian cleruchy therefore gave the polis considerable vested interests in the political context of the northern Aegean.

These different regions were not the only sources of grain that Athens looked to in the early Hellenistic period. The difficulty for any polis was how to ensure that grain reached the city. One strategy focused on the origin of the grain or at least those who had strategic control of grain-producing territory. The Spartokids in the northern Black Sea; the Ptolemies in the Aegean, Egypt, and Levant; Audoleon and Lysimachos in Paionia and Thrace; and the polities of Magna Graecia, were all to a greater or lesser extent potential sources of surplus grain. The polis could, through diplomacy and the use of less formal avenues such as the "friends" of kings, hope to secure aid. But other avenues existed; we now turn to one such institution, the *sitōnia.*

9.5. CIVIC INTERVENTION: *SITŌNIA*

A new policy at Athens saw the city pass honorific decrees and set them up on stone *stēlai* in the Lycurgan period for merchants who transported grain to Athens or sold their valuable cargoes at a good price.[140] The office of *sitōnēs*

[138] See Ch. 2.

[139] See Ch. 1, sect. 6.

[140] Lambert will develop this point in a forthcoming survey of Athenian honorific decrees in the Lycurgan period.

can be traced back to the fourth century, and it may have been instituted around the same period—Demosthenes is the first known office-holder in 338/7.[141] In the previous chapter the focus was on the individuals who served in this office, and now the concern is to see how the institution might have functioned.

Instances of *sitōnia* are known in the years following the removal of Demetrios of Phaleron and later in the third century.[142] Fragments of the two copies of an inscribed honorific decree record the many services of a Pyr[— —] of Herakleia who contributed to a *sitōnia* possibly in the archonship of Euxenippos, 305/4.[143] He had provided three talents in 307/6, and on another occasion 4,000 drachmai, perhaps related to the assault on Mounychia in 307.[144] This man of substance who had performed apparently expensive benefactions was awarded an olive crown.[145] He is also associated with King Demetrios.[146] There is not enough evidence to determine the nature of his award, but there can be little doubt that during or shortly before 305/4 he contributed money to the *sitōnia*.

A fragmentary decree from 305/4 praises an Athenian who seems to have been a councillor this year and now, in the same year, has been voted to a position concerned with grain, possibly as a *sitōnēs*.[147] The year of the text coincides with the date of Pyr[— —]'s contribution to the *sitōnia*. [— —]ides was either one of the officials responsible for the *sitōnia* to which Pyr[— —] contributed or possibly administered another *sitōnia* the following year (304/3). The timing of this decree *may* be important. The proposal takes place in Thargelion 18, the penultimate month of the year when one normally expects the grain harvest to take place. Is it possible that the harvest has been poor and the Assembly has decided to institute a *sitōnia*? If the date of the honours for [— —]ides corresponds to his recent election

[141] Develin 1986: 34.

[142] Ch. 8, sect. 5.

[143] *IG* ii^2 480 + 479 = A. Wilhelm, *Anz. Wien.* 1942: 65–72. One possible restoration is Pyr[rias] [Herakl]ea; Wilhelm ibid. 103–4 suggests Herakleia Pontica Cf. L. Robert, 'Études Déliennes', *BCH* suppl. 1 (Paris, 1973) 435–42. Such attributions remain uncertain, even more so the identification of the honorand as [— —]ias of Herakleia, praised, along with Mnemon, at the end of the 330s, *IG* ii^2 408 ll. 6–7.

[144] Three talents: *IG* ii^2 480 ll. 19–21; 479 ll. 3–5; 4,000 drachmai: *IG* ii^2 480 l. 11.

[145] Wilhelm restored the text so that Pyr[— —] seems to have been voted as treasurer although he could have been one of a board of treasurers, and yet his foreign status would prevent him serving as an Athenian official (*IG* ii^2 479 l. 12. Cf. A. Wilhelm, *Anz. Wien.* 67 (1942), 69 l. 12.

[146] *IG* ii^2 480 ll. 13, 17.

[147] *Hesp.* 5 (1936) 201–5 (EM 12825). He cannot be identified. Of the names that fit the space (e.g. Lysides, Lytides Nikides, Timides), Komides (of Diomeia) would be an ironic possibility; a Tolmides served this year for the tribe Akamantis but is one letter too long (*Agora* xv. 58 l. 66).

then the *sitōnia* may well be related directly to the unfavourable prospects for the harvest. It is not clear whether a single officer or a board supervised the *sitōnia* in 305/4. But there is little detail here about the operation of the *sitōnia*.

Normally one might expect *sitōnai* to operate beyond Attica and the fund to involve financial contributions. Honorific decrees rewarding those who have helped in the supply of grain to Athens typically reveal little direct information about the origin of the grain and often even less about the precise contribution of the merchants.[148] However, in the third century, non-Athenian merchants seem to have been involved in the supply of grain. The fragmentary decree for Habron of [— —] and Matrias of Nesos passed in 286/5 may honour (?) merchants for some sort of action involving grain.[149] The identity of Thibron, the last known benefactor of the grain trade in the 280s, is equally obscure.[150] Honours were awarded to him in 280/79 for the money that he provided either for grain or for the purchase of grain.[151] The precise purpose for which Thibron gave money cannot be known for certain, but Kirchner restores the text to suggest that money was given to a grain purchasing fund, or *sitōnia*.[152] If this restoration stands, Thibron's action is the first known example involving the *sitōnia* at Athens since the revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes in 287. It also establishes *sitōnia* as a monetary fund.

Rhodian merchants (?) may have contributed money to a *sitōnia*, although the date of the decree in their honour is extremely uncertain and rests largely on the evidence of the letter-cutter.[153] Little evidence for similar external assistance for *sitōnia* exists until the 250s. A fragmentary decree honouring

[148] In the later fourth century two Tyrians (*SEG* xxxv. 70 = *IG* ii^2 342 (with *SEG* xxiv. 104) + *Hesp.* 40 (1971) 181 no. 29, EM 13412); [— —] and Potamon who helped bring grain from (exceptionally) Sinope (*IG* ii^2 409 + Wilhelm 1942: 150–2) and Sopatros of Akragas (*Agora* xvi. 106h = *Hesp.* 43 (1974) 322–4 no. 3, Ag. I 7178) are similarly obscure.

[149] *IG* ii^2 651 l. 14: Lolling thought that νησιώτης meant a citizen of the *koinon* of islanders, *AD* 5 (1889) 207–9, Kirchner preferred it as the ethnic of the island Nesos, lying between Lesbos and Asia Minor (*IG* xii. 2. 646, from the island of Nesos, names a Matrodotos Matraos and a Zenon Matripha, ll. 22 and 19 respectively); see Pečirka 1966: 93 n. 3.

[150] *IG* ii^2 670a l. 6. Despite extensive attempts to identify him, Thibron's origin remains very shadowy. The ostentatious name is unusual, occurring occasionally in Boeotia (e.g. Étienne and Knoepfler 1976: 311, a Boeotarch, *SEG* xv. 282) and in Sparta (a *polemarch* and a *harmost*, Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4–5. and 3. 1 respectively). The most mysterious but interesting parallel is the Athenian Thibron, 'known as Perfection', named in a fragment of Philostephanus, *PCG* vii p. 372 fr. 1. Thibron is obviously a foreigner because he has also been helpful to Athenians living in his city (*IG* ii^2 670a l. 7; *FRA* 7703).

[151] *IG* ii^2 670a and B. D. Meritt, *Hesp.* 38 (1969) 109–10 (*SEG* xxv. 91). The decree, dated on the strength of the demotic of the secretary (Eleusis), must belong to 280/79 (cf. Tracy 1988: 322).

[152] *IG* ii^2 670a l. 11, followed by Meritt, *Hesp.* 7 (1938) 106.

[153] *Agora* xvi. 106g (*SEG* xxx. 65; Ag. I 7360); see Tracy *A&M* 142 n. 25; *ADT* 157.

Xenokrates of Chios reveals that Athenian *sitōnai* had travelled outside Athens in execution of their duties. The honorand seems to have assisted in transporting Athenian *sitōnai* to their destinations, one of which was almost certainly Syracuse; the identity of another is uncertain.[154] The honours were passed in the archonship of Polyeuktos (250/49) and so the *sitōnia* predates this year.

The Xenokrates decree highlights how little we know about the operation of the *sitōnai* in third-century Athens. In the decree for Xenokrates it is clear that the *sitōnai* travelled abroad, perhaps to commission or encourage grain ships to sail to Athens.[155] Normally one would expect *sitōnai* to be responsible for the administration of a fund for purchasing grain.[156] In another decree, passed in 302/1, honours were awarded for actions in a war that must be the Four Year war from 307 to 304/3 when the Athenians were defending themselves against Kassander.[157] This context makes it all the more possible that the honorand who "contributed] to the People 5,000 [*medi*]*mnoi* of wheat at the established price also for the grain fund (*eis ta sitōnika*)" had done so for the *sitōnia* of 305/4 to which other documents refer.[158] The phrase *eis ta sitōnika* would therefore be an alternative way of referring to the institution of *sitōnia*. The phrase appears in other inscriptions. The naval lists of 326/5, 325/4, and 323/2 use it to describe a decree proposed by Demades son of Demeas of Paiania.[159] There the context must be the provision of naval ships to escort a grain cargo. In a much later context, a decree proposed by Mikion in the early second century concerns the grain fund and the election of three Athenians to be responsible for the *sitōnia*.[160] It looks likely that *eis ta sitōnika* can be used to refer to a *sitōnia*.[161] It was therefore a fund to which contributions in kind could be made.

Each *sitōnia* need not necessarily have operated in the same way. On the one hand, an honorand might provide grain for a *sitōnia*, but more often one might expect money to be at the heart of the fund. From Eleusis in the early years of the Chremonidean war a decree honours Dion for his actions as

[154] *SEG* iii. 92 = *IG* ii^2 584 and 679 (date and cutter, Tracy *A&M* 128).

[155] L. Robert, 'Une inscription honorifique à Athènes', *AE* 1969: 24–30. The *sitōnēs* was to buy grain for the city, as Amorgos (*IG* xii. 7. 40 ll. 6–7), Ephesos (*I. Ephesos* 1461) and Ios (*IG* xii. 5. 1010 ll. 5–6).

[156] It is in this context that money may have been given by the Rhodian honorands, *Agora* xvi. 106g.

[157] *IG* ii^2 499 l. 20.

[158] Ibid. ll. 15–17; thus *IG* ii^2 480 + 479; *Hesp.* 5 (1936) 201–5 (EM 12825).

[159] The phrase *εἰς τά σιτωνικά* appears in the naval lists relating to a decree of 326/5 proposed by Demades (*IG* ii^2 1628 ll. 347, 361, 366, 383, 408, 429, 447 (326/5); 1629 ll. 867, 881, 886, 903, 928, 950, 969 (325/4); 1631 ll. 64, 73, 80, 82 (323/2)). The decree must relate to the provision of naval escorts for grain convoys. Demades is connected with several decrees concerning grain (Brun 2000: 146–50).

[160] *IG* ii^2 906 ll. 3–6 (175/4).

[161] Ibid. 499 ll. 15–17.

secretary to the treasurers of the grain fund (*sitōnika*), and the board for the distribution in the past.[162] Dion's identity is elusive but he is praised by the Athenian soldiers stationed at Eleusis for his current service in 267/6.[163] Dion had looked after 'the distribution of grain and the tokens given out for the grain' and was decorated with an olive crown by the soldiers.[164] If Dion's office as secretary to the treasurers of the grain fund was part of the same operation as that in which *sitōnai* were normally involved, one might see this inscription as evidence that the *sitōnia* provided a source of grain for the running of the polis. For the soldiers it is clear that a public source of grain was required. Such a resource is suggested also by the cavalry of 300/299 who had not received the requisite grain from the public supply.[165]

The operation of the *sitōnia* involved not only the purchase or importing of grain from overseas but also mechanisms for its distribution. The honorific decrees for the boards of the *sitōnai* that were discussed in the previous chapter reveal little about their wider administrative support such as treasurers and secretaries. There is little in the three decrees that reward the *sitōnai* to help us understand how these officials operated.[166] However, the decree for the officials of 248/7 at least specifies that the *sitōnai* made sure that 'the best possible grain at the cheapest possible price was bought for the People'.[167]

The operation of the *sitōnia* at Athens in the late fourth and third centuries remains elusive. If we assemble the pieces of evidence we may assume that *sitōnia* had two aspects. On the one hand, the purchasing of grain could involve the movement of officials abroad. But equally the board's responsibility had an impact on the marketplace and perhaps even on other institutions in Athens such as the soldiers and cavalry who would require grain when on service.[168] Nevertheless there is enough evidence for the *sitōnai* in this period to suggest that the board was increasingly the subject of honorific decrees after 280 and in the 250s and 240s fulfilled an important role on behalf of the polis. The *sitōnia* was essentially one way in which the polis intervened in the grain trade. If there is certainty, it is this: *sitōnai* were concerned to provide grain of the highest quality at the best prices. Their involvement in the trade on such terms is certainly a quintessential indication of the state's intervention in the wider commercial world of the grain trade.

[162] Ibid. 1272 ll. 2–5 (*I. Eleusis* 182).

[163] Ibid. 1272 ll. 9–11 (*I. Eleusis* 182). Köhler suggested he was a foreigner or a slave (*IG* ii 614c) but this is not easy to support (Jacob 1928: 168–71 esp. 170). His status remains uncertain (*LGPN* ii s.v. Diōn 107).

[164] *IG* ii^2 1272 ll. 11–14 (*I. Eleusis* 182).

[165] *IG* ii^2 1264 ll. 2–8. On this inscription, see now Oliver 2006*a*.

[166] *IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904 (Olbios, 275/4), only the second half of the stone survives; *Agora* xvi. 188 (Lysitheides, 272/1) is fragmentary where this sort of information might have existed.

[167] *Agora* xvi. 216 ll. 10–12 (Diomedon, 248/7; passed in the archonship of Kydenor).

[168] See Oliver 2006*a*.

Conclusion: War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens

If one wonders what were among the most essential elements in the lives of Athenians in the early Hellenistic period it should by now be clear that the protection of the food supply in the territory of the polis must have numbered among the main concerns of most residents. But while that issue was certainly a high priority for the Athenians, as for the people of other Greek poleis, the early Hellenistic period presented enormous operational problems to the people of Athens. What distinguishes this period of Athenian history is not only the new relationships between the polis and the powers of the Mediterranean (the Successors and later kings of the Hellenistic era). For the polis suffered the loss of its own territory on a scale that had not been experienced since the disruptive Dekeleian war at the end of the fifth century. Then the extended presence of the Spartan army on the low hills of Dekeleia (modern Tatoi) overlooking the heart of the Athenian countryside was compensated by the strength of the Athenian fleet and its control over the major routes of grain supply from the Black Sea. The loss of that strategic route and the collapse of the city's naval power after Aegospotamoi determined the fate of Athens in the Peloponnesian war.

In the early Hellenistic period, the Lamian war saw the loss of that naval power. The Athenians had no direct way of controlling those same maritime routes. But if loss of naval power was not already serious enough, for extended periods of time the polis was unable to maintain control over its own territory. The Athenians suffered foreign garrisons on the Mouseion hill in the heart of the city (295–288/7), at Mounychia fortress in the Piraeus (322–307, 295–229), and on several occasions in the garrison demes of Attica. Safety in the countryside of Attica was not always guaranteed and the relative stability of the earlier fourth century was denied for extensive stretches in the late fourth and third centuries. But the occupation of the Mounychia fortress brought with it the presence of a foreign power controlling Piraeus. When one adds to such difficulties the tenacity of the Athenians in claiming control of

their overseas 'peraea' of Lemnos, Imbros (and perhaps Skyros), it should be clear that the pressures on the economies of the Athenian polis in the early Hellenistic period deserve closer examination.

The disruption of Athenian history in the late fourth and third centuries is well established. But what impact did the disruption have? Part I assessed the economic structures of the polis and demonstrated the fragility of its economies. It considered the functions of commerce in the fourth century (Ch. 1); the territory of Athens that was so important to the movement of grain from outside Attica, the Piraeus, and the Athenian 'peraea', and its overseas cleruchic territories (Ch. 2); and the demography of the polis (Ch. 3).

The fourth century has offered an opportunity to see how the economies of the polis operated at a time when the territory of Athens was by and large secure and the Piraeus open to peaceful trade. Chapter 1 therefore placed emphasiz on the economic environment of the commercial operations that saw grain transported, bought, and sold in the Piraeus and Athens. Financiers, proto-bankers, played an important role. The polis was able to draw revenues from such commercial activity and had established institutions to oversee trade. It could award individuals honours that gave them special privileges in commerce (*ateleia*). Honours could reward people for maintaining commercial relations with the polis and encourage others to follow suit. In the changing economic and political environment in the eastern Mediterranean after *c.*340, the Athenians worked hard to make the polis attractive to commercial operations. Chapter 1 has underlined the fragilities of commerce. If one considers the turmoil that came with invasions of Attica, sieges in Piraeus, and the occupation of Mounychia by foreign forces, then one might expect some destabilization of that commercial environment. Chapter 1 therefore established the context against which to measure the changes that the early Hellenistic period brought.

In view of the importance of commercial activity to the fourth-century polis, the next chapter investigated the history of the Piraeus and the overseas territories of the cleruchies. The main harbours of the polis merited closer examination, for in the early Hellenistic period the Athenians suffered problems in the Piraeus. Unlike during much of the fourth century, the Piraeus of the early Hellenistic period experienced disruption. Sieges, and for extended periods (321–307, 295–229) a garrison under the control of a foreign power, introduced new conditions for commerce in the Piraeus. It has proved difficult to establish how extensive, or how damaging, such changes were for commerce. One key question remains: was the polis able to maintain its institutions and fiscal control of the Piraeus throughout this period? Chapter 2 was not able to determine a definite answer because of the lack of evidence. However one reconstructs communication between the city (*asty*) of Athens

and the Piraeus, there were clearly problems at certain times in the third century that affected the cults of the communities who lived there. If the historical changes affected the religious environment, it is likely that the commercial world also saw change. The purpose of this chapter was to consider the economic impact in the early Hellenistic period of the disruption in Piraeus. The same consideration was extended to the territory of Athens that lay beyond the confines of Attica. The Athenians were tenacious in maintaining their overseas territory. The persistence of the cleruchy question in the late fourth and third centuries, and beyond, provided sufficient reason to view these distant islands as an Athenian 'peraea'. These territories were important not only as producers of grain but also for their regional position. Chapter 2 therefore focused closely on the defining feature of the early Hellenistic period: the loss of Athenian control over its territory.

No appreciation of the economies of the polis is possible without some consideration of the people who made up its producers and consumers, the buyers and the sellers. Chapter 3 investigated the people of Athens and considered whether there were changes in the elements of the population: citizens, foreigners or metics, slaves. Although quantification proved elusive, this enquiry concluded that population probably fell in Attica. The archaeological evidence has suggested a reduced density of occupation in the countryside of the polis. The fourth century had seen a peak in the rural settlement and exploitation of Attica. The early Hellenistic period witnessed a fall. But some areas of Attica may have suffered less than others. The third century saw the regions around Eleusis and Rhamnous become distinctive spheres of activity when compared to the other parts of Attica. Not all regions continued to flourish and the mining region of the Laurion was probably one of the areas that suffered the most from the reduction in rural activity in the first half of the third century. Movement of people is the critical theme explored by this chapter, and the mobility of people in the early Hellenistic period clearly presented Athens with problems that the polis had experienced before. The polis did not enjoy the benefits of territorial control and naval power that had existed in the fifth and fourth centuries. This context was further affected by the fragility of Athenian control over the Piraeus. Part I has looked at different vulnerabilities within the Athenian economies and established the foundation for Part II.

Part II was devoted to the theme of war. Warfare affected the rural territory of the Athenian polis throughout most of the late fourth and third centuries. The disruption to the polis and its reactions to it provide a key to understanding the specificity of the early Hellenistic period. Warfare affected the Athenians' territorial control over Attica. Society in this period was concerned very much with its military organization. Part II has confirmed how central the rural territory of Attica was to the Athenian polis.

Chapter 4 confronted directly the impact on Athens of warfare in its own rural territory, offering a survey in narrative form of the invasions, warfare, and therefore disruptions to rural life in Attica. The early Hellenistic period witnessed extensive periods when the economic resources of the Attica countryside were severely damaged. The Laurion mines and the agricultural capacity of Attica was curtailed and restricted respectively. The chapter has shown just how much the polis had to endure because of the warfare that affected Attica during the Four Year war (307–304), the campaigns of Demetrios Poliorketes in the 290s, the revolt of 288/7 and subsequent years, the Chremonidean war (268–262), the invasions of Alexander in the 250s–240s, and the Demetrian war of the 230s.

If Chapter 4 accounted for the warfare in the polis, the next three chapters dealt with the responses to war in the rural territory. Chapters 5–7 drew heavily on the extensive evidence from the fortress demes of the Attic countryside and the documentary material from the city itself for the military organization of the polis. Chapter 5 reviewed the infrastructure of defence in Attica. It showed how the different military threats of the late fourth and third centuries saw the Athenians develop a military strategy based on the regional centres of Rhamnous in the north-east of Attica and Eleusis in the west. But these military fortresses were not the only structures that the Athenians exploited. The specific military strategies of both the 280s and the Chremonidean war raised the importance of the coastal areas in the Vouliagmeni region and the west coast around Porto Raphti. In both cases, the importance of these regions cannot be detached from the fact that the Athenian control over the Piraeus was limited by the continued presence of an enemy garrison in these years. The infrastructure of defence in Attica reflects its importance but also the need for the Athenians to be able to gain access to support from overseas. The chapter has shown how the polis responded to the reality of the early Hellenistic period when the Athenians were unable to prevent enemy forces not only from invading Attica but also from remaining a roaming threat there. The course of the Four Year war proved just how difficult it was for the Athenians to remove the forces of the Hellenistic Successor from Attica. It also showed how important the garrison demes were to be for acting as centres from which the territory of Attica could be controlled.

If Ch. 5 analysed the physical remains of these strategies, Ch. 6 explained how the command structure of the military institutions embraced the physical components of Attica. The hoplite general remained the most important military office but in the late fourth and third century his role is clearly defined in terms also of other regional generals. By the second half of the third century the polis had developed a tripartite division of command in

Attica. The hoplite general was based at Athens and two generals for the countryside operated in distinct regions, one around Eleusis and the Parnes hills, the other at Rhamnous and covering the coastal strip of Attica heading south towards Sunion.

But the command structure of the polis was limited by the Hellenistic Successors and kings. Chapter 6 has shown how, even in these military institutions, the polis suffered from royal interference. Not only in the mid-third century but also in the late fourth century we find examples of the king interfering in the appointment of Athenian generals. But for the most part the Athenians appointed their generals to control the territory around the *asty* and most of Attica. The exception of course was Piraeus where the commander was always appointed by a Successor or king and *never* by the polis. The analysis of the command structure has served also to reinforce the importance that recovery of Piraeus had to the institutions of the polis.

The last element of military organization considered here was manpower. Chapter 7 underlined just how much the early Hellenistic polis depended on its citizens to provide the manpower for its military structures. It was demonstrated that Athens depended not on mercenaries but on its citizens. One of the consistent features established is how continuously Athens deployed its own citizens to Attica to defend the territory. Mercenaries played their role but the emphasiz in this chapter was the contribution of the people of Athens to its defence. In this sense Ch. 7 echoes the themes at the centre of Ch. 3: both aspire to place the people at the heart of the story that the book retells. While bottom-up history is often very difficult in antiquity, the glimpses that we get of it are often seen in economic and military contexts such as these.

Part III looked outwards beyond Attica. While Part II determined how the agricultural resources of the polis were protected within Attica, this part has shown how the polis organized its institutions to support the provision of food from both within and outside Attica. Its focus was on other non-military responses to the economic fragilities of early Hellenistic Athens. The emphasiz of Chs. 8 and 9 was on the institutions of the polis. Chapter 8 addressed the institutions affecting the resources of Athens and Attica and the economies of the polis, while Ch. 9 looked outside Attica and considered how Athenian institutions facilitated the movement of commodities such as grain into Attica from abroad.

The book has covered familiar topics: grain supply; warfare, in particular its impact on the countryside; institutions (army, magistracies, politicians); and demography, and has tried to offer a contextual approach. *War, Food, and Politics* has drawn together these themes and considered how the economies of the post-classical polis of Athens had to adapt to the new conditions of the

early Hellenistic era. The book is therefore a contribution to the history of the polis in the Hellenistic age, but above all offers a case study of how some economic structures worked in the post-Classical polis.

Fundamental to the economies of the polis was its supply of food. Finley was right to have seen that agriculture was at the heart of Greek, if not ancient, economies. The Athenians relied on the supply of economic resources from their territory. Finley's stress on rural economies is at the heart of the economic model that lies behind this book. But Finley's concept of the economies of the Greek world is inadequate, for it took insufficient account of the importance of commerce and finance and notoriously neglected the Hellenistic period. *War, Food, and Politics* also maintains that the rural economy was critical but takes greater account of the function of trade.

This book grew out of an analysis of the evidence for the supply of grain to Athens from abroad in the early Hellenistic period (App. 8). One of the purposes of that operation was to consider the movement of commodities in a wider context of political and military events at home and abroad. In this respect, what those documents that mention the supply of imported grain tell us about the Athenian economy cannot be divorced from the historical context nor from the wider concerns that the Greek polis displayed in cultivating benefactors. In fact we gain a far deeper understanding, not only of the Athenian food supply but also of the Athenian economy, by appreciating the circumstances in which Athens rewarded those who had supplied grain to the city. The value of broadening how such evidence is perceived therefore has wider methodological value. If we incorporate the historical context into the discussion of economic evidence, our understanding not only of the nature of the evidence but also the history it reveals, and the context of the institutions that were at the heart of the Greek polis, can advance. There can be a tendency to shy away from considering the three themes of institutions, economies, and political history at the same time.

The Piraeus was a central factor in the commercial operations that were so vital to the polis and figured in the city's success in the fifth and fourth centuries. War brought intense upheavals in the mid-290s, 280s, and 260s. Despite the equilibrium that existed after *c.*260 between Athens and the Macedonian kings, the recovery of the Piraeus in 229 marked a major turning point for Athenians, not only in symbolic terms but probably also in the civic control of the economy. In both 307/6 and in the aftermath of 229, the Athenians launched major restoration projects on the walls of the polis. It is significant that only after the Athenians recovered the Piraeus do we start to see again evidence of civic naval activity and extensive *civic* presence in the harbour with the setting up of state decrees in addition to state-organized projects.

The Athenian polis throughout the early Hellenistic period faced a series of threats. The citizen body at all levels performed services to help save the polis in times of difficulty. The polis, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, proved resilient. Its constituent parts, the citizens and the resident foreigners, made enormous contributions to its survival. The city that we remember as the birthplace of democracy had not fallen completely. Nor had the energy of democracy completely disappeared. The Athenians might have forgotten the prosperity of the fifth-century empire but they clung onto its legacies, the prosperity brought by the Piraeus and the 'peraea', the overseas territory of the cleruchies. That ambition was fuelled further in the second century. New opportunities came about in the late third and second centuries as a new power broke down the monopolies that the Hellenistic kings had established over discrete areas of the eastern Mediterranean. Athens benefited from Rome. The polis extended its territory and economic capacity after 167 when Delos and Haliartos were given to the Athenians. The city prospered in the second century in a way that had proved impossible for much of the third century. Then the Athenians had struggled to maintain control over the heart of the *polis,* the territory of Attica. Great energy was devoted to protecting the countryside but the lack of control over the Piraeus was always a strong brake on Athenian activity. But after 229, the renewed union of the *asty*, the countryside, and the Piraeus marked a revival in the history of Athens. The ultimate restoration of control over its territory allowed a great Hellenistic polis to flourish again.

APPENDIX 1

The Eponymous Archons of Early Hellenistic Athens

Year		*Archon*	*Secretary*	*Tribe*
323/2		Kephisodoros	Archias Pythodoros Alopeke	X
322/1	P	Philokles	Euthygenes Hephaistodemou Kephisia	I
321/0		Archippos (I)	Anagrapheus: Thrasykles Nausikratous Thria	
320/19		Neaichmos	Anagrapheus: Archedikos Naukritou Lamptrai	
319/18		Apollodoros	Anagrapheus: Eukadmos Anakaia	
318/17	P	Archippos (II)	Thersippos Hippo[—6—] Kollyte	II
317/16		Demogenes		
316/15		Demokleides		
315/14		Praxiboulos		
314/13	P	Nikodoros		
313/12		Theophrastos		
312/11		Polemon		
311/10		Simonides		
310/9	P	Hieromnemon		
309/8		Demetrios Phaleron		
308/7		Kairimos		
307/6		Anaxikrates	Lysias Nothippou Diomeia	II
306/5	P	Koroibos	Pamphilos Theogeitonos Rhamnous	XI
305/4		Euxenippos	Autolykos Lykou Alopeke	XII
304/3		Pherekles	Epicharinos Democharous Gargettos	I
303/2		Leostratos	Diophantos Dionysodorou Phegous	III
302/1	P	Nikokles	Nikon Theodorou Plotheia	IV
301/0		Klearchos	Mnesarch[os Timostrat]ouProbalinthos	V
300/299		Hegemachos		6
299/8		Euktemon	Theophilos Xenophontos Kephale	VII
298/7	P	Mnesidemos		8
297/6		Antiphates		9
296/5		Nikias		[X]
		Nikias *hysteros*	Antikrates Kratinou Auridai[1]	X
295/4		Nikostratos	Dorotheos Ar[ist o..]nou Phaleron	XI
294/3	P	[Olympiodoros]	[Anagrapheus]	
293/2		Olympiodoros (II)	Anagrapheus	
292/1		Philippos	Anagrapheus	
291/0		Charinos	Theotimos [— —] Trikorynthos	XI
290/89	P	Telokles		
289/8		(?) Aristion		
288/7		Kimon		
287/6		Xenophon		

(*cont.*)

Appendix 1 (*cont.*)

Year		*Archon*	*Secretary*	*Tribe*
286/5	P	Diokles	Xenophon Nieou Halai	IV
285/4		Diotimos	Lysistratos Aristomachos Paiania	V
284/3		Isaios		6
283/2		Euthios	Nausimenes Nausikydou Cholargos	VII
282/1	P	Nikias (II)	Theophilos Theodotou Acharnai	VIII
281/0		Ourias	Euxenos Kalliou Aixone	IX
280/79		Gorgias	[— —]rionos Eleusis	X
279/8		Anaxikrates (II)	[—9—]ides Nikonos Oinoe	XI?
278/7	P	Demokles	[—25 to 29—]	12
277/6		Aristonymous	[—16—]s Aithalidai	I
276/5		Philokrates	Hegesippos Aristomachou Melite	II
275/4		Olbios	Kydias Timonidou Euonymon	III
274/3	P	Euboulos	Kleig[enes—Halai]	IV
273/2		Glaukippos	Euthoinos Euthykritou Myrrhinous	V
272/1		Lysitheides	Semonides Timesiou Sunion	VI
271/0		Pytharatos	Isēgoros Isokratou Kephale	VII
270/69	P	Sosistratos	Athenodoros Gorgippou Acharnai	VIII
269/8		[—10—]	[—21—] (*IG* ii² 672, Tracy, *A&M* 169 n. 3)	9
268/7		Peithidemos		10
267/6		Menekles	Theodoros Lysitheou Trikorynthos	XI
266/5	P	Nikias (III)	Isokrates Isokratou Alopeke	XII
265/4		Euboulos (II)		
264/3		Diognetos		
263/2		Phanomachos		
262/1	P	Antipatros		
261/0		Arrhenides		
260/59		Philostratos		I or VI
259/8		Philinos	Theotimos Stratokleous Thorai	II
258/7	P	Antiphon		
257/6		Thymochares	Sostratos Arist[—16—]	
256/5		Antimachos		V
255/4		Kleomachos	Aphthonetos Archinou Kettoi	VI
254/3	P	Phanostratos		
253/2		Kallimedes	[Kal]lias Kalliadou Plotheia	IV
252/1		Pheidostratos	[—]ochares Ktesi[— —]	V (III/VIII)
251/0		Thersilochos	Diodotos Diognetou Phrearrioi	VI
250/49	P	Polyeuktos	Chairephon Archestratou Kephale	VII
249/8		Hieron	Phainylos Panphilou Oa	VIII
248/7		Diomedon	Phorykides Aristomenou A[lopeke]	XII
247/6		Theophemos	Prokles Ap[—15—]	
246/5	P	Philoneos	[—19 to 20—]demou H[ybadai]	VI
245/4		Kydenor	Polyktemon Euktimoenou Eupyridai	VI
244/3		Eurykleides		
243/2				
242/1	P			
241/0		Lysiades	Aristomachos Aristo[—16—]	

240/39				
239/8		Athenodoros	Arketos Archiou Hamaxanteia	X
236/5		Kimon (II)		
235/4		Ekphantos	[—7—]os Demetriou Hippotomadai	II
234/3	P	Lysanias	Eumelos Empedionos Euonymon	III
233/2				
232/1		Mneseides	(or the previous year)	
231/0				
230/29	P	Jason	(or the previous year)	
229/8		Heliodoros	(or the next year) Charias Kallio Athmonai	IX
228/7		Leochares	Theokrisios Pasionos Oion	X
227/6		Theophilos	Philippos Kephisodorou Aphidna	XI
226/5	P	Ergochares	Zoilos Diphilou Alopeke	XII
225/4		Niketes		
224/3		Antiphilos		
223/2			Kedoi	III
222/1	P	Euxenos?	(Habicht 1982)	IV
221/0		Thrasyphon	[—*c.*10—]tou (Lower?) Paiania	V?
220/19		Menekrates	Philodromos Sotadou Sounion	VI
219/18		Chairephon	Ph[— —] Kydantidai	VII
218/17	P	Kallimachos[2]		
217/16				
216/15		Hagnias	Potamōn Dok[—*c.*10—]	
215/14		Diokles	Aristophanēs Stratokleous Keiridai	XI
214/13	P	Euphiletos	Aristōn Theodōrou Rhamnous	XII
213/12		Herakleitos		
212/11		Archelaos	Moschos Mos[cionos A]nkyle	I
211/10		Aischrōn		

Notes: P = Great Panathenaia. Floating archons in the 240s and 230s: Lykeas ([— —]es Lysistratou Mar[athon]), Polystratos, Diogeiton, Alkibiades ([— —Ph]anoponpou Potamoi), Ambrosios (M. J. Osborne 2003: 73 n. 54).

[1] See Woodhead *ap. Agora* xvi. 165, pp. 238–9.

[2] Petrakos, *I. Rhamnous* 38 l. 3; 39 probably the same year. The general for the countryside at Eleusis in the archonship of Kalli[machos] was Theophrastos, honoured there by the Athenians stationed at Eleusis, Panakton, and Phyle (*SEG* xxv. 157). Both generals had significantly defended the garrison. For similar concerns for the defences of the fortress, compare the actions of Theophrastos (*SEG* xxv. 157 ll. 22–4) with Theotimos (*I. Rhamnous* 43 ll. 10–11; 215/14).

Sources: M. J. Osborne 1989; 2000; 2003; Tracy, *A&M*; Habicht 1982.

APPENDIX 2

The Hoplite Generals of Early Hellenistic Athens, from *c.*338 to 229

Unknown	*IG* ii² 556 l. 14 (Sarikakis 1951: 23)	*c.*305	's[trat]ēgos o e[pi ta hopla]'[a]
Unknown	*IG* ii² 857 + *Hesp.* 57 (1988): 320 (*SEG* xxxviii. 89; Tracy, *A&M* 132)	*c.*260–235	'epi ta hopla'
Unknown	*IG* ii² 1281 (Tracy, *ALC* 47, 52)[b]	after 229	'st[ratēgos epi tous] hoplitas'
Phaidros Thymocharou Sphettos	*IG* ii² 682 ll. 30 ff.	for a/s Kimon 288/7[c]	'epi ta hopla'
Phaidros Thymocharou Sphettos	*IG* ii² 682 ll. 44 ff.	for a/s Xenophon 287/6	'voted epi ta hopla . . first'
Olympiodoros	*IG* ii² 2429	'init. *s.* III a.'	'[general epi ta] hopla'
Glaukon Eteokleous Aithalidai	*IG* ii² 3079 ll. 13–15 (crown 5)	before a/s Nikias 282/1	serving as general 'epi tōn hoplōn'
Glaukon Eteokleous Aithalidai	*IG* ii² 3079 ll. 19–21 (crown 7)	before a/s Nikias 282/1	serving as general 'epi tōn hoplōn'
Glaukon Eteokleous Aithalidai	*Horos* 14–16 (2000–3) 89–93 (ed. pr. *Hesp.* 37 (1968): 284–5, no. 2 = Ag. I 2462) (Tracy, *A&M* 104, 111)	a/s Nikias of Otryne 266/5	'[general epi ta ho]pla'
Eurykleides Mikionos Kephisia	*SEG* xxxii. 169 (= IG ii² 1705 +*Hesp.* 8 (1939): 45–7 (Ag. I 3951) (l. 5) + *Hesp.* 57 (1988): 35 (Ag. I 922) (Tracy, *A&M* 132)	end of 240s?[d]	general 'epi t[a] hopla'

Eurykleides Mikionos Kephisia	*IG* ii² 1300 ll. 2–3, 20–3	*c.*230 (?)[e]	general 'epi tous hoplitas'
Charias	*P. Oxy.* 17. 2082, fr. 1 l. 4	early 3rd century	general 'epi tōn hoplōn'[f]

Notes: Omitted from the list are Leosthenes of Kephale (Lamian war) and Kallippos (leader of the Athenian forces in 279 against the Celts). Cf. Sarikakis 1951: 23, 67.

[a] Heavily restored, Sarikakis 1951: 14 n. 1.

[b] Tracy, *ALC* 52, dates it after 229; it is the work of the Cutter of *IG* ii² 1706, operating 229–*c.*203.

[c] a/s = archonship.

[d] Tracy, *A&M* 132, recognizes as the work of the Cutter of *IG* ii² 788 who was operating *c.*260–235 and Habicht 1997: 155 n. 18 agreed that the list is from 'the end of the 240s' and 2000–3: 93 with n. 14 suggests a date of *c.*245.

[e] Not assigned to any cutter by Tracy, *ALC*: 14. Habicht 1982: 121 and n. 15 suggests 229 as the earliest date of Eurykleides' generalship, believing that the hoplite general was not elected between 261 and 230 (ibid. 45 ff.) but the date could well be earlier now that he is recognized as serving as hoplite general in the late 240s. The fact that Athenians were serving at Sunion suggests that the date must follow the Athenian recovery of the fortress which is likely to have coincided with the Macedonian withdrawal from Piraeus.

[f] The genitive plural used here is understood by Sarikakis to have been equivalent to the phrase '*epi ta opla*' (Sarikakis 1951: 12 n. 6) of which thirty-eight examples have been found; the genitive plural appears only in literary sources (except at *IG* ii² 3079). Sarikakis believes that 'epi tōn hoplōn' was *not* used metonymically for 'epi tēn tōn hoplōn paraskeuēn'. The most common form used at Athens (in all periods) was 'epi tous hoplitous'. For the reading and interpretation of *P. Oxy.* 17. 2082 fr. 1 ll. 1–10 see now Thonemann 2003.

APPENDIX 3

Non-Civic Appointments in Early Hellenistic Athens

Macedonian 'officials' in the Athenian polis *c.*307–229[a]

Name	Reference	Position held	Year
Adeimantos	*Ergon* 1993 [1994]: 7; Petrakos 1999: i. 32–3 [= Rhamnous Inv. no. 1235]	Adeimantos, general for the countryside, appointed by King Demetrios (Poliorketes) '[for two] years' (?)	305–4 (?)
Herakleides	Polyainos 5. 17. 1	Garrison commander, Piraeus	280s
Hierokles	Polyainos 5. 17. 1	*Xenagos*, under Herakleides, Piraeus	280s
Hierokles	Diog. Laert. 2.40[b]	Garrison commander in the Piraeus	from late 280s
Strombichos	*IG* ii² 666 and 667 (Osborne, *Nat.* D78)	Served Demetrios at Athens, under Spintharos	early 280s until 287
Spintharos	*IG* ii² 666 and 667 (*Nat.* D78)	Macedonian commander in Athens, removed from the Mouseion	early 280s until 287
Unknown	*FGrH* 244 f. 44	One man was appointed to have control of all things	after 261 to ?255
Herakleitos of Athmonon	*IG* ii² 1225 ll. 2–3 and ll. 7–9 = Bielman 1994: no. 25	?Garrison commander (?) 'before stationed with King Antigonos . . . now appointed by the king as general for the Piraeus'	*c.*260–*c.*240s
Apollodoros Apollodorou Otryne[c]	*I. Rhamnous* 8	Athenian General for the countryside	250s
Apollonios and Dikaiarchos	*I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 5–6	for the defence of the garrison	261–236/5
Dikaiarchos	*I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 5–6	'now appointed by Demetrios to the promontory of Eretria'[d]	261–236/5
Glaukon (*PA* 3012) 'the teetotaller'	Pythermos *FGrH* 80 f. 2 (*ap.* Athenaios ii. 21. 44c)	'one of those acting as tyrant in Piraeus', a possible garrison commander in Athens?[e]	240s(?) (cf. date, Beloch 1912: 458)
Diogenes	Plut. *Arat.* 34. 3–4, Paus. 2. 8. 6; *IG* ii² 834 ll. 12 ff.	Garrison commander in Piraeus	*c.*240–230/29

[a] Beloch (1912: iv/2 p. 458) reconstructed the list of Macedonian commanders: 322–319: Menyllos; 319–317: Nikanor of Stageira; 317–307 Dionysios; 307–294: none; 294–?: Herakleides; 273–263: none; 263–252:

Hierokles; 252–*c.*245: Herakleitos of Athmonōn; *c.*245–*c.*239: Glaukōn; *c.*239–228: Diogenēs son of Pausimachos of Kolonos.

[b] Diog. Laert. 4. 40: Arkesilas of Pitane (see A. A. Long, 'Diogenes Laertius, Life of Arcesilaos', *Elenchus* 7 (1986): 431–9) was particularly good friends with Hierokles and was subsequently prosecuted because of this friendship. Reger (1992: 373–9) questions Habicht's hitherto widely accepted position, and suggests that Hierokles became garrison commander in the early stages of the Chremonidean war following Antigonos' recapture of the Piraeus.

[c] Apollodorus appointed as *epimeletēs* Endios Aischeou of Aithalidai.

[d] Dikaiarchos appeals to the general Philokedes when the latter arrives at Eretria, *I. Rhamnous* 17 ll. 21 ff.: is Dikaiarchos subordinate to Philokedes? Pouilloux (1954: 133 n. 1) refers to the coincidence of the general Philokedes named and honoured in *I. Rhamnous* 18 and the Philokedes named here in *I. Rhamnous* 17; the two texts, he concludes, are probably related and both date to the 230s. However, nothing is made there of the possible implications if Philokedes is superior to Dikaiarchos and the honorand of *I. Rhamnous* 18—Philokedes—could have held the generalship on a number of occasions. If the Philokedes of *I. Rhamnous* 17 and 18 are the same man, then one might expect that Philokedes' generalship of the 'paralia' would have preceded what I assume would have been a more powerful position—with authority extending over Eretria—and one closely associated with King Demetrius' organization.

[e] Ferguson 1911: 201, 212 on Glaukon. See Pythermos (C. Müller, *FHG*, Paris, 1885: iv. 488), reviewed by Jacoby (*FGrH* 2C: 133). Beloch (1912: iv/2 p. 457) had argued that 'Pythermos kann also nur die makedonischen Kommandanten gemeint haben'. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1881: 225 n. 47) rightly rejected Droysen's suggestion that Glaukon was the brother of Chremonides.

APPENDIX 4

Groups Represented in the Epigraphy of the Fortified Demes of Attica

Detailed study of the different groups represented on inscriptions from Eleusis, Rhamnous and Sunion, *c.*320 to 200 BC

Group responsible for decision or involved in granting honours	References	Range of dates
soldiers (*στρατιῶται*)	*I. Rhamnous* 1, 3, 20, 25, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 113; *Ergon* 1991 (1992): 5; *SEG* xxxiii. 204; *IG* ii² 1287 (*I. Eleusis* 187), *IG* ii² 1958 (*I. Eleusis* 210); Sunion: *IG* ii² 1280	330s to 230 or later
soldiers stationed at <garrison> (*στρατιῶται τέταγμένοι*)	*I. Rhamnous* 57; *IG* ii² 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196)	230s to *c.*200
soldiers stationed at <garrison> (*στρατιῶται ταχθεντες . . .*)	*I. Rhamnous* 138; *IG* ii² 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196)	250s
soldiers serving near the city (*στρατιώταις . . . τοῖς παρὰ τεῖ πόλει στρατευομένοις*)	*IG* ii² 1299 (*I. Eleusis* 196)	230s
those of the citizens on military service in . . . (*πολίτων οἱ στρατευόμενοι*)	*I. Rhamnous* 10, 49	250s to 215
those of the Athenians on military service in . . . (*πολίτων οἱ στρατευόμενοι*)	*I. Rhamnous* 10, 19, 22; Sunion: *IG* ii² 1281, 1302	250s to late third century
those of the Athenians stationed . . . (*τῶν Ἀθήναιων οἱ τετάγμενοι*)	*I. Rhamnous* 50; *Ergon* 1990 (1991) 3–4; *I. Eleusis* 180; *IG* ii² 1272 (*I. Eleusis* 182), *IG* ii² 1280 (*I. El.* 193), *IG* ii² 1305 (*I. El.* 197), *IG* ii² 1306 (*I. El.* 198), *IG* ii² 1307 (*I. El.* 205), *IG* ii² 1303 (*I. El.* 207), *IG* ii² 1304 (*I. El.* 211); Sunion: *IG* ii² 1300, 1308	260s to late third century
those of the Athenians stationed by the People (*Ἀθηναίων οἱ τετάγμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δημοῦ*)	*IG* ii² 2971 (*I. Eleusis* 195), *IG* ii² 1299 (*I. El.* 196)	230s
those of the citizens stationed (*τῶν πολίτων οἱ τετάγμενοι*)	*IG* ii² 1304b (*I. Eleusis* 184), *IG* ii² 1285 (*I El.* 194), *IG* ii² 1299 (*I El.* 196)	260s to 230s

those of the citizens stationed (*οἱ τάχθεντες ὧν πολιτων*)	*IG* ii² 3460 (*I. Eleusis* 186)	250s
those of the citizens living (*οἱ οἰκοῦωντες τῶν πολίτων*)	[*I. Rhamnous* 2]	End of fourth/start of third century
the community of those on military service (*τὸ κοινὸν τῶν στρατευόμενων*)	Sunion: *IG* ii² 1302	220s
[presumably Athenian soldiers, list of names, various demotics]	*I. Rhamnous* 24, 28, 29,	Last quarter of third century
ephebes	*I. Rhamnous* 98, 100; *IG* ii² 1189 (*I. Eleusis* 84)	330s
the community of those deployed at (*τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ῥαμνοῦντι ταττόμενων*)	*I. Rhamnous* 17	230s
Athenians for the defence (*Ἀθηναίοι ἐπὶ τῆι φυλακῆι*)	*IG* ii² 1191 (*I. Eleusis* 95)	*c.*320
Decisions of or supported by demesmen from the fortified deme itself	*I. Rhamnous* 2, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 31, 57, 102, 113, 180; *I. Eleusis* 71, *I. El.* 72, *IG* ii² 1190 (*I. El.* 74), *IG* ii² 2845 (*I. El.* 79), *IG* ii² 1189 (*I. El.* 84), *SEG* xxviii. 103 (*I. El.* 85), *IG* ii² 1192 (*I. El.* 96), *I. El.* 80, *IG* ii² 1187 (*I. El.* 99), *Hesp.* 8, 1939: 177–80 (*I. El.* 101), *IG* ii² 1363 (*I. El.* 175), *IG* ii² 2500 (*I. El.* 176), *IG* ii² 1272 (*I. El.* 182), *IG* ii² 1218 (*I. El.* 189), *SEG* xxii. 127 (*I. El.* 191), *IG* ii² 1280 (*I. El.* 193), *IG* ii² 1299 (*I. El.* 196); *IG* ii² 839 + 2844; *IG* ii² 2971; Sunion: *IG* ii² 1180, 1181 (?), 1300 (?)	357/6 to *c.*200
Decisions proposed by a local demesman	*IG* ii² 839 + 2844; *I. Eleusis* 70, *IG* ii² 1185 (*I. El.* 71), (*I. El.* 72), (*I. El.* 79), (*I. El.* 85), (*I. El.* 92), *IG* ii² 1193 (*I. El.* 80), *IG* ii² 2973 (*I. El.* 81), (*I. El.* 99), (*I. El.* 182), (*I. El.* 196); *I. Rhamnous* 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 17, 37, 56, 70, 84, 100, 167	357/6 to late third century
The community of the Rhamnousians and those living in the garrison (*τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ῥαμνουσίων καὶ τῶν οἰκοῦντων τὸ φρουρίον*)	*I. Rhamnous* 17	230s
Those of the citizens living at/in (*οἱ οἰκοῦντες τῶν πολίτων*)	*I. Rhamnous* 9, 17, 31, 84; *IG* ii² 1305 (*I. Eleusis* 197)	250s to 220–203

(*cont.*)

Appendix 4 (*cont.*)

Those of the Athenians living at (οἱ οἰκοῦντες . . . τῶν Ἀθηναίων)	*SEG* xxii. 127 (*I. Eleusis* 191)	250s
The Athenian People at (the garrison) (ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων)	*I. Rhamnous* 13	late third century
Those of the *hypaithroi* on military service (οἱ στρατευόμενοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων)	*I. Rhamnous* 55	230s?
The *hypaithroi* (οἱ ὕπαιθροι)	*I. Rhamnous* 49; *IG* ii² 2978 (*I. Eleusis* 200), *IG* ii² 1304 (*I. El.* 211)	*c.*220s–200
The *kryptoi* (οἱ κρυπτοί)	*I. Rhamnous* 3, 17	260s–230s
The *paroikoi* (οἱ πάροικοι)	*I. Rhamnous* 41, 42, 50	225–200
Those of the *paroikoi* stationed (οἱ τεταγμένοι τῶν παροίκων)	*I. Rhamnous* 27, 30, 38, 43, 47, 51; *Ergon* 1991 (1992): 4	(?)248/7–second century
Those of the *isoteleis* stationed (τῶν ἰσοτελῶν τοῖς τεταγμένοις)	*I. Rhamnous* 8	250s
Possibly (including) mercenary soldiers (at least non-Athenian, sometimes also under foreign commander)	*I. Rhamnous* 11, 18(?), 25, 57; *IG* ii² 3460 (*I. Eleusis* 186), *IG* ii² 1958 (*I El.* 210); Sunion: *IG* ii² 1300	250s–*c.*200

APPENDIX 5

Analysis of the Contributors to the *Epidosis* of 248/7

Name of Contributor (including fragmentary names)	Deme/Status/ethnic or polis	Tribe	Column/Line	Sum (Drachmai)	Career details/offices	*LGPN* II
[— —]	[—]atho(?)	—	I.47	200		
[— —]	[—]u	—	I.45	200		
[— —]	Eiresidai	VII	II.40	200		
[— —]	Koile	II	II.41	[2]00		
[— —]	Oion	II/X	I.46	200		
[— —]os	Phlya	IX	II.79	200		
[— —]kles	Sphettos	VI	III.33	[— —]		
[. . . .]dotos	Acharnai	VIII	III.35	[— —]		
[. . . .]omachos	Oe	VIII	III.34	[— —]		
[. . . .]onides	Kolonai	I/VI	II.43–4	200		
[. . . 6 . . .]ras	Aphidna	XI	II.39	200		
[. . . 7. . . .]des	Pr[— —]	—	III.36	[— —]		
[. . .]kles	Azenia	X	III.38	[— —]		
[. . .]osth[en]es	Sphettos	VII	I.77	200		
[. . 4 . .]oros	Themakos	III	II.38	200		
[. . 5 . . .]on	Aphidna	XI	I.49	100		
[Ag]nok[rat]es	Halai	IX/IV	II.65	200		Agnokrates no. 3
[D]emophilos	Oion	II/X	I.61	200		Demophilos no. 49

(*cont.*)

Appendix 5 (*cont.*)

Name of Contributor (including fragmentary names)	Deme/Status/ethnic or polis	Tribe	Column/Line	Sum (Drachmai)	Career details/offices	*LGPN* II
[D]romeas	Erchia	III	I.36	200	*APF* 4558 cf. 126	Dromeas no. 4
[Dio]kles	Erchia	III	I.37	200	*APF* 4025 cf. 126	Diokles no. 92
[Diogen?]es	*Macedon*(?)	—	I.48	200		
[I]dmon	Oe	VIII	I.60	200		Idmon no. 1
[L]ysiades	Oion	II/X	I.80	200	archon	Lysiades no. 33
[L]ysimachos	Oinoe	II/XI	I.81	200	cavalryman B342–3	Lysimachos no. 87
[Melan?]opos	[— —]		III.41	[— —]		
[N]ikomach[os]	[Lamptrai?]	[I/III]	III.76	[— —]	cavalryman (?)B415–19; *APF* 10953	Nikomachos no. 113
[Nik]okra[te]s	Melite	II	I.75	200		Nikokrates no. 32
[Sosikrates?]	Sphettos	VII	I.76	200	treasurer of stratiotic fund	Sosikrates no. 34
[Tele]gnotos	Alopeke	XII	I.50	100		Telegnotos no. 2
[Thra]ssylos	Eleusis	X	I.79	200	dedication at Eleusis	Thrassylos nos. 21/19
[X]anthippos	Erchia	IV	I.58	200	dedicated statue (?) *APF* 4549 p. 172	Xanthippos no. 11
[X]enokles	Sphettos	VII	I.57	200	priesthood; *APF* 11234	Xenokles no. 85
[Z]opyros	*Syracuse*	—	I.59	200		
A[nt]iphates	[— —]	—	III.40	[— —]		Antiphates no. 8
Ai[— —]	[— —]		III.49	[— —]		
Ai[— —]	[— —]		III.56	[— —]		
Aischron	Paiania	I/V	II.67	200		Aischron no. 33
Ale[x]i[s]	Phyle	II	I.72	200		Alexis no. 21
Alk[— —]	[— —]		III.57	[— —]		
Amoi[bichos]	[— —]		III.65	[— —]		Amoibichos no. 1
Antipatros	Paiania	I /V	II.64	200	archon	Antipatros no. 41
Antiphon	Erchia	IV	I.33	200	archon; cavalryman (?)B32–4	Antiphon no. 42
Apollodoros	Otryne	IV	I.68–9	200	cavalryman (?)B36	Apollodoros no. 155
Apollophanes	Alopeke	XII	II.68	200	cavalryman B37/39	Apollophanes no. 19
Archandros	Eleusis	X	II.61	200	general for the countryside (coastal)	Archandros no. 4

Arist[— —]	[— —]		III.66	[— —]		
Aristagoras	Kolonos	IV	I.56	200		Aristagoras no. 9
Aristion	Themakos	III	II.78	100	archon	Aristion no. 61
Aristolas	Erchia	IV	I.54	20		Aristolas no. 2
Ariston	Paiania	I/V	II.63	200	cavalryman B56	Ariston no. 116
Aristophon	Erchia	IV	II.34	200	cavalryman (?)K92	Aristophon no. 23
Asklepiade[s] son of Xenon	Phyle	II	II.57–8	200	general; cavalryman B71	Asklepiades no. 173
Autias	Acharnai	VIII	II.72	200	taxiarch; *sitōnēs*	Autias no. 3
Chairephon	Eitea	XII	II.62	100	cavalryman K61/72	Chairephon no. 12
D[— —]	[— —]		III.51	[— —]		
Dem[—]	[— —]		III.58	[— —]		
Demophilos	Phrearrioi	VI	II.76	100	*APF* 3738	Demophilos no. 55
Dio[n]ysios son of Sosibios	—	—	II.54	50		Dionysios no. 999
Diog[— —]	[— —]		III.62	[— —]		
Diopeithes	Phyle	II	I.66	200	councillor; cavalryman (?)B108–12	Diopeithes no. 44
Dorion	[— —]		III.72	[— —]		Dorion no. 10
Drakontides	Erchia	IV	II.33	200	*APF* 4549 (?)brother of Xanthippos 11	Drakontides no. 10
Epi[ph]anes	[— —]		III.68	[— —]		Epiphanes no. 1
Eriotos	Melite	II	I.62	200	*sitōnēs*	Eriotos no. 2
Euagides	Philaidai	IV	II.59	200	*APF* 5232	Euagides no. 3
Eumachos, son of Sokrates	Eupyridai	IV	I.51–2	200		Eumachos no. 9
Eurykleides	Kephisia	III	I.34	200	archon; treasurer of stratiotic fund; hoplite general	Eurykleides no. 7
Hekataios	*Mesembria*	—	I.73	200		Hekataios
Hier[— —]	[— —]		III.52	[— —]		
Hier[— —]	[— —]		III.53	[— —]		
Hierokles	Sunion	VI	II.35	200	cavalryman (?)B237	Hierokles no. 61
Hippolochos	[— —]	—	II.81	200		Hippolochos no. 2
Hy[— —]	[— —]		III.44	[— —]		

(*cont.*)

Appendix 5 (*cont.*)

Name of Contributor (including fragmentary names)	Deme/Status/ethnic or polis	Tribe	Column/Line	Sum (Drachmai)	Career details/offices	*LGPN* II
K[.]l[— —]	[Ei]residai	VII	II.80	200		
Ka[— —]	[— —]		III.47	[— —]		
Kallimachos		—	I.70	200	poet	Kallimachos no. 106
Kephi[s— —]	[— —]		III.60	[— —]		
Kephisophon	Athmonon	IX	II.60	200	priesthood	Kephisophon no. 24
Kt[— —]	[— —]		III.50	[— —]		
Lachar[es]	[— —]		III.73	[— —]		Lachares no. 5
Ly[— —]	[— —]		III.45	[— —]		
Lykon	*Philosopher*	—	I.71	200	philosopher	Lykon no. 27
Lysias	Kephisia	III	II.48	200	archon	Lysias no. 57
Lysitheides	Erchia	IV	II.74	200	cavalryman (?)B335–337; *APF* 7305	Lysitheides no. 7
Mikion	Kephisia	III	I.35	200	politician; *agōnothetēs*	Mikion no. 19
Mikion	Thria	VIII	II.36	200		Mikion no. 33
Nikagoras	Erchia	IV	II.47	200		Nikagoras no. 4
Nikeratos	Phlya	IX	I.78	[— —]	ephebe; cavalryman (?)B403–409.	Nikeratos no. 37
Niketes	Pergase	I/III	I.74	100	*epimeletēs* of Mysteries; honoured at Eleusis	Niketes no. 24
Nikokles	Phlya	IX	I.63	200		Nikokles no. 41
Nikosthenes	Phlya	IX	I.64	200	*APF* (?)143	Nikosthenes no. 8
Pausias	Paiania	I	II.51	200	*epimeletēs* of Asklepeion; cavalryman (?)B433	Pausias no. 15
Pausimachos	Kolonos	IV	II.50	200	Future father-in-law of Diogenes?	Pausimachos no. 7
Pheid[— —]	[— —]		III.61	[— —]		
Phi[l]okles	*Corinth*	—	I.65	200		
Phil[— —]	[— —]		III.48	[— —]		
Phili[— —]	[— —]		III.63	[— —]		

Philiskos	Pambotadai	III	I.53	200		Philiskos no. 19
Philotheos	Phrearrioi	VI	II.75	200	general; cavalryman B522	Philotheos no. 19
Phyromachos	Steiria	V	II.66	200	cavalryman B544–5	Phyromachos no. 10
Physt[eus?]	[— —]		III.59	[— —]		
Praxit[eles]	Eiresidai	VII	III.69f.	[— —]	*APF* 8334	Praxiteles no. 13
Pytho[— —]	[— —]		III.64	[— —]		
Simias D[— —]	[— —]		III.74	[— —]	cavalryman (?)K98; B471	Simias no. 10
Sophilos	Kollytos	IV	II.77	200		Sophilos no. 17
Sosibios	*Isoteles*	—	II.52	50		Sosibios no. 63
Sosigenes	Paiania	I/V	II.69	100		Sosigenes no. 49
Sosos	Halai	IV/IX	II.45	200		Sosos no. 10
Spoudias	Teithras	IV	II.37	200	cavalryman B475–9	Spoudias no. 22
Stratios	Sphettos	VII	II.49	200		Stratios no. 23
Th[e]m[i]sto[kles?]	[— —]		III.75	[— —]		Themistokles no. 50
The[— —]	[— —]		III.46	[— —]		
Thea[i]t[etos]	[Epikephisia]	[VIII]	III.67	[— —]	ephebe; cavalryman B185–9	Theaitetos no. 2
Theopompos	Aigilia	XII	II.73	200		Theopompos no. 31
Theopompos	Lamptrai	I/III	II.71	200		Theopompos no. 51
Thoukr[itos]	[?Myrrhinous]	[?V]	III.71	[— —]	general; cavalryman B217–218	Thoukritos nos. 2–4, 9
Thoumorios	Euonymon	III	I.55	200	cavalryman B220	Thoumorios no. 3
Thymochares	**Sphettos**	VII	II.70	200	archon; *agōnothetēs*; cavalryman B232–233; *APF* 13964	Thymochares no. 11
Ti[m— —]	[— —]		III.55	[— —]		
Tim[— —]	[— —]		III.54	[— —]		
Timon	Sphettos	VII	I.67	200	councillor	Timon no. 41
Xen[o]n, son of Asklepiades	Phyle	II	II.55–6	[2]00		Xenon no. 41
Zenon	Halai	IV/IX	II.46	200		Zenon no. 44

Notes: B = Brun 1970; K = Kroll 1977. Wealth/family = *APF*.

APPENDIX 6

Regional Representation in the *Epidosis* of 248/7 BC?

Dow compared the proportion of demes from the three trittyes (inland, city, and coast) in the *epidosis* of 248/7 with two other documents of the late third and early second centuries: a list of officials (*IG* ii² 1706) and a later *epidosis* (from the archonship of Hermogenes, *IG* ii² 2332).[1] A slightly greater number of Athenians from demes in the Mesogeia than either the City or Coastal regions appears in the list of officials but there is little difference in the later *epidosis*. However, there were twice as many individuals from demes of the Inland trittys in 248/7 compared to those from the City demes.[2] Is this difference significant?

A comparison with the fourth-century representation of politicians reveals that little regional bias can be found in terms of the representation of the regional trittyes.[3] It is necessary to consider not only what has survived on *Agora* xvi. 213 but what has been lost from the surviving stones to determine an answer. There is no obvious geographical, deme, trittys, or tribal order in the listing of the names. The only distinction seems to be the prominence given to certain individuals: Antiphon (a former archon), Eurykleides and his brother Mikion, Dromeas, and Diokles head the first column. However, when we start to consider the representation on the level of the deme (as opposed to the trittys) we find some demes are better represented than others (see Table A6.1 below). Erchia provides the largest number of contributors (nine), followed by Sphettos (seven). Erchia's nine contributors is in proportion to the size of the adjustment to the deme's quota of councillors in the Hellenistic period. Its quota of eleven demesmen on the Council is an increase of over half from the provision in the Classical period. It was one of the few demes to benefit from *an above average* increase (of four) in the quota adjustments of 307/6. Sphettos also falls into this category because its quota had increased by two. The relatively strong representation of these demes in the *epidosis* seems

This discussion here refers to Woodhead's text of the inscription, *Agora* xvi. 213.

[1] Dow 1937.

[2] The number of those from the Mesogeia/City/Coast are 47/27/19 in the Diomedon *epidosis*; 39/22/33 in *IG* ii² 1706; and 54/50/57 in *IG* ii² 2332, contributions in the archonship of Hermogenes (Dow 1937: 107 n. 3).

[3] Hansen's (1983: 157 ff.) accounts of rhetores and generals in the fourth century reveals similar levels of representation: 38 per cent Mesogeia, 26 per cent City, 36 per cent Coast.

to complement the implicit demographic trend that the quota allocation of 307/6 seems to have addressed in respect of the successful demes of the fourth century.[4] In other words, the quota adjustment of 307 suggests strong growth in the demes that gained an above-average increase.

If such change is carried forward, then the *epidosis* of 248/7 confirms the same phenomenon: the same demes that present relatively large quota increases in 307 are also well represented among the contributors. What Ferguson saw as a politically oriented regional interest may in fact reflect better the strength in numbers of certain demes in the third century, an extension of their development in the fourth century.

It is nevertheless remarkable that some demes are not represented in the *epidosis* of 248/7, particularly Rhamnous where we know of so many demesmen in this period. This may indicate that Rhamnousians resided largely in their deme and played less of a role in the operations of the polis at Athens. But it is more likely that the fragmentary condition of the inscription accounts for this under-representation. For example, the deme of Acharnai is a large deme but is represented by only two contributors. Individuals from the demes Anaphlystos and Piraeus are also absent.[5] In fact neither Mesogeia nor any *geographic region* of Attica monopolized the *epidosis* in the way Ferguson had proposed. There is no obvious concentration of any group of demes on the list of contributors. It is likely, therefore, that the missing fragments of the list would have balanced the representation of the demes.

The third column of the inscription (fragment d) preserves only the initial letters of the names of the contributors; the first column at the bottom of fragment c and the start of fragment d is missing; and a break in the text between fragments c and e and fragment d has caused at least three lines of text to disappear.[6] These gaps may well have contained members of the other demes we would expect to find.[7]

[4] Rosivach (1993: 401 and fig. 1) shows that a number of demes benefited from an increase of over 20 per cent. Those demes that did not have such a large increase had been affected by a smaller population growth. Rosivach, in the belief that the reapportionment broadly reflected deme population, argues that the urban demes suffered from a slower rate of growth than other demes in the rest of Attica and dismissed the argument for migration from the countryside to the city in the fourth century and later. Traill (1975: 59–60) on the quota increase argues that the reapportionment did not reflect population change because no deme suffered a reduction in its quota.

[5] Acharnai would have had 25 councillors on the Boule after 307/6, Kydathenaion 12, Anaphlystos 12, Aphidna 16, Rhamnous 8, Marathon 10, Piraeus (?)11, Traill 1975 Map 3.

[6] *Agora* xvi. 213 ll. 41–4. At least three lines, but probably no more than six, i.e. between nine and eighteen contributors.

[7] It is perhaps worth noting that Thoukr[itos] (III.71) and Thea[i]t[e]tos (III.67) may represent Myrrhinous (Pandionis) and Epikephisia respectively, otherwise not represented in the surviving better-preserved fragments of the inscription.

Table A6.1. *Deme representation on the* epidosis *list and in the Council*

Demes represented	No. of contributors	Quota of councillors in deme, 307/6 to 224/3	Adjustment to original quota in 307/6
Erchia	9	11	+4
Sphettos	7	5	+2
Paiania	5	Upper 1/Lower 22	Upper -/Lower +11
Phlya	4	8?	+2?
Phyle	4	6	+4
Eiresidai	3	3	+1?
Halai	3	Aixonides 11?/Araphenides 9	Aixonides +4/Araphenides +4
Kephisia	3	8	+2
Oion	3	Dekelikon 3/Kerameikon 1	Dekelikon -/Kerameikon -
Acharnai	2	25	+3
Alopeke	2	12?	+2
Aphidna	2	16	—
Eleusis	2	13?	+2
Kolonos	2	2	—
Melite	2	7	—
Oe	2	6	—
Phrearrioi	2	9	—
Themakos	2	1	—
Aigilia	1	7	+1
Athmonon	1	10?	+4?
Azenia	1	2	—
Eitea	1	2	—
Epikephisia	1	1	—
Euonymon	1	12	+2
Eupyridai	1	2	—
Koile	1	3	—
Kollytos	1	4	+1
Kolonai	1	2	—
Lamptrai	1	Upper 5/Lower 10	Upper -/Lower +1
Myrrhinous	1	8	+2
Oinoe	1	Oinoe (X) 2/Oinoe (XI) 4	Oinoe (X) -/Oinoe (XI) -
Otryne	1	1	—
Pambotadai	1	1/0	—
Pergase	1	Upper 3/Lower 2	Upper +1/Lower 2
Philaidai	1	3	—
Steiria	1	3	—
Sunion	1	6	+2
Teithras	1	4	—
Thria	1	8?	+1

APPENDIX 7

Imported Grain in Early Hellenistic Athens

Reference	Date of event	Event	Agent	Source?	Amount of grain	Price	Honours?
***IG* ii^2 398a + 438** = *AHB* 1 (1987) 10–12 and *SEG* xl. 78	*c.*322/1–320/19	Sent back to Athens grain from/at Hellespont	?	(?)Hellespont	(?)*medimnoi*	?	Athenian citizenship
***IG* ii^2 407 + *SEG* xxxii. 94** *ZPE* 67 (1987) 165–6 with *SEG* xl. 79	321–318	Bringing grain to the emporion of Athens; cares for the route from Cyprus	[.....12.....] from Miletus	Cyprus route	n/a	n/a	Gold crown 1,000 drachmai
***IG* ii^2 401**	*c.*321–319	Proven himself useful in sending back of grain from Asia Minor	[.....11.....] Metrodorou from Kyzikos	Asia Minor	n/a	n/a	Gold crown [1,000 dr.]
***IG* ii^2 400**	*c.*320/19	Bringing grain to Athens	[Eu]caristos Chei[—up to 13—]	?	Promise of 8,000 *medimnoi* (4,000 *medimnoi* to come)	The 8,000 *medimnoi* at the established price	Details do not survive on the stone

(*cont.*)

Appendix 7 (*cont.*)

Reference	Date of event	Event	Agent	Source?	Amount of grain	Price	Honours?
Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 1 and Diod. Sic. 20. 46. 4	307/6	Grain from Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes	Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes	?	150,000 *medimnoi*	Gift	No known specific award for precise service but numerous other honours
***IG* ii^2 479 + 480** (Wilhelm *Anz. Wien.* (1942) 65–72)	(?)307/6–305/4	Saved something for the *sitōnia*	Pyr[— —] of Herakleia	?	?	?	Olive crown
***Hesp.* 5 (1936) 201–5** (EM 12825)	305/4	Appointed to a position [?*sitōnēs*] related to grain trade	[— —]ides, an (?) Athenian	n/a	n/a	n/a	Details do not survive on the stone
***IG* ii^2 499**	307/6–305/4	Gave the People wheat and (?) for the *sitōnika*	?	(?)Sicily	5,000 *medimnoi* wheat	At established price	Details do not survive on the stone
***IG* ii^2 657 ll. 9–14** (Tracy, *A&M* 62–5, cutter of *IG* ii^2 657)	299/8	Gift of wheat from King Lysimachus given out to all Athenians	Philippides, poet and honorand	From Thrace	10,000 *medimnoi* wheat	Gift?	Career: highest honours for Philippides (gold crown, declared at Dionysia; bronze statue; sitesis in prytaneion; proedria)
Plut. *Demetr.* 34. 4	295	Gave grain to Athens	Demetrius Poliorcetes	?	100,000 *medimnoi* grain	Gift	Demetrius given Piraeus and Mounychia, orator Dromokleides, see Plut. ibid.

***IG* ii^2 682 ll. 28–30**(Tracy, *A&M* 129, cutter of *IG* ii² 788)	*c.*295–288	Embassy of Phaidros secured grain from Ptolemy I	Ptolemy I, through Phaidros, honorand	?	?	(?)Gift	Career: highest honours (gold crown, declared at Dionysia and Panathenaea. Bronze statue and sitesis in prytaneion, proedria)
***IG* ii^2 650** (Tracy, *ADT* 154–9, cutter of *IG* ii² 650)	286/5	Made sure the grain was brought in safely	Zenon, Ptolemaic commander of aphracts	?	?	?	Honours do not survive on the stone
***IG* ii^2 651** (Tracy, *ADT* 156, cutter of *IG* ii² 650)	286	Service involving grain	Habron [. . . . .10. . . . .] and Matrias Nesiotes	?	?	?	Gold crown; made proxenoi; granted *enktesis*
***IG* ii^2 657 ll. 31–6** (Tracy, *A&M* 62–5, cutter of *IG* ii² 657)	286–282	Grain and money to Athens	Lysimachos	(?)Thrace	?	(?)Gift	Highest honours for Philippides (gold crown, declared at Dionysia; bronze statue; sitesis in prytaneion; proedria)
***Agora* xvi. 106g** *Hesp.* 49 (1980) 251–5 no. 1 (Ag. I 7360) (Tracy, *ADT* 157, cutter of *IG* ii² 650, 318/17–283/2)	*c.*285	Grain for the [*si*]-*tōnia*	Three Rhodians	?	?	(?)Gift	Olive crown to the Rhodians. Others are honoured in the upper part of the stone (missing)

(*cont.*)

Appendix 7 (*cont.*)

Reference	Date of event	Event	Agent	Source?	Amount of grain	Price	Honours?
***IG* ii^2 653** (Tracy, *ADT* 166, cutter of Ag. I 4266, 304–271)	285/4	Gift of grain to Athens	Spartokos King of the Bosporos	Black Sea	15,000 *medimnoi*	Gift	High honours (gold crown, declared at Dionysia; bronze statue in Agora, next to ancestors (family has inherited citizen status, Demosth. 20. 29–40))
***IG* ii^2 654** (= Osborne, *Nat.* D76) (cutter not assigned by Tracy)	284	Gift of grain to Athens	Audoleon, King of Paionians	Macedonia	7,500 *medimnoi*	Gift	Gold crown, declared at Dionysia; enrolled as citizen; bronze equestrian statue in Agora
***IG* ii^2 655** (cutter not assigned by Tracy)	284	Worked together for the shipping of the grain, given by Audoleon	Timon[..4..]	Macedonia	n/a	n/a	Crown
Shear 1978: 3 ll. 43–55 (Ag. I 7295) (*SEG* xxviii. 60)	after 285	Ptolemy II gave wheat and silver	Ptolemy II Philadelphus	Wheat measured out at Delos	20,000 *medimnoi* wheat	Gift	Career: Kallias of Sphettos awarded most of the highest honours
***IG* ii^2 670a** (*SEG* xxxviii. 75; Tracy, *A&M* 82: 304, cutter of Ag. I 3238 and 4169, 286/5–*c.*239)	280/79	Spent from his own money on the *sitōnia*	Thibron	?	?	?	Gold crown

***IG* ii^2 792 + Ag. I 1904**(Tracy, *A&M* 84, 89–90, cutter of Ag. I. 3238 and 4169, 286/5–*c.*239)	275/4	*Sitōnai* of this year (Olbios) are honoured	Board of *sitōnai*	?	?	?	Olive crown proedria in all contests of the City to be arranged by the *architecton*
***Agora* xvi. 188** (*Hesp.* 23 (1954) 296–316 no. 183, Ag. I 6096; *SEG* xiv. 65) (cutter of Ag I 6664, 281/0-*c.*240)	272/1	*Sitōnai* of Lysitheides archonship are honoured in 271/0	Board of *sitōnai*	?	?	?	Gold crown proedria in all contests of the city
***IG* ii^2 768 + 802** (Tracy, *A&M* 137–41; Migeotte 1992 no. 15)	256/5	Aischias of Pergamom gave money and (?) barley	*epidosis*—a *sitōnia*	?	(?)2,000 *medimnoi* of (?)barley	?	*Isoteleia*, (?)enktesis
***IG* ii^2 744** (Tracy, *A&M* 133, style of cutter of *IG* ii² 788, *c.*260–235)	*c.*250	people chose *sitōnai*	[. . . .7 . . .] Phayllos [. . . 6 . . .]s Neonos of Sikyon	?	?	?	Apparently only a single person is honoured
***SEG* iii. 92**(*IG* ii² 584 + 679 + Add. p. 663). Join: A. Wilhelm *AU* III (1925) 50 ff. (cutter of *IG* ii² 788, Tracy, *A&M* 128, *c.*260–235)	[250/49]	Money given to the *sitōnia* [archonship of Polyeuktos]	Xenokrates of Chios	?	?	?	Honours are not preserved on stone

(*cont.*)

Appendix 7 (*cont.*)

Reference	Date of event	Event	Agent	Source?	Amount of grain	Price	Honours?
***Agora* xvi. 216** *Hesp.* 17 (1948) 3–13 no. 3 (Ag. I 6064)(Tracy, *A&M* 133, 138, cutter of *IG* ii² 788, *c.*260–*c.*235)	248/7	Ensured grain is as good and as abundant as possible	Board of *sitōnai* of Diomedon (248/7) honoured in archonship of Kydenor (245/4)	?	?	?	Honours are not preserved on stone
***Agora* xvi. 194 + unpubld. fr.** *Hesp.* 6 (1937) 444–8 no. 2 (Ag. I 3238 and 4169)(Tracy, *A&M* 80, 86, cutter of Ag. I 3238 and 4169, 286/5–*c.*239)	239/8	*Sitophylakes* of archonship of Athenodorus honoured	five *sitophylakes* and allotted secretary	?	?	?	Honoured with [olive] crown. Others possibly praised in decree 2 = fr. B, ll. 10–11.

Note: Primary references appear in bold.

APPENDIX 8

Grain Prices on Delos, 282

Month (Delian)[1]	Athenian month; modern month	Amount of grain bought	Grain type	Total Cost	Cost per *medimnos*
Lenaion	Gamelion; Dec./Jan.	2 *medimnoi* 9 *hemiekta* 3 *choinikes*	Wheat	19 dr. 4 obols	7 dr. (W)
Hieros	Anthesterion; Jan./Feb.	2 *medimnoi* 9 *hemiekta* 3 *choinikes*	Wheat	18 dr. 1 3/4 obols	6 dr. 3 obols (W)
Galaxion	Elaphebolion; Feb./Mar.	1 *medimnos* 10 *hemiekta* 2 *choinikes*	Wheat	11 dr. 1 1/2 obols	6 dr. (W)
Artemision	Mounychion; Mar./Apr.	1 *medimnos* 10 *hemiekta* 2 *choinikes*	Wheat	8 dr. 2 1/4 obols	4 dr. 5 obols (W)
Thargelion	Thargelion; Apr./May[2]	1 *medimnoi* 10 *hemiekta* 2 *choinikes*	Wheat	12 dr. 4 3/4 obols	6 dr. 5 obols (W)
Metageitnion	Metageitnion; Jul./Aug.	1 *medimnos* 10 *hemiekta* 2 *choinikes*	Wheat	13 dr. 3/4 obols	7 dr. (W)
Bouphonion	Boedromion; Aug./Sept.	1 *medimnos* 10 *hemiekta* 2 *choinikes*	Wheat	18 dr. 4 1/2 obols	10 dr. (W)
Apatouria	Pyanopsion; Sept./Oct.	3 *medimnoi* 9 *hemiekta*	Barley	15 dr.	4 dr. (B)
Aresion	Maimakterion; Oct./Nov.	3 *medimnoi* 9 *hemiekta*	Barley	[18 dr. 4 1/2 obols]	5 dr. (B)
Posideon	Posideon; Nov./Dec.	3 *medimnoi* 9 *hemiekta*	Barley	[18 dr. 4 1/2 obols]	5 dr. (B)

Notes: Prices are based on the accounts of the *Hieropoioi* in the archonship of Kleostratos in the temple of Apollo on Delos, *IG* xi. 2 158A ll. 37–47.

[1] See Jardé 1925: 169–72. On Delian month names, Trümpy 1997: 63–4; Reger 1994*a*: 13 and table 1.3. For a brief summary of the inscribed accounting systems on Delos, Chankowski in Prètre 2002: 18–20.

[2] The months of Panemos and Hekatombaion are not recorded.

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